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About Arctic Yearbook 
 
The Arctic Yearbook is the outcome of the Northern Research Forum (NRF) and UArctic joint 
Thematic Network (TN) on Geopolitics and Security. The TN also organizes the annual Calotte 
Academy. 
The Arctic Yearbook seeks to be the preeminent repository of critical analysis on the Arctic region, 
with a mandate to inform observers about the state of Arctic politics, governance and security. It is 
an international and interdisciplinary peer-reviewed publication, published online at 
[www.arcticyearbook.com] to ensure wide distribution and accessibility to a variety of stakeholders 
and observers.   
Arctic Yearbook material is obtained through a combination of invited contributions and an open call 
for papers. For more information on contributing to the Arctic Yearbook, or participating in the TN 
on Geopolitics and Security, contact the Editor, Lassi Heininen.   
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Preface 
 
 
Arctic Governance 
 
Fran Ulmer 
 
 
 
“The most important thing for people to know about the governance of the Arctic is that we have a chance now 
to act to maintain the integrity of the system or to lose it. To lose it means that we will dismember the vital 
systems that make the Arctic work. It's not just a cost to the people who live there. It's a cost to all people 
everywhere.” 
-  Sylvia Earle1 
 
 
Governance is “the processes of interaction and decision-making among the actors involved in a collective problem that 
lead to the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction of social norms and institutions.”2 In short, it’s the effort to 
make good decisions for society. 
From my perspective, the news is good. Arctic governance is gaining strength, both within the US and 
internationally. Despite stressful changes tied to global geopolitical pressures and dramatic climate 
change, cooperation continues to be the theme in dialog, actions, and outcomes in the Arctic. The 
world’s ability to set aside sharp policy differences experienced at lower latitudes, in order to work 
together at the higher ones is, perhaps, a testament to the special value the world places on the Arctic. 
  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
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Let’s start with the United States. The most recent phase of attention on Arctic governance began in 
2009, in the waning days of the Bush Administration, with the update to the Arctic Region Policy 
(NSPD-66/HSPD-25). This policy document was reaffirmed in the early days of the Obama 
Administration as the first of several steps to build on that foundation. 
It could be argued that one of President Obama’s enduring legacies will be his attention to the growing 
importance of the Arctic region, and the need to govern it well, both domestically and internationally. 
His recent trip to Alaska (and north of the Arctic Circle) represented both a significant symbolic and 
practical achievement. Appreciation was expressed for the Administration’s focus on and investments 
in climate change, renewable energy, enhancements to safety and security, and assistance to remote 
communities. 
Good governance starts with reliable information, including results from scientific research. In a vast 
region with relatively limited access, it is particularly important to obtain and integrate as much relevant 
information as possible. To that end, in 2010, President Obama elevated the stature of Arctic research 
by directing the National Science and Technology Council to revitalize the Interagency Arctic 
Research Policy Committee (IARPC), a coordinating entity created by Congress by the Arctic 
Research Policy Act of 1984 (the US Arctic Research Commission (www.arctic.gov) is another product 
of that legislation). 
In February 2013, the White House released IARPC’s first five-year integrated Arctic research 
program plan. The plan’s seven research themes advance fundamental knowledge of the region, and 
help inform decision-making.  
In May 2013, President Obama released “The National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” which focuses 
on three lines of effort, which are to: (1) advance US security interests; (2) pursue responsible Arctic 
region stewardship; and (3) strengthen international cooperation. 
In January 2014, the White House released the “Implementation Plan for The National Strategy for 
the Arctic Region,” establishing the process and approach for executing the Strategy. These initiatives 
build upon existing efforts by federal agencies, state government, local, and tribal authorities, the 
private sector, and international partners. In January 2015, the President signed Executive Order 
(#13689) establishing an Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC) to focus coordination efforts, 
chaired by White House senior leadership. 
The AESC helped plan and conduct the August 31, 2015 “Global Leadership in the Arctic 
Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement and Resilience (GLACIER)” conference, hosted by the US 
Department of State, and attended by ministers and other high-level officials from many Arctic and 
non-Arctic states. The “Chair’s Summary” can be found here 
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/246511.htm); the “Joint Statement” here 
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/08/246487.htm); and President Obama’s closing speech 
(https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/01/remarks-president-glacier-conference-
anchorage-ak).  
Although GLACIER was not an official Arctic Council event, its agenda aligned with the main focus 
areas of the Council: environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic. In recent 
Arctic Yearbook 2015 
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years, the Council, established in 1996, has increased its effectiveness. For example, Council 
discussions initiated and resulted in binding, multilateral agreements on search and rescue, and on oil 
pollution preparedness and response. A third agreement is currently being negotiated to enhance and 
strengthen Arctic scientific cooperation. I hope this agreement will provide additional incentives to 
improve access and sharing of observations and information among all nations. 
A recent example of progress toward effective Arctic cooperation and governance can be found in 
the topic of fisheries. Two consensus views emerged from informal discussion among parties from 
Arctic coastal states. First, that the commercial fishing industry may be enticed to the high seas region 
of Central Arctic Ocean, where waters previously covered by multi-year ice are increasingly 
experiencing thin ice, and even open water. Second, as minimal scientific research has been focused 
on the fisheries and ecosystem of this region, the state of knowledge about Arctic fish stocks is 
inadequate to support sustainable management of them. As a result, five Arctic coastal states signed a 
declaration in July 2015, agreeing to prevent unregulated commercial fishing in high seas portion of 
the Central Arctic Ocean. Other countries are encouraged to join them. 
Two other examples are worth noting. One is the recent adoption by the International Maritime 
Organization of the mandatory Polar Code governing shipping, which enters into force in 2017, and 
addresses shipping requirements related to safety and the environment. The second is the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which, by providing a firm foundation for freedom of the 
seas and the limits of national boundaries, reduces the potential for unresolvable jurisdictional issues. 
As many have argued, for years now, the US needs to accede to this treaty. 
I remain optimistic that Arctic nations will continue to work together respectfully and cooperatively. 
It is in their collective best interest to assure the region is governed with clear rules reflecting the 
shared values of environmental protection and sustainable development. It is also in the best interest 
of future generations that all nations focus on actions that will protect this valuable and vulnerable 
region from melting, thawing, and transforming into an entirely different ecosystem. The health of the 
comfortable planet we call home depends upon it. 
 
 
Notes  
1. Quote in a 2011 interview with EarthSky. See: http://earthsky.org/earth/sylvia-earle-an-open-
ocean-in-the-arctic-in-summer  
2. Hufty, Marc. (2011). Investigating Policy Processes: The Governance Analytical Framework 
(GAF) in U. Wiesmann, H. Hurni, et al. (eds). Research for Sustainable Development: Foundations, 
Experiences, and Perspectives (pp. 403–424). Bern: Geographica Bernensia. 
 
 Lassi Heininen is Editor and Heather Exner-Pirot and Joël Plouffe are Managing Editors of the Arctic Yearbook. 
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Governance and Governing in the Arctic: 
An Introduction to the Arctic Yearbook 2015 
 
Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot & Joël Plouffe 
 
 
 
 
Defining governance and governing in the Arctic 
Governance and governing have several (contested and distinct) meanings across the social and political 
sciences’ disciplines and sub-disciplines (Pelaudeix 2015; Cairney 2011; Kjaer 2004; Rhodes 1996, 2000 
& 2006; March & Olsen 1995; Rosenau 1995; Newman 2005). As a theme for this issue of Arctic 
Yearbook, “Governance and Governing” is intended to provide critical analysis of the often-blurry 
functions of transnational and regional cooperation in the Circumpolar North. It seeks to emphasise 
governance as processes that embody a multiple set of public and private governing actions (Stoker 
1998; Ansell & Gash 2011).   
Broadly defined, these two conceptual ideas serve as a setting to map different levels of interactions 
(local to international) that constitute the multiple and complex equations of (historical and 
contemporary) Arctic geopolitics. Indeed, both concepts are useful since they offer reference points 
to conceptualize everyday language and practices embedded in public or private decision-making. 
They highlight a puzzle, web or network of northern collective efforts and relationships between many 
actors that make up the governance equation that underlines the peaceful and/or conflictual 
interactions of Arctic geopolitics (see also the definition of governance in the preface by Fran Ulmer). 
Arctic Yearbook 2015 
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Governance is considered here as numerous principles, objectives and meanings that create the space in 
which actors will implement ideas, policies and institutions and/or institutional arrangements in a way 
to achieve collectively decided objectives. Arctic Yearbook 2015 therefore seeks to map some patterns 
of various interrelationships and interdependences in the Arctic by looking at how (multi-faceted) 
governance structures have emerged, are negotiated, influenced and organized in a way to address 
cross-border and transnational problems and opportunities.  
Governing is understood here as a set of, and a practice by, different private or public actors engaged in 
the development and implementation (or operationalization) of governance (structures and 
mechanism) through various actions and instruments. They are the makers and doers of governance 
in which various actors are engaged: public and/or private individuals, organizations and institutions 
(actors) that develop and implement governance frameworks that are established and structured by 
normative constraints and opportunities in different regional contexts and contingencies.  
The interplay between governance and governing occurs at a variety of levels in the Arctic including:  
 Local – e.g. municipal (Barrow, Troms, Akureyri), indigenous (Aleutian Pribilof Islands 
Association, Yellowknives Dene First Nation, Kativik Regional Government); 
 Sub-national – e.g. self-governing constituencies (Greenland, Faroe Islands), territories (Yukon, 
NWT, Nunavut), states (Alaska), republics (Yakutsk, Komi, Karelia), provinces (Québec), and 
counties (Lapland, Norbotten);       
 National – e.g. states (Canada, Kingdom of Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Russian 
Federation, Sweden, United States); 
 Sub-Regional – e.g. Barents Euro Arctic Council, Arctic Five, West Nordic Council, Inuit 
Circumpolar Council, Saami Council; 
 Regional – e.g. Arctic Council, Northern Forum, Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation 
Program; 
 International – e.g. International Maritime Organization (IMO), UN Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf (UNCLOS). 
 
Most stakeholders will tend to view the governance level nearest to their interests and everyday life as 
the most important. But what is unique in the Arctic is the extent to which these various levels intersect 
and interact. In addition there are a variety of circumpolar non-governmental actors who often 
communicate, influence or participate in the process of policy development and implementation. It 
has often been remarked that the epistemic community on the Arctic is particularly influential and 
engaged, for better and for worse, and includes media outlets, academic networks, and environmental 
and social NGOs.  
We chose the theme “Governance and Governing” to build awareness of and address the nuances of 
governance in the Arctic region, and the impacts of different histories, cultures, constraints and values. 
It is easy for the casual non-Northern observer to imagine the Arctic as a singular, international, region, 
governed by the Arctic Council. But this represents only a sliver of what is required and conducted. 
  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
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Governance of the Arctic (as structure and agency) is multi-faceted, interconnected and evolving. 
Above all, it is complex. 
 
Exceptionalities of Arctic governance 
If all politics are local, then it should be no surprise that governance in the Arctic seems to have taken 
on some unique characteristics, reflective of the culture of the inhabitants, the particularities of the 
geography, and the time in which many governance and arrangements came into being. There is a 
pervasive sense of governance in the Arctic being different – even exceptional.  
How does this manifest itself in practice? First off, Arctic governance seems to be less hierarchical 
and more decentralized than conventional governance, from the local all the way to the regional level. 
There is a high premium placed, and increasingly an expectation of, consultation and engagement, a 
reaction to centuries of control and authority of distant southern capitals over local decision-making. 
Similarly northern governance often aims for consensus, something that is important when networks 
are small and close-knit, and the stakes are historically high given the extreme conditions. But the 
congeniality of consensus is often diminished by the concomitant slowness it imposes on decision-
making in the 21st century, where rapid business and political changes often call for a more decisive 
approach. 
This inclusive approach to decision-making has produced a flattened hierarchy where an unusually 
diverse collection of stakeholders, not just indigenous and state governments, have had agency in 
decision-making processes.  
This includes the private sector, from the presence, though declining, of single industry company 
towns across the Circumpolar North where the line between work and community life is blurred; to 
the growing number of Impact and Benefit Agreements and their ilk, which once again is seeing the 
private sector accept responsibility for traditional state obligations such as training, employment 
creation, health promotion and infrastructure development.  
The military has also had an inordinate level of governance and governing involvement in the Arctic, 
not only by producing the bulk of jobs in communities where bases are located but through the 
development of infrastructure, from airstrips, ports and roads to heat, power and water. Alaska, 
Greenland, Iceland, the North Calotte and the Murmansk regions, all provide examples of military 
needs driving local development.  
But perhaps one of the most unique aspects of Arctic governance has been the role played by the 
epistemic community in policy development and decision-making. The Arctic epistemic community 
includes scientists, academics, environmentalists, and NGOs, brought together by common values 
around sustainable development and conservation. Is there any other region in the world where 
scientists play such a high profile role in policy shaping, from shipping regulations to resource 
development? Or where science, from polar bear numbers to the impacts of climate change, is so 
politicized? Is there another region where the average citizen is as fluent in environmental technicalities 
such as Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) or historic averages of sea ice extent?  
Arctic Yearbook 2015 
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Source: Nordregio (2013). 
 
Finally, accounts of Arctic governance often revolve around innovations in legal and political 
institutional arrangements (see AHDR 2004) developed in the past forty years, most notably: 
  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
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 The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, which transferred approximately 99 million 
acres (40 million hectares) of public land to native Alaskans, along with a US$962.5 million 
settlement; 
 The attainment of Home Rule in 1979 and then Self-Rule in 2009 in Greenland, which 
transferred control over a wide variety of governance functions from the Kingdom of 
Denmark to Greenland, including the right to revenues from non-renewable resource 
development;  
 The establishment of Sami Parliaments in Norway (1989), Sweden (1993), and Finland (1996) 
and a Kola Sami Assembly in Russia (2010); 
 Cultural self-determination in Finland (1996), and the Finnmark Act in Norway in 2005; 
 The establishment of the territory of Nunavut in 1999 and the settlement of land claims in 
the four Canadian Inuit regions of Nunavik (1975), Inuvialuit (1984), Nunavut (1993), and 
Nunatsiavut (2005); 
 The negotiation of the Yukon First Nations Land Claims Settlement Act in 1994; and 
 The devolution of additional governance functions to Yukon in 1993 and 2003, and 
Northwest Territories in 2013.  
 
These are among the most progressive arrangements for devolving governance and governing powers 
and responsibilities to geographically and ethnically marginalized populations in the world, and in 
particular are a model for promoting the self-determination of indigenous peoples. Why did these 
innovative, even revolutionary, agreements cluster in the Arctic? Part of the answer is that many of 
these agreements occurred in underpopulated areas, particularly in North America and the Nordic 
region, where European migrants had settled only marginally and indigenous inhabitants still made up 
the majority, and where administrative structures were still relatively flexible. This made the political 
and economic costs associated with devolution bearable to Southern voters/taxpayers. Another factor 
was the introduction of devolution processes, much based on the Nordic model, after World War II, 
when the northernmost regions started to adopt/accept modernization. Devolution assisted northern 
regions to become more resilient, and prepared them for self-determination and self-governing 
functions, as the Home Rule Government of Greenland shows.   
And while it’s a stretch to think of indigenous policies of the Arctic states as having been benign, the 
fact that they are almost all liberal democracies gave the shared values of self-determination and 
pluralism an ability to translate into concrete policy. The comparatively limited governing powers 
granted to Russian indigenous and northern peoples is much more similar to the abrogation of agency 
endured by ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples around the globe. That said, most if not all 
northern indigenous and sub-national governments remain dependent on national governments for 
large public transfers and subsidies for the services expected in the modern welfare state for the past 
several decades. However it is also true that in the early 21st century the situation changed due to mass-
scale fisheries and exploitation of hydrocarbons and other minerals, and the gross production of the 
Arctic region as a whole exceeded transfers by southern capitals (AHDR 2004), although with 
significant regional variation.   
De jure autonomy is not the same as de facto autonomy, and it remains to be seen if or how northern 
polities, with their huge geographical areas and small, often economically depressed, populations can 
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combat the limitations imposed by a lack of economies of scale. Reducing dependence on external 
transfers will likely become more difficult as the globe shifts to a non-hydrocarbon based energy 
paradigm, an important source of local revenues in Alaska, northern Norway and the Russian Arctic 
especially. Greenland is making the most protracted efforts to become wholly independent, of 
Denmark, but a total break seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, as commodity prices slacken. 
Finally, the innovative governance arrangements that extended around the Arctic can be said to have 
benefited from a lack of path dependency – few historical institutions and agreements limiting the 
options available to northern polities as they set to establish new frameworks for local governance and 
self-governing. The fact that northern governance matured in the post-World War II era, with the 
right to self-determination entrenched in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the global 
order slowly evolving towards a post-Westphalian paradigm, also opened up possibilities.  
The special nature of regional Arctic governance 
The Arctic Yearbook has an intellectual bias towards exploring regional governance, development and 
security, which in the past two decades has provided a front row seat to one of the most rapidly 
changing and exciting evolutions in contemporary world politics. It is often remarked that regional 
Arctic governance is unique, and even exceptional. What makes it so?  
Regional governance bears many similarities to indigenous and sub-national governance in the Arctic. 
The Arctic Council, for example, operates on a consensual basis, and has created a tremendous 
amount of space for indigenous and local engagement, most notably in the creation of the Permanent 
Participant role. Although the format can impede the speed at which decisions are made, the net result 
has been incremental and consensual progression of activities, a governance dynamic based on a 
bottom-up (rather than top-bottom) approach for developing and implementing local to international 
ideas, and a very cooperative atmosphere. While the Arctic Council has no formal governance 
responsibilities and rights, it has proven progressively more effective at policy-shaping in the Arctic 
region.  
Another aspect which is unique to the Arctic are the issue areas that have been identified as priorities. 
Regional governance equations in other parts of the world have typically developed as security or trade 
complexes. In the Arctic however, international collaboration has taken place almost entirely around 
environmental issues and sustainable development: from marine mammal protection to addressing 
pollutants, on the one hand, and supporting social-economic development to facilitating business 
interaction and responsible economic development in very remote and underdeveloped areas of the 
globe, on the other. This was started in the late 1980s by Indigenous peoples and their organizations, 
who together with environmentalists and some researchers first became concern on a state of the 
environment non-states, and then demanded and pushed the governments of the Arctic states to do 
something on the matter. The Arctic states listened and started their cooperation for Arctic 
environmental protection, as was agreed in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) 
signed in 1991 (Rovaniemi Declaration 1991). Furthermore, the states manifested their commitment 
- to the well-being of the inhabitants, the protection of the Arctic environment and sustainable 
development - when the Arctic Council was established in 1996 (Ottawa Declaration 1996). These 
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commitments have earned legitimacy among the people(s) and the civil societies of the Arctic region, 
though the implementation could be faster. 
From a foreign policy and security perspective, it can also be argued that the interactions of Arctic 
governance agencies have provided an instrument that continues to serve the national interests of all 
regional state actors. Considered as a geostrategic hotspot during the Cold War era, the warming of 
East-West relations during the 1990s opened a foreign policy window of opportunity to push forward 
ideas, agendas and values that would strengthen regional state and sub-state confidence and prosperity 
in a very remote and complex area of the globe. Indeed, the Arctic has produced and has been shaped 
by governance efforts by regional state-to-state and people-to-people relationships that have arguably 
established and enhanced stability through diplomatic, scientific, and emerging economic, dialogue. 
From efforts to sustain scientific collaboration for common environmental imperatives, to recurrent 
post-Cold War regional and international networks and meetings dealing with non-military concerns 
between governments and non-governmental actors, Arctic governance is a rubric of ideas, ideals and 
actions that have resulted in numerous multilateral soft-power confidence building instruments that 
contribute to stability and security in a unique geographical and political area of the globe. As recently 
demonstrated by the compartmentalization of Arctic governance from other non-related geopolitical 
events (e.g. Ukraine-Russia crisis), states and non-governmental actors in the region have implicitly or 
explicitly expressed their common intention to preserve Arctic stability through multilateral soft-
power governance efforts.  
Intergovernmental cooperation under the auspices of the Arctic Council continues, as was the message 
from the ministerial meeting in April 2015 in Iqaluit (Iqaluit Declaration 2015). In addition, scientific 
cooperation in Arctic research is stronger than ever, as the ASSW 2015 and ICARP III in April 2015 
in Toyama, Japan indicated (see Toyama Conference Statement 2015). The Arctic states and nations, 
including the Russian Federation and the USA, have too much at risk if they lose the high stability of 
the Arctic and the solid foundation for international cooperation that exists – put simply, a stable and 
cooperative Arctic is valuable for its states and peoples, especially in an era of globalization. The Arctic, 
not overtly plagued by conflicts, can be seen an exception in international politics, akin to the 
International Space Station. It might, as well as Iran after the nuclear deal, become a new metaphor 
for ‘Exceptionalism’, and be taken as an example of how to shape alternative premises of security and 
politics. Here, maintaining and further developing the interplay between science and politics (‘trans-
disciplinarity’), as well as the high profile role of scientists and scholars in policy shaping, can be seen 
as critical (Heininen 2015). 
The Arctic in 2015 
This past year has been a watershed for Arctic governance, although in ways much muted. Most 
notably, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) finally agreed to the parameters of a new, 
mandatory Polar Code for regulating shipping in polar waters, including safety and environmental 
aspects. This has been over two decades in the making, and is probably the most important new 
governance arrangement affecting the Arctic since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) was signed in 1982. 
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Speaking of UNCLOS, the past year saw official submissions for extended continental shelf in the 
Arctic Ocean from both Kingdom of Denmark and Russia (Norway’s claim was accepted by 
UNCLOS’ Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2009, Canada is preparing 
the Arctic portion of its claim, and the United States is still not a signatory to UNCLOS). While these 
events sparked headlines about who owns the North Pole, the real story is in the manner in which the 
Arctic states have chosen to follow a rules based, legal and scientific approach to make their claims to 
vast new swathes of territory, as was promised at Ilulissat in 2008 (i.e. a recognized extended 
continental shelf offers coastal states exclusive rights to extract the natural resources of the seabed 
and subsoil of the extended continental shelf beyond the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of an 
Arctic state).  
Bolstering the case that the Arctic is insulated from the geopolitical tensions that affect Russian-
Western relations elsewhere, the Arctic Five – the five states bordering the Central Arctic Ocean, 
including Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia and the United States – signed in July a pre-
emptive ban on fishing in the Central Arctic’s international waters until regulations are in place, 
applying the precautionary principle. Although applauded in political, media and environmental 
circles, Iceland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs took exception to the exclusive discussions and called in 
the Arctic Five Ambassadors in Reykjavik for a scolding. Who could have predicted a year ago that 
the most contentious event in Arctic politics in 2015 would feature Iceland, over a fishing moratorium 
where no fishing heretofore has taken place?   
Adding to the environment of progressive Arctic cooperation in 2015 is the establishment of an Arctic 
Coast Guard Forum, to take place in New London, Connecticut as this issue of the Arctic Yearbook 
goes to press. The eight Arctic military Chiefs of Staff have previously met in an effort to promote 
confidence building in the region, but these meetings have been deferred since Russia invaded Crimea 
in March 2014. The launch of a new forum, appropriately involving the constabulary forces of the 
Arctic states who have much ground to cover in the vast Arctic Ocean and much benefit in doing so 
cooperatively, is welcome news for a variety of reasons. 
Finally, 2015 saw the handover of the Arctic Council Chairmanship from Canada to the United States, 
in April in Iqaluit, Nunavut. Politically, the Canadian Chairmanship was difficult relative to its 
predecessors, and the American Chairmanship promises to generate new momentum and interest in 
the work of the Council. But it remains to be seen whether issues of human and sustainable 
development, which Canada pushed against significant resistance, will be granted the attention they 
deserve amidst the Obama Administration’s single-minded association of the Arctic with climate 
change. This brings us finally to mention the COP21 meeting taking place in December 2015 in Paris 
where climate change impacts in the Arctic will be a dominating theme serving various interest groups. 
The final outcomes and results of this meeting remain to be seen.    
The Arctic Yearbook 2015 
Local, sub-national and national governance 
The many scholarly articles and commentaries of this year’s Arctic Yearbook address these and many 
other contemporary regional governance issues. Several articles address issues of practical governance 
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in the local and sub-national polities of the circumpolar north.  Irina Barakaeva, Natalia Batugina, and 
Vladimir Gavrilov examine in significant detail the costs and challenges to importing fuel energy to 
the polar regions of Chukotka and Sakha, and the perhaps unintended consequences of devolving, or 
downloading, responsibilities from the Russian federal to regional governments of the Arctic.  Energy 
security here has an entirely different meaning, and many local and sub-national governments be able 
to relate. 
 
Leah Beveridge, Mélanie Fournier and Ronald Pelot share their visualization tool and concept to better 
engage and address the needs of the multiple marine stakeholders in the Canadian Arctic. This marks 
a progression to an era of addressing the practical challenges of using the Northwest Passage, a 
transition from when discussions and assessments were very hypothetical, or at best siloed. 
 
Adrienne Davidson provides a much welcomed comparative review of self-government arrangements 
in the North American Arctic. The article provides insight into the ways that political and practical 
considerations result in different outcomes, and provides the reader with an appreciation of the 
significant and fascinating variations between even neighbouring self-governance models and 
institutions. 
 
Erica Dingman examines how a particular nation-state, in this case the United States, implements 
Arctic Council environmental initiatives in practice. This is an eye-opening exercise that shows how 
Arctic Council recommendations are really only the very beginning of particular efforts, for example, 
to reduce black carbon or otherwise mitigate negative environmental effects. Once through the Arctic 
Council phase, states must negotiate through complex local and national particularities, challenges and 
barriers in order to make practical progress on these issues. 
 
Marc Jacobsen illustrates the ways in which culture and collective identity are influencing Greenland’s 
path towards a more autonomous foreign policy. Of particular interest to the editors was the way in 
which Greenland has variously adopted an identity as a traditional nation-state to justify its increasing 
assumptions of state-like responsibilities and rights, while simultaneously forwarding an indigenous 
identity in other legal fora to legitimise extraordinary rights, such as in whaling or sealing, which 
‘traditional’ states are not privy to. 
 
Thierry Rodon and Aude Therrien tackle the notable complexity of the resource development 
approval process in the Canadian Arctic, where a mixed vertical and horizontal multilevel governance 
framework has been criticized for balkanizing decision-making. Here, the often competing processes 
and mandates of the federal and territorial governments, land claims agreements, Impact and Benefit 
Agreements, and various boards and organizations tasked with making recommendations on natural 
resource development, are institutionally challenging. But efforts to simplify the regulatory process 
may result in reducing the level of control local peoples have only just begun to exert on the process.  
 
Heidi Tiainen, Rauno Sairinen and Olga Sidorenko examine the efforts and challenges in promoting 
sustainable mining practices in Finland, Sweden, Greenland and Russia. Although the concept of 
sustainability has achieved near universal acceptance, what it comprises and requires in practice is still 
under debate and negotiation.  The structures, institutions and cultures that exist across these northern 
polities have resulted in a wide variety of strategies. The comparative approach for assessing these 
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efforts proves very enlightening, and demonstrates the impact of the many contextual differences that 
exist across this Arctic region. 
 
Finally, Gary Wilson and Jeff Kormos provide a case study of political change and self-determination 
in Chukotka, particularly in the decades since the Soviet Union collapsed. In addition to articulating 
the challenges and complexities that have affected the economic and political development of 
Chukotka’s indigenous peoples, the authors provide a much welcomed and needed insight on the local 
northern governance in Russia, a neglected topic in much of the mainstream Arctic literature. 
 
Arctic regional governance 
 
Several articles address issues of contemporary concern in regional Arctic governance. Melina 
Kourantidou, Brooks Kaiser and Linda Fernandez examine the governance structures needed to 
address marine invasive species.  So much of the environmental work occurring in the Arctic is 
understood only superficially. This articles provides insight into the complexity of the Arctic 
environmental changes and challenges being spurred by climate change, and the role and variety of 
existing legal and governance frameworks which future policies must leverage but also conform to.  
 
Michal Luszczuk provides, perhaps for the first time, a comparative analysis of the many inter-
parliamentary institutions active in the Arctic region, including the Conference of Arctic 
Parliamentarians, the Barents Parliamentary Conference, the Nordic Council and the West-Nordic 
Council.  These institutions comprise an important but often overlooked segment of regional Arctic 
governance, and the article provides a timely evaluation of the histories and mandates of these varied 
institutions as they expand their level of engagement, and influence, in Arctic issues. 
 
Cécile Pelaudeix examines the governance of offshore activities in the Arctic, and the attempts to 
address tensions between sustainable development and hydrocarbon exploration. The concept of 
multilevel governance is drawn on to tackle the overlapping competencies, jurisdiction and 
interactions that mark such offshore activities, and the fundamental differences in history, politics and 
culture are seen to play a huge role in how the sector is ultimately governed across the Arctic.  
 
Focusing on a separate but equally timely issue, Rebecca Pincus examines the state of disaster response 
in the Arctic. SAR and shipping have featured prominently in recent Arctic regional governance 
arrangements, and the many unique challenges have been well identified. Pincus argues that the 
challenge of emergency response in the Arctic comprises a ‘wicked’ policy problem. The article 
provides much in the way of identifying scenarios that represent real and immediate policy challenges 
needing to be addressed. 
Finally, Malgorzata Smieszek and Paula Kankaanpää examine the role of the Arctic Council 
Chairmanship, a much needed assessment in a sub-field that is generally overlooked and under studied.  
Drawing on Arctic Council documents, the article provides an overview of the formal responsibilities 
of the chair, the inevitability of domestic political influence on the role, and the challenges the structure 
has imposed on the work of the Arctic Council, such as shifting priorities and truncated work plans 
limited by a two year rotating schedule. 
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International and global governance 
 
The Arctic Yearbook is a product of the UArctic and NRF joint Thematic Network on Geopolitics 
and Security, and so writings on the topic are of particular interest. The year 2015 certainly had its 
share of geopolitics, and the articles presented here reflect that.   
 
Kristen Bartenstein deconstructs the oft-used concept of “commonality”, the framing of the Arctic as 
somehow a common space.  Whereas Arctic states may speak of working towards common goals with 
their Arctic neighbours, non-Arctic states often characterize the region as a global commons, to which 
everyone has rights and responsibilities. While the term is used in divergent ways, the author criticizes 
the fact that states are pushing narratives that position them to gain advantage on the Arctic 
“chessboard”.  As a legal construct, furthermore, the concept of the Arctic as a common heritage is 
found to be misleading and misguided.  
 
Ieva Bērziņa provides an insightful comparison of the way different Russian actors frame Arctic 
political discourse. As might have been expected, but which has rarely been so carefully documented, 
there is very different messaging for domestic and foreign audiences.  Western analysts would do well 
to appreciate such nuances, which no doubt apply to the rhetoric adopted by other Arctic states, most 
notably Canada under the Harper government.  
 
Reid Lidow frames the Arctic as one political region among many, and assesses its behaviour and 
characteristic accordingly.  Of particular usefulness in devising, if not a model, then analogue, for the 
Arctic Council and the region as whole, is ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations, 
which may provide lessons for enhanced regional Arctic integration.  
 
Ingrid Medby provides a case study on the construction of an Arctic state identity, drawing on the 
example of Norway.  An ever larger number of actors have found it advantageous and desirable to 
identify as “Arctic” – see Barack Obama’s GLACIER speech and visit to Alaska – with Arctic 
statehood in particular tied to political status, leverage, and legitimacy.  The article demonstrates the 
very constructed and normative nature of the current focus and privileging of Arctic identities.  
 
Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen explores the significant advances made in the past year on continental shelf 
claims in the Central Arctic Ocean, with both Denmark and Russia submitting theirs.  The claims 
process is often articulated as a legal and scientific endeavor.  The article reminds us that politics, 
indeed, are involved, and may prove a wild card going forward.  However it seems likely that Canada, 
Denmark and Russia will continue to follow a peaceful and legal dispute settlement process, benefiting 
as it does all three of them. 
 
Benjamin Schaller examines the current Arctic security environment, including the spillover from the 
Russian incursion into Ukraine.  The article argues that the Arctic states should take additional steps 
to mitigate fallout from the crisis and its negative impacts on the Arctic, for example through 
confidence-building measures, ensuring that the Arctic role is not merely that of a sub-plot in 
European security, but rather a proving ground to restore peace and stability. 
 
Commentaries and briefing notes 
 
One of the more distinguishing features of the Arctic Yearbook is its platform for stakeholders, policy-
influencers and experts to provide commentary and analysis on events and actors of particular 
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contemporary interest.  This year we are pleased to provide comment on many of the year’s most 
notable developments, from the growing importance of sub-national actors in Arctic politics, as told 
from the perspective of Yukon and Alaska; evaluations of some of the year’s governance milestones, 
including the establishment of an Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the Arctic high seas fishing 
moratorium; analysis of some of the year’s biggest events, from the Arctic Council Chairmanship and 
the Greenlandic elections to COP21 and GLACIER; as well as an overview of some of the 
contributions made in the field of Arctic social science, including the publication of AHDR II, the 
Arctic Futures Initiative, and several other notable conferences and gatherings.  These and many more 
opinions and analyses have been curated on the issues and events which have sparked our collective 
interest over the past year.  
 
Finally, we want to acknowledge the work and support of those who contribute to the Arctic Yearbook 
every year, including and especially Arctic Portal, who provides web hosting and design; our Editorial 
Board, including our new Chair, Lawson W. Brigham from the University of Alaska, Fairbanks; the 
University of the Arctic; and Arctic Circle. Thanks also to all the reviewers, many of whom have 
provided their services to Arctic Yearbook every Summer since our establishment; our authors; and U.S. 
Special Advisor on Arctic Science and Policy Fran Ulmer, who graciously accepted to contribute this 
year’s preface.  
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AY 2015 Year in Review 
 
 
2 0 1 4 
 
 31st – The second annual Arctic Circle event is held in Reykjavik, Iceland. The 2014 Arctic 
 Yearbook is launched. 
 22nd-23rd – US announces its priorities for its Arctic Council Chairmanship 2015-17, at a 
 Senior Arctic Officials meeting in Yellowknife. Its overarching theme is One Arctic: Shared 
 Opportunities, Challenges and Responsibilities. 
 
 
 
17th-21st – The International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopts the International Code 
for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), and related amendments to the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) to make it mandatory. 
25th - Canadian Auditor General Michael Ferguson releases his audit of the Nutrition North 
report, sparking debate on the best ways to address the high rates of food insecurity in the 
Canadian Arctic and beyond. 
28th – Early general elections were held in Greenland following a spending scandal. A three 
party coalition government, led by Kim Kielsen, was formed consisting of the incumbent 
Siumut and Solidarity parties alongside the Democrats. 
 
 
 
11th – The head of the Northern Sea Route Administration, Alexander Olszewski, announces 
that in the year to December 1, 2014, the volume of transit cargo through the Northern Sea 
Route fell by 77%, from 1.176 million tons in 2013 to 274,000 tons.  
14th – Denmark provides a submission for its Arctic Ocean extended shelf to the UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), claiming just under 900,000km2. 
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2nd – Economic sanctions and other Russian economic woes materialize in a 30% drop in 
traffic, year over year, of Russian shoppers visiting the Norwegian town of Kirkenes to 
partake in Orthodox Christmas preparations, from 26,850 border crossings in December 
2013 compared to 15,879 in December 2014. 
 
 
 
20th – The Arctic Human Development Report II is published on the tenth anniversary of 
the first volume, with a theme of Regional Processes and Global Linkages.  
27th – UK House of Lords Arctic Committee publish their report on Responding to a Changing 
Arctic. 
 
 
 
16th-21st – Russia conducts a massive five day military exercise in its Arctic, involving 80,000 
troops, 220 aircraft, 41 ships and 15 submarines. 
 
 
 
12th – The Russian embassy of Canada announces that Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei 
Lavrov, would not attend the Arctic Council Ministerial in Iqaluit, due to prior commitments.  
Lavrov had attended every previous Arctic Council Ministerial since 2004. 
23rd – 30th The Arctic Science Summit Week 2015 and International Conference for Arctic Research 
Planning, (ICARP III) is held in Toyama, Japan. The conference statement “Integrating Arctic 
Research: A Roadmap for the Further” is released.  
24th – The 9th Arctic Council Ministerial is held in Iqaluit, Canada. Key deliverables of the 
Canadian Chairmanship include an Enhanced Framework of Black carbon and Methane Emissions; 
a Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Marine Oil Pollution; and the establishment of an 
Arctic Economic Council. 
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11th-15th – The International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopts the environmental part of 
the International Code for ships operating in polar waters (Polar Code) and associated 
MARPOL amendments to make the Code mandatory by the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee (MEPC). 
21st – US Secretary of State John Kerry hosts a reception in the Benjamin Franklin Room at 
the Department of State to celebrate its Arctic Council Chairmanship. 
31st -June 7th – The 2015 Calotte Academy travels to Rovaniemi, Inari and Salla in Finland, 
Apatity and Murmansk in Russia, and Kirkenes in Norway. 
 
 
 
1st – Canadian High Arctic Research Station Act comes into force, establishing Polar Knowledge 
Canada, a new federal research organization that combines the mandate and functions of the 
former Canadian Polar Commission and the Canadian High Arctic Research Station 
program. 
1st – Digital diplomacy meets the Arctic, as the five Nordic Ambassadors to the United States 
host a Twitter Town Hall under the hashtag #AskNordicAmbs to discuss the US Arctic 
Council Chairmanship themes of climate change, stewardship of the Arctic Ocean, and 
improving economic and living conditions in the Arctic. 
12th – Policy Options for a Changing Arctic 2015 (POCA2015). The Northern Research 
Forum, in collaboration with the Interuniversity Research Center on the International 
Relations of Canada and Québec (CIRRICQ), co-organize a full day workshop on US Arctic 
Policy in Montréal, Québec, Canada. Admiral Robert J. Papp, the first US Special 
Representative for the Arctic takes part in the days’ meeting and launches the State 
Department’s Arctic Council Chairmanship on Canadian soil. 
15th – “Kayaktivists” attempt to block Shell’s drilling rig the Polar Pioneer from departing 
Seattle’s Elliott Bay. The Polar Pioneer is one of two drilling vessels used by Shell in its 2015 
Chukchi Sea drilling expedition.  
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13th – Greenpeace and designer Vivienne Westwood launch a “Save the Arctic” celebrity 
campaign selling designer t-shirts for $115 to raise funds for the Amsterdam-based 
environmental organization.  
16th – The five Arctic littoral states – Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United 
States, known as the Arctic 5, sign an agreement to combat unregulated fishing in the Arctic 
Ocean. It prevents fishermen from their countries from fishing in the international waters of 
the central Arctic Ocean. The Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs subsequently called in 
the Arctic 5 Ambassadors to express its concern on being excluded from those negotiations.  
21st – Inuvialuit sign a self-government agreement-in-principle with the governments of the 
Northwest Territories and Canada. 
22nd – Shell receives final approval from the Obama Administration for exploratory drilling 
in the Chukchi Sea in 2015, after receiving preliminary approval in May. 
31st – The European Union (EU) formally approves the Government of Nunavut as a 
Recognized Body under the Indigenous Communities Exemption of the EU Seal Regime, 
which means that the Government of Nunavut will be able to certify sealskins as having been 
harvested according to the rules of the exemption. The EU seal ban issue had previously 
been cited by Canada as the reason for their objection to EU Observer status at the Arctic 
Council.  
31st – The Northwest Territory Métis Nation sign a land and resources agreement-in-
principle with the governments of the Northwest Territories and Canada. 
 
 
 
3rd – Russia provides a revised submission on its Arctic Ocean extended shelf to the UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, claiming over 1.2 million km2.  
8th – House Bill 1, Alaska's Arctic Policy, legally went into effect August 8, 2015 under Alaska 
Statute 44.99.105. 
13th – Ambassador Mark Brzezinski is appointed Executive Director of the US 
Government’s Arctic Executive Steering Committee.  
31st – GLACIER (Conference on Global Leadership in the Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, 
Engagement and Resilience) is held in Anchorage with participation from US President 
Obama to build momentum for ambitious action at COP-21 (UNFCCC meeting on climate 
change in Paris, December 2015). Although taking place during the US Arctic Council 
Chairmanship, the event is not affiliated with that forum. 
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2nd – The five Arctic coastal states agree to a ten year circumpolar action plan to protect and 
manage polar bears and their habitat. 
11th – The Arctic Economic Council (AEC), founded in Iqaluit in September 2014, opens its 
Secretariat in Tromsø, Norway. 
15th-17th – Fifth International Meeting of the Arctic Council Member States, Arctic Council 
Observer States and International Academic Community Representatives, organized under 
the auspices of the Russian Federation Security Council, takes place in Arkhangelsk, Russia.  
25th – Book release: “The Barents Region – A Transnational History of Subarctic Northern 
Europe.” Edited by Lars Elenius et al., this is the first common history book on the European 
North.   
28th – Royal Dutch Shell announces that it will cease exploration in Arctic waters off Alaska’s 
coast “for the foreseeable future.” Shell had invested upward $7 billon on Arctic offshore 
development in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas over the last years. 
 
 
1st – The European Council of the European Union adopted regulation that brings the EU 
ban on trade in seal products into compliance with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. 
28th (expected date as of publication) – The eight Arctic states send their heads of coast guard or 
equivalent official delegation to the US Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut 
to officially launch the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF). 
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State Support of Delivery of Fuel & Energy Resources 
to the Subarctic Zone of the Russian North-East:  
A View & Recommendations 
 
Irina Barakaeva, Natalia Batugina & Vladimir Gavrilov 
 
 
Existing approaches of state support of fuel and power delivery to the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug and Polar regions of the 
Sakha Republic (Yakutia) are discussed in the article. Considerable attention is focused on remotely located regions of Yakutia 
which are in more difficult conditions and have special features of goods delivery. Complicated transportation-logistic schemes of 
fuels delivery, difference in the  launch and  completion of river and marine navigation, ice roads, thousand kilometer length of the 
routes lead to a significant increase of time and costs of goods delivery and thus to deterioration of its quality. Since 2003, 
subventions from the Fund of Financial Support for the Russia’s Federal Subjects have not any longer been targeted. A general 
transfer is allocated by the federal budget subsidize Russian regions. Fiscal support of delivery of freights is carried out by means of 
transfer of subsidies from to the budget of the Sakha Republic and Chukotka as subsidy by an authorized operator of the 
governments, annually selected in bidding and performing goods delivery to the north. The advantages and disadvantages of the 
current system of fuel and power delivery to the Arctic regions of Yakutia and Chukotka are evaluated in the article. An effective 
way of strengthening energy safety in Yakutia and Chukotka and decreasing expenses is an arrangement of fuel mining locally to 
replace fuels transported from other regions. 
 
 
Introduction 
The Sub-Arctic zone of the Russian North-East encompasses the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug and 
Arctic regions of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), and is characterized by extremely harsh climate, a low 
population density, substandard living conditions, underdeveloped economic and social sectors, and 
the total dependence of community sustainability on delivery of goods in summer (Figure 1).   
These territories cover the least studied and underdeveloped eastern Arctic and Polar zones of Russia. 
The Sub-Arctic areas of Yakutia encompass 13 municipal districts, 5 of which are located within the 
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Arctic zone, where the population of 70,000 people occupy 1.7 million km2 (Fondahl et al. 2014). The 
total area of Chukotka makes 721.5 km2 with a population of 50,500 people. 
Figure 1: Arctic and Sub-Arctic areas of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 
 
In the Soviet time, intensive development of the Russian North-East was related predominantly to 
geological survey, operation of mining enterprises, management of the North Sea Route, and 
combating state security issues. A reliable system of support of ahead of schedule delivery of goods 
to northern territories (Vasiliev et al. 2009; Pelyasov 2005) was established and operated.  
Since 1989, in Yakutia and Chukotka, the number of permanent residents in the areas under study has 
decreased respectively by 2.1. and 3.1. (Table 1). 
Table 1: Population of the Arctic regions of Yakutia and Chukotka 
Administrative area (ulus) 
Population, 
persons, 
1989.1 
 
Population, 
persons,  
January 
2014.2 
Population 
in 2014, in % 
as compared 
with 1989.  
Number of 
settlements 
13 Arctic areas, Sakha Republic (Yakutia) 
Abyyskiy 6097 4196 68.8 6 
Allaikhovskiy  5218 2764 53.0 7 
Anabarskiy 3903 3403 87.2 4 
Bulunskiy 17,257 8507 49.3 13 
Verhnekolymskiy 10,072 4317 42.9 6 
Verkhoyanskiy 24,259 11,665 48.1 17 
Zhiganskiy 5678 4245 74.8 5 
Momskiy 5505 4237 77.0 7 
34  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
State Support of Delivery of Fuel & Energy Resources 
Nizhnekolymskiy 13,692 4414 32.2 12 
Olenekskiy 3993 3963 99.2 4 
Srendnekolymskiy 9441 7535 79.8 10 
Ust-Yanskiy 41265 7359 17.8 11 
Eveno-Bytantayskiy National 3  0 2790   2 
Total 13 Arctic areas 146,380 69,395 47.4 104 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 
Anadirskiy 40,475 23,329 47.2* 16 
Beringovskiy4 8968    
Bilibinskiy 27,847 7855 28.2 10 
Iultinskiy 15689 5197 16.5** 10 
Providenskiy 9778 3771 38.6 6 
Chaunskiy 32,167 5800 18.0 12 
Chukotskiy (rural population) 6878 4603 66.9 6 
Shmidtovskiy5 15,726    
Total Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug 157,528 50,555 
 
32.1 60  
 
In Yakutia, a marked population decline is evidenced in the areas of incessant industrial development 
in the Ust-Yanskiy region – by 5.6 times; in the Nizhnekolmskiy region – by 3.1; and in the Bulunskiy 
region – by 2.1. In regions with traditional economies, the population decline was less evident: in the 
Abyyskiy region – by 1.5; in the Anabarskiy, Zhiganskiy, Momskiy, and Srendnekolymskiy regions – 
by 1.1-1.3; while the population density in the Olenekskiy region was not subject to a change.  In 
Chukotka’s Anadirskiy (by 2.1) and Chukotskiy regions (by 1.5) a less marked population decline was 
evidenced. The population in the Bilibinskiy, Iultinskiy, and Chaunskiy regions declined by 3.5 - 6.0 
times. 
Similar dynamics resulted from a shift in Russian state policy towards the Arctic by the end of the 
20th century and a significant reduction of mining production in northern Yakutia (Table 2) and 
Chukotka, as well as the deterioration of other subsidiary sectors. 
 
Table 2: Production volumes in the Arctic areas, Sakha Republic (Yakutia) 
Mineral / 
year 
1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Diamonds             
Joint stock company “Almazy Anabara”6 
Diamond 
production, 
thousand 
carats 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2534 2408 2521 3059 
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Production 
cost millions 
USD 
 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 157.7 136.3 175.4 153.1 N/A N/A 
Joint stock company “Nizhne-Lenskoe”7 
Diamond 
production, 
thousand 
carats 
N/A N/A 984 1297 1301 1372 1351 1253 1508 1521 2010 1818 
Production 
cost million 
USD 
N/A N/A 81.53 97.1 90.8 92.94 100.9 86.4 116.9 110 132.9  
Gold, kg8 2242 956.5 614 2152 594 785.4 593 642 432 482 415 446 
Inclusive 
the Ust-
Yanskiy 
region 
1137 491.8 6 1350 22.0 26.6 35.3 29.0 2.0 24.0 15.0 43.0 
The 
Verkhoyanski
y region 
1105 327.8 262 308.0 316.0 323.2 224.1 310.0 130 106.0 123.0 137.0 
The Momskiy 
region 
 60.0 96 107.0 118.0 217.8 153.4 149.0 141 176.0 125.0 133.0 
The 
Nizhnekolym
skiy region 
 8.9 154 280.0 20.0 0.0 26.8 5.0 0 0.0 27.0  
The 
Verkhnekoly
mskiy region 
 8.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Tin, ton (the 
Ust-Yanskiy 
region)8 
3707 2569 1957 2001 674 187 No production 
Coal, thous. 
ton 
(the 
Verkhnekoly
mskiy 
region)8 
N/A 279 182 123 152 150 195 172 243 200 171 160 
 
Currently, management and governance of settlements in the polar areas of Yakutia and Chukotka are 
predominantly oriented towards social needs of the communities (Vasiliev et al. 2009). These remote 
Arctic settlements have no industry and are generally used as terminals for supply of sparse mining 
enterprises, transportation of their production and personnel (Huskey 2011). The production and 
infrastructure are bound to diamond, gold and other mineral industries (Fondahl et al. 2014), and labor 
force is attracted in a shift work arrangement.   
Rearrangement of the Russian economy resulted in changes of approaches towards its Arctic 
territories development, notably the eastern regions. In the 1990s, the operating system of delivery of 
goods to northern territories collapsed resulting from misunderstanding of the role of the Arctic and 
the prospects of its development in the framework of the country’s economy and the demolition of 
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branch-wise and departmental principles of management and governance (Pelyasov 2005; Vitjazeva 
& Kotyrlo 2007; Vasiliev et al. 2009).  
In 1991, the State Committee for Affairs of the North (Goskomsever), Russian Federation, was 
established as a federal body responsible for northern policy, its characteristic feature being a territorial 
(horizontal), non branch-wise principle of management (Vitjazeva & Kotyrlo 2007). In 2000, the 
Committee was eliminated, and its functions were transferred to the Ministry for Regional 
Development (Russia) and Ministry for Economic Development and Trade (Russia). According to 
some Russian economists (Pelyasov 2005; Vitjazeva & Kotyrlo 2007), the Commission liquidation was 
a mistake. The northern territories and the Arctic region are autonomous in state governance due to 
complicated and diverse problems to be solved under special conditions.  
Delivery of fuels to Arctic regions of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) and Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug  
Transportation-logistic schemes for delivery of fuels as a large share in the total volume of delivered 
goods, in terms of quantity and finance, to the northern regions under study are complicated, as the 
launch and conclusion of river and marine navigation and the operation of winter roads differ in 
timespans, with resultant delivery risks (Huskey et al. 2014; Vasiliev et al. 2009; Stephenson et al. 2014). 
The extent of fuel and energy delivery routes is measured in the hundreds and thousands of kilometers, 
while annually delivered volumes of goods to each community are generally small, sometimes 
composing only a few tons for small settlements.   
The Sakha Republic (Yakutia) 
Oil, gas condensate, oil products (diesel fuel, petrol, and aviation kerosene), and coal produced either 
in the republic or in other Russian regions, are delivered to the Arctic regions for production of electric 
and thermal power, supply of facilities, and transport fuel.  
Required fuel and energy resources come from various areas. Oil products are delivered from plants 
via railroad to the town of Ust-Kut located on the Lena River in the Irkutskiy Oblast, where they are 
subsequently loaded on to vessels and transported down the river. With the construction of the 
railroad on the right bank of the Lena in the vicinity of Yakutsk (a settlement of Nizhniy-Bestyakh) 
and a large-scale reconstruction of the highway in South Yakutia–Yakutsk, new schemes for goods 
delivery have been elaborated to facilitate a significant decrease in the risks relating to shallow waters 
in the upper reaches of the Lena in the shipping season. 
Oil and gas condensate are transported from deposits located in West Yakutia via pipelines to river 
ports and are then loaded onto river vessels. Coal is delivered from the Dzhebariki-Khaya mine 
through the Aldan and Lena rivers and from the Zyryanskiy mine on the Kolyma River (Figure 2).  
Motor vessels with goods (fuel energy and coal) for northern territories go down to the Lena estuary 
and the Kolyma River. If necessary, the goods are shipped on to river boats and seagoing vessels, and 
take the sea route for estuaries of the Anabar, Yana, Indigirka, and Kolyma rivers, where they are 
transshipped aboard shallow-draught crafts.  
37  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
Barakaeva, Batugina & Gavrilov 
Correspondingly, delivery schemes are formed with respect to the navigation seasons and terms of 
operation of winter roads used for transportation of goods to remote communities located far from 
rivers and seashore.  
Figure 2: Major routes of fuel and energy resource delivery to regions of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia). 
 
In 2014, thousands of tons of product were shipped to meet the needs of housing and communal 
services, including coal from the Dzhebariki-Khaya deposit (128 tons), from the Zyryanskiy coal 
deposit (70.6 tons), and from the Arkagalynskiy deposit  (1.78 tons) in the  Magadanskiy oblast, as well 
as 41 thousand tons of oil, 10.9 thousand tons of gas condensate, and 2.4 thousand tons of diesel fuel. 
In addition, to supply the joint stock company Sakha energo (the Deputatskiy thermal power station), 
37 thousand tons of coal and 59.1 thousand tons of oil products were delivered by the Russian joint 
stock company SUEK (Government of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) 2014).   
Currently, subventions to the Russian Federation regions are no longer target-oriented. Subsidies 
from the federal budget to the regions are part of an aggregate transfer, without specification of 
purpose or sectors of application. The only objective is a guarantee of balanced state payments to 
regions with a budget deficit, regardless of their geographical location and long-term product 
delivery. 
In 2011-2014, expenditures on fuel delivery and storage in the 13 Arctic regions of the Sakha Republic 
rose by a factor of 1.5 and reached 4 billion rubles per year (Table 3). The most marked increase in 
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expenditures is obvious in the Anabarskiy (1.6 times), Verkhoyanskiy (2 times), and Eveno-
Bytantaiskiy regions (2.7 times), mostly due to increased costs of coal and crude oil delivery.  
Table 3: Fuel costs (current market price and the costs for transporting and storage fuel to the community) according to 
Arctic regions of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), (thousand rubles). 
Arctic areas, Sakha Republic 
(Yakutia) 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
Abyyskiy 169,665.1 187,364.5 242,069.8 250,329.9 
Verhnekolymskiy 66,490.5 66,742.7 76,224.5 87,308.7 
Momskiy 241,331.1 249,288.7 310,519.3 357,324.3 
Srendnekolymskiy 199,053.2 203,700.5 247,738.5 271,869.9 
Eveno-Bytantayskiy National   57,453.7 67,938.9 83,400.6 157,694.9 
Allaikhovskiy  161,865.2 164,432.8 231,095.9131 223,654.3 
Anabarskiy 111,070.1 119,745.1 187,327.7 181,009.2 
Bulunskiy 356,774.2 365,730.2 443,009.5 492,973.8 
Verkhoyanskiy 404,211.2 451,970.8 589,274.2 833,730.4 
Zhiganskiy 96,034.6 101,031.7 65,726.1 88,125 
Nizhnekolymskiy 207,634.3 210,447.6 275,078.1 258,638.8 
Oleneksky 160,223.1 183,390.1 211,391.2 232,145.2 
Ust-Yanskiy 398,337.1 475,375.8 625,655.4 606,764.8 
Total 2,630,143 2,847,159 3,588,510 4,041,569 
Source: Data of the State Committee for Pricing Policy – the Regional Power Commission, Sakha Republic (Yakutia).   
 
The situation varies from region to region: in the Ust-Yanskiy region, a share of shipped coal for 
housing and utilities services is 90%, in the Nizhnekolymskiy region it is 28.4%, while in the remainder 
a share of liquid fuel ranges between 90-100%. 
 
Table 4: Fuel costs over Arctic regions of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) (thousands of rubles).  
Fuel 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Coal 902,434.2 990,359.7 1,380,552 1,765,780 
Crude oil  1,028,624 1,100,543 1,457,008 1,548,331 
Gas condensate  412,296.9 463,615.9 424,916.1 455,962.4 
Diesel fuel (the needs of housing 
and communal services) 253,454.9 250,281.3 250,721.7 246,768.9 
Woods  33,333 17,968.1 33,130.3 24,726.1 
Total 2,630,143 2,847,159 3,558,510 4,041,569 
Source: data of the State Committee for Pricing Policy – the Regional Power Commission, Sakha Republic (Yakutia). 
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Storage and distribution costs of major fuels increased by 2 times for coal and by 1.5 times for oil over 
the four-year period, while the share of coal in the structure of fuels expenditures has increased from 
34% in 2011 to 43% in 2014, as the share of oil has not changed (Table 4).  
According to the data of the Sakha Republic Regional Power Commission, the share of coal itself in 
the structure of its prime cost for consumers in remote regions composes only 15-20% for the 
Abyiskiy, Momskiy, Ust-Yanskiy, and Verkhoyanskiy regions, and 37-50% for other Arctic areas - the 
Zhiganskiy, Nizhnekolymskiy, Srednekolymskiy, and Verkhnekolymskiy regions.  
In 2014, according to data available from the Regional Economy Commission, State Committee for 
Price, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), the cost of fuel oil including delivery to  regions ranges, for coal, 
from 5 thousand rubles per ton (to the Niznekolymskiy region) to 11 thousand rubles per ton (to the 
Ust-Yanskiy region), which exceeds world prices by 2-3 times (Figure 3); for oil, from 20,600 rubles 
per ton (to the Bulunskiy region) to 22,600-23,400 rubles per ton (to the Allaikhovskiy and 
Nizhnelenskiy regions); and for gas condensate 23,700 rubles per ton (to the Anabarskiy region) to 
24,300 rubles per ton  (to the Bulunskiy region). 
The recent large price rises for gas condensate in Yakutia resulted in costs significantly exceeding the 
cost of oil produced in the republic, leading in 2013 to the Allaikhovskiy region’s refusal of gas 
condensate deliveries and a transfer to oil. Such transitions, however, usually requiring additional 
investments into the re-equipment and renovation of boilers.  
 
Figure 3: Cost of coal in view of transportation and storage in Arctic regions of Yakutia, rubles/ton 
 
Source: Data of the Regional Economy Commission, State Committee for Price, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)  
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We will now look at coal delivery to Yakutia’s Arctic regions from the Dzhebariki-Khaya and 
Zyryanskiy mines, which supply consumers living in the lower reaches of the Lena, and the basins of 
the Yana, Kolyma, and Indigirka rivers. The special feature of these delivery schemes is the availability 
of en-route storage facilities. 
Part of the delivery of coal to consumers on the Yana and Indigirka rivers, where annually navigable 
depths meet their upper reaches for an average of only a month’s time, is stored in the river estuaries 
due to a non-concurrency in the river and marine navigation seasons. Coal may be stored in various 
storage facilities and river estuaries as required by operational and hydrological situations.    
Located in the Yana basin are the Ust-Yanskiy, Verkhoyanskiy, and Even-Bytantaiskiy regions (uluses). 
Delivery of fuels via vessels (Figure 4) is performed with 2-3 or more transshipments and en route 
storage, in some cases in the second navigation year. Coal is shipped by water for most of the route 
from deposits to the settlements of Nizhneyansk (Figure 5), Ust-Kuiga (Figure 6), Saidyy, and Batagai.  
Volumes of coal delivery to these destinations depend on the hydrological conditions on the Yana and 
the quality of operation and logistics management. The coal is delivered to end-point consumers by 
motor-vehicle transport via winter roads (Figure 7). Any planned volumes of coal from the previous 
navigation season which haven’t yet been shipped by water are also transported by winter roads with 
an operation period of around 3.5-4.5 months. 
 
       
Figure 4: Coal shipment by river (Figure 4-7 Photos by  Figure 5: Transshipment coal storage unit 
V. Zaharova, V. Gavrilova)      (Nizhneyanskiy) 
  
                      
Figure 6: Coal storage unit (Ust-Kuiga)  Figure 7: Coal loading on to motor-vehicles (Ust- 
Kuiga) 
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The delivery period for a particular volume of coal can range from 3-4 to 30 months, with 3-4 
transshipments. Such a transportation scheme, even absent technological difficulties, implies huge 
losses in terms of quality and quantity (Zaharov 2013). The total length of the coal transportation 
route produced by Yakutia’s enterprises for remote consumers can reach 2700–2900 kilometers. The 
distance multiplies for oil product suppliers from other Russian regions.  
The Chukotka Autonomous Okrug 
The Chukotka Autonomous Okrug utilizes gas produced in small quantities (25.4 million m3, 2014) in 
the Zapadno-Ozerny deposit (100 km south to Anadyr) for NGV stations; black and brown coal from 
the Nagornaya (202,000 tons) and Ugolnaya (233,500 tons) deposits and black coal transported from 
the Zyryanskiy  open-pit mine and Sakhalin (>110,000 tons); and oil products (in 2014, 106,400 tons 
of diesel fuel; 24,400 tons of jet fuel; 5500 tons of petrol) supplied from Russian plants via Russian 
Far East ports and the Northern Sea Route from Murmansk. Moreover, a nuclear power station 
operates in Bilibino connected to the Chaunsky thermal power station by electric transmission lines.  
Fuels are delivered to storage facilities mostly via marine transport to five major ports (Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Major fuels delivery routes to the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.  
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Fuel is shipped in small tonnage vessels by sea and navigable rivers to the settlements. In cold seasons, 
winter roads are operable for the delivery of goods to remote and difficult to access locations.  
In northern Yakutia and Chukotka, waterway and highway networks are not reliable for supplying 
consumers and enterprises with fuels given the settlement and productive force pattern now in place. 
In recent years, shallow waters in navigable sections of rivers have added to the complexity of the 
long-standing issue of northern delivery. In 2013, for example, this resulted in a delivery failure to the 
Indigirka and sudden freezing of winter roads to deliver fuels by more expensive motor transport, and 
even usage of a military helicopter to transport diesel fuel, to a small remote village. The updating of 
the delivery scheme led to additional expenses totaling up to 900 million rubles financed from the 
regional budget. In addition, the forced outage of vessels was estimated at 900 million rubles (Tajurskij 
2013). The high risks of delayed goods delivery in the required volumes will continue given the existing 
levels of transport infrastructure development. In the short- and medium-term, a significant rise in 
energy consumption is unlikely.   
During the past decade, a decrease in the efficiency of fuels transportation and usage has been evident. 
Delivery and consumption of oil, gas condensate, natural gas, and oil products are increasing alongside 
a reduction in coal mining, including those coals extracted from the Arctic zone.  
In 2002-2014, costs of diesel fuel increased by almost 5 times (from 11 to 50 rubles per liter), and that 
of electric power by 4 (from 1.05 to 4.43 rubles per kW/hr) (Figure 10). 
Figure 10: Fuel price movement in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia), 2002. 
Source: data of the Russian Statistics and the Regional Economy Commission, State Committee for Price, Republic of 
Sakha (Yakutia), various years. 
Rates of diesel fuel and electricity price increases were higher than inflation rates, which averaged 8-
11% annually and in 2014 reached its peak at 16%. In 2014, fuel expenditures cost 1.2 billion rubles.  
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Comparison of delivery mechanism for fuels in Alaska and Chukotka  
The Chukotka Autonomous Okrug is relatively similar to Alaska (USA) in terms of fuel delivery 
conditions. Similar to Chukotka, Alaska is characterized by a poorly developed transportation network, 
as compared with other American states.  
However, there are significant varieties in organization of fuel delivery in both the regions. The 
characteristic feature of the transportation system in Chukotka is a total lack of railroads and pipelines.  
Major cargo transportation over Chukotka is performed via marine, air, and motor transport, while in 
Alaska, southwards from the Arctic zone borderline, the Alaska Railroad is in place (760 km). 
Although the railroad runs within the state limits and has no access from outside the region, its mere 
existence significantly simplifies cargo transportation to nearby settlements.    
In Chukotka, the network of roads accessible all year round was constructed only in 2011-2012. Their 
total length makes 4500 km, including 568 km long dirt roads, 1300 km long winter roads with 
prolonged terms of exploitation, and 2700 km long winter roads (Voroncova 2015). In Alaska, the 
network of motor roads with concrete surface covers the central and southern parts of the state, the 
roads’ total length being about 20,000 km.  
Northern areas of Chukotka are accessible for less than 3 months. Limited terms of goods delivery to 
these areas are due to severe climatic conditions. Waters in the region are navigable for about 3 
months, and ice breaker steering is required to deliver goods for the rest of the year, which significantly 
increases expenditures.  
Southern areas of Chukotka depend on marine navigation for 3-6 months, as goods delivery is 
performed predominantly via the sea route (Vasiliev et al. 2009). 
By contrast, ice-free coastal areas of Alaska where big cities and settlements are located are open to 
goods delivery all the year round. The so-called “northern delivery” is performed only for settlements 
located in Central and Western Alaska (Szymoniak et al. 2010). 
Most of the rural settlements in western Alaska and northern Chukotka are road-less and are not 
interconnected. As such, fuel delivery to some rural settlements is performed by air. Coal and oil 
products in Chukotka and diesel fuel in Alaska form the backbone of fuel delivery. 
State regulation of long term product delivery in Sakha Republic (Yakutia) 
Financing schemes for goods delivery to the north comprise one of the most complicated areas of 
finance (Gritsevich 2008). The system of state support of fuel delivery has undergone several changes 
in its long history. Under a centralized planning framework, the purchase and delivery of goods was 
performed by assigned enterprises, financed from the state budget.  
However the state financing of pre-scheduled delivery of goods was terminated as an article of budget 
expenditures in 2003, and subventions from the Fund for Finance Support of Russian Federation 
Subjects ceased to be purpose-oriented.  
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A general transfer is allocated by the federal budget to subsidize Russian regions. Financial guarantees 
for the pre-scheduled delivery of goods are now conducted through a fund transfer from the budgets 
of the Sakha Republic and Chukotka as a subsidy to authorized operators, who are selected annually 
in a bidding process and then perform the goods delivery to the north (Figure 11).  
 
Figure 11: Financing scheme of pre-scheduled fuel deliveries 
 
 
In Yakutia, the criterion for defining settlements as Arctic and northern is an inaccessibility by 
transport for more than 180 days a year (State Assembly (Il Tumen) of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia) 
2004).  
All operations connected with state involvement in northern delivery, referring to fuel purchase, 
delivery, transshipment, and storage, are performed through competitive bidding. According to 
statutory regulations on the placement of orders for goods and services to meet state and municipal 
needs, all purchases by states are made through open-bid auctions. The bidding for goods delivery is 
an open procedure intended to select a production supplier and to define the prices of the agreements. 
The multi-link and complicated conditions of delivery have been responsible for a significant fuel 
price increase for consumers.  
Today’s structure of pre-scheduled fuel delivery implies a shared responsibility for various stages of 
delivery among federal (timely financing), regional (purpose-oriented draft of funds, timely and full 
supply of northern communities with fuel), and local (fuel supply for housing and communal services) 
state bodies.   
Thus, the redistribution of responsibility and financing from the federal level (the Ministry for Economic 
Development) to the regional and municipal levels is evident. The major source of financing of pre-
scheduled goods delivery is now the regional budget, while a right for guaranteed prices is granted to 
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enterprises, including profit-making organizations of housing and communal system, thus 
complicating control over consumer choice and price formation by state authorities.  
Currently, no systematized approach towards pre-scheduled goods delivery management in the region 
under study has been elaborated. No unified regulatory legal act of the Russian Federation to define 
the order of legal regulation of subjects, sources of finance, rights and obligations of the parties of 
agreements on goods delivery, or division of responsibility between different government bodies and 
levels are currently in place. 
Information on the fuel prices considered in the formation of electric and thermal energy rates for 
each year supplied to enterprises of the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug is provided by the State 
Committee for Price and Tariff Regulation, and by the State Committee for Price Making Policy, 
Regional Energy Commission Sakha Republic, in the Sakha Republic (Yakutia). 
Measures on improvement of pre-schedule fuel and power resources delivery 
The data here and above allows us to summarize the pros and cons of the existing system of pre-
scheduled delivery of fuels to the polar regions of Yakutia and Chukotka (Table 5). 
Table 5: Pros and cons of the existing system of pre-scheduled delivery of fuel and power resources to the polar regions 
of Yakutia and Chukotka. 
Pros Cons 
Unified system of delivery of different types of fuel 
and power resources 
Need for usage of multiphased transportation and logistics 
scheme 
Long period of fuels delivery to ultimate consumers 
Strictly centralized transport and financial support 
for fuels delivery 
High delivery expenses; 2-3 times higher than the cost of fuel 
and power resources   
State support for pre-schedule delivery of fuel and 
power resources including payments to suppliers, 
transport and energy companies 
Multiple re-loading and inter seasonal storage of fuel and power 
resources in en route storage facilities 
Huge losses of resources in terms of quality and volumes along 
the technological chain “fuels producer - consumer “  
State control over delivery and consumption of fuel 
and power resources  
Exceptional dependency on petroleum products supply from 
outside the regions  
Necessity for storage of large reserves of petroleum products 
Large suppliers and consumers of fuel and power 
resources capable of organizing relatively efficient 
delivery and fuel resources usage (Joint Stock 
companies “Sakhaneftegazsbyt” and 
“Yakutskenergo”, State Unitary Enterprise 
“Chukotkasnab”, etc.) 
Insufficient levels of usage of local energy  sources, notably, 
coal 
Competitive selection of suppliers of fuels and 
transportation companies 
Lack of standardized boiler equipment and noncompliance 
with  fuel types 
State and regional programs on support of pre-
schedule delivery and consumption of fuel and 
power resources and regular up-grading of such 
programs 
Low energy efficiency of fuel usage 
Social and economic inequality of population in various regions 
with similar climatic conditions 
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The analysis of pros and cons allows us to formulate recommendations aimed at the improvement of 
mechanisms of goods delivery to the northern territories. 
For improvement of fuels delivery to remote areas of Yakutia and Chukotka, it is necessary to not 
focus on an efficiency estimation of the separate stages of production, purchase, storage, and delivery. 
Rather, it is advisable to analyze the whole system of providing the region with fuel and power 
resources. Here, volumes of fuel and power resources consumed and paid for by the ultimate 
consumers should be used as a criterion in comparison of existing and proposed options of delivery. 
Currently, the economic efficiency of pre-scheduled goods delivery is due exclusively to the savings 
from separately calculated expenses on the purchase and delivery of fuels, and is owing to an absence 
of the necessary financial efficacy (Vasiliev et al. 2009). 
It is worthwhile to note here the issues related to the prospective re-settlement of the population 
from remote and difficult to access Arctic areas to places with more favorable climatic and 
transportation conditions. In spite of the expected economic efficiency of resettlement, we should 
take into consideration the required solutions of various social problems, which may require a long 
period of time. It is also obvious that the financial expenditures for resettlement will exceed the annual 
expenses on maintenance of communities, which will result in delayed economic benefits (Gritsevich 
2008). 
An effective way of strengthening the energy security of Yakutia and Chukotka and decreasing 
expenses would be the arrangement of local fuel production to replace fuels transported from other 
regions. As proposed in the Strategy of Russian Arctic Development, an optimization of the 
economical mechanisms of goods delivery to the north is required, predominantly “using local energy 
sources and energy-saving technologies, as well as upgrading power facilities” (Putin 2013). However, 
profit maximization should not necessarily be the main goal for companies already mining or planning 
to mine in the Arctic zone. Feasibility and needs for companies oriented towards population welfare, 
rather than commercial interests, is predetermined by increased energy requirements for safety, the 
creation of new jobs etc. 
Coal mining in the Arctic is hardly possible without the participation of the state, as coal production 
projects are characterized by high capital intensity, long-term pay-back periods, and significant 
investment requirements.   
However, no federal incentives are currently offered to utilize local coals in the Arctic regions of Sakha 
in substitution of delivered fuels. Recently, the proportion of regional and local budgets taken up by 
the supply of energy to municipal entities has been shown to be rising.  
Special preferences at the federal level for coal production enterprises that mine or plan to mine in 
the Arctic region would be feasible, including fixed tax rates at 0% for mineral production; and an 
exemption from income, private property, company property, and transport taxes.  In addition, 
simplified procedures for outgoing and licensing document execution for field development are 
required.  
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State guarantees for credits granted to Russian enterprises for the implementation of investment 
projects, technical equipment upgrading, etc., and subsidies to cover part of their expenses on interest 
rate discharge are also required at the regional and municipal levels.  
For a number of regions in Yakutia and Chukotka, the transportation costs exceed the costs of one 
ton of delivered fuel so substantially that the development of local deposits near the key points of 
consumption would significantly increase the energy security of the local population and decrease 
regional budget expenses. 
Development of local coal deposits by small scale and very small opencast mining producers should 
be conducted with the active participation of regional authorities. Coal prices should be fixed at such 
a level that they would allow mining companies to operate normally with low economic risks and to 
be able not only to cover operating and capital costs connected with exploration, but also to achieve 
the profits necessary for mining. Currently however, the state refuses to use mechanisms of direct and 
indirect pressure, thus equating small-size and very small coal opencasts to typical enterprises in 
European Russia. 
Our calculations reveal the potential for a three-fold coal price decrease, compared to the price of coal 
delivered externally, if local coal deposits were developed on the Indigikra river in the Abyskiy region 
(rayon). Even if the price of coal from newly developed coal mines which are close to the consuming 
communities was equal to the price of transported fuels (11-12,000 rubles per ton for the Ust-Yanskiy 
and Abyiskiy regions), energy security issues should demand significant improvements in the 
transportation schemes in the Arctic.  Such an approach furthermore conforms with market economy 
principles.  
Conclusions 
This article has addressed mechanisms of state support for fuel and power delivery to the Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug and polar regions of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia). The focus has been on the 
difficulty to access areas of those territories, which experience harsh climatic conditions and specific 
difficulties in goods delivery. 
Complicated transportation schemes of fuels delivery, differences in the launch and completion of 
river and marine navigations, and operation of winter roads lead to a significant increase of time and 
costs of goods delivery and thus to the deterioration of its quality.  
Annually, hundreds of millions of rubles are allocated from the federal, regional and municipal budgets 
for these expensive goods delivery procedures. Transportation expenditures account for 70-75% of 
the cost of fuel for consumers in the Arctic. 
The system of state support of fuels delivery has undergone many changes in its long history. During 
the centrally planned economy, the purchase and delivery of goods was performed by specialized 
organizations and were financed from the Russian state budget. Since 2003, however, subventions 
from the Fund of Financial Support for Russia’s Federal Subjects have no longer been purpose-
oriented. 
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Given the redistribution of responsibilities among federal, regional, and municipal authorities, the 
maintenance of state control over a feasible choice of suppliers and price-formation has become much 
more difficult. Organizational and economic mechanisms of interaction and division of powers among 
federal, regional, and municipal authorities, and business entities participating in goods delivery, have 
not been regulated yet. As such, no system of organization for pre-scheduled goods delivery in 
Chukotka and Yakutia has been elaborated. 
The potential for improvement of the economic mechanisms of pre-scheduled fuels delivery, 
predominantly through the establishment of local production of petroleum products to replace fuel 
types delivered from other Russian regions, has been demonstrated. 
The survey and recommendations given in the article confirm the significance of the theme of the 
study. 
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Notes 
1. See http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus89_reg1.php. 
2. See http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc_2014/bul_dr/mun_obr2014.rar. 
3. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic, April 21, 1989, the Eveno-Bytantaysky National Ulus (Rayon) was split out of the 
Verzhoyanskiy region (rayon). 
4. By the Law of the Chukotka Automonous Okrug #44-03, May 26, 2011, the Beringovskiy 
region (rayon) was liquidated as an administrative and territorial entity and was joined to the 
Anadyrskiy region (rayon). 
5. By the Law of the Chukotka Automonous Okrug #44-03, May 26, 2011, the Shmidtovsky 
region (rayon) was liquidated as an administrative and territorial entity and was joined to the 
Iultinskiy region (rayon). 
6. Reports of the Joint Stock Companies “Nizhne-Lenskoe” and “ALROSA” 
(http://alanab.ykt.ru, www.alrosa.ru). 
7. Reports of the Joint Stock Company “Nizhne-Lenskoe” (http://nlykt.ru). 
8. Data of the Ministry for Industrial Development of the Sakha Republic (Yakutia). 
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9. Annual reports of the Joint Stock Company “Yakutskenergo”. 
http://yakutskenergo.ru/shareholders_and_investors/open_information/Year-reports.php. 
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Maritime Activities in the Canadian Arctic:  
A Tool for Visualizing Connections between Stakeholders 
 
Leah Beveridge, Mélanie Fournier & Ronald Pelot 
 
The Canadian-German project PASSAGES (Protection and Advanced Surveillance System for the Arctic: Green, Efficient, 
Secure)1aims to: (1) determine the needs of Canadian stakeholders for better maritime situational awareness; and (2) design a 
maritime monitoring system adapted to Arctic conditions. Although the system could be deployed in the circumpolar region as a 
whole, the geographical zone of interest is the Northwest Passage within the Canadian Arctic archipelago. In its first phase, 
PASSAGES has created a database by collecting and cross-referencing contextual information and interacting with potential users 
of such a system (government agencies, shipping companies, communities etc.). Exploring the Canadian stakeholder network is a 
necessary part of understanding how operations are planned for and conducted. The sources of this information, however, remain 
fragmented and difficult to locate. 
The objective here is to take a new approach to sharing stakeholder information through a visualization tool. The goal is to go 
beyond traditional bibliographies and indexes to provide a comprehensive account of the major stakeholders in the Canadian Arctic, 
including an evaluation of their scale(s) of operation, their interests, and interactions. 
 
 
Introduction  
Maritime activities in the Canadian Arctic have historically been minimal; aside from some offshore 
oil and gas exploration in the Beaufort Sea, uses have been limited to annual community resupply, 
minor commercial fishing, and significant local subsistence harvesting. As the climate continues to 
warm and the sea ice continues to diminish, it is expected that the level of activity by maritime vessels 
in the Canadian Arctic will also steadily grow. The majority of the growth will be destinational traffic 
for natural resources projects and community resupply, and cruise tourism (AMSA 2009; Lasserre & 
Pelletier 2011). This change in traffic presents numerous opportunities for economic development 
both for Canada as well as internationally, such as new transportation routes and increasing cruise 
tourism. There are also numerous risks, though, most of which revolve around the immense potential 
environmental damage that could arise from an accident. 
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To fully understand the potential opportunities, risks, enablers, and barriers associated with developing 
Canada’s maritime Arctic, it is important to gain an understanding of all those involved. Improved 
stakeholder consideration and integration for more effective governance of maritime activities is being 
promoted at several scales, but understanding the stakeholder environment and coordinating their 
efforts is no easy feat. The complexity of the interests for using the marine environment in the Arctic 
arises from the scope and diversity of stakeholders, ranging from international industries, through 
national government departments, down to local communities and economies.  
A holistic view of the wide range of stakeholders involved in marine Arctic activities and the 
relationships among them appears to be lacking in the current body of literature on these topics. Most 
studies have focused solely on one or two groups of stakeholders, or one or two sets of interests; it is 
rare to see work that embraces the diversity of stakeholders and concerns. Furthermore, the reader 
often can become overwhelmed by the literature that does exist by the level of detail, and the sheer 
volume of information available makes it difficult to draw connections between stakeholders. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the stakeholders involved in maritime activities in the 
Canadian Arctic, and to document our findings in a user-friendly visualization tool. This research aims 
to shed light on all those who are involved in one way or another in maritime vessel-based activities 
in the Canadian Arctic. In addition, it aids in highlighting the major topics of interest at different 
operating scales, which will help to identify gaps and overlaps between stakeholders, and provides a 
platform for future collaboration between groups. 
Why conduct a stakeholder analysis? 
When decisions about planning and development are made by groups in isolation from other 
stakeholders, the result is often a fragmented plan with numerous gaps and overlaps. By clearly 
considering, if not directly including relevant stakeholders in the governance process, conflicts can be 
avoided and the overall efficiency of the resulting policy can be improved. By identifying and 
integrating the interests of all stakeholders from the beginning, a better understanding of the social, 
economic, and environmental systems to be governed can be established and a balance between the 
interests can be found, thus reducing potential conflicts and maximizing the benefits for each 
stakeholder (VanderZwaag 1990; Douvere 2008; Halpern et al. 2008; Maes 2008; Pomeroy & Douvere 
2008; Beaufort Sea Partnership 2009; Ehler & Douvere 2009; Jay 2009; Ritchie & Ellis 2010; 
Katsanevakis et al. 2011; Gopnik et al. 2012). Stakeholders are also more likely to support a governance 
regime when it is clear that their interests have been taken into account (Maes 2008; Jay 2009; Ritchie 
& Ellis 2010).  
Demonstrating the common interests between stakeholders can also facilitate cooperation among 
themselves, as it is more evident where partnerships can be made (Grimble & Chan 1995; Douvere 
2008; Pomeroy & Douvere 2008). It provides an opportunity for all stakeholders to gain a better 
understanding of the environment within which they work, and perhaps a better understanding of the 
perspectives and interests of others, allowing for greater transparency and potential for relationship-
building (Helmick 2008; Reed 2008).  
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Arctic maritime activities, the risks, and the potential for development in the changing climate have 
been widely discussed in the literature, illustrating the extensive range of interests, concerns, and types 
of activities. Anthropologists and geographers have documented the role indigenous people have to 
play in developing their territories (Hovelsrud et al. 2012; Kelley & Ljubicic 2012; Flynn 2013); 
biologists have raised awareness about the risks to the Arctic environment from maritime activities 
(Erbe & Farmer 2000; Huntington 2009; Reeves et al. 2012; Chan et al. 2013); engineers have studied 
technological and structural issues with cold-climate navigation (Frankenstein & Tuthill 2002; Liu, Lau 
& Williams 2006; Kennedy, Simoes Re & Veitch 2014); and lawyers have described the international 
and national legal aspects (Pharand 2007; Chircop 2012; Karim 2015). Each of these is an important 
piece, but putting them together to form a complete picture of the region is challenging. 
Some reports have endeavoured to provide an overview of the situation. Many organizations, for 
example, have produced reports addressing aspects that must be considered when trying to develop 
marine Arctic activities, all providing a broad perspective of their respective topics (Chatham House 
2012; Parsons 2012; Conference Board of Canada 2013; Johnston et al. 2013). 
Most notably, however, is the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) (Arctic Council 2009) by the 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group of the Arctic Council. The 
AMSA report provides an overview of the aspects that need to be taken into consideration if and 
when maritime activities progress in the circumpolar Arctic. The working group incorporated the 
views of a range of stakeholders, and approached the document by ship type, including tankers, bulk 
carriers, offshore supply vessels, passenger ships, tug/barge combinations, fishing vessels, ferries, 
research vessels, and government and commercial icebreakers. The focus, however, is on shipping 
rather than on the stakeholders:  
The AMSA is designed to be circumpolar in breadth and also to consider regional and 
local perspectives. The assessment’s central focus is on ships: their uses of the Arctic 
Ocean, their potential impacts on humans and the Arctic marine environment and 
their marine infrastructure requirements (AMSA 2009: 2).  
Furthermore, given the circumpolar approach, the level of detail on the stakeholders is not present. 
The goal herein is not to replace the work of the PAME, or any other authors who have addressed 
the task of providing a holistic image of Arctic shipping, but rather to amalgamate the information in 
a way that provides the necessary level of detail without overwhelming the reader with text, while 
adding valuable information on interrelationships. 
Why create a visualization tool? 
Data exploration and data sharing 
There are many reasons for visualizing data. Beyond the practical aspects of aiding internal and 
external communications of a project, visualizations can also be used for sharing data and the products 
of data processing with groups that are unconnected to a given project. We discussed the use of 
visualization tools for sharing information with many of the stakeholders of Arctic shipping, all of 
whom provided their support. Many people do not have the time to sift through literature or the 
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training to understand data and analyses. A visually appealing and easy-to-use tool can provide them 
the information they need in a timely manner. For example, in conversations with Canadian shipping 
companies it was mentioned that visualization tools would be particularly helpful for passing 
knowledge on to new employees. 
The main goal of this research was to find a way to visualize and understand the governance of 
maritime activities by adapting pre-existing data visualization tools. Several projects are dedicated to 
studying the stakeholders and governance of the Arctic. Unfortunately, when the projects terminate, 
the maintenance of the associated tools do as well. There are also a number of relevant indexes and 
bibliographies (e.g. The Arctic Governance Project, 2010),2 but they are unclear and difficult to access; 
that is to say they are hard to find, they are not particularly user-friendly, and they do not provide any 
kind of analysis. These tools are nevertheless valuable to those who are knowledgeable on the given 
topic. However, they are not very useful to users who are not experts on the topic of interest. 
Object of knowledge 
The type of representation we are discussing can be compared, to a certain extent with Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS). Many people want to use GIS or provide an online GIS platform, but 
most of the time the result is a simple map with stacked layers of information and relatively little added 
value. The added value lies where disciplines overlap and factors intersect; it is these aspects that make 
the Arctic so unique. Recognizing the required interdisciplinarity of marine activities, the aim was to 
incorporate the complexities of the system: the legal framework, issues related to Inuit traditional use 
and cultural connectivity to the marine environment, security and defence aspects, safety concerns, 
the unique climatic conditions, environmental considerations, natural resource development potential, 
and economic trends. By providing a visualization tool the user is able to consider all the possible links 
between the stakeholders in the Canadian Arctic as a result of common scale(s) of operations, shared 
interests, or working relationships. By making the tool interactive, the user is able to see only the 
information they are interested in, while still having access to the complete picture, thus simplifying 
the visualization to a user-friendly format. We aim to create a “mediating object of knowledge” 
(Kaplan, Fournier & Nuessli 2014); we want to provide a tool that is interactive and allows the user 
to play and explore the structured information. 
Stakeholder analysis 
According to Grimble and Chan, a stakeholder analysis is “an approach and procedure for gaining an 
understanding of a system by means of identifying the key actors or stakeholders in the system, and 
assessing their respective interests in that system” (Grimble & Chan 1995). They also define a 
stakeholder as an individual, a community, a social group, or an institution that affects and/or is 
affected by the policies, decisions, and actions of the system. The system we are dealing with is that 
of maritime traffic in the Canadian Arctic, which is the geographic region described in the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA 1985) as waters bound within the 60th parallel north, the 141st meridian 
west, the equidistance line between the islands of the Canadian Arctic and Greenland, and a line 
measured seaward from the nearest land a distance of 100 nautical miles (Figure 1). This definition 
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was chosen because within this area, maritime vessel activities are governed by Arctic-specific 
Canadian regulations. 
The stakeholder analysis was conducted in four steps: 1) general information on the present maritime 
vessel activities in the Canadian Arctic and the legal framework governing those activities was 
gathered; 2) stakeholders involved in the different aspects of the activities were spoken to directly; 3) 
the results were analyzed for commonalities and differences; and 4) a user-friendly tool for visualizing 
the results was designed and developed. 
Figure 1. The study’s area of interest: the Canadian Arctic marine waters defined by the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention 
Act, 1985.  
 
Methodology & results 
The first step towards analyzing the stakeholders of maritime vessel-based activities in the Canadian 
Arctic was to identify the stakeholders. Some were easily identified, such as the industries that deploy 
vessels. Others, such as the organizations that have sway over regulatory bodies were more difficult 
to isolate. In order to aid this process, an examination of the legal framework surrounding vessel 
activities in marine Arctic waters in Canada was conducted. To begin, the legal framework was divided 
into nine categories: international public law, international private law, non-legally binding documents, 
precedents, Memorandum of Understanding, territorial governments, Arctic Council, Arctic states 
and non-Arctic states. The last three categories have been sub-divided by territory and by country (see 
Figure 2 below).   
Stakeholders were also identified through a review of the most up-to-date information, including 
reports, academic publications, news articles, and websites. Further information was gathered through 
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participation in a number of industry- and academia-based conferences and forums, and the 
networking opportunities provided therein. These events included the Arctic Shipping Forums held 
in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Helsinki, the MASS conference held in St. John’s, and the Canadian 
Marine Advisory Committee - Prairie and Northern Region Meeting in Iqaluit.3 In addition, formal 
and informal interviews were conducted to collect expert knowledge of the groups involved, as well 
as to better understand the interests of the stakeholders and their interactions. 
Once the stakeholders, their inputs, and their roles were identified the data needed to be analyzed. 
Based on the information gathered during interviews and from the mandates provided on the official 
websites of stakeholders, we determined three criteria for our evaluation: a) the scale at which a 
stakeholder operates, b) their interests, and c) their interactions. Scale refers to the geographic level at 
which the stakeholder focuses: international (including circumpolar), national (Canada-wide), local 
(limited to a specific region in the Canadian Arctic), or any combination of the three. These three 
scales reflect the governance regimes: international conventions, national legislation, and local 
regulations. 
Figure 2. A screenshot of the tool for understanding the legal aspects relevant to shipping in the Arctic. The tool is 
available at http://passages.ie.dal.ca/Legal_Aspects_Tool.html. The user needs to enable the scripts into the browser used 
to run the tool.  
 
The categories of interest were derived from the working groups of the Arctic Council. We decided 
to mirror the approach of this intergovernmental organization because of the Council’s influential role 
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in the governance of Arctic maritime activities, its work on the AMSA, and because of the support it 
receives from stakeholders. We determined five categories of interests: 
1. Climate & Environment: pollution (spills, ejections, discharges, noise, light, invasive species); 
response; environmental protection; sustainable development; environmental hazards to and 
from ships; climate change. 
2. Economics: business development; cost-efficiency; trade; financial gains; economic utilization of 
natural resources (petroleum, gas, minerals, fish); competitiveness; employment; income; 
sustainability. 
3. Safety, Security & Defence: search and rescue; safety of navigation; maritime security; 
sustainability. 
4. Health & Social: health; happiness; well-being; tensions and social problems; welfare. 
5. Inuit-Specific Aspects: culture; language; traditional activities. 
Safety, security & defence are grouped for our analysis because of the similarities in concerns within 
the three topics. Based on a presentation given by Major Pascal Sévigny of the Canadian Department 
of National Defence at the Warming of the North Conference4, they are viewed along a gradient rather 
than as three distinct areas of interest.  
From sources to structured data 
Stakeholder segmentation 
We identified seventy-eight stakeholders; to simplify the analysis we decided to combine sets of 
stakeholders into stakeholder groups (SGs) (Table 1). The clusters were made according to four 
criteria: a) departments or working groups within the same authority (e.g., the Arctic Council includes 
its various working groups; and the Canadian Department of National Defence includes the Canadian 
Rangers, Defence Research and Development Canada, the Joint Rescue Coordination Centres, Joint 
Task Force North, and the National Search and Rescue Secretariat); b) characteristics; c) interests; and 
d) a combination of points b and c.  
For example, the banks and the insurance market have been clustered, as they both play similar roles 
in determining whether a ship will be able to voyage in the Arctic. According to a stakeholder with 
considerable experience on this topic, in order for a ship to be built, a finance agreement must be 
established with a bank. Such agreements often require that the vessel has insurance, sometimes from 
a particular company known to have high standards, and require that the vessel remain in compliance 
with its insurance policy. As such, it was not seen as appropriate to include one and not the other, but 
it was unnecessary to separate the two. 
After stakeholders were grouped, the number of distinct entities was reduced from 78 to 28. In three 
cases the decision was made not to group certain stakeholders. The first is the shipping industry. 
Although components of the shipping industry were combined (ship-owners, operators, etc.), the 
international and domestic shipping industries were left separated because different regulations apply 
depending on whether international or local transits are being conducted by foreign or domestic 
vessels. An example is the Canadian Ballast Water Control and Management Regulations (SOR/2011-237 
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2011): the regulations apply to all Canadian and foreign vessels conducting international transits, but 
do not apply to vessel operating exclusively in waters under Canadian jurisdiction. 
Commercial fisheries were also left divided into Inuit and non-Inuit fisheries because their operations 
are quite different; Inuit fishers operate at the local level, whereas non-Inuit fishers are directed by 
international commercial interests. Another set of stakeholders that could have been grouped were 
those operating for tourism purposes: the cruise industry and adventure tourists. They were left 
separated because the cruise industry is highly regulated, whereas adventure tourists essentially operate 
on their own. The cruise industry was also left separated from international and domestic shipping 
because their purposes for operating in the Arctic, parts of the legal framework surrounding their 
activities, and the type of voyages they undertake are significantly different. 
Finally, we decided to combine the territorial governments under one stakeholder group. This decision 
was made because, although their agendas may differ, their general mandate and role in the realm of 
shipping in the Canadian Arctic is the same. This is particularly true given the scale at which we are 
conducting this study. 
Some stakeholders were consciously omitted from the analysis, such as the International Chamber of 
Shipping and the International Labour Organization. Although they do influence aspects of shipping, 
they were not considered to be central to the development of shipping in the Canadian Arctic 
specifically. The International Chamber of Shipping promotes the interests of shipowners and 
operators, and the International Labour Organization addresses workers’ rights, but neither 
contributes to the demand for shipping in the Canadian Arctic that will drive changes in volumes of 
activities. In addition, many of these organizations collaborate with the IMO to develop guidelines 
and regulations for maritime activities. The decision was also made to exclude port authorities because 
there is a known lack of deepwater ports, places of refuge, marine salvage, and adequate port facilities 
in the Canadian Arctic, and the ports from which vessels voyaging to the Arctic originate are located 
outside the region, and outside the scope of our study. 
Table 1. All identified stakeholders organized alphabetically by stakeholder group. For a complete list of all stakeholders 
and stakeholder groups, their scale(s) of operations, and their interests, see Appendix 1 on our website.5 
Stakeholder Group Stakeholders Included in Group 
Aboriginal Affairs & Northern 
Development Canada (AANDC) 
Canadian Polar Commission 
Adventure tourists  
Arctic Council 
Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP); Arctic 
Monitoring & Assessment Programme (AMAP); Conservation 
of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Economic Council; 
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness & Response (EPPR); 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); 
Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) 
Banks/Insurance market Underwriters, lawyers, P&I Clubs 
Canadian Northern Economic 
Development Agency (CanNor) 
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Classification societies 
American Bureau of Shipping; Bureau Veritas; ClassNK; 
DNV GL; Korean Register; Lloyd’s Register; RINA Services, 
SpA 
Cruise industry 
Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operations (AECO); 
ship owners, operators and crew 
Domestic shipping industry 
Ship owners, operators and crew; cargo owners; chartering 
companies; shipbuilders 
Environment Canada Canadian Ice Service 
Fisheries & Oceans Canada (DFO) 
Canadian Coast Guard (CCG); Marine Communications & 
Traffic Services (MCTS); Canadian Hydrographic Service 
(CHS) 
Foreign Affairs Trade & 
Development (FATD) 
 
Ice Navigators  
International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) 
Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC); 
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) 
International shipping industry 
Ship owners, operators and crew; cargo owners; chartering 
companies; shipbuilders 
Inuit commercial fisheries  
Inuit population Communities 
Mining industry  
National Defence (DND) 
Canadian Rangers; Defence Research & Development Canada 
(DRDC); Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC); Joint 
Task Force North (JTFN) 
Natural Resource Canada 
(NRCan) 
Geological Survey of Canada (GSC) 
Non-Government Organizations 
(NGOs) 
Greenpeace; Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC); Inuit Tapiriit 
Kanatami (ITK); Oceans North; World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
Non-Inuit commercial fisheries  
Northern population  
Oil & Gas industry  
Parks Canada  
Public Safety Canada 
Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA); Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (CSIS); National Search & Rescue 
Secretariat (NSRS); Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
Research community/consultants 
Centres of Excellence; National Research Council (NRC); 
Research Institutes 
Territorial Governments Northwest Territories; Nunavut; Yukon 
Transport Canada 
Canadian Marine Advisory Council (CMAC); NASP; Marine 
Safety; Marine Security 
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Scale and interests 
The stakeholders were first analyzed by scale and interest separately. As one could expect, more 
stakeholders operate nationally than internationally or locally (71% versus 54% and 57% respectively) 
(Table 2). Of the 28 SGs, only seven operate at all scales: classification societies, DFO, DND, non-
Inuit commercial fisheries, the cruise industry, NGOs, and the research community/consultants. We 
then analyzed the stakeholders based solely on interests, of which most were concerned with climate 
& environment (93%), safety, security & defence (89%), and economics (79%) (Figure 3). No 
stakeholder group is dedicated to only health and social aspects or Inuit interests. Nine are interested 
in all five topics.  
Table 2. The distribution of stakeholder groups based on the scale(s) at which they operate. 
Scale Number of  stakeholder groups Percent 
Includes international 15 54% 
Includes national 20 71% 
Includes local 16 57% 
International only 3 11% 
International and national only 4 15% 
National only 6 22% 
National and local only 4 11% 
Local only 4 15% 
International and local only 1 4% 
International, national and local 7 26% 
 
For the analysis, international and domestic shipping industries were classified as not having an interest 
in health & social aspects. Codes of conduct often require consideration of potential impacts on 
society, but it is our understanding that the main goals of the shipping industry are not focused on 
improving the health and well-being of northern societies. Thus they were not considered to be 
interested in “health & social” within this study.  
 
Figure 3. The number of stakeholder groups interested in a particular set of interests; those interested in all aspects are 
not included (9 groups). C=Climate & Environment; E=Economics; S=Safety, Security & Defence; H=Health & 
Social; I=Inuit-Specific Aspects. Each side of a square represents an interest, allowing up to four interests to be 
communicated. In some cases, an interest will be repeated, resulting less than four interests to be represented. Take the 
square with the number “7” for example: Starting on the left with Interest 1, we see the first interest is Climate & 
Environment; Interest 2 on the top of the square indicates the interest of Economics; the right side indicates Interest 3, 
which is Safety, Security & Defence; and Interest 4 represented by the bottom is also Safety, Security & Defence. This 
means that there are 7 stakeholder groups interested in climate & environment, economics, and safety, security & defence. 
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The trend of more interest in climate & environment, safety, security & defence, and economics over 
health & social and Inuit interests was consistent when SGs were analyzed by both scale and interests 
(Figure 4). Of all the stakeholder groups, only one operates at all scales and is interested in all aspects 
of maritime, vessel-based activities, and that is the research community/consultants. 
Figure 4. The distribution of stakeholder groups by operating scale and interests. 
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From structured information to visualization 
To begin we needed to find a platform upon which to develop the flexible and user-friendly tool. Mike 
Bostock6 created D3.js, which is unlike classic visualization libraries in that it allows information to be 
communicated in much more powerful ways. The almost endless options for data representations 
make the library itself a tool. From the D3.js library we chose a visualization based upon hierarchical 
edge bundles (Holten 2006). The data are represented in a wheel format, which is composed of nodes 
and edges all coloured in light grey. The data are grouped into eight bundles: seven represent the 
stakeholders organized by the scale(s) at which they operate (see Table 2) and the eighth represents 
the interests. The nodes within each bundle are the stakeholder groups that operate at those particular 
scale(s), and each is linked to its interests (Figure 5).  
Figure 5. The foundation of the visualization tool showing all connections between stakeholder groups, and between 
groups and their interests. 
 
 
Each node (SG or interest) acts as both a source and target. When the user passes their cursor over 
either a stakeholder group or an interest (the source), it becomes highlighted in black. The colour of 
the edge (connecting line) and the target(s) will be different, though, depending on whether the 
selected source node is an interest or a SG. If the user passes their cursor over a SG, the edge(s) and 
the target node(s) become highlighted in red if it is an interest, or in purple if it is another SG (Figure 
6a). In contrast, if the user passes their cursor over an interest, the edge(s) and the target node(s) will 
become highlighted in blue (Figure 6b). 
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Figure 6. (A) The visualization tool when a stakeholder group is selected: red indicates a link to an interest, and purple 
indicates a link to another stakeholder. (B) The tool when an interest is selected: all stakeholders with that interest are 
linked and highlighted in blue. 
 
  
Furthermore, description windows were added for each SG and interest (Figure 7). They appear when 
the user clicks on a particular node. The descriptions are either taken directly from the official website 
of the SG (e.g., those of federal departments and agencies), or they have been written based on the 
literature. We took this approach because we wanted to provide more information to the user, but 
wanted to keep the visualization simple and easy to read and understand.  
Figure 7. The pop-up description windows when clicking on (A) a stakeholder group or (B) an interest. 
 
 
Conclusions  
With another three to four decades before substantial increases in maritime traffic are expected in the 
Canadian North, a unique opportunity has been presented: there is the time to conduct the integrative 
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and collaborative work required to produce a governance regime that is inclusive and proactive. The 
need for this kind of approach has been documented in reports from numerous sources, and has been 
announced by leaders of organizations and states. The comprehensive, interactive visualization tool 
we have developed will facilitate future stakeholder-related work, be it more in-depth stakeholder 
analyses, consultations, engagement efforts, or planning processes. 
As with all new tools, there are current limitations, but in this case those limitations are also the 
strengths of the work. The visualization tool is intended to be an evolving and ongoing collaborative 
tool, rather than a static end-product of a single research project. At this stage the list of stakeholders 
is not exhaustive; some have been intentionally omitted, others combined into groups for the purpose 
of simplifying the tool and the analysis. The limitation is that the visualization illustrates the interests 
and connections of stakeholders as identified by the stakeholders themselves. In other words, in order 
to improve the tool, stakeholder input is required. When a stakeholder chooses to participate, they not 
only provide data for the analysis but they become part of the project, thus initiating the desired 
stakeholder engagement and collaboration process. One example of this is the work we conducted 
with three domestic shipping companies that operate in the Eastern Canadian Arctic: we gathered 
information from them and presented it to delegates of the World Maritime University’s ShipArc 2015 
Conference, thus connecting two groups that may not necessarily interact on their own (our 
presentation is available at http://passages.ie.dal.ca/PPT/BeveridgeFournier_ShipArc.pdf). 
The data have been gathered in an open-source format (D3.js for the interactive visualization, GitHub 
to share the code and data), so the users not only have online access to the representation, but they 
can also freely use the data and expand upon the tool (as long as the original developers’ names are 
embedded within the code). For example, the scope of the analysis could be focused to study particular 
areas within the Canadian Arctic (e.g., the Beaufort Sea or Lancaster Sound), or the scope could be 
narrowed to study specific activities (e.g. search and rescue or fishing). The structure could also be 
broken down and the study segmented by the type of sailing routes, such as intra-Arctic, destinational, 
or transit routes. 
The AMSA report describes the governance of Arctic shipping activities as a “complicated mosaic” 
(AMSA 2009: 50), and it was our goal to provide a way to visualize this puzzle; a way to gain access 
to the complex web of stakeholders, their interactions, and the antagonisms of their activities and 
interests with a single click. The topic of Arctic shipping governance is not new, but documentation 
has often focused on the legal framework and only those players directly involved in writing and 
following the rules. There is so much more to the picture, though, and to begin to try to understand 
it, a more in depth analysis was required. Not only did we engage with numerous stakeholders from 
varying scales and arenas, we analyzed the information and translated it into a visualization tool to 
help decode the complexities of maritime Arctic activities in Canada. With further stakeholder support 
and collaboration, the work we have done can be expanded and improved. 
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Notes 
1. The PASSAGES Project: http://passages.ie.dal.ca. 
2. The Arctic Governance Project, Compendium is available at:  
http://www.arcticgovernance.org/compendium.137742.en.html. 
3. Respectively: October 2014, February 2015 and May 2015.  
4. Conference held in Ottawa in 2015: 
http://umanitoba.ca/faculties/management/ti/warming-of-the-north-2015.html. 
5. See http://passages.ie.dal.ca/Publications.html. 
6. The D3.js library is available at http://d3js.org. 
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Regional Governance without Self-Government: 
Dynamism and Change in the North American Arctic 
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How do we understand the evolution of sub-national governance in the North American Arctic? In what ways are Indigenous 
policy actors empowered and organized? Discussions of circumpolar regionalization often focus on the increasing role of state, 
provincial, or territorial governments in policy development, in international relations, and in managing the future of the north. 
However, these institutions do not constitute the only form of regionalization that the Arctic has experienced. Over the past 40 
years, the North American Arctic has also seen rapid political change at the sub-national level. The land claims movement, which 
emerged in the 1960s in Alaska and in the 1970s in Canada, shifted policy authority into new regional institutions and empowered 
local indigenous populations. This has meant that the northern territories and the state of Alaska have moved toward becoming 
their own quasi-federal systems, and has heightened the complexity of northern governance. This paper presents a comparative study 
of regional models of governance in the North American Arctic. The paper pays specific attention to regional models that emerged 
in a policy vacuum, prior to the pre-1990s period that saw both US and Canadian federal governments reaffirm notions of 
Indigenous sovereignty. However, due to policy legacies and path dependency, some populations do not (and may never have) 
Indigenous self-government. The paper explores the layered development of governance, focusing on the Northwest Arctic and North 
Slope regions in Alaska, and the Inuvialuit and Gwich’in regions in the Canadian Northwest Territories. This paper explores 
how differences in institutional structure influence shape regional policymaking, and how these institutions are poised to affect the 
future political, economic, and social development of Arctic Northern America.  
 
 
Introduction: Conceptualizing the Arctic region 
 
Since the end of the Second World War, the Arctic has experienced considerable political and 
institutional change. The political reorganization of the Arctic has evolved along three parallel streams 
of governance: (1) transnational cooperation; (2) decentralization; and (3) regionalization. The first 
path of institutional development came through the ideational creation of an ‘Arctic Region’ in 
international relations. The ‘Arctic Region’ became a focal point during the Cold War, sparking 
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significant bilateral and multilateral cooperation and conflict (Young 2005). Transnational regional 
cooperation evolved through a number of political venues such as the Arctic Council and multilateral 
agreements in the Barents region (along the Barents Sea from Norway to Russia), as well as through 
the institutionalization of Arctic indigenous polities (Paasi 1999; Shadian 2006). By comparison, the 
second path developed through intra-state political and economic decentralization to existing 
regional/territorial units. This trend in Arctic governance has been particularly obvious in the federal 
Arctic states—which have progressively devolved policy authority to sub-national governments within 
the Arctic region, including Territories (Yukon/Northwest Territories/Nunavut), States (Alaska), and 
Provinces (Wilson 2005, 2008)—as well as in non-federal states, such as Denmark. This process has 
focused on bolstering existing political units through policy decentralization and increased political 
power, rebalancing (to a degree) the governance mismatch between center (southern capitals) and 
periphery (northern interests). 
The third plane on which Arctic governance has evolved is the focus of this paper. In this paper, 
regionalization is defined as the creation of bounded regional institutions through political processes 
such as lobbying, legislation, and negotiation. In the Arctic, this is characterized by the institutional 
recognition of sub-state/sub-territorial units of Indigenous governance.1 Through regionalization, 
Arctic Indigenous actors have actively wrested away policy control and political autonomy from other 
orders of government (be they territorial or national), and vested these powers in new geographically 
and culturally situated organizations of governance. The most common institutions of regionalization 
in the North American Arctic are Indigenous land claims (which generally transfer land and money, 
and in some cases include the policy authority to manage regional natural resources) and Indigenous 
self-government agreements (which generally transfer the authority over social policy and 
responsibility of program delivery to new indigenous governments) (Abele & Prince 2006).  
Each stream of governance finds its origins in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in a period of northern 
expansion and political conflict. Indigenous policy actors have played a key role in the organization of 
each of the three planes of governance, advocating for, and shaping the scope of Indigenous influence 
and role in policy matters at each level. At the transnational level, six transnational Indigenous 
organizations sit as Permanent Participants on the Arctic Council.2 At the territorial level, Indigenous 
politicians have made their mark in Canada’s Westminster-style territorial governments, and in 
Alaska’s bicameral legislature. But it is at the regional level that Indigenous policy authority and self-
determination are truly evident. This paper will explore the development of regional models of 
Indigenous policy authority. In particular, it will argue that the factors of timing and identity have 
influenced the way in which institutions layer to create units of regional governance and this in turn 
influences the policy dynamics between new regional actors.  
Regionalism in the Arctic: institutional models and variation 
Over the past four decades, Indigenous groups have wrested policy authority and political legitimacy 
away from other orders of government and into new institutions of regional governance. Control over 
land and resources, social and economic policy, and environmental oversight has been reconstituted 
through new institutions of land claims, co-management organizations, and self-government. During 
the 1960s and 1970s, land claims were the main tool through which to recognize Indigenous rights in 
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United States and Canada (as self-government did not make its way into the federal rights framework 
until the 1990s). Modern land claims put forward a new regional model of political and organizational 
development through the creation of geographically bounded native regional corporations (NRCs), 
which hold and manage collective Indigenous lands. As northern political development evolved, new 
institutions have been layered on top of the regional template provided through the NRCs. Though 
there has been a general progressive trend towards the development of regional Indigenous 
governance in the north, the actual outcomes operate on a continuum: 
Figure 1: Regional Governance in the North American Arctic 
 
Where federal recognition of local tribal self-government at the village/hamlet level has occurred, the 
regional model has been diluted. Broadly speaking, most of Alaska falls into this category. Though the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971 introduced the beginnings of a regional 
template with the development of twelve regional corporations, the simultaneous creation of over 200 
village corporations tempered the regional model (McBeath & Morehouse 1980). Moreover, when the 
United States federal government reinforced nation-to-nation relationships with Indigenous 
populations in 1994, it did so by reaffirming the rights to Indigenous self-government through the 
recognition of village tribal governments (Case 2005).3 There has also been some limited movement 
in this direction—towards the combination of regional institutions and local self-government—in 
northern Canada: in the Sahtu land claim region of the Northwest Territories, self-government is being 
negotiated on a community-by-community basis.4  
By comparison, cases of strong regionalization generally evolved from layering of regional 
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institutions—operating over geographically identical territories—on top of one another. Broadly 
speaking, this is the way that Indigenous governance institutions have evolved in northern Canada. In 
1995, when the Government of Canada updated its policy of negotiation to include self-government 
provisions, the same groups that had come together to negotiate regional land claims could now enter 
into the negotiation of regional self-government (Alcantara & Davidson 2015). As these agreements 
were finalized, they overlaid existing regional corporate institutions. For those land claims not yet 
settled in 1995, self-government was added into the package of goods on the table for discussion, thus 
reinforcing the existing regional model.  
The literature has begun to explore how these distinctly regional models of governance affect northern 
politics, with a focus on what types of policy authority they have, how regional governance is 
structured, and the implications for regional and national politics (Abele & Prince 2006; Anders & 
Anders 1986; Wilson & Alcantara 2014). In their 2014 article, Wilson and Alcantara explore some of 
these implications by looking at Inuit political development in the Canadian north. They present a 
model (duplicated below in Table 1) that sets out the potential for intra-jurisdictional relations5 within 
Inuit political regions, based on the sequence and form of land claims and self-government 
settlements:   
Table 1: Model of Regional Institutions & Intra-Jurisdictional Relations 
 Land claims and self-government 
completed at the same time 
Land claim agreement first, self-
government agreement later 
Indigenous 
Government 
1. No interaction because there is no 
land claims organization to compete 
with the Inuit government (i.e. 
Nunatsiavut) 
2. Interactions between Inuit 
government and land-claims 
organization (i.e. potentially the 
Inuvialuit Region) 
Public 
government 
3. Interactions between the Inuit-
dominated public government and the 
land-claims organization (i.e. 
potentially Nunavik) 
4. Interactions between the Inuit-
dominated public government and the 
land-claims organization (i.e. Nunavut) 
(Wilson & Alcantara 2014) 
This typology presents a useful starting point for understanding these regions as political units. It 
presents a theoretical model through which to explore how actors are engaged in policy and highlights 
how the timing of institutional development shapes the ways institutions operate together. 
Nonetheless, some important gaps remain. One issue arises in the equal treatment of the creation of 
Nunavut—which in some ways combines the phenomena of decentralization and regionalization—
with the other types of (purely regional) political development they explore. Though the creation of 
Nunavut came about through a similar process of land claims and negotiation, as a Canadian territory, 
Nunavut has a distinctly different relationship with the Government of Canada. A bigger issue, 
however, is that the typology is limited to Canada and, furthermore, to the Inuit within Canada. While 
these limitations form a reasonable boundary to the project, there are important implications to 
thinking through regional development and intra-jurisdictional relationships both for other Inuit 
groups (such as in Alaska or Greenland) as well as for other Aboriginal groups throughout the Arctic 
region who have also engaged in the project of regionalization. In essence, their model of institutional 
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layering builds a useful ideal-type for understanding intra-jurisdictional relations once regional 
institutions of Indigenous governance are in place and in operation.   
When we attempt to export this model outside of Inuit northern Canada and into the rest of Arctic 
North America, the prospect of the ‘completeness’ of regional development becomes complicated. 
Throughout the Arctic, and even within Arctic North America, regionalization is a largely unfinished 
project. By looking beyond the ideal-types of regional institutional development, we can begin to build 
a more comprehensive understanding of how regional organizations interact in dynamic models. In 
particular, the inclusion of Alaska’s experience in the framework strongly disrupts the notion that 
strong models of regional development are a common or even an expected outcome. The next section 
of the paper will expand on Alcantara and Wilson’s typology of intra-jurisdictional dynamics by 
exploring how regions were constructed across the northern United States (Alaska) and northern 
Canada (particularly in the Northwest Territories). It will consider how the factors of timing and 
institutional identity have shaped organizational development and the policy scope practiced by 
regional Indigenous governing authorities. 
Constructing regions in Alaska and northern Canada 
Despite the fact that the native regional corporations (NRCs) became a central component of modern 
land claims in both the Alaska and Northern Canada, differences in how land claims were settled have 
led to distinctly different outcomes throughout the North American Arctic. The land claim process 
was settled quickly for Alaska—over a period of three years—through a process of Congressional 
hearings and political lobbying. By comparison, northern Canada has adopted a much more prolonged 
process of negotiation (Scholtz 2006). These differences have structured the outcomes of regional 
development throughout the north. 
The idea for NRCs was first introduced in a 1968 report from the Governor’s Task Force on Native 
Land Claims in Alaska (Governor’s Task Force 1968). The idea of the NRCs to hold and manage 
Native lands advanced a distinctly regional template through which native claims would be 
implemented. Many rallied around this new venue for political and economic development, including 
the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN), which was the main body through which Alaska Natives 
were represented in negotiations. In particular, the AFN threw its weight behind the development of 
twelve Alaska Native Corporations, to be divided along the lines of common geographic, economic, 
and cultural interests.6 Yet despite the creation of regional boundaries along common interests, the 
regions themselves were constructs of geographic and historical convenience, and blurred the lines 
between many more distinct Indigenous groups. Prior to beginning negotiation on the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 39 separate native protests had been made laying claims to parts of 
Alaska7 (Brady 1967). The formation of twelve distinct regions thus resulted in boundaries that split 
across groups and created regions with (generally) more highly mixed Native populations (see Table 
2, which divides the Alaska native population along the line of American Indian and Inuit, two 
categories which hide further cultural variation within those distinctions).  
Despite the top-down nature of regional definition, ANCSA was a landmark agreement between the 
United States federal government and the Alaska Native population. Following its finalization in 1971, 
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the Act transferred 40 million acres of land to Alaska Natives, and provided nearly one billion dollars 
as part of the settlement (Hirschfield 1992). 
Table 2: Regional Heterogeneity under ANCSA (1970) 
   High Regional Heterogeneity 
 Alaska Native Population 
Twelve ANCSA Regions % Indian % Inuit 
1. Cook Inlet Native Association 39.1 60.9 
2. Chugach Native Association 20.8 79.2 
3. Tanana Chiefs Conference 81.7 18.3 
|| || || 
10. Bering Strait Native Association 0.4 99.6 
11. Arctic Slope Native Association 0.4 99.6 
12. Northwest Alaska Native Association 0.2 99.8 
   Low Regional Heterogeneity 
Within this system that otherwise created weak regional governance and strong local governance, 
Alaska’s two northern-most regions (Northwest and North Slope) have developed a unique model. 
Like most of  the other regions, the regional Alaska Native Corporations worked to solidify the 
mandate of  a profit-based corporation, while the regional Non-Profit Native Associations (which had 
been key participants in AFN and thus in ANCSA negotiations) reorganized into regional non-profit 
corporations in order to access federal funds and to manage regional health and social services. 
However, the Northwest and North Slope regions went further, and worked to establish a third 
regional institution through the creation of borough government.8 The creation of borough 
governments—which are regional public governments—introduced an “as-close-as-possible” version 
of Indigenous regional self-government in these two regions. Within the two regions, the regional 
Alaska native corporation, the non-profit native association, and the borough government have 
coordinated a stronger form of regionalism in the Alaskan north (though with some important caveats 
on whom each of the institutions provide services to): 
Table 3: Institutional Development & Regionalization after ANCSA 
Alaska Native 
Corporation 
Non-Profit Native 
Associations 
Regional Borough 
Government 
Village Tribal 
Gov’ts 
Regionalization  
Chugach Alaska -- -- 6 Weak  
Calista Corp. 
Association of Village Council 
Presidents 
-- 56 Weak  
Bristol Bay Bristol Bay Native Ass’c -- 32 Weak  
Doyon, Ltd. Tanana Chiefs Conference -- 32 Weak 
Bering Straits Kawerak, Inc. -- 18 Weak  
Aleut Corp. Aleutian/Pribilof Islands  -- 15 Weak  
Sealaska 
Central Council Tlingit & 
Haida Indian Tribes 
-- 10 Weak  
Koniag, Inc. Kodiak Area Native Ass’c -- 9 Weak  
Ahtna Inc. Copper River Native Ass’c -- 8 Weak  
Cook Inlet Cook Inlet Tribal Council -- 8 Weak  
NANA  Maniilaq Northwest Arctic Borough 11 Medium (ad hoc) 
Arctic Slope  Arctic Slope Native Ass’c North Slope Borough 8 Medium (ad hoc) 
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Unlike the United States, Canada did not settle northern claims in one fell swoop. Instead, Canada’s 
decision to introduce a policy of negotiation in 1973 clearly set the development of Arctic 
regionalization in motion. In comparison to Alaska’s ad hoc solution, negotiation favoured the 
development of clearly defined regions constrained by group identity. The structure of the policy tied 
collective rights to the identification of distinct groups that occupied and utilized a bounded 
geographic territory. 
Under Comprehensive Land Claims (CLCs), the Government of Canada invited Indigenous groups 
that had never previously signed a treaty to begin negotiating claims. This did not necessarily mean 
that singularly homogenous groups advanced their claims (for example, the Sahtu land claim was a 
combined Dene and Métis claim). However, whereas Alaska’s process set regional boundaries as the 
ANCSA process approached finalization, Canada’s modern land claims pushed Indigenous peoples 
to self-organize into most-similar groups based on region, culture, and ethnicity prior to negotiation. 
By virtue of this group self-identification, the conceptualization of regions in northern Canada was 
more deliberate. More importantly, the lengthy negotiations resulted in stronger units of regional 
governance than those created in Alaska. Initially (and like Alaska), the settled claims relied on the 
transfer of land, money, and resource revenues through the creation of regional corporations. 
However, these regional corporations were primarily not-for-profit organizations and Canada’s model 
of regionalism was embedded through the creation of regulatory boards whose borders were 
geographically identical to the regional land claims. These regulatory boards institutionalized 
Indigenous participation on regional environmental screening committees and review boards9 and 
have reinforced Indigenous authority over resource development (White 2002).  
Canada’s policy of negotiation continued to evolve throughout the next few decades as the country’s 
legal regime changed. Indigenous collective rights were reinforced through different venues, including 
through the period of constitutional negotiations in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Though the Meech 
Lake and Charlottetown Accords ultimately failed, the negotiations shaped a new path forward and 
significantly affected the norms regarding the place of Indigenous Canadians in the federation. To 
reflect these changing norms, Canada’s CLC policy was updated in 1995 to include the negotiation of 
Indigenous self-government (Alcantara & Davidson 2015). During this period of  updating (between 
1973 and 1995), 13 comprehensive land claim agreements or modern treaties were negotiated. None 
of  these claims, including the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (1984) and the Gwich’in Agreement (1992), 
created Indigenous self-government. These processes of policy layering have resulted in the creation 
of strong regional governance models, yet not all groups have moved evenly towards this realization 
of regional policy autonomy: 
Table 4: Institutional Development & Regionalization in Canada’s Northwest Territories10 
Negotiated Land Claims  Regional Self-Gov’t Regionalization  
Sahtu Dene and Metis CLC Agreement11 -- Weak (community SG) 
Inuvialuit Final Agreement Ad hoc (Inuvialuit Regional Corp.) Medium (ad hoc) 
Gwich’in CLC Agreement Ad hoc (Gwich’in Tribal Council) Medium (ad hoc) 
Tlicho CLC Agreement Tlicho Government Strong (regional SG) 
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The regional institutional development of the Northwest Territories (NWT) is illustrative of the 
processes of regionalization in Canada; the Territory saw some of the earliest movement towards land 
claims (with the Inuvialuit), while later entrants into the process (the Tlicho) emerge with very different 
results. Regionalization in the NWT also clearly highlights the degree to which the Canadian model 
emphasizes identity in the development of regional governance. The implications of timing, identity, 
and institutional layering on regional models will be further explored in the next section. 
Layered authority & ad hoc institutional development  
Indigenous regional governance in the North American Arctic has not moved evenly in the direction 
of strong regional models. In the absence of Indigenous regional self-government, each one of the 
four regions of interest—the Northwest and North Slope regions in Alaska, and the Gwich’in and 
Inuvialuit Regions of the Northwest Territories—highlight important intra-jurisdictional tensions 
brought about by the timing and form of institutional development. Each case has exhibited the 
combination of (1) institutions undergoing functional conversion, whereby actors harness the abilities 
of existing organizations to meet new ends; and (2) institutional layering, adding on new institutions 
to fill in policy gaps (Thelen 2000). Moreover, these cases can be used to expand our understanding 
of how conversion and layering interact with a third important factor, institutional identity.  
Alaska: Timing and institutional development – implications for policy scope 
The regions created through ANCSA have not uniformly advanced towards regionalization. Broadly 
speaking, the regional corporations are weak units of  governance.  Moreover, they occupy a fraught 
location in the politics of  Alaska. The Native Corporations were designed as self-contained 
institutions, divorced from Native tribal governance; they were conceived as tools to integrate Native 
Alaskans into the modern market economy, rather than to act as a bridge between traditional practices 
and the modern economy (Berardi 2005). 
Given this complicated relationship, Native Alaskans did not want to build upon the NRCs as they 
worked towards developing further institutions of  governance (McBeath & Morehouse 1980). Instead, 
as the relationship between the federal government and Native Alaskans evolved, local tribal 
governance (at the village level) gained renewed support. In the 1990s, the federal government 
reaffirmed its nation-to-nation relationship with Alaska Natives, which for Alaska meant the 
recognition of  229 village tribal governments. Co-management institutions and subsistence policy 
were layered on top of  these tribal governments and focused on the participation tribal organizations, 
thus securing local governance over regional governance as the model for Alaska. Though the non-
profit Native associations generally act as regional coordinating bodies for tribal governments (in most 
of  the twelve regions of  Alaska), taking these developments and ANCSA at face value, it is fair to 
suggest that Alaska has evolved weak regional governance and strong local governance. The North 
Slope and Northwest regions of  Alaska, however, stand apart.   
In northern Alaska, two geographically large regional Alaska Native Corporations were created 
following the passage of  ANCSA in 1971: the NANA Corporation in the Northwest and the Arctic 
Slope Regional Corporation (ARSC) in Alaska’s North Slope region. There are two notable factors 
particular to the space in which these institutions were created. Firstly, the corporate boundaries 
76  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
Regional Governance Without Self-Government 
covered regions populated by Alaska’s Inuit (Iñupiat) population (with high regional population 
homogeneity). Thus, even though the regions created through the ANCSA corporations were not 
distinctly “Iñupiat” institutions, strong cultural cohesion through common identity removed an 
important barrier to regional institutional layering. Second, the virtual lack of  any other governance 
organizations in the two regions meant that there was no real competition over policy. Though tribal 
government existed to some degree, there was little (if  any) real state- or federal-level involvement in 
the far north.  
 Building borough government 
Though the finalization of  ANCSA meant that the resultant NRCs could trade on their land resources 
and could collect resource revenues on private land development, the lack of  a strong system of  local 
governance threatened to undermine the efforts by local Iñupiat populations to control the north. 
While the ANCSA negotiations moved forward in the early 1970s, the leadership of  the North Slope 
began to organize for ‘strong local government.’ The North Slope Iñupiat applied to the Local 
Boundary Commission of  Alaska to create the North Slope Borough, a regional municipal 
government that would share the regional boundaries of  the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation. In 
the early 1980s, the leadership of  the Northwest Arctic Region followed a similar path. Following the 
discovery of  a significant zinc deposit in the Northwest region, the leadership of  the NANA Regional 
Corporation and Maniilaq (the non-profit native association) pushed for a regional borough 
government. The borders of  this northwest borough would be geographically identical with those of  
the corporation, encompassing the future Red Dog Mine development. The North Slope Borough 
was incorporated as a home-rule regional municipality in 1973; the Northwest Arctic Borough was 
similarly incorporated over a decade later in 1986. 
Despite their similar evolution, the Northwest Arctic Region and the North Slope Region in Alaska 
have clear differences in the practice of policy authority. For example, the Arctic Slope Native 
Association (ASNA; the non-profit native association) in the North Slope region has limited policy 
authority, overseeing the delivery of healthcare services. By comparison, Maniilaq in the Northwest 
delivers healthcare services but also has a significant role in social service administration, tribal 
services, and public health. Policy authority and regional service delivery is generally broken down as 
follows:  
Table 5: Policy Authority & Service Delivery 
  Alaska 
  Northwest / NANA   North Slope / ASRC 
 Native 
Corporation 
Nonprofit 
Association 
Borough 
Government 
Native 
Corporation 
Nonprofit 
Association 
Borough     
Government 
Economic Development       
Employment Services X    X   
Workforce Development X    X  X 
Energy – Price Relief X      X 
Land and Wildlife       
Land Use Planning X  X X  X 
Co-management12  X  X   X 
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Renewable resource 
management 
X     X 
Social Services       
Healthcare provision  X   X  
Income Support X X  X   
Cultural Services X X  X  X 
Language Revitalization X     X 
Public Health  X   X X 
Scholarships (education) X X X X  X 
Children & youth services  X    X 
Post-Secondary 
Education 
     X 
Social Services  X    X 
Emergency Services   X   X 
Tribal Programs       
Village assistance  X X    
Governance programs  X     
Tribal operations  X     
The timing of institutional development constrained how the regional organization of ad hoc policy 
authority evolved in northern Alaska. In the North Slope, the borough government was incorporated 
within two years of the completion of the land claim. Because of this, neither the regional corporation 
nor the regional native association had the time to expand beyond the scope of their original mandates 
establish a distinct role in the regional policy (though the scope of the ARSC did undergo functional 
conversion as it began to creep into educational scholarships, cultural services, and income support, 
expanding beyond a purely economic role in the region).  
Due to the timing of its early creation (relative to the other institutions), the borough carved out a 
significant policy role in the region by essentially replacing any potential role of the state of Alaska. 
The North Slope Borough took on policy oversight and delivery for social services (including the 
regional health department), emergency services (including public safety, the fire department, search 
and rescue), and housing policy, among others. It is also the organizing body through which most of 
the regional wildlife co-management structures are managed, thus building a strong relationship with 
federal and state governments in this policy area. In essence, the North Slope Borough is the regional 
institution through which most policy development (from social services to regional economic 
development) occurs, limiting the regional corporation and the regional native association to much 
smaller mandates.  
By contrast, the Northwest Arctic Borough was incorporated 15 years following the finalization of 
ANCSA. During that period, both the NANA Regional Corporation and Maniilaq (the regional native 
nonprofit association) significantly expanded on their original mandates to fill in many of the policy 
gaps within the region. It was not until the early 1980s that the discovery of significant zinc resources 
in the region precipitated discussions regarding a borough government. With the leadership of 
Maniilaq and NANA at the forefront of organizing the borough application to the Bureau of Land 
Management, the resultant institution simply filled in many of the gaps that remained in the 
governance of Alaska’s Northwest.  
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 Regional governance without self-government 
An important caveat remains in thinking about regional development in Arctic Alaska. Though these 
borough governments were created in Indigenous-majority regions, they are not regional Indigenous 
governments. Regional Indigenous governments, such as those found in Canada, have citizenship 
models based on ethnicity (in which voting members belong to a specific Indigenous group, as do all 
candidates for leadership). In contrast, the borough model is a public government that has a 
citizenship model based on local residency. That is not to say that public governments cannot operate 
as de facto Indigenous governments, depending on population makeup. Indeed, that is very much the 
case in the two northern regions of  Alaska, both of  which currently have majority Indigenous 
populations and all-Native councils.  
Table 6: Alaska’s Northern Boroughs 
Borough Name Population (2010) % Native (2010) Area (square miles) 
North Slope 9,430 55.4% ~88,800 
Northwest Arctic 7,523 82.0% ~36,000 
Furthermore, while the Northwest Arctic Borough and the North Slope Borough are public 
governments, they tie the operation of  governance to the local Iñupiat culture. The municipal code 
of  the North Slope Borough notes “the very existence of  the Code is proof  that the Iñupiat of  the 
North Slope have succeeded in returning self-rule to their land” (North Slope Borough Code 2015). 
Meanwhile, the Northwest Arctic Borough “recognizes the Iñupiaq language as the language of  the 
original people of  the borough” and it is the policy of  the borough to perpetuate the use of  the 
Iñupiaq language as a key part of  the region’s culture and values (Northwest Arctic Borough Code 
2015). 
However, because the boroughs are tied to the principles of  local government rather than to the 
principles of  Indigenous self-government, they are vulnerable to population shifts. Though the 
Northwest Arctic Borough’s population has remained relatively constant over the last four decades, 
sitting at 85% Alaska Native, the North Slope has seen its proportional Native population drop 
significantly from approximately 85% in the early 1970s to 54% in 2010 (ISER 1970; State of  Alaska 
2015). This has not yet begun to affect the makeup of  the borough governments; nonetheless, the 
potential remains and is obvious in other venues. For example, while the population of  the village of  
Kotzebue is similar to the Northwest Arctic Borough as a whole (at approximately 85% Native 
Alaskan), the public municipal government of  Kotzebue is only 28% Native Alaskan (2 of  7 
councilors). 
Northern Canada (NWT): identity and institutional development  
In Canada’s Northwest Territories, three groups finalized their land claims prior to the federal 
government’s 1995 decision to include self-government negotiations as part of the process of 
Comprehensive Land Claims, thus ensuring the development of strong regions from that point 
forward. In each of these three cases, regions were co-determined on questions of identity—the claims 
put forward (and which ultimately formed the finalized agreements) were based on a culture and 
history of traditional land use, and on distinct Indigenous identities: the Gwich’in claim was advanced 
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by the Gwich’in First Nation; the Inuvialuit claim (a northern Inuit group) split off from the larger 
Inuit land claim that would later create Nunavut; and the Sahtu land claim brought two groups 
together, combining the overlapping interests of the region’s Dene and Métis populations under a 
single land claim. Two of these land claims groups—the Gwich’in and the Inuvialuit—have advanced 
towards stronger regionalization in the absence of negotiated self-government, while the third—the 
Sahtu land claim—is moving in a direction of Alaska’s broader model of governance (perhaps due to 
the similar nature of its regional population heterogeneity), with a regional land claim and the 
development of community self-government.  
Despite operating under a policy framework that kept self-government off of the table during the land 
claims negotiations, both the Inuvialuit and the Gwich’in have long pushed for strong regional 
governance. From the beginning of their land claims negotiations in the mid-1970s, the Inuvialuit 
made clear their desire for regional self-government to manage administrative policy responsibilities 
and health and social service delivery to the Inuvialuit population. Indeed, the model favoured by the 
Inuvialuit resembled something quite like Alaska’s model of borough government. As early as their 
first land claim document, Inuvialuit Nunangat, the Inuvialuit leadership pushed for the development 
of regional public government, with the ability to tax development for revenue (IRC 2009). The 
Gwich’in claim also attempted to move in the direction of self-government. However, in the absence 
of the updated policy that would come just three years later, the Gwich’in could not fully secure their 
preferred option (though the land claim included the provision that the group could enter into separate 
self-government negotiations at a future date).  
As both groups continued to press the federal government for self-government, Inuvialuit and 
Gwich’in leadership decided that, in light of the geographic overlap of the two populations in the 
Northwest Territories, they would combine their push for self-government in the form of the 
Beaufort-Delta Regional Government (Alcantara & Davidson 2015). The Beaufort-Delta government 
would have transferred federal and/or territorial jurisdiction over health and education, social services, 
justice and policy, among other areas, to the new regional government (GNWT 2001; for a full 
breakdown, see Table 7). Though negotiations advanced and an Agreement-in-Principle was signed 
in 2000, the Beaufort-Delta claim ultimately fell apart. In 2003, the Gwich’in withdrew from the joint 
negotiations for the Beaufort-Delta government, saying that the Agreement-in-Principle no longer 
represented the goals of the Gwich’in population (for a more complete view of the dynamics present 
in this decision, see Alcantara & Davidson 2015). Both groups have since begun negotiating separate, 
more limited, forms of Aboriginal self-government. 
 Building de facto models  
Had the Beaufort-Delta government been established, there would have been a clear increase in the 
policy authority of the Gwich’in and the Inuvialuit in the realm of social policy. Many of the social 
policy areas that the Gwich’in Tribal Council (GTC) and the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (IRC) 
currently operate in (seen in Table 7) would have been consolidated and moved over to the new 
government (such that the IRC and GTC would have operated under smaller mandates). Similarly, 
under the proposed Beaufort Delta government, the Territorial government would have transferred 
the jurisdiction over many of the remaining human and social development policy areas.  
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Table 7: Policy Authority & Service Delivery 
  Canada 
  Inuvialuit Region   Gwich’in Region 
 Inuvialuit Regional 
Corporation 
Beaufort-Delta 
Public Government 
Gwich’in Tribal    
Council 
Economic Development 
Employment Services X   X 
Workforce Development X  X X 
Energy – Price Relief    
Land and Wildlife 
Land Use Planning X  X 
Co-management  X  X 
Renewable resource mgmt. X  X 
Social Services 
Healthcare provision  X X 
Income Support X X X 
Cultural Services  X X 
Language Revitalization X X X 
Public Health  X X 
Scholarships (education) X  X 
Children & youth services X X X 
Education (K-12)  X  
Post-Secondary Education  X  
Social Services  X X 
Emergency Services  X  
Local Government  X  
Taxation  X  
Justice and Policing  X  
The promise of strong regional government remains for these two Canadian cases (and the Inuvialuit 
have announced that they have finalized an Agreement-in-Principle on self-government; CBC 2015), 
however, the eventual outcome of regional Indigenous governance will likely be more limited on 
policy scope and jurisdiction. Nonetheless, in the absence of self-government, these two regions have 
clearly carved out a policy space.   
 Regional governance without self-government 
For both the Inuvialuit and the Gwich’in, regional institutional development has been highly 
constrained by factors of institutional identity. For the Gwich’in, the land claims institutions developed 
in 1992 were actively integrated into the Gwich’in Tribal Council, the existing Gwich’in institutions 
of First Nations government recognized under the Indian Act. Upon settling the Gwich’in Land Claim, 
the new institutions of governance (including the regional regulatory boards and the Gwich’in 
Development Corporation, akin to the NRCs) were folded into the pre-existing institutions of First 
Nations governance. The Gwich’in have moved into program delivery, building on the provisions in 
their agreement for administrative governance. Today, the Gwich’in Tribal Council has departments 
overseeing regional health and wellness, language and cultural services (through the Gwich’in Social 
and Cultural Institute), land management, and educational scholarships, among others.  However, one 
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important issue remains for the Gwich’in as they work towards self-government. In most cases, the 
negotiation of self-government means that the federal Indian Act no longer applies to self-governing 
Aboriginal governments. This was one of the major sticking points in the negotiation of the Beaufort-
Delta government, as the Gwich’in were not prepared to dismantle the existing institutions of tribal 
governance in favour of a new model (Alcantara & Davidson 2015). As they continue to move towards 
Aboriginal self-government, these institutions may have to once again change, allowing a new form 
of regionalism evolve.  
By comparison, as an Inuit population in Canada, the Inuvialuit had to rely on building out their 
governance regime from the organizational structures established through their land claim (the 
Inuvialuit Final Agreement 1984). With the exception of the Committee of Original Peoples 
Entitlement—the Inuvialuit land claim advocacy group that operated throughout the 1970s—there 
were no distinctly “Inuvialuit” institutions that pre-dated their land claim. Thus, the expansion of 
regional Inuvialuit governance has been operationalized through the land claims institutions: the 
Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (IRC) and the Inuvialuit Game Council (IGC) (Wilson & Alcantara 
2012). Through these organizational bodies, and in the absence of regional government, the Inuvialuit 
leadership expanded the role of the IRC into policy areas traditionally thought to belong to 
government. After implementation, the IRC not only took on the role of negotiator for self-
government, but also quickly moved into social program development and service delivery. This has 
included the delivery of social services, income support, and public and community health programs, 
among other policy areas (Wilson & Alcantara 2012). They have a role in delivering the Inuvialuit 
Child Development Program, the Inuvialuit Cultural Resource Centre, and coordinating the Brighter 
Futures program, accessing federal government funds to expand into these policy areas. 
Despite the setback faced in establishing a regional public government, and in the absence of securing 
fully negotiated Indigenous self-government, both the Inuvialuit and the Gwich’in have carved out de 
facto models of regional governance. They have been constrained in their development by the tight 
relationship between institutions and identity (which acted as a barrier to building a regional Beaufort 
Delta government). However, by building on their existing institutions of governance, they have 
transformed more narrow organizational mandates into something much more far-reaching in the 
interim. 
Conclusion: capitalizing on capacity  
Indigenous groups in Canada and the United States have clearly moved the Arctic towards a model of 
regional Indigenous governance, and today they have a role in the development of policy and delivery 
of programs and services. However, the factors of timing and institutional identity have constrained 
the ability of some regions to advance towards strong models of regionalization.  
As a general observation, the early entrants into land claims have had the most difficultly in securing 
coordinated regional models of governance. This has been true for most of the regions within the 
state of Alaska (which collectively settled in 1971), and for the Inuvialuit, Gwich’in, and Sahtu regions 
in the Northwest Territories (each of which settled their claims prior to the 1995 policy change on 
self-government). As a second general observation, those regions with homogenous populations have 
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had fewer barriers to institutional layering (and thus the development of stronger regions with ad hoc 
authority) than more heterogeneous regions. This helps to explain both the emergence of strong 
regional models in the Iñupiat-inhabited northern regions of Alaska, and sheds light on the decision 
of the Sahtu region to explore community self-government. It is also an important intervening factor 
in understanding why the combined Gwich’in-Inuvialuit regional government did not advance as a 
successful model. Both timing and identity have structured how institutions have layered on top of 
one another to create strong models of regional governance in the north. 
Unpacking ad hoc regional Indigenous authority is key to understanding one of the primary 
mechanisms through which local Indigenous populations interact with Arctic policy. Though some 
cases see the promise of more ‘concrete’ regional self-government, other regions will continue to 
operate in more dynamic models. By focusing on these ad hoc models, we have a better understanding 
of the ways in which Indigenous organizations have transformed their operations to expand into new 
policy areas. As such, we have a better understanding of the existing regional capacity and the 
opportunities for building partnerships with other levels of governance. For example, as the Arctic 
Council continues to tackle the challenges that come with coordinating Arctic search and rescue, the 
resources and experiences of Alaska’s northern borough governments—which have been conducting 
policy and service delivery in this area for over thirty years—may provide some important lessons. 
Meanwhile, northern Indigenous governments in the Canadian north can tap into resources and 
knowledge from other regions that have faced (or are facing) similar population, infrastructure, and 
fiscal challenges. This exploration presents a starting point for understanding both how new regional 
organizations interact intra-jurisdictionally and inter-regionally across new regional borders. 
Ultimately, despite the many barriers to their creation, these regions are poised to carve out an even 
greater role in territorial and international Arctic development. 
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Notes 
1. The classical definition of regionalism, developed by Michael Keating and John Loughlin, 
defines regionalism as pressure from a region (by regional political elites) towards the central 
government demanding more (cultural) autonomy, social priorities, democratization, and 
decentralization. The processes explored in this paper do not always fit neatly under this 
definition, as the definition presumes that region is largely pre-defined. The process of land 
claims—whereby regional Indigenous elites place pressure on the central government to 
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transfer autonomy and authority to new structures of governance—suggests the creation of new 
and/or the solidification of existing (but abstract) boundaries: while Indigenous traditional lands 
and territories are bounded conceptually, the modern land claim process institutionalized these 
boundaries within western legal and political traditions. This paper does not cover all the 
possible ways and forms that local mobilization engages in processes of regionalization, and 
there may be opportunities to better tease out ‘traditional’ regionalism from processes that 
occur under ‘indigenous regionalism / self-governance’. 
2. The Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan 
Council, the Gwich’in Council International, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples 
of the North, and the Saami Council. 
3. Alaska has 229 federally recognized tribes. 
4. To date, only the Deline community self-government agreement has been finalized, though 
the other communities within the boundaries of the regional land claim are currently in 
negotiations. 
5. In their paper, Alcantara & Wilson define intra-jurisdictional relations as the “relationships 
between separate governance bodies within a single jurisdictional unit” (45). Thus, these 
relationships operate in a clear geographical and regional location. 
6. A 13th corporation was also created for Alaska Natives no longer residing in the state. As such, 
it is not a “regional corporation” as its endowment did not include a geographical unit within 
the state of Alaska. 
7. By May 17, 1967 the following claims (Native Protests) had been made to the Department of  
the Interior:  (1) Mentasta; (2) Gulkana; (3) Copper Centre; (4) Yakataga; (5) Lake Aleknagik; 
(6) Stevens Village; (7) Birch Creek; (8) Minto; (9) Nenana; (10) Tanacross; (11) Prince William 
Sound; (12) Anvik; (13) Northway; (14) Chilkoot; (15) Cantwell; (16) St. George Island; (17) 
Eklutna; (18) Bethel; (19) Southeast; (20) Katalia; (21) Copper River; (22) Kaltag; (23) Huslia; 
(24) Kotzebue; (25) Anaktuvuk Pass; (26) North Slope; (27) Venetie and Arctic Village; (28) 
Chalkyitsik; (29) Eagle; (30) Seward Peninsula; (31) Knik; (32) St. Lawrence Island; (33) 
McGrath; (34) Nondalton; (35) Kenai; (36) Tanana; (37) Alaska Peninsula-Kodiak; (38) Holy 
Cross; (39) Kotzebue. 
8. Local leaders would also include a fourth regional institution: the school board, overseeing 
education policy.  
9. These boards include land and water boards, renewable resource boards, and environmental 
impact review boards (though some of these are being threatened under new legislation which 
would merge many of these boards into a single super-board). 
10. The table does not include the ongoing land claims negotiations within the Territory.  
11. Self-government is being negotiated for the communities of: Deline (finalized); Colville Lake; 
Fort Good Hope; Norman Wells; and Tulita. 
12. Note: Co-management, and the degree to which the institutional structures of Indigenous co-
management are reinforced through federal statutes and relationships differ between Canada 
and the United States. 
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Arctic Council Environmental Initiatives:  
Can the United States Promote Implementation?  
 
 
Erica Dingman 
 
 
When the United States assumed the Arctic Council chairmanship in 2015 they came with the intent to promote full 
implementation in all Arctic states of the Black Carbon and Methane Task Force recommendations. Reduction of these short-lived 
climate forcers (SLCFs) would have multiple benefits for environmental and human health, and reduce emissions that are a cause 
of global warming. Yet, with a history of pollutants migrating to the Arctic from elsewhere, and inherent limitations at the Arctic 
Council, is to suggest that a paradigm shift is in order. Thus, to the extent that the U.S. has the capacity to exert influence, 
implementation of emission reductions must start at home and likely requires robust engagement of outside actors. This article will 
address how the U.S. is demonstrating an intent to tackle SLCFs, specifically black carbon, through policy and regulation; the role 
of renewable energy sources in Alaska; and why an engaged private sector is critical. To engender change will require a multi-level 
cross-sector approach.   
 
 
“A degenerative disease will not be cured by procrastination. It requires decisive action.” 
- Peter F. Drucker, The Theory of the Business, Harvard Business Review  
  
Introduction 
When the United States assumed the Arctic Council chairmanship on April 24 2015, Secretary of State 
John Kerry remarked at the Legislative Assembly of Nunavut in Iqaluit, Canada that “One of the 
biggest challenges everybody has talked about today is climate change. The numbers are alarming, and 
that’s putting it mildly” (Kerry 2015). Toting a self-acknowledged ‘ambitious agenda’ the U.S. will 
address the impacts of climate change, which includes promoting full implementation in all Arctic 
states of the Task Force on Short-lived Climate Forcers and Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane (2013) 
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recommendations. Reduction of short-lived climate forcers, such as black carbon and methane, would 
have multiple benefits for human health, agriculture and ecosystems to aid in reducing the potential 
for crop failure, early death, and planetary warming. Observation of pollutants in the Arctic has long 
been recorded, and the sheer plentitude of documentation originating from the Arctic Council alone 
attest to the challenges that lay ahead.  
This article considers the narratives, policies and actions taken to address the well-known evidence of 
Arctic pollution, specifically black carbon, also known as soot. To what extent is the U.S. able to exert 
influence beyond national borders in the implementation of short-lived climate forcer reductions? 
What actions has the U.S. taken at home? For it is by example that the U.S. can best engage other 
nations to develop measures and implement existing policy to mitigate the effects of climate change.  
Pollutants: Documentation & a slow road to action 
The appearance of possible pollutants in the Arctic first occurred in the late 1880s with the observation 
of ‘dark stains’ on Arctic snow and ice by Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen. From the 1940s to 
the 1960s U.S. weather reconnaissance flight crews reported observations of “dense haze that 
extended for thousands of miles” over the Arctic (Soros 1992: 8). However, it was not until 1987 
when President Mikhail Gorbachev appealed to the international community in Murmansk, Russia 
calling for demilitarization of the Arctic region that the stage was set for multilateral engagement on 
environmental protection. A significant outcome of his now famous speech was the formation of the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991 (Heininen 2011), which represented a 
“collective, circumpolar approach toward environmental issues,” (Canadian Arctic Resources 
Committee 1993-94).  
In the United States, pressing concern about the environmental legacy of nuclear arms led to the 1992 
U.S. Senate Hearing Select Committee on Intelligence, Radioactive and Other Environmental Threats to the United 
States and the Arctic resulting from past Soviet activities. The proceedings, which took place in Alaska, 
made public the extent to which Soviet radioactive contaminants from nuclear reactors, accidents and 
“reckless nuclear waste disposal” had permeated the Arctic region, reaching the shores of Alaska 
(United States 1992: 2). Yet Alaska’s Senator Frank Murkowski, the Committee Vice Chairman, 
proclaimed that radioactive containments were “just a part of a larger Arctic pollution problem,” a 
point that was reiterated in the testimonies of numerous others throughout the proceedings (ibid). 
Pollutants in the Arctic region, he noted, including “small amounts of heavy metals possibly from 
industrial pollution or Arctic Haze,” had contaminated the principle food source of Alaska’s residents 
including walrus and other marine mammals (ibid).  
Of course, Russia alone was not the only offender. At a 1993 workshop on Arctic contamination, 
Murkowski (1993) stated that North American Distant Early Warning, or DEW Line, sites in Alaska 
(these sites extended from the Aleutian Islands to the Atlantic Ocean) and over 150 U.S. defense sites 
in Alaska alone had been identified as waste sites contaminated by North American Cold War testing, 
storage, disposal, and dumping of radioactive tracers. As was argued by numerous witnesses during 
the U.S. Senate Hearing on Soviet Activities, Murkowski (1993) urged the U.S. to support the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), the cornerstone of AEPS, and pressed Washington 
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for funding sufficient for monitoring and clean up.  
Indeed, it was unclear as to whether AEPS, and later the Arctic Council (AC), would garner the 
required pan-Arctic political attention and financial commitment required to deal with the “serious 
consequences of transboundary environmental issues” (VanderZwaag, Huebert & Ferrara 2002:2). 
According to a 2002 report, the AC had “largely involved studying and talking about environmental 
problems with little concrete action,” and noted, “between 1994 and 1996, AMAP was allocated only 
$ 3,875,200” (ibid: 9). While in principle all Arctic Council member states have, since inception, 
committed to environmental protection in the Arctic, the Council remains soft law-based, focused on 
developing non-legally binding guidelines and recommendations (ibid).  
Such is the case with black carbon and methane emissions reductions. Indeed, the Iqaluit 2015 SAO 
(Senior Arctic Officials) Report to Ministers, Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions: 
An Arctic Council Framework for Action, Annex 4 (Arctic Council 2015a), outlines the agreed upon 
voluntary actions expected of Arctic states and realized “through the development of national actions 
or action plans or mitigation strategies, which can include setting of aims and objectives, implementing 
policies and regulations, identifying best practices and awareness-raising activities.”  But the Council 
Framework indirectly acknowledges that action is a long-term process, thus seeks to “promote 
enhanced action over time” (ibid). Furthermore, the Framework encourages other stakeholders, 
including civil society, other governments, financial institutions and academia to play a key role in 
helping to reduce emissions and seeks to “encourage mainstreaming of considerations of these 
emissions into their broader funding decisions” (ibid). 
Short-lived climate forcers: the role of black carbon  
Environmental issues have remained at the forefront of Arctic cooperation, first through AEPS and 
now through the Arctic Council (AC). Indeed, the AC has gained considerable recognition for their 
science-driven reports, most notably the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (2004). To address the issue 
of short-lived climate forcers (SLCF) the 2009 Tromsø Declaration launched the Task Force on Short-
Lived Climate Forcers. The resulting report, Recommendations to Reduce Black Carbon and Methane Emissions 
to Slow Arctic Climate Change (2013) concluded, “Immediate reductions in black carbon and methane 
can slow Arctic warming over the next few decades”, but that simultaneous carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emission reductions are critical to “preventing dangerous levels of climate change over the long term” 
(2). Based on these findings the Task Force for Action on Black Carbon and Methane (TFBCM) was 
established at the 2013 Kiruna Ministerial Meeting with the mandate to develop actionable arrangements to 
achieve reductions of black carbon (BC) and methane in the Arctic. 
As a 2013 scientific study confirmed, the impact of present BC emissions is considerable but that 
antecedent conditions can be traced back to industrialization. In what is hailed as a ‘landmark’ scientific 
study published in the Journal of Geophysical Research-Atmospheres (2013) the direct impact of BC is twice that 
of previous assessments. According to the study, BC, a leading cause of global warming second only 
to CO2  emissions, is found to have a direct negative impact on snow, ice, and cloud effects 
(International Geosphere 2013). This would seem contrary to the AC Task Force on Short-lived Climate 
Forcers Recommendations to Reduce Black Carbon and Methane Emissions (2013: 2), which states “Methane is 
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estimated to be the second most important greenhouse gas (GHG) emitted by human activities after 
CO2,” though the Report does acknowledge the study’s then-recent findings. 
Another scientific assessment that chronicled BC dating established that by the 1890s biofuel 
produced from open burning was the leading cause of BC emissions, followed by coal emissions from 
the 1880s to the 1950s, with the addition of diesel and return of biofuel by the latter half of the 20th 
century (Bond et al. 2007). At present, diesel engines and traditional biofuel account for 90% of BC 
emissions, with the addition of gas flaring which is associated with significant emissions in the high 
north (Bond et al. 2013). Together these pollutants contribute to destabilization of the cryosphere and 
rising temperatures (AMAP 2011). From a global perspective, the long-range impact of Arctic 
warming has a significant influence on weather patterns and rapid warming of the Northern 
Hemisphere, also affecting the monsoon season farther south (International Geosphere 2013). 
Moreover, melting land ice and glaciers do contribute to global sea-level rise (National Research 
Council 2015).  
Keeping in mind that CO2 emission reductions are paramount, BC reductions offer an achievable 
control over short-term local warming effects. For its part, the U.S., in cooperation with all Arctic 
nations, can enable the political direction required for the reduction of SLCF, starting at home. From 
a national perspective, the U.S. expects a decline in BC emissions of 86% by 2030 based on existing 
regulation (Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.) This is largely implemented through the 
Environmental Protect Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act, which continues to issue a host of 
federal regulations and standards directed at lowering toxic emissions. Further incentives are 
specifically directed toward development of renewable energy projects. In 2009, US$13.3 billion in 
federal loan guarantees was made available to 16 solar power projects. Adding to existing funding, on 
August 24, 2015, President Obama announced an additional US$1 billion directed toward “new, 
innovative projects,” including renewable energy and energy efficiency (White House 2015). These 
incentives represent a host of policy and regulatory instruments recently introduced by this 
administration to reduce the nation’s BC inventory. This serves as a compliment to the U.S. Arctic 
strategy on short-lived climate pollutants, in tandem with plans to expand the U.S. renewable energy 
partnerships in Alaska’s remote communities (White House 2014a). 
Alaska’s renewable energy potential 
Political will and government policy can either enhance or hinder the advancement of a climate-
friendly energy transition. Policy that attracts private investment and takes into account the cost of 
fossil fuel carbon emissions will more likely encourage development of renewable energy sources and 
technology. This can be achieved through numerous policy instruments including taxes, emissions 
trading and subsidy reform (Kaygusuz 2012: 1123). Without such reform on a global scale some 
estimate “that the energy mix will rely primarily on fossil fuels (80%) and energy-related CO2 emissions 
will increase by 55%” (ibid: 1117). Relative to black carbon, however, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE 2011) projects that emissions will decline by one third between 
2000 and 2020 primarily as a result of existing legislation directed at the transportation sector. An 
additional 20% reduction could be achieved through additional measures, the largest share of which 
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results from residential combustion remediation. Notably, “nearly 50% of the remaining mitigation 
potential for black carbon emissions in the UNECE region is to be found in the residential heating 
sector”. Although the U.S. and Russia are responsible for nearly 50% of these emissions, the U.S EIA 
Annual Energy Outlook (2015) reports that federal tax credits and state renewable portfolio standards 
have driven a relatively robust growth of non-hydropower renewable sources. Renewable energy 
generation is projected to increase by “72% from 2013 to 2040, accounting for more than one-third 
of new generation capacity” (Energy Information Administration 2015: ES-6).  
In Alaska, renewable energy generation investment increased “dramatically,” driven by both a desire 
for energy security and as a means of reducing the high cost of energy delivery, particularly in remote 
‘islanded’ locations where infrastructure is lacking, according to the Implementation Plan for Alaska’s 
Arctic Policy (2015). These drivers have prompted a wealth of research and development in new energy 
technology, public-private partnerships and a knowledge-based community. As an example, in the last 
ten years innovation has led to the growth of over 100 microgrid and related businesses designing 
techniques to feed renewables into isolated energy grids. The Plan seeks the support of the legislature 
to promote Alaska’s potential as a “global leader in microgrid deployment and operation to advance 
a knowledge-based export economy, creating new jobs and revenue for the state,” an aspiration 
potentially within reach given new alliances in the microgrids market such as that between ABB and 
Samsung SDI (Energy Industry Times 2015: 9).  
Indeed, technology, logistics and economics are both drivers and conversely deterrents to clean energy 
development, particularly in remote Alaska locations where diesel-dependent indigenous communities 
are “facing an unprecedented crisis” (Sikka, Thorton & Wori 2013: 1), thus prompting community-
driven renewable energy projects. By transforming the energy system a community not only reaps the 
benefit of reliable and cost effective energy delivery, but renewable energy development contributes 
to local decarbonisation and can also create a pathway to local economic development and job creation 
(Sikka, Thorton & Wori 2013). Conversely, numerous challenges limit rapid expansion of Alaska’s 
renewables – integration logistics with existing power grids is difficult given the highly limited 
infrastructures; fossil fuel subsidies deter investment into renewable energy; initial investment is often 
costly and investors are less likely to commit financial backing to projects that are yet commercially 
viable.  
Access to affordable energy is uneven throughout Alaska ranging from reasonable pricing in ‘urban’ 
areas to exceedingly costly in rural communities disconnected from the central grid. Whereas urban 
residential customers located in the Railbelt Region, inclusive of Anchorage and Fairbanks, paid as 
little as 10 cents per kilowatt-hour in 2011, remote rural communities located in Western and Interior 
Alaska that rely primarily on diesel for heating and electricity paid roughly 50 cents to more than $1.50 
per kilowatt-hour (Ginny, Villalobos Meléndez & West 2012: 7). Prompted by these high costs and 
environmental regulations, the Denali Commission and Alaska Renewable Energy Fund are tasked as 
the primary financial sources of rural renewable energy projects (Ginny, Villalobos Meléndez & West 
2012). 
Established in 1998, the Denali Commission is designed as a cost-effective vehicle for the delivery of 
federal government services to remote, primarily indigenous, Alaskan communities, with a mandate 
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to promote rural development, provide power generation and infrastructure requirements. The 
Commission works closely with the Alaska Energy Authority (AEA) and Alaska Village Electrical 
Cooperative (AVEC) to provide funding and support for renewable demonstration projects and career 
training for local residents with a focus on community sustainability. Additional support comes from 
a variety of government agencies. However, the Commission is constrained by fluctuating and now 
declining federal funding: “During the 14 years of the Commission’s existence, federal budget 
authority has been as low as $10 million, has expanded to as much as $140 million a year, and over 
the past four years has steadily declined to $23.9 million,” equal to funding in fiscal year 2000 (Denali 
Commission Alaska 2014: 10).  
Despite hurdles numerous projects are showing varying degrees of success in wind, hydro and modern 
biomass increasing access to a stable energy supply while decreasing their reliance on diesel. These 
projects encourage integration of energy supply development with the greater needs of the community 
(Denali Commission Alaska 2014). 
 With AEA support the island community of St. George developed an integrated energy supply 
using wind technology, which at peak has delivered 80% of community power supply. Once 
dependent on diesel shipped from Anchorage, and occasionally Seattle, Washington, the 
community now expects that wind turbines will fulfill 50% of local energy requirements 
including growth of its commercial fishing operation (Alaska Energy Authority 2014). 
 Started in 1968, AVEC (About Us) is a non-profit collective serving 56 remote communities, 
representing the interests of members who are culturally Athabascan, Aleut, Inupiat, Yupik, 
Siberian Yupik, and Caucasian.  Grants from the Denali Commission are funding efficiency 
upgrades for more than 150 diesel generators, and 34 wind turbines installed in 11 
communities are targeted to replace 25% of diesel consumption by 2018. Hooper Bay, AVECs 
largest community of 1,160 residents, “will displace about 44,500 gallons of diesel fuel 
[annually] used for power generation.” 
 Developed in 2007, the Tanana Washateria project is showing promising results. The 
instillation of two high-efficiency wood-fired Garn heating boilers, which heats this laundry 
and shower facility, has reduced oil consumption by 30% and saved the community tens of 
thousands of dollars. In addition woodcutters earn $250 per cord of wood and money remains 
at home rather than leaving the community in payment for diesel (University of Alaska 
Fairbanks, Case Study: Tanana). 
 The fishing community of Craig installed a biomass energy system fuelled by wood chips from 
the local sawmill to offset a monthly fuel bill in excess of $10,000 that provides heat for 2 local 
schools and the community swimming pool. The wood-fired system has displaced 85% diesel 
and propane use and the community expects the $1.5 million investment to pay for itself in 
12 years (University of Alaska Fairbanks, Case Study: Tanana). 
The potential for renewable energy coupled with sustainable socio-economic development is 
examined in a study (Sikka et al. 2013) conducted in cooperation with the Native Corporation Sealaska 
and its subsidiary organization Haa Aaní, LLC, located in the nation’s largest forest, the Tongass 
National Forest region, to which Sealaksa holds title. Concerned with outmigration Haa Aaní invested 
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in the development of numerous new businesses including the processing of wood-pellet biomass as 
a means of providing employment and economic stability for community members. Further study by 
the report’s authors showed that the residual byproducts of the logging industry could have substantial 
economic, environmental and social benefits. Community members reap the benefits of energy cost 
savings and job creation spurring new business; the net environmental benefits of switching from oil 
to biomass results in significant CO2 emission reductions and modern biomass technology addresses 
air quality issues traditionally associated with wood-fuel combustion exhaust, including reductions in 
black carbon. But, numerous impediments hinder the development of renewables, the least of which 
is the need for investment. “Sealaska leaders believe that favorable policies, such as tax on fossil-fuel 
carbon emissions could play a pivotal role in the adoption of wood-pellets for energy” (9). In addition 
the authors suggest that renewables would benefit by feed-in tariffs, investment subsidies for heating 
conversion, and tighter environmental regulations at local, state and federal levels (Sikka, Thorton & 
Wori 2013).  
Unlike traditional biomass techniques, modern biomass technology relies on locally available wood 
chips and shavings, lumber off-cuts or fast-growing tree wood such as willows and alders that thrive 
in Alaska’s conditions. If managed properly biomass can be a clean renewable energy source, resulting 
in considerable savings for communities otherwise dependent on diesel and propane.  Concerns that 
biomass will produce additional GHG emissions and pollutants are largely addressed by modern 
bioenergy systems that sequester harmful emissions, however emissions released from combustion 
must be in balance with fast-growing reforestation (Renewable Energy Policy 2014: 32). Mitigating 
black carbon through modern biofuel installations reduces emissions substantially and can slow the 
pace of warming in the Arctic (Bond et al 2013).  
Alaska is endowed with the full menu of renewable energy source potential —geothermal, wind, tidal, 
wave, hydro, biomass and even solar—which if developed could meet most state-wide energy needs 
and provide additional socio-economic opportunities. However, Alaska’s renewable energy potential 
must be understood relative to the state’s prime source of revenue; offshore oil exploration projects 
are considered “critical to Alaska’s economic stability” (Alaska Arctic Policy Commission 2015: 11). 
Indeed, the 2015 National Petroleum Council (NPC) Arctic Potential Report notes that fossil fuels 
generate approximately 90% of Alaska’s general revenue and a third of its jobs. The report claims that 
projects beginning within the decade will increase economic activity and employment for anticipated 
production coming online in 20 to 30 years. To attain such results, NPC maintains that “Industry and 
government have a shared responsibility to gain and maintain the public trust,” and that the “effects 
[of development] must be understood with any negatives minimized” (32). The NPC report advises 
the U.S. Arctic Council chairmanship to promote Arctic fossil fuel development on a region-wide 
scale and recommends that they “should seek to strengthen the Arctic Economic Council’s formal 
interaction and engagement with the Arctic Council as well as to promote its business advisory role” 
(National Petroleum Council 2015: 53).   
Offshore fossil fuel extraction in the Arctic is projected to grow in the future (Hossain, Koivurova & 
Zojer 2014), driven by increased accessibility due to Arctic warming and the decreasing supply of 
conventional oil reserves that flatlined in 2005 (Mearns 2014). In Alaska, the Prudhoe Bay oilfield, 
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North America’s largest oil field, extraction peaked in 1988 (Energy Information Administration 
Alaska 2014). Coupled with Alaska’s present US$3.6 billion budget deficit (State of Alaska 2015), and 
high wage-earning potential that averaged US$127,148 in 2012 (Fried 2013), the desire for offshore 
exploration is considerable. To that end, in August 2015 Royal Dutch Shell received final approval 
from U.S. Department of Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) to resume work 
in the Chukchi Sea halted in 2012 when its main drilling rig ran aground. Shell has already invested 
US$7 billion in exploration for oil in the Arctic (Gardner 2015).  
But the consequences of offshore oil extraction are considerable. Only months before BOEMs 
approval of Shell’s project, the agency’s own Environmental Impact Report (2015) reported that in a 
scenario based on the lifetime of a drilling project in the Chukchi Sea that there is a “75% chance of 
one or more large oil spills,” and also estimates the chance for 800 small oil spills. “Even under the 
best of conditions,” NPC (2015: 44) acknowledged, “one can never expect to recover all of the oil 
from a large spill on water.”  
Indeed, the potential, if not likelihood, of future oil spills are clearly exemplified by the 1989 Exxon 
Valdez accident and the 2010 Deepwater Horizon blowout, but seem not to deter expansion of 
offshore drilling. In the aftermath of the latter Walter Parker, chair of the Alaska Oil Spill Commission 
responsible for the Exxon Valdez oil spill investigation said, “It’s as though we had never written the 
report” (Struzik 2015: 156).  
Despite past oil spills, government reports and vast scientific study, efforts to drill in the Arctic are 
ongoing. A scientific study published in Nature (McGlade & Ekins 2015) said: “We show that 
development of resources in the Arctic and any increase in unconventional oil production are 
incommensurate with efforts to limit average global warming to 2 °C. Our results show that policy 
makers’ instincts to exploit rapidly and completely their territorial fossil fuels are, in aggregate, 
inconsistent with their commitments to this temperature limit.”  
As the case of Alaska shows, the fledgling development of renewable energies juxtaposed with fossil 
fuels represents the dueling perspectives. In what is known as the ‘energy paradox’, Jaffe and Stavins 
wrote in 1994, “In the long run, the development and widespread adoption of new technologies can 
greatly ameliorate what, in the short run, sometimes appear to be overwhelming conflicts between 
economic well-being and environmental quality” (92). This brings to the forefront the question of 
governance. What is the state of environmental governance when Arctic warming, and broadly climate 
change are up against the economics and availability of fossil fuels?  
Unraveling governance 
The concept of governance for the changing Arctic is a challenging question for even the most 
seasoned of Arctic experts (Koivurova 2012; Young 2013). What are the possibilities and limits of the 
Arctic Council? What roles do international fora and national policy play in the governance of Arctic 
development and conservation? For purposes here, I propose that the AC needs to govern for 
conservation while national policy, writ large, must compliment the principle of environmental 
protection.  If in fact the object of desire is to curb global warming, scientific studies, some of which 
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I have cited within, strongly suggest that an ongoing cycle of fossil fuel dependency is the bane of 
sustainable environmental protection. That said the limits of the Arctic Council, as well as national 
and international bodies are not inconsequential. Although I have not addressed the specific needs of 
Arctic indigenous peoples, the desire for economic development through responsible non-renewable 
resource development may be without recourse if suitable options are not available.  
To avail ourselves of a broad understanding of environmental governance potential, Young (2013: 2) 
comments that the human-environmental interaction is key. The environment is not governed, but 
rather “What we can aspire to manage, or more generally, govern are human beings.” In this 
examination of environmental governance solving for complexity – collective action problems, multi-
level and cross-sector interactions, and governance for times of turbulence – demonstrates the sheer 
breadth of multi-level engagement required to overcome the challenges of global climate change 
embedded with the rapid acceleration of Arctic change. At all levels, from the local to the global, the 
process is highly political fraught with impediments from policy inaction, a disconnect between those 
that create environmental problems and those most affected, to matters of compliance. Knowing this, 
solving for what is viewed as particularly daunting – “climate change presents a stiff problem” – Young 
(2013: 153) makes the case for identifying specific features and “devising regimes that fit the essential 
features of the problems at hand, thereby maximizing the chances of success in problem solving.”  
Specific to how Arctic governance functions, Koivurova (2012: 31) notes that the AC “has mainly 
served as a platform for Arctic actors to discuss Arctic policy issues, with occasional soft-guidance 
documents adopted… Overall, however, the AC was developed for a region that requires a minimum 
of governance.” Yet, Arctic warming and increased economic interest have compelled AC member 
states to develop initiatives that take on aspects of regulatory frameworks including the legally-binding 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011), and Agreement 
on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013). As Koivurova (2014) 
remarks “This view of the importance of treaties is, of course, very comforting for international 
lawyers: when things get serious, international legal instruments, treaties, are needed.” On the other 
hand, because the AC is a non-treaty-based forum it has allowed for “soft-law cooperation [that] 
enables better participation by the region’s actors,” and decision making ultimately guided by the eight 
sovereign nation-states. Thus, to understand how the human-environmental interaction will be 
governed for future developments we need to consider inter-state cooperation and the role of 
individual state members (Koivurova 2014). 
On the part of the U.S., climate change, the role of renewable energy development and black carbon 
emission reductions are a priority of the U.S. Arctic Council chairmanship, as well as a national 
imperative. Concurrently, The Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2015) 
upholds its interests in national energy security, which includes development of non-renewable energy 
sources, and underscores the importance of Alaska as a strategic partner in fulfilling the Arctic agenda. 
Given the duality of governing for the present and accounting for the future, it may be necessary to 
understand U.S. initiatives in this light. At the same time, Young (2013: 147) notes that the U.S. “has 
emerged as a stumbling block for those working to enhance environmental governance” at the UN. 
These are the breadth of issues that must be considered when assessing U.S. intentions. 
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The paradox in Arctic policy-making: U.S. 
The initial plan for developing Arctic renewable energy sources stemmed from the joint Arctic Council 
chairmanship agenda led by Norway, Denmark and Sweden, who together identified climate change 
as a Council priority (Hossain, Koivurova, & Zojer 2009: 69). Thus when U.S. Secretary of State John 
Kerry (2015) addressed the 2015 Arctic Council Iqaluit Ministerial Meeting his message appeared to 
convey that U.S. intentions were to move in this direction: “If we got the whole world to embrace 
clean energy choices rapidly, we can meet our two-degree target…. So it is essential, especially in the 
Arctic, to provide affordable, reliable energy that is needed here.”  Indeed, as an instrument of foreign 
policy the environmental NGO community lauded Kerry for taking a stand on Arctic warming (Kelly 
2015). Coming at the heels of U.S.-China Joint Announcement on Climate Change (White House 
2014b) these utterances could be interpreted as a shift in U.S. climate change policy. 
Yet, less than a month later, the Obama administration conditionally approved Shell’s plans to resume 
offshore exploratory drilling in the Chukchi Sea (Davenport 2015). Notably media coverage on the 
decision was extensive, far more plentiful than it was of Kerry’s Iqaluit speech. Most coverage was 
purely reportorial, but others expressed indignation. “The idea that importing oil is ‘bad for our 
people’ is populist pandering,” argued Mia Bennett (2015):  
BOEM’s [Bureau of Ocean Energy Management] decision also makes the U.S. appear 
hypocritical as Arctic Council chair given all its talk about the environment and combating 
climate change in Iqaluit. Contrast this with the Russian minister for natural resources, who 
wrote on his Facebook page last week: ‘There is no alternative to the fields on the shelf.’ He 
may not say what environmentalists want to hear, but at least he can’t be accused of going back 
on his word. 
Indeed, U.S. Arctic policy is not without ambiguity. Understood from the most basic perspective, the 
U.S. Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for the Arctic Region (2015) objectives are to: 1) 
advance United States security interests, 2) pursue responsible Arctic region stewardship and 3) 
strengthen international cooperation. Briefly, U.S. security interests include both the pursuit of 
renewable energy development and ensuring the ‘safe’ and ‘responsible’ development of non-
renewable energy resources, so it should come as no surprise that this paradox of events came to pass.  
As is the case with governments worldwide, U.S. interests include economic growth (Stern 2006), but 
at the same time there is a growing understanding that the environment cannot continue as a back-
burner issue. In the U.S., actions on climate change are implemented primarily through the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). By Executive Action, President Obama has given the EPA 
a broader regulatory role developing, for example, stricter limits on coal-fired power plants (Baker 
2014). But, on the whole environmental governance is stymied by political inertia and most likely 
suffers from a collective-action problem. As Oran Young (2013: 23) suggests, “Collective-action 
problems are ubiquitous in human affairs.” So, how might we start to unravel the great divide between 
sound environmental action and the global fossil fuel dependency? If we are to look solely to 
Washington policy-makers for a grand plan in environmental governance, we will likely be hard 
pressed to find the solution. Whereas the U.S. played a “leading role in creating the UN system,” 
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Young (2013: 147) notes that in subsequent years since the U.S. became “a laggard in the realm of 
environmental governance … [and] has emerged as a stumbling block for those working to enhance 
environmental governance.” The U.S. has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea nor 
the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, it would appear that as Young (2013: 162) suggests, 
“Increasingly, success in the creation and administration of these regimes will require the cultivation 
of coalitions among the public sector, private sector, and civil society,” a trend that has gained 
significant momentum in light of numerous economic reports such as the 2006 Stern Report, that 
provided an unsettling account of the costs of climate change.   
“The solution for our energy problems is going to be corporate America, that is actually private 
enterprise,” said Tom Steyer, founder and former CEO of the hedge fund Farallon Capital 
Management, “that’s when we get the policy framework right the people in that sphere will come up 
with creative, imaginative and innovative solutions that will blow our mind.” Steyer has invested $65 
million to launch renewable energy centers at Yale and Stanford (Bloomberg 2014). The market would 
seem to concur. Where cheap oil is thought to be a threat to renewable energies Citibank reports, 
“Fundamental factors—increasing economic competitiveness, energy security, and environmental 
goals—all remain potent forces driving ever more rapid adoption of renewable energy globally” 
(Parkinson 2015). Reporting on the 2015 Bloomberg New Energy Finance summit Bloomberg 
business said “The question is no longer if the world will transition to cleaner energy, but how long it 
will take” (Randall 2015). These examples and others suggest that global markets are undergoing a 
transformational shift, redirecting capital toward the development and consumption of sustainable 
renewable heating and power sources. Still, the pace at which renewables are developed will depend 
on numerous factors. In 2013, for example, lower system costs and policy uncertainty precipitated a 
decline in investment. Yet “new financing structures provided low-cost financing through capital 
markets” and net investment into added renewable power capacity continued to trend upward 
outpacing fossil fuels (Renewable Energy 2014: 25). In 2012, renewable energy was an estimated 19% 
of global consumption, 9% of which was traditional biomass (Renewable Energy 2014: 21), 40% of 
which utilizes modern bioenergy technology and methods.  
Conclusion 
The extent to which environmental protection of the Arctic region has evolved is often a condition 
of extreme circumstance.  Emerging from the Cold War years was a glum picture of how extreme 
geopolitical differences could wreak havoc on a region whose people had no part in the destruction 
of the environment. Likewise, today the visual depictions of a melting cryosphere has brought 
heightened awareness to the Arctic as a region where the human race has once again debased the 
environment, this time as a condition of industrialization. Black carbon is but one of the vast number 
of issues that government must address in order to make progress toward an environmental 
sustainability future. In this regard, the Arctic Council has set the stage through scientific evidence 
and guiding principles, but institutional limitations preclude enforceable procedures. Consequently, 
the capacity for effectiveness relies on the desire of nations, writ large, to provide the strategy and 
structure capable of promoting and supporting a transition to environmentally friendly practices.  
  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
 
Dingman 
97 
Throughout this article I have made reference to the private sector. Yes, government has a critical role 
to play in laying the foundations of robust environmental policy and enforceable regulation, but 
implementing environmental policy necessitates the support of outside actors. Indeed, the role of 
NGOs and academia cannot be underestimated, but to bring about pragmatic solutions requires the 
robust support of the business community and financial institutions. Quite rightly, the U.S. Arctic 
Council chairmanship has formally encouraged partnership with the public sector and civil society. Of 
the numerous activities required, to encourage BC reduction strategies such as renewable energy 
sources is certainly an encouraging step toward climate change mitigation, but the challenge is to parlay 
small successes into a broader framework, a framework in which government, industry and the 
investment sector develop synergy.   
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This paper demonstrates how different Greenlandic governments have exploited a narrative of a unique Greenlandic identity to 
shape and strengthen a foreign policy autonomous from Denmark. Central to this narrative is, on the one hand, the widespread 
anticipation of more independence in the future and, on the other hand, the notion of a common cultural core formed in the past. 
The three main elements of this core are the Greenlandic language, hunting traditions, and a particular relationship to nature. 
While the status of the three elements is often disputed in specific domestic policy debates, such as the commissions exploring future 
Greenlandic constitution and reconciliation with Denmark, on the international policy level there is a remarkable agreement about 
the narrative. Here the three elements are understood as a matter of societal security. They need to be protected from external threats 
in order to uphold the current Greenlandic society. In several cases, the elements are securitised. Hereby the nomination of external 
threats is used to successfully legitimise extraordinary rights, such as whaling, while the strive for independence substantiate more 
favourable CO2-reduction requirements. These different rights do, on the one hand, enhance Greenland’s individual position in the 
world, and hence also strengthen the nation-building process, while, on the other hand, making visible a paradox where increased 
CO2-emissions have negative implications for the traditional way of living. These implications mirror the complexity of the identity 
narrative, as the cultural core and the anticipated future independence sometimes contrast each other.  
 
 
Introduction: a ‘window of opportunity’ 
Greenland’s foreign policy competence seems to be clearly defined, but as this paper will show the 
articulation and protection of an alleged unique identity represents a ‘window of opportunity’ that has 
been used to extend the competence. To show this, the foreign policy analysis will focus on the 
communication by Greenland’s political representatives regarding three synchronic cases that together 
mirror the central cultural elements of the ethno-national community, namely: 1) status of the 
Greenlandic language; 2) protection of hunting rights; and 3) the protection and development of the 
Greenlandic nature. These three elements have been highlighted by exemplary analyses of how the 
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current hegemonic collective identity narrative has emerged, while the individual cases have been 
emphasised by Naalakkersuisut’s (the Government of Greenland) annual foreign policy reports. The 
three analyses will make visible how the designation of an external threat to the cultural traditions and 
the envisioned future with more independence, have been used to legitimise a claim for extraordinary 
rights with regard to whaling and more lenient CO2 reduction requirements. This double perspective 
on a common heritage and an anticipated future reflects the tension between tradition and modernity 
within the collective identity narrative, as tradition signals status quo while development means 
change. This is also visible on the international level where the official communication oscillates 
between portraying Greenlanders as either a minority or an equal partner depending on the situation; 
something which may be an intentional strategy or a transitory phenomenon as a result of the relatively 
recent transition from home rule to self-government. 
The paper is theoretically inspired by Ole Wæver’s discursive approach to foreign policy analysis and 
his understanding of foreign policy as based on a state’s self-image. Empirically, the author’s curiosity 
has been stimulated by an interesting sentence on the webpage of Greenland’s Foreign Affairs 
Department. Here it is written that Greenland’s foreign policy competence is regulated by three 
measures: the Constitutional Act of Denmark, the Act on Greenland Self Government and practice 
(Naalakkersuisut.gl n.d.). The fact that practice is also a regulatory factor indicates that the legal 
frameworks may be open to interpretation, hence leaving a ‘window of opportunity’ for Greenland to 
achieve a more autonomous foreign policy. But why then focus on how a collective identity narrative 
has been articulated internationally? Besides the theoretical inspiration, statements such as the 
following by the former Premier Aleqa Hammond have stimulated the curiosity. In her first opening 
speech of Inatsisartut (Greenland’s parliament) she stated:  
Greenland’s active participation internationally contributes to the drawing of attention 
to Greenlandic interests and also to attract investments to the development in 
Greenland. But it also signals that no one can step on us or override Greenland’s 
interests. It provides the backbone; it gives pride. The individual citizen may also use 
this to strengthen one’s self-awareness. As a people it can strengthen our culture, self-
awareness and self-perception (Hammond 2013: 3. Author’s translation).  
This statement shows a clear connection between the collective identity narrative and the development 
of international relations. What is, however, conspicuous is the lacking definition of what characterises 
the collective identity; what exactly is it that is possibly threatened or strengthened? To give an 
adequate answer to this question, this paper refers to exemplary historical analyses of the emergence 
of a collective Greenlandic identity and to articulations by the political parties in Inatsisartut. Together 
with a short introduction to Wæver’s theoretical approach, these findings are necessary as basis for 
the foreign policy analysis, and will, thus, be presented on the following pages. 
Analytical strategy: foreign policy as representation and protection of a collective 
identity 
Ole Wæver’s discourse theoretical approach to foreign policy analysis observes a country’s foreign 
affairs as being based on a specific identity representation, whose contingent composition is what 
defines the state’s self-image (Wæver 2001: 285). This image is dependent on a dichotomy between 
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Self and Other, where the outside of the delineation is constitutive to a certain identity (Laclau 1990; 
Torfing 1999: 299), meaning that what defines the collective ‘Us’ is first and foremost that ‘We’ are 
different from ‘Them’ (cf. Laclau & Mouffe 2002: 82). An Other can either be perceived as an 
antagonistic enemy that threatens the very existence of a state (cf. Campbell 1992: 48) or an agonistic1 
competitor which merely represents different values that are tolerated due to the common acceptance 
of fundamental democratic rules (Mouffe 1993: 4). In the development of a collective Greenlandic 
identity, Denmark has been the primary Other, while ethnicity has traditionally been perceived as 
something congenital (cf. Sørensen 1994: 168-169), as to be a Greenlander seems to require at least 
one Greenlandic parent (Petersen 1991: 17; Kleivan 1999: 98). Secondly, the identity narrative has 
been connected to language; reified culture, such as hunting traditions; and a romantic, intimate 
relation to the Greenlandic nature (Sørensen 1994: 108-109). Such characterisations of self-images are 
found through historical analyses (Wæver 2002: 40), and by drawing on exemplary analyses 
highlighting exactly these three cultural components (cf. Gad 2005), this paper will narrow down the 
focus to how language (cf. Langgård 2003: 231), hunting rights (cf. Sørensen 1991: 189; Thomsen 
1998: 21f.) and nature (cf. Pedersen 1997: 154ff.) have been articulated as a matter of protecting the 
Greenlandic collective identity. 
When linking a state’s identity representation to its foreign policy, a security policy focus is essential 
(Wæver 2002: 26) as articulations of external dangers or threats to the state’s existence and identity is 
what legitimises a particular foreign policy (Campbell 1992: 12). To define a threat is in Wæver’s terms 
to securitise; a political and discursive action (Wæver 1995: 55) that seeks to justify specific state-centred 
acts (ibid.: 65) that ultimately allow temporary disregarding of fundamental rights (Buzan & Wæver 
2009: 217). On the international level, Greenland is, however, a special case as it is not yet a state and 
military security policy is still in the hands of Copenhagen. Instead, this paper subscribes to a wider 
understanding of security, and special attention will be given to the issue of societal security whose 
reference object in this case is the collective Greenlandic identity that may be perceived as threatened 
by different external actors or values with putative potential for eroding the nation (Buzan et al. 1998: 
121). As Greenland has never been a state, the basic constellation of a collective We has been 
dominated by the so-called culture nation (Gad 2004: 121), characterised by a widespread perception 
of culture and identity as an essence (Sørensen 1994: 168ff.) rather than something dynamic and 
interchangeable. This reflects how Greenlandic culture is generally believed to be an ethno-national 
community, whose members have an internal, cultural core in common, that should be protected from 
external interference (Gad 2008: 274, 281). An ethno-national community is “an extremely powerful 
mode of subjectivation” (Wæver et al. 1993: 22) and as the national narrative is formed, different 
subject positions are ascribed to people within the group who, again, stand in contrast to other groups 
defined by different predicates, hence constructing a meaningful and mutually defining Us and Them 
(Howarth 2005: 157).  
As the foreign policy analysis develops it will become visible how different subject positions are 
ascribed to the Greenlandic people depending on the situation. Particularly the subject positions 
‘minority’ and ‘equal partner’ will be identified throughout the analysis as the international 
communication by Greenland’s political representatives sometimes rest upon a perception of 
Greenlanders as a minority with special rights or on a perception of Greenlanders as an equal partner 
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with equal rights. These labels reflect the different wording in the Home Rule Act and in the Act on 
Self Government respectively. When the Home Rule Act was introduced in 1979 it was “[…] in 
recognition of the special status which Greenland occupies in national, cultural and geographical terms 
within the kingdom” (Hjemmestyreloven 1979. Author’s translation), which is a formulation that 
mirrors the contemporary perception of Greenlanders as a minority (Thisted 2012: 612). With words 
such as ‘equality’, ‘mutual respect’ and ‘partnership’ the Act on Self Government broke with this 
characterisation and the historic subordination within the Danish Realm (ibid.). Other subject position 
pairs can sometimes also be identified in the communication, but it is with reference to these historical 
documents that ‘minority’ and ‘equal partner’ are the preferred guiding difference throughout the 
analysis. 
On the international level, Greenland’s collective identity narrative seems to be clear and unambiguous 
and although the consensus on certain central values is relatively sedimented, the different political 
parties do, however, have different perceptions of how static or dynamic the Greenland nation is. 
Before we turn to the foreign policy analysis, the following section will, thus, briefly describe some of 
the nuances present in the domestic debates about what constitutes the Greenlandic collective identity.  
Domestic nuances on how Greenland should develop as a nation 
On 25 November 2008, 75.5 percent of all eligible Greenlanders voted for the Act on Greenland Self-
Government, which acknowledges Greenlanders as “a people pursuant to international law with the 
right of self-determination” (2009: 1). On 21 June 2009 the Act on Self-Government entered into 
force whereby the legal obstacles on the road towards full independence were removed with the 
sentence: “Decision regarding Greenland’s independence shall be taken by the people of Greenland” 
(2009: §21). The social liberal Demokraatit was the only political party that recommended a ‘No’ in 
the referendum on the Act on Self-Government (Demokraatit 2008: 9). In spite of this, Demokraatit 
today, however, unequivocally support the quest for independence just like every other political party 
in Inatsisartut (cf. Jacobsen 2014: 24-29) and, thus, all parties unite around this Greenland’s raison 
d’être (cf. Tobiassen 1995: 40f; in Gad 2004: 276). The agreement between the political parties is, 
however, only intact as long as the anticipated future independence is vaguely defined. If e.g. the 
parties’ different characterisation of the desirable relation to Denmark is included, consensus ceases 
and disagreement appears, as Atassut and Demokraatit put great emphasis on maintaining close 
relations to Denmark, while Partii Inuit, as the Other extreme, plead for no links to Denmark 
whatsoever (cf. Jacobsen 2014: 24-29). The two major parties, Inuit Ataqatigiit and Siumut, are situated 
in between, with the latter sometimes being closer to Partii Inuit, when Denmark’s past subjugation 
of Greenlanders is described in more antagonistic terms and as actions that need to be dealt with by 
a reconciliation commission, inspired by the process following the end of South Africa’s apartheid 
regime (ibid.).  
Each and every political party in Inatsisartut agree that the Greenlandic language, hunting traditions 
and a particular relationship to nature are core cultural elements important for the Greenlandic nation 
and, thus, need to be protected (Jacobsen 2014: 29-34). Whether they constitute an identity-wise 
essence is, however, object for disagreement. Some parties have a more ethno-national perception 
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where identity is believed to be a static essence, while others subscribe to a more dynamic and civic-
national perception of what it means to be a Greenlander (ibid.) (cf. figure 1). When zooming in on 
the domestic political debates concerning protection of language, the often-used term ‘non-
Greenlandic speaking Greenlander’ reveals that language cannot be used as demarcation line between 
Greenlander/non-Greenlander (ibid.). If a Greenlander does not speak Greenlandic, the person is 
merely perceived as a Greenlander with a flaw (cf. Gad 2005). Similar nuances appear when 
parliamentary climate debates are included in the analysis as higher temperatures represent a paradox 
because they, on the one hand, constitute an existential threat to the hunting traditions while they, on 
the other hand, help to diversify fishing opportunities and improve the accessibility for mining and 
hydrocarbon extraction. The unanimous support for the parliamentary motion regarding a territorial 
exclusion for Greenland in the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period (EM2013/109) indicates 
that the endeavour for new significant economic profits – necessary if future independence shall be 
realised – is favoured even if it may compromise culturally important hunting traditions and the 
environment. In this way, the current dominating collective identity narrative in Greenland contains 
an immanent tension between tradition and modernity, as it has done throughout history. 
Figure 1: Greenland’s political parties’ identity perception and preferable future relation to Denmark.  
Partii Inuit is marked with a dashed line to show that the party is no longer present in Inatsisartut. 
 
Cultural protection and demands for development through foreign relations 
Based on the exemplary historic analyses showing how the Greenlandic language, hunting traditions 
and a particular intimate relation to nature have been highlighted as central cultural components in 
the dominating collective identity narrative, the focus will now be narrowed down to the question of 
how these components have been articulated internationally since the introduction of self-
government. When doing this, it is relevant to look at whether these components have been securitised 
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as a matter of upholding the national identity, and how the communication ascribes different subject 
positions to the Greenlandic people. The empirical data for the three synchronic analyses have been 
structured according to Naalakkersuisut’s annual foreign policy reports, which highlight a list of 
relevant forums and cases: 1) Regarding the status of the Greenlandic language, the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), United Nations Expert Mechanism on the Rights 
of Indigenous People (EMRIP) and the Nordic Council constitute the list of relevant forums. 2) 
Concerning the protection of hunting traditions, the European Union’s (EU) ban on seal product 
import and the dispute with the International Whaling Commission (IWC) stand out as exemplary 
cases. 3) Pertaining to the analysis of how the particular relation to nature has been articulated on the 
international level, the communication under the auspices of UN – the COP meetings in particular – 
are the empirical foundation for the last analysis. As these three synchronic analyses will show, the 
foreign policy communication oscillates between portraying Greenlanders as either a minority or an 
equal partner, which indicates a tension between modernisation and tradition within the dominating 
collective identity narrative. In the communication regarding the protection and development of 
nature this tension becomes paradoxical as the anticipated increased industrialisation - necessary if the 
dream of independence shall be realised – indirectly threatens the hunting traditions.  
Status of the Greenlandic language 
When UNESCO published its Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger in 2010, the Greenlandic language 
was identified as being in danger; more specifically avanersuarmiusut and tunumiusut, which are spoken 
in North and East Greenland respectively, were characterised as ‘definitely endangered’, while the 
West Greenlandic Kitaamiusut – which is the written language standard (Thomsen 2013: 261) – got the 
label ‘vulnerable’ (Moseley 2010). By doing this, UNESCO securitised the Greenlandic language, but 
a specific threat was not, however, unequivocally pointed out. By observing the parliamentary debates 
about an official language policy back in 2009 and 2010, it is clear that particularly the Danish language 
is perceived as the primary threat or opponent. This observation is supported by former Minister for 
Family, Culture and Church, Mimi Karlsen, who, in a speech to the Nordic Language Commission in 
2011, stated:  
The modernisation of Greenland has i.a. led to danification - also language wise – and later 
greenlandisation. The linguistic crisis between 1950 and 1980 has had some repercussions, 
which can be difficult to overcome. Back then, the language almost lost its status among 
people with middle-range training (Karlsen 2011: 4. Author’s translation).  
Such articulations have been more frequent in the domestic debates than internationally where a threat 
to the status of the language is not articulated to the same extent. The Atlas of the World’s Languages in 
Danger is, however, the founding documentation for the ICC project Assessing, Monitoring and Promoting 
Arctic Indigenous Languages, in which the head of Greenland’s Language Secretariat, Carl Christian Olsen, 
plays a key role (ICC 2011: 6). 
As mentioned by Karlsen, the protection of the Greenlandic language was a core element in the 
nationalist wave in the 1970’s when indigenous traditions were idealised and the links to other Inuit 
were enhanced. These relations are still central in i.a. UNPFII and EMRIP of which the latter has 
given special attention to “[…] language and culture’s role in connection with promotion and 
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protection of indigenous peoples’ rights and identity” (Naalakkersuisut 2013a: 24. Authors’ 
translation), as they are still threatened by “[d]iscriminatory legislation, dominant cultural majorities 
and lack of recognition” (ibid.). Whether this also concerns the Greenlandic language is not crystal 
clear from the information publicly available, but the adoption of an official language policy underlines 
that: “The Greenlandic language is a central part of the Greenlandic people’s cultural identity. The 
language has a culture-bearing function that shall be preserved, strengthened and simultaneously 
developed” (EM2009/88:1. Author’s translation). This mirrors Greenland’s special position within 
the international indigenous network, well exemplified by Kuupik Kleist’s speech at the EMRIP 
annual meeting in 2009 where he emphasised that the introduction of self-government is a “[…] de 
facto implementation of the declaration of indigenous peoples’ rights” (Naalakkersuisut 2010: 22. 
Author’s translation) and that “[…] the experiences of Greenland’s process can serve as inspiration 
for others of the world’s indigenous peoples in their struggle for greater autonomy and in their 
development as a people” (ibid.: 23). Such a statement indirectly excludes people who are not 
indigenous but still perceive themselves as part of the Greenland nation and, thus, the statement 
represents a static or more ethno national perception of what it means to have a true Greenlandic 
identity. The positioning of Greenlanders as a minority in these forums is furthermore a relic from 
the past when Greenland did not have self-government and is as such more retrospective than 
prospective.  
The communication made under the auspices of Nordic Council is contrary to the communication in 
the UN forums, as ‘equality’ and ‘independence’ rather than ‘minority’ are the subject positions used 
to portray Greenlanders desirable position. In 2006, the Nordic Council adopted a declaration on 
Nordic language policy, which distinguishes between ‘community bearing’ languages - consisting of 
Faroese, Greenlandic, Sami, Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish - and ‘state bearing’ 
languages that leave out the first three (Norden 2006: 11). Thus, there is a clear hierarchical line, which 
would have been more likely to be accepted if the non-state entities’ underlying logic was based on 
indigenous peoples’ rights and the subject position ascribed to their citizens was ‘minority’. By 
observing the statements made concerning the status of the Greenlandic language (cf. Jacobsen 2014: 
39-41), it is, however, evident that this is definitely not the case. Instead, Greenland’s representatives 
plead for a position equivalent to the official states’ and a discontent over the lower status of the 
Greenlandic language has often been used for raising questions over Greenland’s general lower 
position in the Nordic Council hierarchy. As a result of this persistent engagement then Premier Aleqa 
Hammond was invited to join the Prime Ministers’ annual summer meeting in 2014 (Sommer 2014). 
This was a clear indication of higher status, a step towards the announced vision of future full 
membership (Nordisk Råd 2013) and in line with Greenland’s foreign policy strategy from 2011 which 
describes direct participation in the Nordic Council as important because it “[…] can generate results 
that support the general foreign policy work” (Naalakkersuisut 2011: 21. Author’s translation). An 
important fact for this successful development was the establishment of a strategic partnership with 
Åland and the Faroese Islands in 2012 that gives the three autonomous areas the authority to speak 
on behalf of each other (lagtinget.aland.fi); a partnership, which a Naalakkersuisut foreign policy 
report described as “a pivotal development of Greenland’s foreign relations” (Naalakkersuisut 2013a: 
12 – author’s translation).  
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Protection of hunting rights 
Hunting traditions’ core position in the dominating collective identity narrative has especially been 
articulated on the international level where the protection of the rights to sealing and whaling have 
been challenged by external decisions that limit the export of seal products and restrict Greenland’s 
quota on large whales. Both cases took their beginning shortly after the introduction of self-
government when Greenland proposed a quota of ten humpback whales – which until then only had 
been allowed for St. Vincent and the Grenadines to catch – and when the EU introduced a ban on 
import of seal products that, however, contained a so-called ‘Inuit exception’ (EU 2009). Despite the 
special exception, it is argued that the ban has still had grave consequences to Greenland’s export of 
seal products as it decreased from DKK 60 million in 2006 to DKK 6 million in 2012 (Sommer 2012) 
and when the exception was overruled by WTO in 2013 – and upheld in May 2014 – the Greenlandic 
seal hunters’ outlook only got gloomier. Contrary to this development, the dispute with IWC has so 
far resulted in a positive outcome for Greenland as the wish for a higher quota on large whales was 
fulfilled in September 2014. On the way to these two different outcomes, the communication 
regarding the two cases have had some central elements in common, namely: a sharply articulated 
dichotomy between Us and Them, a definition of the external decisions as being threats to 
Greenland’s societal security and an oscillation between ascribing ether the subject position 
‘indigenous minority’ or ‘equal partner’ to the Greenlanders. Furthermore, they have both been 
highlighted in Naalakkersuisut’s annual foreign policy reports and described by former Premier 
Hammond as “[...] crucial cases for the future of Greenland” (Andersen 2014. Author’s translation).  
The primary antagonistic Other in both cases has been the EU and the European members of IWC. 
Already before the EU ban on import of seal products came into force it was characterised by Jonathan 
Motzfeldt from Siumut as “[…] a cultural genocide, like the one they have committed in South 
America […]” (Holm 2009. Author’s translation) and the purpose of the ban was interpreted as “[…] 
to prevent the Arctic people from surviving in their own way by eating seals and whales and birds” 
(ibid.). This was an unambiguous securitisation of the traditional way of living that – through its central 
position in the dominating collective identity narrative – can be identified as a matter of societal 
security threatened by the EU. The same pattern has been visible in the IWC dispute, which peaked 
in 2013 after Greenland decided to unilaterally raise its quota on humpback whales, and Denmark, 
thus, considered leaving IWC where it represents Greenland. In response to this consideration, then 
Minister for Fishing, Hunting and Agriculture, Karl Lyberth, retorted with a feature article entitled 
‘The Danes should not decide how we should live and eat’ (Org.: ‘Danskerne bør ikke bestemme 
hvordan vi skal leve og spise’). Here he made a clear distinction between the Europeans who “[…] go 
to the supermarket and buy pre-packed meat of farmed animals butchered by others” (Lyberth 2013. 
Author’s translation) in contrast to “Here in Greenland, we go into the wild to catch our food and we 
are therefore responsible for our own food supply” (ibid.). Ultimately, Lyberth made it clear that the 
decision of unilaterally raising Greenland’s whaling quota was taken “[…] to protect our people’s way 
of living” (ibid.).  
The reason for why Greenland should have these extraordinary rights is explained by historic 
traditions and cultural importance that both the EU and IWC themselves perceive as legitimate 
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arguments. What does not legitimise extraordinary hunting rights is, however, when an economic logic 
is brought into play, like in the following statement made by then Minister for Fishing, Hunting and 
Agriculture, Ane Hansen, where she argues that: “[…] we, in our endeavour to implement self-
government in Greenland, have to make full use of all the resources we can get, including all animals 
caught” (Hansen 2010: 1. Author’s translation). Suspicion of commercial whaling and sealing was 
exactly the reason why IWC did not accept Greenland’s wish for a higher quota in 2012 and the 
explanation for why the WTO undermined EU’s ‘Inuit exception’ because it was perceived as being 
anti-competitive to seal product export in Canada and Norway (Naalakkersuisut 2013b). The question 
of equality or minority has also been relevant at another level, as Greenland is represented by Denmark 
in IWC and WTO, while they both carry out their own bilateral relation with the EU. Throughout the 
two processes politicians such as Juliane Henningsen from Inuit Ataqatigiit has, thus, often suggested 
that Greenlanders as people pursuant to international law with the right of self-determination should 
work “[…] persistently to ensure that Greenland has an independent voice in IWC and WTO, as 
decisions in such forums have influence on Greenland’s opportunities for cooperation with other 
countries” (EM2011/14. Author’s translation). This has, however, not yet happened, but as an 
alternative to the European market, Greenland is now looking towards Asia, where China, South 
Korea and Japan have expressed a growing interest in Greenland’s seal products (Kleist 2013: 3; 
Naalakkersuisut 2014a). 
Development and protection of Greenland’s environment 
Greenland’s self-government was introduced in the wake of the global rediscovery of the Arctic, which 
– with the beginning of the global financial crisis and the simultaneous historically high oil prices in 
mind – created a significant interest in the newly discovered vast hydrocarbon resources and the 
emerging shipping routes in the High North (cf. i.a. Gad 2013). Greenland with Kuupik Kleist at the 
helm was indeed very attentive to this development and it soon became clear that the upcoming 
COP15 in Copenhagen was going to be an important summit where Greenland would seek to position 
itself as an individual international actor with an agenda different from the Danish Government’s. 
Kleist, thus, stated in his first opening speech of Inatsisartut: “We would like to have the same 
opportunity as other countries that have been able to exploit their oil potentials without paying taxes. 
It cannot be true that when it is our turn we then have to pay through the nose to emit CO2” (Kleist 
2009a: 12. Author’s translation). Initially, Denmark was not keen on giving Greenland special 
treatment, but a few days before the beginning of COP15, Kleist and Denmark’s Minister of Climate, 
Lykke Friis, signed a memorandum of understanding which by a single sentence in a footnote frees 
Greenland from being subject to the same obligations as Denmark. The footnote simply stated: 
“Therefore, the commitments of Denmark as a member of the European Union do not apply to the 
Faroes and Greenland” (Kleist & Friis 2009). Though the result of COP15 was limited to the non-
legally binding Copenhagen Accord, it was still a historic event for the development of a more 
autonomous foreign policy, which is part of the raison d’être as confirmed by Kleist in a feature article 
shortly after: “The climate policy must be seen in the context of the overall political objective of a 
financially self-sustaining Greenland” (Kleist 2009b. Author’s translation). 
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The goal of differentiated climate targets was the same the subsequent year, when Kleist participated 
in COP16 in Cancún, but instead of referring to future anticipated independence, the justification was 
then instead based on indigenous people’s rights, exemplified by Kleist’s statement after the summit: 
“Last week, we were the only Arctic country that drew attention to the indigenous people’s rights in 
relation to climate change. We are really proud of this, and the reactions have been very positive” 
(Fisker 2010. Author’s translation). Instead of Greenland vs. Denmark, the dichotomy was here the 
indigenous people vs. the industrialised world that formed a potential threat towards growing 
industrialisation in Greenland. The background for this decision was probably that the COP15 
agreement with the Danish government was no longer applicable, which meant that Greenland was 
no longer certain of self-representation and therefore sought to be part of an alternative coalition. In 
August 2012, Greenland’s individual position in the climate negotiations was, however, enhanced as 
Denmark and Greenland signed an agreement based on §13.2 in the Act on Self-Government: “In 
matters which exclusively concern Greenland, the Government may authorise Naalakkersuisut to 
conduct the negotiations, with the cooperation of the Foreign Service” (Act on Greenland Self-
Government 2009). This was a milestone in Greenland’s development of a more autonomous foreign 
policy. The more individual position on the world stage was reflected at COP18, where the argument 
of indigenous people’s rights was downplayed in favour of articulations pleading for equality, 
anticipated industrialisation and, hence, future independence. 
Since the introduction of self-government, the possibilities rather than the risks have been most often 
emphasised in the official communication, but this changed when UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon arrived in Greenland in March 2014. Climate change’s negative effects on the vulnerable 
environment then became far more pronounced, i.a. by then Premier Aleqa Hammond who stated: 
“It is also important to see that the strong, proud culture in the Arctic is threatened because of climate 
changes” (Naalakkersuisut 2014b. Author’s translation) and “Climate changes have a direct impact on 
our daily lives, on the household economy and that we get food on the table” (ibid.). In this way she 
referred to the collective identity narrative where the hunting traditions are particularly threatened as 
hunting grounds and animals disappear in step with increasing temperatures. According to Hammond 
it is, however, not only of existential importance to the professional hunters, but to the survival of the 
cultural heritage of the entire Greenlandic population and hence a matter of protecting the Greenland 
nation against an external threat.  
Half a year later, Hammond reciprocated Ki-Moon’s visit when she – at what became her last 
international journey as Premier of Greenland – travelled to New York to give a speech at the 
UNESCO side event on climate change and Indigenous peoples’ rights. Here she underlined the 
connection between climate change and exerting Indigenous peoples’ rights, while she in line with the 
tendency since COP15, expressed that “Greenland will not be a passive victim of climate change. A 
likely scenario for the future of Greenland is an economic growth supported by new large-scale 
industries and oil and mineral extraction. This will profoundly affect our society and the environment” 
(Hammond 2014: 3-4). A few minutes later she, however, also stated that “At the heart of Inuit culture, 
is the preservation and long-term protection of the living resources, on which life in the Arctic has 
always depended. These living resources are key to my identity and to that of my people” (Hammond 
2014: 10). Her speech, thus, both highlighted the positive and the negative sides of the climate 
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paradox, as they threaten the culturally important hunting traditions while on the other hand are 
perceived as a welcomed change that may help speeding up the process towards increased 
independence.  
Perspectives and potentials 
The climate change paradox exemplifies well how the cultural traditions and the independence 
discourse sometimes are in conflict with each other, as the prioritisation of one side may have negative 
consequences to the other. The climate change paradox, thus, mirrors the double perspective of the 
dominating collective identity narrative, which, however, is used actively to optimise Greenland’s 
international bargaining position. In this way, both extraordinary whaling rights and special rights in a 
future global climate agreement have been secured, while the official status of the Greenlandic 
language has played a significant role in elevating Greenland’s general status in the Nordic Council. 
The reason for this communicative oscillation between describing Greenlanders as a ‘minority’ or an 
‘equal partner’ may be an intentional strategy or a transitory phenomenon mirroring the relatively 
recent transition from home rule, characterised by hierarchical subordination, to self-government and 
a position as equal partner (cf. Thisted 2012: 612). This change is both visible in Greenland’s external 
communication and in the outside world’s perception of Greenland, visible in e.g. EU’s ‘Inuit 
exception’ and WTO’s subsequent overruling due to its anti-competitive elements (Naalakkersuisut 
2013b). This development may be an indication of an incipient change in the outside world’s 
perception of Greenland’s position, which on the one hand may result in less special treatment in the 
future, but on the other benefit the process towards increased self-determination.  
Greenland’s state-like imitation is particularly observable in the communication in the Nordic Council 
and in relation to the climate summits, where the elected representatives have obtained a higher degree 
of autonomy by referring to the Act on Self-Government and the anticipated future increased 
independence. If one broadens the analytical perspective a bit, it becomes visible how this was also 
the case when Aleqa Hammond on behalf of Greenland decided to boycott the Arctic Council 
ministerial meeting in Kiruna in 2013 because she was discontent with Greenland’s lower status in 
comparison with Denmark (Duus 2013). A similar kind of discontent was expressed in the sealing and 
whaling disputes where wishes for individual representation in WTO and IWC were articulated. Put 
together, these examples can be described as a postcolonial sovereignty game (cf. Adler-Nissen & Gad 
2014: 16), where Greenland sometimes seeks to draw a sharper communicative dichotomy to 
Denmark, while, in other instances, simply leaving out the Danish Realm of the foreign policy 
communication concerning an envisioned future with more self-determination. As mentioned earlier 
in this paper, this will require significant foreign investments in e.g. large-scale mining projects in order 
to, first of all, render superfluous the bloc grant from Denmark of approximately €500 million 
annually. Such projects will, however, require assistance from thousands of foreign workers who may, 
in time, constitute a potential threat to Greenland’s societal security as continuing presence of a major 
group of for example Chinese workers would challenge the widespread ethno-national perception of 
Greenlandic culture. Hence the state-building process can have an effect on the nation-building 
process as the narrative of what is truly Greenlandic will be challenged and possibly changed when 
the structure of society and composition of population also change. This is based on the logic, as 
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explained by Wæver: “If one’s identity is based on separateness, on being remote and alone, even a 
very small admixture of foreigners will be seen as problematic” (Buzan et al. 1998: 124). This logic is 
indeed present in the parliament debates about the anticipated future mining boom, but at the same 
time the expected presence of foreign workers is generally accepted as a necessary means to serve the 
overarching goal of increased independence (cf. FM2014/68).   
Conclusion 
Although the legal frameworks seem to dictate a clear definition of Greenland’s foreign policy 
competence, a ‘window of opportunity’ is, however, present as implied by the Foreign Affairs 
Department that points to ‘practice’ as a third regulatory factor. With inspiration from Ole Wæver’s 
understanding of foreign policy as based on the state’s self-image, this paper narrowed down the focus 
to articulations about protection of a collective identity; language, hunting rights and a special relation 
to nature. These analyses revealed how: 1) The debate about the status of language is used as a platform 
for achieving rights more equal to the states of the Nordic Council, while simultaneously being 
described as an indigenous minority right under the auspices of UN. 2) The sealing and whaling 
disputes have been articulated as threats to the national identity security where the reference to 
indigenous peoples rights have resulted in a higher quota on large whales, while WTO have overruled 
EU’s Inuit exception because it is anti-competitive. 3) The special relation to nature represents a 
paradox – mirroring the double perspective of the dominating identity narrative – where the 
exploitation of the nature’s non-living resources, necessary if increased independence shall be realised, 
indirectly threatens hunting traditions, as growing industrialisation would contribute to continuing 
climate changes. Common for these three cases is the oscillation between portraying Greenlanders as 
either a minority or an equal partner depending on the situation, which either may be a transitory 
phenomenon as a result of the relatively recent transition from home rule to self-government or an 
intentional strategy used to optimise Greenland’s bargaining position internationally. No matter the 
reason, this has resulted in extraordinary rights to whaling and more favourable CO2 reduction 
requirements, which do not apply to the rest of the Danish Realm. In this process, Greenland has 
furthermore enhanced its cooperation with Åland and the Faroe Islands under the auspices of the 
Nordic Council, while initiating new international relations with China, Japan and South Korea that 
are perceived as new promising markets for i.a. seal product export. By referring to protection of 
cultural traditions and by articulating the anticipated future with more independence, Greenland has, 
thus, shaped and strengthened a foreign policy a little more autonomous from Denmark. 
 
Notes 
1. Or not-so-radical Other as termed by Lene Hansen (2006: 7). 
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The Canadian Arctic is seen as a resource-rich territory and attracts many developers however, at the institutional level, it is a very 
complex region. Arctic Canada is formally under the jurisdiction of the federal government, yet a devolution process initiated in the 
sixties has led to the creation of responsible territories in Yukon, the Northwest Territories and ultimately the Nunavut Territory 
in 1999. At first this devolution didn’t include the management of natural resources, but recently the Yukon (2003) and the 
Northwest Territories (2014) have signed a natural resources devolution agreement with the federal government and Nunavut is 
negotiating a similar agreement. Furthermore, all of the Canadian Arctic territories have a significant indigenous population which 
has attained constitutional recognition through multiple court decisions, leading to the conclusion of land claims settlements. These 
agreements involve the creation of regional or local governments and various boards and organizations tasked with such 
responsibilities as making recommendations on natural resource management, and environmental and social assessments of resource 
development. In addition, all recent land claims settlements require developers to sign Impact and Benefit Agreements with local or 
regional Indigenous organizations. 
This has led to complex governance arrangements that offer a good example of vertical and horizontal multilevel governance but 
that are often denounced by developers and some federal policy-makers as a balkanization of decision-making. This paper will map 
the formal and informal powers and the interaction of the different regulatory institutions from the local to the federal level. The 
authors will then analyse the federal effort to streamline environmental governance through the Action Plan to Improve Northern 
Regulatory Regimes and assess how it impacts the MLG scene in the Canadian Arctic.  
 
 
The Canadian Arctic is resource-rich and has been attracting many developers. It is also a very complex 
region institutionally. Though officially under federal jurisdiction, a process of political devolution has 
since the 1970s brought responsible government to Yukon, to the Northwest Territories and, later, to 
Nunavut, a territory created in 1999. At first this devolution excluded management of natural 
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resources, but recently Yukon (2003) and the Northwest Territories (2014) have signed devolution 
agreements to transfer control of natural resources from the federal government, and Nunavut is 
negotiating a similar agreement. In each case, devolution is a process of delegating federal powers to 
the respective territorial government and Indigenous government. 
All of the Canadian Arctic territories have a significant Indigenous population, whose rights have been 
constitutionally recognized through multiple court decisions that have led to the signing of land claim 
agreements. These agreements allows the creation of co-management boards, whose responsibilities 
include making recommendations or decisions on natural resource management and on environmental 
and social assessment of resource development (Berger et al. 2010), and since the recognition by the 
federal government in 1998 of the right to self-government, the creation of Aboriginal governments. 
In addition, all recent land claims settlements require developers to sign Impact and Benefit Agreements 
with local or regional Aboriginal organizations. Land claim agreements are constitutionally protected 
under section 35(1) of the 1982 Constitution Act, and therefore they cannot, contrary to the territorial 
devolution process, be unilaterally rescinded. 
This paper focuses on the multilevel governance structure of the Canadian Arctic territories—
Nunavut, the Northwest Territories, and Yukon—a structure established through devolution and the 
land claim and self-government agreements that have been signed with the first inhabitants of those 
regions: the Inuit and the First Nations. Both devolution and the self-government process are based 
on the principle of subsidiarity—a clear departure from the Canadian Constitution, which does not 
recognize subsidiarity below the provincial level. All the lower level of governments (region, city or 
municipality) have only delegated powers. 
Devolution and the land claims and self-government process have together created a complex 
governance arrangement that some developers and the Conservative government have denounced as 
slowing down decision making on resource development (INAC 2008). This paper will map the formal 
and informal powers and the interaction of the different regulatory institutions from the local to the 
federal level. The authors will then analyse the federal effort to streamline environmental governance 
through the Action Plan to Improve Northern Regulatory Regimes and assess how it impacts the Multilevel 
Governance (MLG) scene in Arctic Canada.  
Multilevel governance in the Canadian Arctic 
Multilevel governance approaches have been first developed to understand the increasing complexity 
and dispersion of power among different levels of public institutions in the European Union. This 
dispersion of power can be observed both vertically, among sub-national units, through processes of 
decentralization and regionalization, and horizontally through increased participation by non-
governmental and quasi-governmental actors in policy making (Marks & Hooghe 2004).  
In Canada, MLG approaches have been used to describe the governance arrangements created by 
Aboriginal land claim settlements (Timpson 2003; Papillon 2007; Wilson 2008a; Wilson 2008b; 
Alcantara & Nelles 2013; Rodon 2014; Wilson et al. in press). For these authors, such arrangements 
create vertical power sharing by empowering sub-provincial units within the Canadian federal system 
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in what is sometimes referred to as nested federalism (Wilson 2008a). In the case of Aboriginal land 
claim settlements in Canada, power is dispersed between public institutions and Indigenous 
institutions. 
In fact, two parallel processes are at play, (1) territorial devolution and (2) Aboriginal land claims and 
self-government agreements.  In Canada, the Northwest Territories initially encompassed all of 
Rupert’s Land—the territories purchased from the Hudson’s Bay Company—and were considered to 
be underdeveloped and underpopulated regions that could gain provincial status if settled by enough 
European immigrants (Coates 1985). Until then, the federal government would directly administer 
these territories. The entire southern section of the Northwest Territories eventually gained provincial 
status (Manitoba in 1870, Saskatchewan and Alberta in 1905) but the Arctic regions remained too 
sparsely populated by Europeans to acquire provincial status. Political devolution started in the 1970s 
with the creation of the first representative governments in Yukon and the Northwest Territories. 
This devolution gave both territories powers similar to those of the provinces, with the exception of 
jurisdiction over land and resources, which remained in federal hands. Moreover, unlike the provinces, 
which have constitutionally protected powers, the territories have only delegated powers, are overseen 
by a federal commissioner who has to approve all territorial bills, and their legislation can be revoked 
by the Canadian Parliament within 45 days of enactment. It should be said that to date the Canadian 
parliament has never used these powers and that convention has established that the federal 
commissioner should accept all advice from the territorial assembly in territorial matters.  
A parallel trend toward self-government has also been ongoing among Aboriginal people throughout 
Canada, although it has gone the farthest in Arctic Canada. This process stems from the recognition 
of Aboriginal rights by the Canadian Supreme Court. To honour these rights, the federal government 
has put into place a land claims policy (Canada 1987) and a self-government policy (INAC 1995) and 
has negotiated land claims and self-government agreements in Arctic Canada. These governments 
form a new level of government that is based on constitutionally protected treaties while not being 
part of the constitutional order (Rodon 2014), although, in the case of Nunavut, self-government was 
implemented through the creation of a third territorial government. 
The land claims agreements create another level of governance through multiple co-management 
boards, which mostly have recommending power but have decision-making power in some cases. The 
resulting governance arrangements may be complex. In the Northwest Territories, for example, major 
land claims have already been settled with respect to four nations: the Inuvialuit in 1984, the Gwich’in 
in 1992, the Sahtu in 1993, and the Tlicho in 2005. Such arrangements created a number of boards 
that make recommendations on such things as natural resource management and environmental and 
social assessment of resource development—a clear example of a vertical multilevel governance 
framework with dispersion of power among local and regional Aboriginal institutions. 
Resource development in Canada’s territories 
Land and resource management have remained under federal jurisdiction, but there is a clear trend 
toward devolution of these responsibilities to the territories. The first step was the Canada Yukon Oil 
and Gas Accord signed in 1999, which gave Yukon legislative control over oil and gas resources, 
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including the collection of resource revenues. It was followed by a devolution transfer agreement in 
2003, which provided for the transfer of responsibilities for land, water, forest, and mineral resources. 
A similar agreement has just been signed in the Northwest Territories and has led to an update of the 
Yukon resource-sharing agreement to bring it into line with the NWT one. At this time, the Nunavut 
government is negotiating a similar devolution agreement but the talks had been stalled for many years 
and restarted just last year. These agreements empower the territories to manage the land and 
resources, although they have to share the resource revenues with the federal government according 
to a formula that allows the territory to keep 50% of the revenues, the other 50% being deducted from 
Territorial Formula Financing. The amount of money to be transferred is capped in order to keep the 
territories from becoming too wealthy (Irlbacher & Mills 2007). Land claim agreements have also 
impacted land and resource management because they recognize Aboriginal property rights over 5 to 
20% of the claimed territory. In the most recent agreements, subsurface rights have also been 
recognized, although for very small tracts of land.  
Land and resource management has been affected the most by the co-management regime stemming 
from these agreements. These co-management regimes create boards that oversee wildlife, water, land, 
and resource management and impact assessment, and whose composition is usually 50% 
representatives of Aboriginal people and 50% representatives of the two levels of government (federal 
and territorial). 
In Yukon, the Umbrella Final Agreement has created a framework for the negotiation of land claim 
agreements by each Yukon First Nation. To date, 11 Yukon First Nations have signed land claim 
agreements. Surface rights and the environmental assessment process are dealt with by the Council of 
Yukon First Nations, thus bringing management of these issues to the territorial level. 
In the NWT, the recent land claims agreements (Gwich’in, Sahtu, and Tlicho) have put into place 
three land and water boards in the Mackenzie Valley. In addition, the Mackenzie Valley Land and 
Water Board (MVLWB), under the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act (MVRMA), 
coordinates management of these resources and covers those regions that are not yet under a land 
claim agreement.  
The Inuvialuit Settlement Region, which is located in the NWT, encompasses the Mackenzie River 
delta as well as the Arctic Islands, and has quite a different management structure. The Inuvialuit Final 
Agreement was signed in 1984, at a time when there was no established model for land claim 
agreements. Although it makes no provision for a non-renewable resource management board, such 
a role is played by the Inuvialuit Game Council. 
The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) encompasses all of Nunavut, but three co-
management boards are responsible for land resources and make recommendations to the relevant 
minister: the Nunavut Planning Commission, the Nunavut Water Board, and the Nunavut Impact 
Review Board. A fourth body, the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board, is responsible for wildlife 
and is the only Nunavut board with decision-making powers. 
The land claims agreements have thus created multiple poles of governance (Loukacheva 2007; White 
2009; McArthur 2009; Rodon 2014) with competing legitimacy and, according to some, a risk of 
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balkanization of decision making, especially in the NWT—where there are multiple land claim 
agreements, each with its own set of resource boards and approval processes for resource 
development.  
The existing boards are, however, integral to the land claim and self-government agreements. In 
addition, land use planning and non-renewable resource management are central to the quest by 
Aboriginal nations to regain control over their lands (Berger et al. 2010). These boards provide them 
with direct input into land planning, management, and resource development, thus giving them 
decision-making power in some cases or at least strong recommending powers and providing 
indigenous parity representation.  
The Mackenzie Valley pipeline: testing the land claim regulatory regime 
The three Mackenzie Valley land claims agreements (Gwich’in, Sahtu, and Tlicho) established a 
regulatory process that was first tested by the proposed Mackenzie Gas Pipeline, a 1,196-km natural 
gas pipeline system along the Mackenzie Valley that would have run across the territory of most of 
the new land claim boards in the NWT. This project was a revival of an older project, the Mackenzie 
Valley Pipeline that had been abandoned in 1977 after the first extensive public inquiry in the NWT 
concluded that the project should not go ahead before settlement of Aboriginal land claims. When the 
project was revived in 2000, most of the NWT’s Aboriginal land claims had been settled. There was 
thus a very different institutional and regulatory regime composed of Aboriginal governments and 
multiple treaty-based boards.  
In preparation for the environmental review, the Northern Pipeline Environmental Impact Assessment and 
Regulatory Chairs’ Committee was formed in November 2000 to develop the Cooperation Plan which 
would set the foundations for a coordinated approach of the regulatory process for the Mackenzie 
Gas Project. The committee was formed of representatives of the different resource boards in the 
NWT and of representatives of the federal and territorial governments.1 The project proponent 
officially filed the pipeline project in June 2003.  
After preliminary public hearings, the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board 
(MVEIRB) ordered an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) due to the many concerns aroused 
by the project. The National Energy Board (NEB), a federal board that has to approve all energy-
related projects, also had to conduct a project review and organize public hearings. To avoid 
duplications, a Joint Review Panel (JRP) was formed. The MVEIRB selected three members (one 
from each of the three Mackenzie land claim boards) and the Minister of the Environment appointed 
four members, two of whom have to be appointed by the Inuvialuit Game Council, and one by the 
NEB. The JRP was mandated to evaluate possible project impacts on the environment and on the 
lives of the people in the area. The NEB review and the Joint Review Panel evaluation were conducted 
simultaneously; the Joint Review Panel’s recommendations were necessary, however, for the NEB to 
make its decision. 
During 2006-2007, the JRP held public hearings in 23 communities in the NWT and northwest 
Alberta. It heard directly from 558 presenters, as either individuals or as representatives of groups or 
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organizations (Joint Review Panel for the Mackenzie Gas Project 2009). A clear divide appeared 
between those regions where a land claim had been signed and those that had no such agreement yet. 
In the first case the Aboriginal organizations supported the pipeline project, while in the second there 
was widespread opposition (Joint Review Panel for the Mackenzie Gas Project 2009; National Energy 
Board 2010). The NEB, for its part, held public hearings from 2006 to 2010 in 15 communities (NEB 
2010). 
In December 2009, the Joint Review Panel submitted its report and concluded “that there are reasonable 
grounds for expecting that the Project would make a positive contribution to sustainability provided that the Panel’s 
recommendations are fully implemented” (Joint Review Panel for the Mackenzie Gas Project, 2009). In 
November 2010, the governments of Canada and the Northwest Territories responded to the JRP 
report and accepted 88 of the 115 recommendations. One month later, the NEB issued a decision to 
approve the project and, finally, on March 11, 2011, almost eight years after the project proponents 
had filed the pipeline project, the Mackenzie Gas Pipeline was granted federal cabinet approval. 
However, by that time it was no longer financially viable because the natural gas price had dropped 
from $15.38 per MMBtu in December 2005 to $4.57 in 2011 due to increased American production 
of shale gas. 
The Mackenzie Gas Project (MGP), thus, received approval through a lengthy and complicated 
process, which took over seven years from the time the project was officially tabled. The land claim 
and water boards did not, however, slow down the process conducted by the Joint Review Panel. In 
fact, most of the delays were due to the extensive public consultations taking place and to the need to 
review the project through two processes: a local one for the Mackenzie Valley and the NWT and a 
federal one through the National Energy Board. Finally, the MGP had support from all of the 
Aboriginal groups that had signed land claim agreements, and all of the groups that had not were 
opposed. Therefore, it could be said that the land claim agreements are, in fact, facilitating approval 
of development projects. 
The federal solution: streamlining and recentralizing the regulatory process  
In the NWT  
During MGP public hearings, the federal government mandated a special rapporteur, Neil McCrank, 
to review the regulatory system in the North with an almost exclusive focus on the NWT. In March 
2008, after consultations with many stakeholders, a two-day roundtable was held in Yellowknife to 
hear the opinions of other stakeholders, with 80 people being present (McCrank 2008). The McCrank 
Report recommended two options: transform the regional boards into administrative regulatory 
bodies that would no longer have quasi-judicial power or merge all the land and water boards into a 
single board, the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water Board (MVLWB). If that second option was to 
be chosen, the report further recommended that the federal government reach agreements with each 
party in order to make amendments to the land claim agreements before amending the MVRMA and 
that the MVLWB have final decision-making authority (rather than the Minister).  
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After this first round of consultations, in May 2010, the federal government launched a Federal Action 
Plan to Improve Northern Regulatory Regimes. The aims were twofold: ensure that development would not 
be impeded by “red tape” and bring the northern regulatory regimes into line with those of the rest 
of Canada. Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) appointed a chief 
federal negotiator with the mandate to negotiate the merging of the four NWT land and water boards 
into a single board. The federal government had thus clearly chosen the report’s second option 
(Terriplan Consultants 2010). However, consultations had to be held with the three Mackenzie Valley 
Aboriginal land claim organizations (Gwich’in, Sahtu, and Tlicho) because all of them opposed merger 
of their newly created land and water boards. In total, the AANDC Chief Negotiator “has held over 50 
consultation meetings with Aboriginal groups and organizations, co-management boards and industry. In all, 24 
Aboriginal groups were invited to participate in technical consultations and funds were made available to them to assist 
them in the consultation process” (AANDC 2014).  
Following these consultations, the chief federal negotiator recommended to the Minister to merge the 
land and water boards into a single board. This recommendation was accepted by the Minister and 
put into draft legislation, but the negotiator had to request two more amendments because of the 
opposition of all of the Aboriginal groups in the Mackenzie Valley (Pollard 2014): First, the draft bill 
was amended to allow creation of regional MVLWB subcommittees, with each one having at least 
three members and if possible a person from the region. These subcommittees would have decision-
making authority, thus bringing decision making closer to the community, a clear effort to reintroduce 
subsidiarity into the recentralization process. The second amendment concerned appointment of the 
chair. In the first draft, the Minister would have appointed the chair without consultation. Because of 
widespread opposition from NWT Aboriginal groups, this provision was amended so that the Minister 
would appoint the chair but only after consultations with the MVLWB. The draft bill with the 
proposed amendments to the MVRMA was included in the Omnibus Bill C-15, which also included 
the Northwest Territories Devolution Act. It received royal assent on March 2014.  
In spite of these last minute amendments, it should be noted that two recommendations from the 
McCrank report were not implemented: the approval of the land claims signatories was not sought 
before passing the law, amounting to a unilateral change of land claim agreements, and the final 
decision-making rests with the federal minister for most decisions. For the NWT First Nations, the 
elimination of the three land and water boards without their formal approval is seen as an unilateral 
violation of their land claim agreements, as expressed by the Grand Chiefs of the Tlicho Government:  
Canada has returned to the old colonial way of thinking, that they know what is best for 
us. They are silencing our voice. That cannot be the way of the future. That is not the 
constitutional promise made in the Tlicho agreement. We demand better. We will stand 
up to this proposed law and challenge it if need be (Erasmus, E. Grand Chief, Tlicho 
Government, January 27th, 2014). 
The Dehcho First Nations provide a similar perspective: 
So we fail to see, from the perspective of the Dehcho First Nations, how Canada is 
fulfilling its obligations to maintain some parity, some equality, either at the table with the 
Dehcho First Nations in its negotiations or indeed for the Dehcho in its reconstituted 
super-board. Neither is being maintained. This is fundamentally disrespectful to the 
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principles under which the Dehcho have entered these negotiations, and it's 
fundamentally at odds with the honour of the crown (Norwegian, H., Grand Chief, 
Dehcho First Nations, January 27th, 2014). 
Another important concern of the NWT First Nations is that elimination of the regional boards will 
reduce participation by First Nations in decisions affecting their region and limit community 
involvement. For example, the Sahtu, the Tlicho, and the Gwich’in will no longer participate equally 
in decision making, and the single representative on a committee of 11 cannot engage and represent 
the communities as the regional board did (Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment 
and Natural Resources 2014; Erasmus, E. 2014; CBC News 2013) 
The Tlicho and Sahtu governments both decided to challenge the new legislation in court. First, the 
Tlicho Government, in July 2014, filed a lawsuit against Canada, claiming that the changes to the 
MVMRA are unconstitutional and in breach of the Tlicho Agreement. Second, the Sahtu Secretariat, 
in March 2015, in their lawsuit against Canada, argues that the elimination of regional land and water 
boards violates the terms of the land claims and dilutes the ability of Aboriginal governments to co-
manage resource development in the territory (Wohlberg 2015). On February 27, 2015, the Supreme 
Court of the Northwest Territories granted the Tlicho Government injunctive relief, suspending the 
effect of s. 253(2) of the Northwest Territories Devolution Act. The federal government has however 
appealed the decision.  
The NWT has been the territory the most impacted by the federal Action Plan to Improve Northern 
Regulatory Regimes. Despite many consultations, there has been unabated opposition from all of the 
Aboriginal groups concerned. This should be no surprise since the merging of the three land claim 
boards into a single “super board” has affected recently signed land claim agreements. The new “super 
board” will also be farther from the communities, and the influence of each Aboriginal group will be 
quite diminished. 
In Yukon (Bill S-6) 
The Yukon First Nations were also impacted by the action plan of the federal government. The Yukon 
Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment Act (YESAA) was first drawn up in 2005, as a 
requirement under the Development Assessment chapter of the Yukon First Nations Umbrella Final 
Agreement (UFA). It was developed by the Council of Yukon First Nations, the Government of 
Canada, and the Government of Yukon, and it establishes the Yukon Environmental and Socio-
Economic Assessment Board (YESAB) as an independent body responsible for environmental and 
socio-economic assessment. As part of the Action Plan to Improve Northern Regulatory Regimes, Bill S-6 
amends the YESAA.  
As in the NWT, there was widespread opposition to the change proposed by the federal government. 
Four aspects of the bill were of concern to Yukon First Nations: 1) section 34 empowers the federal 
government to give binding policy direction to the YESAB (similar to Bill C-15); 2) Canada can 
choose, under section 2, to delegate its powers to the Yukon Government; 3) sections 23 (2) and 16 
impose maximum timelines—the YESAB has 15 months to make its recommendations and nine 
months to complete its evaluation of a project; if the YESAB needs more time it has to make a request 
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to the federal minister; 4) finally, section 14 will allow for exemption of projects that come up for 
renewal—they can get approved without having any YESAB assessment. (Council of Yukon First 
Nations 2014). These changes are seen as a breach of agreements by the First Nations:  
The four problematic and substantive amendments […] give undue power to the federal 
and Yukon governments and upset the tripartite balance inherent in YESAA as currently 
written. In supporting these amendments, Canada and Yukon have put up roadblocks to 
meaningful collaboration, and these actions have strained intergovernmental relations to 
a degree rarely seen since the Final Agreements were signed (Joseph, R. 2015 [Chief 
Roberta Joseph of Tr’ondëk Hwëch’in First Nation]). 
Unlike the NWT, Yukon already had a single impact review board, so in this case, the issue was to 
facilitate project approval by imposing tighter deadlines and tighter federal control over the process. 
The changes were thus not as drastic but nonetheless they give to the federal government a tighter 
control on the YESAB. The Yukon First Nations have threatened to take court action but at this time 
have not filed a lawsuit. 
In Nunavut (Bills S-6 and C-47) 
In Nunavut too, there was no need to merge boards since there is only one land claim agreement. The 
focus was entirely on shortening the approval timeline, and that goal was achieved with bills C-47 and 
S-6. 
Bill C-47 was the first federal bill concerning Nunavut to be part of the Action Plan to Improve Northern 
Regulatory Regimes. It modified the Nunavut Planning and Project Assessment Act in 2013. Bill S-6 
amended the Nunavut Waters and Nunavut Surface Rights Tribunal Act. The bills, among other 
things, introduced timelines to speed up the review process. They did not cause many reactions. Bill 
S-6 had support from both the Nunavut Water Board (NWB) and the Nunavut Impact and Review 
Board (NIRB), since, for the Nunavut Water Board, “The Nunavut portion of Bill S-6 does not affect the land 
use planning and project assessment aspects of the Nunavut regulatory system” (NWB 2015).  
The only concern raised has been about the timelines for the water licensing process. The Nunavut 
Water Board thinks that these provisions might not be “sufficiently flexible to account for the issues 
beyond the NWB’s control that can—and regularly do—affect the Board’s ability to process 
applications in compliance with the 9 month time limit proposed under s.55.2” (NWB 2015). The 
NIRB shares this concern (NIRB 2015). According to the NIRB and the NWB, consultation was 
adequate and their proposals were taken into consideration (NWB 2015; NIRB 2015). In fact, the only 
real concerns in Nunavut have been about whether funding will be adequate for the board to review 
a project in a timely manner. These boards are indeed federally funded, and there has been ongoing 
dispute with the federal government over their inadequate funding. Following the lawsuit from 
Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI), which was amongst other things blaming the underfunding of these 
boards, the federal government recently announced a substantial increase in funding for all Nunavut 
boards (Nunatsiaq News 2015). 
The reform of the regulatory system in Nunavut has thus been much less controversial than in the 
NWT and Yukon : the process has had full support from NTI, the organization representing the 
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Nunavut Inuit (Nunatsiaq News 2013), although the Nunavut amendments had no impacts on board 
powers, which are in fact limited to making recommendations to the Minister. 
Conclusion 
The effort to simplify the regulatory process in the North can be seen as a way to improve decision 
making, as claimed by the federal government, a view supported by the NWT, Yukon, and Nunavut 
governments as well. There is, however, a different way of interpreting this reform. As mentioned in 
the introduction, land claim agreements have been a means for Aboriginal people to regain control 
over their ancestral lands. In addition, the creation of local boards had been a clear illustration of the 
subsidiarity principle. The federal government, through its action plan, has unilaterally watered down 
this principle in the NWT by merging the land and water boards into a super board. Although Yukon 
has been less impacted, the YESAB has similarly seen its powers curtailed by Bill S-6. Only Nunavut 
has been spared, but, as mentioned earlier, none of the boards in charge of reviewing and regulating 
resource development have decision-making powers. These changes also show that the federal 
government feels it has to control the multilevel governance that has resulted from land claims, even 
at the cost of litigation. It will be interesting to see the outcome of the Tlicho case, which will 
determine whether the federal government can unilaterally amend land claim agreements. The 
decision, if favourable to land claim organizations, could be a game changer and entrench the 
subsidiarity principle that the land claim and self-government process has established. If, however, the 
federal government wins the case, Aboriginal self-government will, like the devolution process, 
become more controlled, thus entrenching the federal government’s dominance in the MLG process. 
The federal government’s agenda is also open to question. In recent years, there has been a clear trend, 
at the federal level, toward trying to facilitate approval of development projects in Canada. For 
example, changes were made to the Fisheries Act to eliminate the need to consider fish habitats in 
development projects. This might seem like a trivial change but, in fact, Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
has often invoked protection of fish habitats to challenge development projects (Olszynski & Grigg 
2015). 
The same reasoning lies behind the effort to streamline decision-making processes in Yukon, the 
NWT, and Nunavut. Furthermore, the need to streamline has been used as an argument in the NWT 
even though, as seen earlier, the Mackenzie pipeline project failure can hardly be attributed to the 
impact review process. This argument is certainly not valid in the case of Yukon, where the impact 
review process was already managed by one board, the YESAB. Nor is it valid in the case of Nunavut, 
which has only one land claim agreement and one level of government.  
 
 
Notes 
1. The committee was made up of representatives of the Mackenzie Valley Land and Water 
Board, the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board, the Gwich’in Land and 
Water Board, the Sahtu Land and Water Board, the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
Rodon & Therrien 
129 
Agency, the National Energy Board, the Environmental Impact Review Board for the 
Inuvialuit Settlement Region, the Joint Secretariat for the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, the 
Environmental Impact Screening Committee for the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, the 
Inuvialuit Game Council, the Inuvialuit Land Administration, and Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada. The Deh Cho First Nation, the Government of the Northwest Territories and 
the Government of Yukon were observers. The long list of organizations exemplifies the 
institutional complexity of the NWT but also show a will to cooperate. 
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Finland, Sweden, Greenland and Russia are all partly or fully Arctic countries that are seeking to develop new possibilities for 
mining and for promoting the regional economy in their respective northern territories. Even though mining can spur economic 
development and create new wealth within previously undeveloped regions, there is also the potential for causing negative 
environmental effects and irrevocably shaping the social dynamics of Arctic communities and indigenous ways of life. In this article, 
we will compare the national policy strategies, regulation and tools for sustainable Arctic mining. In addition, we will also review 
questions related to social acceptance, coexistence with indigenous people and traditional livelihoods as well as the state of corporate 
social responsibility. The four countries share the goal of sustainable mining at a strategic level and are influenced, to some extent, 
by global trends in mining, but the concrete governance of sustainable mining has evolved very differently in each country-specific 
context.  
 
 
Introduction and background 
Over the past decade governments, private investors and mining companies have begun to regard the 
Arctic as a promising source of mineral wealth with significant deposits of gold, diamonds, platinum, 
nickel kimberlite and other precious stones (Howard 2009). To some extent this interest reflects the 
increase in the market price of minerals, driven mainly by a massive growth in demand from China 
and other rising economies through increasing urbanization and population growth. The impact of 
climate change is also playing its part in creating new opportunities for the mining sectors. Vast new 
areas of land are becoming more accessible during longer periods of time during the year, thereby 
extending the working and exploration season by several weeks. Northern territories, which were 
previously unattainable, or where the costs of operation were too high to warrant development, are 
now becoming economical. This trend in the “opening” of the Arctic is expected to continue into the 
future.  
Mining and other natural resources industries are key economic drivers for Arctic countries and create 
new opportunities for development in their northern regions. In Finland and Sweden, for example, 
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there has been a large growth in the mining sector over the recent decade. The Russian Arctic already 
has well-established industries, such as oil and gas production, mining and ore processing which are 
concentrated in these areas (Fundamentals… 2008; Development Strategy … 2013). 
Mining, as with oil and gas and other natural resource developments, has the potential to not only 
spur economic development and create new wealth, but also to harm the environment and irrevocably 
shape the social dynamics of Arctic communities and indigenous ways of life (Affolder 2011: 526−527; 
Haley et al. 2011). Mining development in the Arctic can be further complicated by its extreme climate, 
remote locations, lack of infrastructure as well as limited labor supply. 
There is also a real concern related to socio-economic impacts of mining in these regions, where new 
development could negatively impact the already established informal economy, consisting primarily 
of subsistence hunting, fishing, and herding, which are a crucial cultural component, and are essential 
to the quality of life of local inhabitants (AHDR 2004). As a result of the many drawbacks and negative 
impacts shown to be connected to mining, there has been growing discussion of the sustainability, 
responsibility and acceptance of mining, together with changes in how these issues can be governed 
and evaluated (e.g. Azapagic 2004; Whitmore 2006). 
Extractive industries are primarily based on non-renewable resources and are inherently unsustainable 
activities. A “strong sustainability” principle requires that current human activities do not eliminate 
future options and would therefore rule out mining as a sustainable development strategy. The “weak 
sustainability” principle, however, posits that different forms of capital, such as natural, human, social 
and produced, are substitutable. According to this, mining could promote sustainable development if 
“it gives rise to long-term benefits (environmental, social, and/or economic) that equal or exceed the 
values that existed prior to exploitation” (Amezaga et al. 2011: 21). Therefore, despite extractive non-
renewable resource industries, such as mining, being inherently unsustainable activities, if done 
responsibly they could give rise to improved social conditions, quality of life and promote further 
economic development. 
The social component of sustainable development, which includes community relations and social 
acceptance, is a critical yet difficult concept to grasp (Suopajärvi 2013). Conflicts over the development 
of resources, and the distribution of impacts and benefits, are often significant in socio-political and 
socio-economic terms. 
In this article, we shall compare the national policy strategies, regulations and tools of Finland, Sweden, 
Greenland and Russia for sustainable mining in the Arctic. In addition, the paper reviews the current 
state of social acceptance of mining, coexistence with indigenous people and traditional livelihoods 
and the state of corporate social responsibility policies for mining in the Arctic. We argue that 
sustainable governance in the Arctic, especially for mining, requires a multifaceted approach to policy 
contents and policy tools. The article is based on an analysis of formal policy documents, legislation 
and earlier research. 
The countries being compared herein represent very different types of institutional societies and have 
varying levels of mining experience throughout their histories but overall are representative of how 
the mining industry operates in the Arctic. Russia is a traditional mining country with a socialist-state 
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ideology and a mining industry still dominated by state owned companies. Today Russia mainly 
struggles with a lack of institutional capacities for governance. Finland and Sweden are Nordic welfare 
states, with strong state institutions that have experienced a recent mining boom, mostly dominated 
by international companies, and have had to adjust with recent and extensive regulatory changes. 
Finland, for example, throughout its mining history has been until now dominated by state-owned 
companies; with the introduction of international companies came also recent changes to mining and 
environmental regulations. Greenland has some history of mining, mostly controlled by Denmark, but 
now is an emerging mining country that recently received larger resource management autonomy and 
has had to develop its own governance framework. 
Finland, Russia and Sweden are some of the key metal and mining producing countries in the 
European Arctic (Kokko 2014, Government offices of…2013). In 2011, Sweden accounted for 80-90% of 
iron ore in the EU (SveMin 2012: 3). The Russian Arctic zone is a traditional mining region producing 
a vast range of mineral commodities (Dobretsov & Pokhilenko 2010; Kaminsky et al. 2014; Matveev 
2015). It is ranked among the world’s leading producers of nickel (12% of total world output), 
aluminum (8%), copper (6%), diamonds (29%), and gold (8%) (EU Mineral Statistics 2013). While 
Greenland does not currently have operating mines, it has vast mineral reserves that have drawn 
increasing interest both globally and from the EU. Greenland has ambitious plans to expand their 
mining industry (Government of Greenland 2014). 
Arctic mining industry in the national context 
Finland 
During the 2000s, the mining industry in Finland experienced a new “boom” (Kokko 2014). The 
previous prosperous era of mining in Finland ended in the late 1980s and was led by the state-owned 
mining company Outokumpu. In 1994, Finland joined the European Economic Area (EEA) and the 
Finnish mining sector was opened up to international actors, but it was not until the beginning of  
2000s that the country really began to draw the interest of  international mining companies 
(Hernesniemi et al. 2011: 137). Today international companies dominate the mining sector (Kokko 
2014: 15). 
Geographically speaking, mining activities are concentrated in the Eastern and Northern parts of 
Finland, which typically suffer from a declining population and a lack of economic opportunities. In 
2013, there were 12 metal ore mines in operation in Finland, with the primary products consisting of 
chrome, zinc, nickel, cobalt, gold and silver. Major mining projects located north of the Arctic Circle 
include Kittilä, Pahtavaara and Kevitsa. In addition, Anglo American Ltd plans to open a mine in 
Sodankylä. The Kittilä gold mine, operated by Agnico Eagle, is the largest gold mine in Europe. At 
Pahtavaara gold mine production was halted in 2014 when the mining company Lappland Goldminers 
AB, filed for bankruptcy. Of the mines in Finland, Kevitsa copper and nickel mine has been evaluated 
as the mine providing most employment and with the vastest impact on the regional economy 
(Laukkonen & Törmä 2014).  
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In 2012, mining production value contributed to 0.6 % of the Finnish GDP (ICMM 2014). The annual 
turnover of metal ore and industrial minerals in 2013 was over EUR 1.5 billion and exports in the 
minerals industry amounted to around EUR 126.5 million. In 2013, the mining industry directly 
employed approximately 3,000 people and indirectly 7,500 to 10,500 people through subcontractors 
(Kokko 2014).  
Sweden 
Mining has been an important part of the Swedish economy for centuries. In 2012, mining production 
value contributed to 1% of the GDP (ICMM 2014). In the end of 2012 there were 16 ore mines in 
operation (Government Offices of… 2013). Swedish mining accounts for about 11% of all exports and 
provides direct employment to approximately 10,000 people and indirectly 35,000 people in the 
country (SveMin 2012: 5). Sweden has a globally competitive minerals cluster with a leading position 
as a manufacturer of mining equipment (SveMin 2012: 5). The Swedish mining industry’s most 
important product is iron ore, but it is also an important producer of  copper, zinc, lead and silver 
within the EU (Government Offices of…2013: 11). 
Some of  the most significant mines in Sweden are located north of  the Arctic Circle. Kiruna is the 
largest underground iron ore mine in the world (LKAB 2015a), and is also known for the massive 
relocation project of  the city of  Kiruna. Malmberget is the second largest underground iron ore mine 
in the world (LKAB 2015b). Aitik is the largest copper mine in the country (Boliden 2015). Other 
Arctic mining projects in Sweden include Rakkuri, located near Kiruna, and Gruvberget. 
The iron ore industry was long dominated by the state-owned mining company called LKAB, until 20 
years ago when Sweden allowed entry of private-sector interests in the mineral resources industry 
(Walker 2011). By the late 1990s, a number of large-scale international companies entered Sweden and 
in 2004, the commodity price boom encouraged increasing interest in explorations (ibid; Ejdemo & 
Söderholm 2011). There is still potential for extensive increases in the mining sector particularly in 
Northern Sweden (SveMin 2012). 
In order to further develop mining, Sweden will have to increase its labor supply, improve its 
infrastructure, develop a more competitive energy supply market and ensure an effective permitting 
process (SveMin 2012). Specifically the transportation capacity issue is one that is vital to the expansion 
of the mining industry and is being currently looked at as collaboration between Sweden and Finland 
(see Rantala et al. 2012).  
Greenland 
Planning of exploration and mining activities in Greenland has dramatically increased during the 
2000s. With vast resources such as zinc, lead, iron ore, gold, platinum, uranium, rare earth elements 
and coal (Statistics Greenland 2013), Greenland has recently drawn the interest of several international 
actors. Greenland has perceived the development of mining as a tool for gaining a more independent 
position from the rule of Denmark (Nationalia 2013; Government of Greenland 2011: 8; Guardian 2013). 
Greenland seeks to turn mining into a major contributor into the national economy, whereas currently 
fishing and the annual block grant from Denmark are the main sources of income (Statistics Greenland 
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2013). Greenland made a final push in 2009 with the adoption of the Act on Self-Government (Act 
no. 473) under which it receives greater rights to self-govern including mineral resource developments 
(Statsministeriet 2009; Government of Greenland 2009: 7). 
Current mining activities in Greenland are mainly composed of exploration activities but a number of 
mining projects are approaching an advanced stage (The Ministry of Finance… 2013: 9). In 2014, there 
were six exploitation licenses in force (Mineral License and… 2014: 11). The number of applied and 
granted mineral licenses in the country increased steadily between 2002 and 2012 (Government of 
Greenland 2012: 13). At the same time, investments in exploration have grown significantly and in 2011 
it reached nearly DKK 700 million (Government of Greenland 2012: 14). In 2010, the industry turnover 
was DKK 24.1 million (Statistics Greenland 2013: 21). 
Russia 
Russia’s mining industry is the country’s most important sector after oil and gas. The extractive 
industry – including oil, gas and mining – is a key driver of economic growth with a widespread effect 
throughout other sectors of the economy (Federal book 2011; Rosstat 2013). In 2012, mining 
production value contributed to 4.4% of the GDP (ICMM 2014). 
Russia is a globally significant producer of a vast range of mineral commodities, including aluminum, 
arsenic, cement, copper, magnesium compounds and metals, nitrogen, palladium, silicon, and 
vanadium (EU Mineral Statistics 2013). Russia has the world’s second biggest proven coal reserves 
and it has been dubbed as the “Saudi Arabia of coal.” Currently the country accounts for 4.5% of 
global coal production (Multanen 2013). 
There are 7425 officially opened mining spots, of which 1909 are in use (Petrov 2010). The main 
mining region is located in the Russian Arctic, with 10% of the world’s proven nickel reserves, about 
19% of the world’s platinum group metals, 10% of titanium, as well as gold, zinc and cobalt (Bortnikov 
et al. 2015). The most significant Arctic mining deposits are located in Sakha region, Kola Peninsula, 
Norilsk area and East Siberia. Domestic private corporations and state-owned companies dominate 
the industry (Minerals Yearbook 2012).  
Currently the Russian extractive industry is undergoing growth of mining activities (Rosstat 2013). 
However, positive economic results were reached mainly because of supplementary exploration of 
existing mines and revaluation of the resources (Federal Book 2010). Until 2009, about 80% of mining 
production came from “old deposits” opened up in Soviet times (ibid). The industry seriously lacks 
investments on geological exploration of new mining deposits (Natalenko 2015). 
Sustainability in national mining strategies 
Being member countries of the Arctic Council, Finland, Sweden, Greenland (through Denmark) and 
Russia, have acknowledged the importance of sustainable use of natural resources and sustainable 
business for the future of the Arctic (Kiruna Declaration 2013). This means that they should promote 
sustainability also in the extractive sector and in national mining policy. 
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All four countries have recently established national mining strategies. The countries point out the 
importance of sustainability or sustainable development but with slightly different focuses. None of 
the countries has a specific strategy for Arctic mining but in addition to mining strategies, Finland, 
Sweden and Russia have national Arctic strategies. 
Finland’s Minerals Strategy (2010) aims to make the mining industry a cornerstone of the national 
economy and to make the country a global leader in sustainable mining by 2050. The Finnish Strategy 
focused on the industrial development of mining and responsible mining. The three main objectives 
of the Strategy are to promote domestic growth and prosperity, solutions for global mineral chain 
challenges and mitigating environmental impact. At the same time as the Strategy, Finland also 
modernized its mining regulations with the aim of ensuring there are sustainability targets for the 
mining industry. During 2010-2012, a few serious incidents involving mining water in Talvivaara mine 
initiated major public debate on the sustainability of the mining industry. The action paper for Finnish 
mining sector from government and other stakeholders was launched under the title “Making Finland 
a leader in the sustainable extractive industry – action plan” (MEE 2013). Based on the guidelines 
defined in the round-table discussions between wide range of stakeholders, the plan proposed 35 
measures for mining sector to operate environmentally, socially and economically sustainable manner. 
Finland has a subsection dedicated to the mining industry in the national Arctic Strategy 
(Valtioneuvoston kanslia 2013). The Strategy envisions Finland at the forefront of sustainable Arctic 
mining and stresses environmental aspects and social sustainability. Technologically sustainable 
solutions are perceived as a business opportunity for the country (ibid: 9). Overall, the focus of the 
Strategy is primarily on operational conditions such as the increasing need for transportation 
infrastructure and the importance of securing enough labour, resources and competent supervising 
authorities (ibid: 29-30). 
The Sustainable Mining Network launched by Sitra serves as a forum for discussion between the 
mining sector and its stakeholders. The working groups include the development of independent 
activities, social responsibility, the prevention and decrease of adverse environmental effects as well 
as the development of local operation models (www.kaivosvastuu.fi). 
In all these Finnish strategies and initiatives the notion of sustainable mining in the Arctic is left 
unaddressed and they only briefly state that the complexity and sensitivity of the environment are to 
be considered (see Kokko 2014: 61). 
The Swedish Minerals Strategy was published in 2013 and highlights the need for growth of the mining 
sector but with a strong emphasis on sustainability (Government Offices of … 2013). The Strategy does 
not assess Arctic mining as such but identifies the North as an important region for the mining sector 
but also with notable natural and cultural values. Coordination and dialogue among the various 
industries, including reindeer husbandry, is promoted.   
The Swedish Minerals Strategy identifies five general strategic objectives for the mining industry: 1) a 
mining and minerals industry in harmony with the environment, cultural values and other business 
activities; 2) dialogue and cooperation to promote innovation and growth; 3) framework conditions & 
138  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
 
Governance of Sustainable Mining in Arctic Countries 
infrastructure for competitiveness & growth; 4) an innovative mining and minerals industry with an 
excellent knowledge base; and 5) an internationally renowned, active and attractive mining industry. 
The Swedish Arctic Strategy identifies mining, together with petroleum and forestry, as an economic 
opportunity for the country (Government Offices of… 2011: 32). The expansion of  resource extraction 
is pointed out to increase the risk for local emissions and the need for transportation infrastructure, 
which is again perceived as an economic possibility (ibid: 15; 27). The Strategy states that future 
extraction should be conducted sustainably. Accordingly, the especially sensitive areas are to be 
protected from extraction, more environmental assessments are needed and that the State will work 
for long-term transportation solutions to promote sustainability. Sustainability is not addressed in 
regard to the social dimension as such but it concludes that Sweden will seek to bring forth and manage 
the negative social impacts of  natural resources development all while utilizing, as much as possible, 
the problem solving tools that consider the Arctic context more actively (ibid: 41). The Russian 
Mineral Strategy, the so-called Geological Strategy, was adopted in 2010 (Russian Mineral Strategy 
2010). Among the strategic objectives are improvements to the mining legislation, increasing investing 
attractiveness and strengthening mining Research & Development. The Strategy highlights the 
importance of mining activities for the country and the need to “move on to the new stage”, based 
on sustainable use of natural resource, reduction of negative environmental and social impacts as well 
as minimization operational risks. The Strategy was of great importance in guiding the new decision-
making process however, it lacks legislative support (Parliament hearings on …, 2010).  The majority of 
the current mining legislation was established in 1990s during different economic and social times and 
still requires updating. 
Several issues related to Arctic mining are reflected in the Development Strategy of the Arctic Region 
of Russia, issued in 2008. It identifies Russian national interests in the Arctic as being strongly linked 
to resource development. Arctic mining development is also discussed in regional policies of the 
Russian northern regions which address the issue in a more detailed manner (see Fundamentals of 
Sakha’s regional policy 2012; Development Strategy of Murmansk region 2013). 
Greenland updated its mining policy document in 2014 and while being highly growth-oriented, the 
Oil and Minerals Strategy highlights the importance of  sustainability (Government of  Greenland 2014). 
The Strategy of  2009 focused on increasing exploration activity and aims to have at least five to ten 
active mines in Greenland in the long term (Government of  Greenland 2014: 7). One of  the focuses of  
the document is to ensure that the benefits of  mining are felt within the Greenlandic society in the 
form of  employment and increased income. It also specifies certain priorities for sustainable 
development such as environmental protection, labor market and employment, training and citizens, 
local community and stakeholders. However, notable attention is paid also to the needs of  the mining 
industry in terms of  operational conditions. In addition, the Greenlandic government has undertaken 
various legal reforms to further encourage mining development in the country. 
Regulatory frameworks and policy tools for sustainable mining 
One of the state level challenges for environmental sustainability in mining is how to establish an 
efficient and trustworthy regulatory framework that minimizes the potential harmful environmental 
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effects of the industry (UNEP 2002; Bastida 2002: 5). In practice, the key regulatory framework for 
mining includes mining laws, which constitute the general framework, and are supported by 
environmental policies and regulations, as well as environmental impact assessment (EIA) and land 
use planning systems. In addition to the ‘hard law’ instruments governing the mining industry, 
countries and companies have also developed their own ‘soft law’ instruments such as sustainability 
principles and CSR practices. In addition, all four countries have introduced a variety of guiding 
principles and best practices to be followed. For example, Finland and Sweden have recommendations 
regarding exploration and mining activities in areas with particular environmental, cultural or other 
interests. In Finland, there is also guidance for stakeholder engagement in exploration and for practices 
supporting environmental regulation and socially sustainable mines in the north (Eerola 2013; Kokko 
et al. 2013). 
In Finland, the central mining regulations are the Mining Act, the Environmental Protection Act and 
the Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure (468/1994). The new Mining Act has been 
perceived as an improvement in terms of environmental governance, participation possibilities of local 
communities (Pölönen 2012) and rights of Sami People (Pettersson et al. 2015: 238). In 2011, the 
Finnish Environment Institute published a guide on the best environmental practices for metallic 
mineral mines (Kauppila et al. 2011). In 2013, some changes were made to environmental legislation 
and extra tests were required for mining sites because of the water pollution problems at the Talvivaara 
mine (Tiainen et al. 2014).  
In Finland, the EIA has two stages: an assessment program and an assessment report. The Finnish 
EIA typically involves two hearings; one in each stage of the process (Pettersson et al. 2015: 246-247; 
251). In Finland, the social impacts are to be considered during the EIA. A special guidance for EIA 
in mining was published just recently which should improve the management of local mining conflicts 
(TEM 2015). Recently, Finland has examined the possibilities for streamlining the EIA process with 
the permitting process (Tarasti et al. 2015). 
In Sweden, mining activities are regulated under the Minerals Act (1991:45) and the Minerals 
Ordinance (1992: 285) (SGU 2007). The environmental aspects are under the Environmental Code 
(1998: 808) (Michanek 2008). In addition, a set of other regulations such as the Reindeer Husbandry 
Act and the Planning and Building Act are of relevance. The Swedish legal framework has somewhat 
conflicting purposes between the two major laws, as the Minerals Act simply promotes exploitation 
and the Environmental Code sustainable development (Pettersson et al. 2015: 251). 
In Sweden, the specific requirements for the EIA can vary depending on if the environmental impacts 
of the project are potentially significant (Legislative Bill 2005: 53). The process frequently involves 
one hearing (Pettersson et al. 2015: 251). Social Impact Assessment (SIA) is not required by law and 
typically, the social impacts of mining are overlooked though some companies voluntarily undertake 
SIA (Pettersson et al. 2015: 238). The Swedish practices are seen as inadequate at properly considering 
the so called “zero-option,” cumulative impacts and lack true discussions on a project’s alternative 
contents (Longueville & Carlman 2013; Oscarsson 2006; Pettersson et al. 2015: 214). At the same 
time, some of the current provisions on EIA under the Environmental Code have been criticized for 
being overly complex and difficult to apply. To reduce the bureaucracy associated with mining, the 
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Swedish Government has tried to coordinate and simplify the EIA and narrow down the number of 
authorities involved in mining issues. In addition, the Strategy states that a manual on mining activity 
assessment for the industry shall be compiled (Government Offices of… 2013: 33-35.) According to the 
national Arctic strategy, Sweden will also promote greater use of EIA in the Arctic for example in 
mining (Government Offices of… 2011: 27). 
In Greenland, the Mineral Resources Act (2010) forms the basis for the regulation of mineral resources 
and mining activities. The Mineral Act brought along changes in regard to public participation and 
impact assessment. The Large-Scale Law regulates the possibilities for using foreign workforce in 
mining (Hannibal 2013). While in principle, the Act prioritizes Greenlandic workforce, the 
mechanisms for ensuring local employment are unclear (Committee for Greenlandic… 2014). The 
amendments in the Mineral Resources Act in 2012 strengthened the regulations that promote or 
require agreements on social sustainability such as Impact and Benefit Agreements (IBA). The 
amendments in 2014 brought along changes in regard to public participation in impact assessment by 
introducing the pre-public consultation. A noteworthy renewal towards improved sustainability was 
the new division of responsibilities between mining authorities in 2014 (Government of Greenland 2014: 
12). In Greenland, the effectiveness and clarity of the legal framework will be demonstrated in the 
future when the mining operation starts in practice. Still today, the authorities lack expertise on mining 
matters in general and are still relying heavily on external consultants. 
The Greenlandic framework requires both an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and a social 
impact assessment (SIA) to be conducted before a license for development may be negotiated. 
Greenlandic authorities have established guidelines for both EIA and SIA processes (BMP 2011; BMP 
2009). The SIA guidelines propose certain issues, related to the special characteristics of Greenlandic 
society, to be treated with particular attention (BMP 2009: 5). SIA serves as the basis for the 
negotiations of an Impact Benefit Agreement (IBA) (BMP 2009). In Greenland, the IBA is an 
important tool for ensuring that benefits of individual mining projects are directly invested back into 
social development (Government of Greenland 2014: 93). IBA is a formal contract involving the mining 
company, associated municipalities and the national government (Government of Greenland 2013: 7). IBA 
is seen as central for ensuring provision of skills-development projects and working opportunities at 
the local level (The Ministry of Finance and Domestic Affairs 2013: 42). According to the recently 
introduced pre-hearing process, if a project has notable social or environmental impacts, the applicant 
must arrange a public pre-consultation before the contents of the EIA and the SIA are determined 
(The Mineral Resources Act unofficial translation 2009: § 87a). 
In Russia, mining is regulated by the Russian Federal Law on Subsoil Resources issued in 1992 (Subsoil 
Law 1992) and the Russian Federal Law on Production Sharing Agreement (Federal Law on … 1995). 
It sets out a framework for contract negotiations between the state and investors on the extraction of 
mineral resources for production revenue sharing. According to Russian legislation, the Russian state 
owns all subsoil resources. The state may hire an investor as a contractor for the extraction of minerals, 
but it retains ownership of the resources (Federal Law on…1995). The Russian licensing system is based 
on the Subsoil Law, which requires companies with user rights to the land to consider certain 
obligations, such as the prevention of industrial waste and complying with particular technological and 
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environmental quality standards (Söderholm et al. 2015). In general, while Russia has established major 
revisions to its legal framework, the changes have remained minor in practice (Pettersson et al. 2015). 
In the Russian context, the lack of predictability of the regulatory system, the absence of coordination 
between the authorities and vagueness of competence across levels of authority are creating problems 
(Söderholm et al. 2015). 
In Russia, the conditions on EIA are defined under the Federal Law on environmental Protection, 
published in 2002, and the Federal Law on environmental expert review (or Law on Environmental Expertise 
1995).  According to Russian legislation, mining projects need to pass environmental expertise to 
prevent possible environmental impacts. In Russia the EIA (or so-called OVOS procedure) is one of 
the main components of the Environmental expert process, and assesses the impacts of a potential 
development, while the Environmental expertise is a process of reviewing the results and 
documentation of the assessment (Solodyankina & Koeppel 2009; Cherp & Golubeva 2004). 
Guidelines for EIA are determined in the Act on implementation of Environmental Impact 
Assessments (2000). Public participation is considered as an integral part of the EIA process. In 2006, 
the law was amended so that the definition of an environmental impact no longer includes ‘related 
social, economic and other project impacts’ (Wilson & Swiderska 2009). The demand from civil society 
to take part in the decision making process is quite insignificant (Fifka & Pobizhan 2014; Polishchuk 
2009; Riabova & Didyk 2014). The relative scarcity of people’s activity and undeveloped mechanisms 
of interaction has led to the formal implementation of the public participation processes. 
Social acceptability of mining 
The growing emphasis on social acceptability1 is an integral part of achieving sustainable mining (Prno 
& Slocombe 2012). In the mining industry participation and empowerment are understood to be more 
likely to lead to approved and supported mining projects than more closed practices. 
Finland and Sweden are internationally recognized as being stable operational and investment 
environments for the mining and ranking consistently at the top of the Fraser Institute’s mining survey 
(McMahon & Cervantes 2012; Jackson 2014). 
In Finland, the public acceptability of mining was underlined as a challenge in the 2010 Minerals 
Strategy (Finland’s Minerals Strategy 2010: 13), mostly due to the environmental problems 
encountered at Talvivaara (MEE 2013). Talvivaara spurred environmental organizations, the media, 
the civil society and individual politicians to take part in a heated public debate around mining and the 
associated environmental issues (Tiainen et al. 2014). In general, water management has been a 
reoccurring theme in the Finnish mining debate (Wessman et al. 2014). Since Talvivaara, the role of 
open and transparent dialogue between the various actors has been more strongly emphasized in the 
Finnish mining policy. During the recent years, several policy programs, cooperation bodies, working 
groups and academic works have targeted the socio-environmental issues of mining. Nonetheless, a 
recent attitude survey indicated that in Lapland the general acceptance of mining is slightly stronger 
than in other mining regions of Finland (Jartti et al. 2014; Jartti et al. 2012), but they were slightly more 
critical towards international companies, favoring state ownership in mining. 
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In Greenland the public debate has challenged the acceptability of the mining industry on the basis of 
weak government mining policy and poorly conducted public participation (Arctic Journal 2013b; 
Arctic Journal 2013c; Jacobsen 2014). Historically, the aim of mining expansion is nothing new in 
Greenland but the Self Government Act of 2009 stimulated further anticipations towards mining. By 
the end of 2013, various legal and political reforms such as the abolishment of the zero-tolerance 
policy on uranium mining and allowance of hiring the foreign workers for mining projects have 
generated heated public debate. One of the primary concerns has been the lack of public participation 
in the decision-making around mining. The government has sought to enhance the situation by 
introducing a pre-hearing process and a fund to support the participation of various stakeholders in 
the impact assessment processes (Government of Greenland 2014: 90-94). 
In Sweden, the question of acceptability has not received much attention yet. A recent study examined 
the practices of Swedish mining companies in gaining social acceptance. It indicated that the mining 
companies with a long history in Sweden have, over the time, gained the acceptance of the surrounding 
society whereas the newer companies face criticism even with extensive efforts to gain social 
acceptance (Tarras-Wahlberg 2014). Typically, the mining conflicts in Sweden are related to land use, 
reindeer herding and environmental values (e.g. Local 2013; BBC 2014). However, the absence of 
intense public discussion on mining may be partly explained by the characteristics of Sweden as a 
country of interest group politics where political activity rarely takes place in the form of open public 
debate (Lundqvist 2004). Also, there have not been major incidents in the Swedish mining sector 
during the recent years to trigger a more heated conversation. 
Despite the large number of mining areas and activities in Russia and the low number of observed 
company-community conflicts, the social acceptance of mining in Russia is not of big concern or 
debate (Polishchuk 2009; Riabova & Didyk 2014; Walker 2011). Historically, and also due to social 
and political reasons, mining companies in Russia are not facing big challenges in getting social 
acceptance (Riabova & Didyk, 2014). First, local people traditionally accept mining activities in the 
northern region. During Soviet times, the Arctic communities were settled near industry, often in close 
proximity to a mineral deposit (see Bolotova & Stammler 2010). Many Russians moved to the North 
following the establishment of industrial enterprise in the territory. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, a number of industrial-based towns have disappeared, however many still exist and enjoy some 
of the new opportunities for socio-economic development and employment.  Secondly, the Russian 
civil society remains quite weak and SLO has not risen to the public agenda in a similar way as in the 
Nordic countries. 
Coexistence with indigenous people and traditional livelihoods 
The pressure on land use in the European Arctic is increasing because of economic and environmental 
reasons (Strategic Assessment of… 2014a). In the Finnish and Swedish mining strategies, coexistence of 
mining with other land uses and livelihoods is an important issue (Finland’s Minerals Strategy 2010: 
13; MEE 2013; Government Offices of… 2013). Northern parts of Finland and Sweden have a number 
of competing land use interests including recreational use, mining, environmental protection, reindeer 
husbandry, and energy production (Strategic Assessment of… 2014b; Government Offices of… 2013: 26-27). 
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In northern Finland, mining projects are often located nearby tourist destinations and nature 
protection areas. Studies indicate that the perceived impacts of mining on the image of a region vary 
on case by case, but for some destinations the impacts may be significant (Jokinen 2014). 
In Greenland and Russia, there is no similar pressure in regard to land use because of the vastness of 
their territories. However, in Greenland effects on fishing and other traditional livelihoods as well as 
questions concerning housing for mining workers will become significant issues in the future (Carlsen 
2011). 
In Arctic mining areas, reconciling the interests of mining with the traditional livelihoods of the local 
people such as reindeer herding and indigenous people’s rights are central issues in mining 
development.  
In Finland, there is not yet mining on Sami Homeland areas but there has been a significant discussion 
about the potential conflict with future developments (Näkkäläjärvi 2015). The new Mining Act 
improved the position of the Sami in resource development and a guide was recently published on 
best practices for exploration activities in protection areas, Sami homeland and reindeer herding areas 
(TEM 2014). Indigenous Sami Homeland areas are ‘protected areas’ in which mining activities require 
special permits. The Reindeer Husbandry Act (848/1990) stipulates that in the reindeer husbandry 
area, activities that may significantly hamper the conditions for reindeer herding are prohibited. 
In Sweden, conflicts have emerged between mining companies and the Sami that have drawn 
significant attention to the issue of land use (Langston 2013; Mines and Communities 2011). The Sami 
have also reached out to UN to stop mining projects from proceeding (Saami Council & Minerals 
Policy Institute 2012). The Minerals Strategy states that a manual for consultation between reindeer 
husbandry and the mining industry should be drafted (Government Offices of… 2013: 27). In the Swedish 
legal framework, reindeer husbandry is protected under the constitution and regulated by the Reindeer 
Husbandry Act (1971: 437). In cases where activities disturb their reindeer operations, the Sami 
communities are entitled to compensation. The Environmental Code also provides reindeer 
husbandry a protected status as a national interest, however mineral deposits can also constitute a 
national interest. In cases when an area is of national interest for several conflicting uses, priority is 
given to the purpose which is best for the long-term management of the land (Liedholm Johnson 
2010: 65). 
In Russia federal legislation grants to the ‘small-in-number’ indigenous peoples (number of ethnic 
community is under 50,000 persons; 46 different groups) of the North, Siberia and Far East special 
rights with regard to land and the preservation of traditional ways of life. However, obstacles are often 
encountered in the exercising of these rights (Prina 2014; Fondahl 2014). In many cases, local land 
users, in designated industrial areas, are not given land rights, a factor that hinders effective impact 
assessment and regulation of industrial activity (Wilson & Swiderska 2009). Russian activists and 
academics have promoted legislative reform relating to the concept of etnologicheskaia ekspertiza 
(ethnological – or anthropological – expert review) (see Wilson & Swiderska 2009; Murashko 2008). 
The law ‘On guaranteeing the rights of indigenous peoples’ contains a reference to the anthropological 
144  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
 
Governance of Sustainable Mining in Arctic Countries 
expert review (in referring to indigenous peoples’ right to take part in ecological and anthropological 
expert reviews). 
CSR in mining 
Currently, the majority of mining companies operating in the Arctic are following some international 
standards, frameworks or guidelines in order to address their own responsibility towards sustainable 
development.  
In Finland, there are vast differences in how mining companies have perceived the need to develop 
their CSR policies. In the beginning of the mining boom until 2010s, the Finnish general political 
atmosphere and mining industry was passive towards social responsibility strategies (Rytteri 2012). In 
2010, the National Mineral Strategy did not give real attention to social responsibility issues. The 
attitudes changed dramatically after the Talvivaara mine issues which prompted the public to have 
very negative views towards mining (Tiainen et al. 2014). After that, some international mining 
companies operating in Finland decided to implement public engagement strategies (Rytteri 2012) as 
well as the Finnish Government has become active in this dialogue. In 2012, the Government 
approved a decision-in-principle to put Finnish enterprises and administration in a position of 
leadership in CSR (MEE 2012). In 2013, the action paper for Finnish mining sector (MEE 2013) 
proposed CSR as one of the main approaches for future development. 
In Sweden CSR has become an established concept in business in general (De Geer et al. 2009: 272). 
The Minerals Strategy of Sweden states that the country is actively involved in international forums to 
develop CSR and business ethics (Government Offices of Sweden 2013: 46), but does not talk about CSR 
in the national context or the expectations towards the companies. Mining companies have been slow 
to develop active policies for improving social acceptance and local communication, though 
differences between the companies exist (Tarras-Wahlberg 2014). A case study on Boliden, a big 
Swedish mining company suggests that the company needs a more systematic approach to dealing 
with community issues (Ranängen & Zobel 2014). A similar finding was made by Knobblock (2013: 
165). Nonetheless, there are some signs of a shift in conduct with the companies (mainly new 
international ones) striving to engage a wider spectrum of stakeholders in consultation and improving 
the quality of EIAs (Tarras-Wahlberg 2014: 145-146). 
In Greenland, mining is still in its beginning phase and so the CSR practices have not yet been tested. 
There is an active history of companies supporting local communities and practicing CSR in general 
(Arctic Journal 2013a.) and the expectations towards the mining industry in terms of education and 
training are rather significant. It has been argued that initiatives such as Transparency International 
and UN Global Compact are important for guiding companies’ CSR practices (Brorman Jensen 2012; 
Rasche 2012). It remains to be seen how the general tradition of CSR in Greenland and international 
mining companies will influence the development of new CSR practices in the country. 
In Russia, the concept of CSR has been under development for the past fifteen years. Large mining 
companies operating in Russia have started to incorporate international ideas of CSR since the early 
2000s. In 2004, the move to social responsibility was firmly pronounced at the governmental level, as 
companies were urged to become “better corporate citizens”, with the aim of shifting some social 
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functions from the state to the private sector (Fifka & Pobizhan 2014; WWF 2007). Mining 
corporations considered CSR as a tool that would enable them to operate and to compete as well as 
to increase trust among international investors (Humphreys 2011; Kuznetsov & Kuznetsova 2012). 
By contrast with other international instruments for responsible mining, the concept of CSR has been 
naturalized into the Russian socio-political environment with some country-specific interpretations. 
CSR in Russia is mostly focused on charitable activities, donations and company philanthropy (Fifka 
& Pobizhan 2014; Polishchuk 2009). From Soviet times, large companies inherited the responsibility 
of taking care of the surrounding communities. Being the major tax payers in the region they were the 
main producers of social services (Fifka & Pobizhan 2014; Riabova & Didyk 2014). This practice is 
still in force today. Within social programs, companies repair roads, build new schools, invest in sport 
as well as health and youth projects of the region. Relations between the municipalities and large 
resource-based companies are often framed by bilateral, trilateral or multilateral agreements on socio-
economic partnerships between the company, municipality and/or regional government (ibid). 
Conclusions  
In this article, we have analyzed and compared the national strategies and policy tools, and reviewed 
questions related to social acceptance as well as aspects of policy content for sustainable mining in 
four Arctic countries: Finland, Sweden, Greenland and Russia. A summary of the comparative results 
can be seen in the Table 1.  
The social dimensions and geographical setting in the Arctic as well as the national contexts in each 
country are quite different and greatly influence their individual sustainable mining policies. Mining in 
the Arctic faces particular challenges due to the sensitive socio-environmental characteristics of these 
regions.  
It seems that in all four countries, there is a need to develop mining policies concerning indigenous 
people’s rights, sensitive environmental values, challenging infrastructure development and economic 
opportunities. Arctic regions, in general, lack infrastructure and have multiple and competing land 
uses to contend with. For mining in particular, Finland and Sweden are focused on transportation 
infrastructure (roads and railroads) development in the Arctic, while Greenland is considering a public-
private partnership model to fund some of the new infrastructure development projects (Government 
of Greenland 2014), but financing still  poses a notable challenge for mining development in the country. 
All countries have recently established national mining strategies. In these, the Arctic is not taken as 
its own special issue, but as part of the general policy approaches. The countries point out the 
importance of sustainability but with slightly different focuses. Finland and Sweden consider the role 
of technical innovations and research as well as the mine lifecycle approach as being central for 
encouraging improved environmental performance.  In Sweden and Finland, mining strategies have a 
strong regional focus. Greenland, on the other hand, sees mining as a tool for social development as 
a whole by stimulating local economies as well as increasing local employment through skills 
development and training. 
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Table 1. Comparison of  key strategies, policy tools and social acceptance promoting sustainability of  mining by country. 
 Finland Sweden Greenland Russia 
2012  
production 
value (% of  
GDP) / 
Ranking in 
Fraser 2014 
0.6% 
 
 
 
1 
1.0% 
 
 
 
12 
(no production) 
 
 
 
41 
4.4%  
 
 
 
61 
Mining 
strategies 
 
National Mining 
Strategy 2010 
New mining act 
2011 
Action plan 2013 
National Mining 
Strategy 2013 
National Oil & 
Mineral Strategy 
2014-2018 
Mineral Strategy 
of  Development 
until 2030 
Main 
interests of  
mining 
strategies 
Economic growth, 
regional 
development, 
attract intern. 
investors,  mining 
cluster,  
innovations for 
environment and 
technology, public 
acceptance 
Economic growth, 
national 
companies and 
investors, mining 
cluster, 
innovations for  
environment and 
technology, public 
acceptance 
Economic 
growth, local 
employment and 
education, 
national 
sovereignty, 
community 
acceptance 
Economic growth, 
support of  
national economy, 
national control of  
resources,  
coordinate 
common targets, 
improvement of  
legislation 
Acceptance 
of  mining 
In Lapland 
acceptance good, 
Talvivaara 
influenced 
negatively, policies 
for improving the 
situation 
General 
acceptance high, 
some conflicts 
rising 
Mining is high 
political issue, 
critique towards 
government  
policy and  
participation 
practices 
General 
acceptance high, 
some conflicts 
with indigenous 
people, civil 
society not active. 
Environment
al regulation 
Standards at good 
level, problems in 
water pollution, 
renewed regulation 
Standards at good 
level. 
Recent revisions 
in the legal 
framework, no 
experience yet 
Recent revisions in 
the legal 
framework, some 
problems in 
implementation 
EIA Obligatory, 
includes SIA & 
participation 
Obligatory, 
includes 
participation, SIA 
not well developed 
Obligatory, 
includes 
participation, 
separate SIA 
required (basis 
for IBA) 
Obligatory, 
includes  
participation, 
implementation 
problems, no SIA 
CSR Active 
development of  
CSR after 
problems, 
government and 
international 
companies active, 
what is Nordic 
concept for CSR? 
Slow   
development in 
local CSR, big 
national 
companies have 
own practices, 
international 
companies active, 
what is Nordic 
concept for CSR?  
CSR under 
development, 
historical 
examples from 
other businesses, 
international 
standards play a 
role 
CSR under 
development, 
Soviet traditions 
influence current 
CSR practices 
 
In addition, pro-mining policy has been linked with Greenland’s push for greater independence from 
Denmark. The Russian strategy considers mining as a source for economic development and support 
for the national economy. Social aspects of mining are discussed in terms of socio-economic regional 
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development, but not as local community issues. Russia has also emphasized the need to increase 
technological as well as research and development within the industry. 
There has been active public discussion on the social acceptability of mining, but the themes have 
been slightly different in each country. In Finland, the social acceptability of mining was somewhat 
assumed until 2011 when water issues were raised to the public domain due to the environmental 
accidents at the Talvivaara mine. Economic growth and employment also play a role in Finnish mining 
policy but, similarly to Sweden, it is from the perspective of regional development rather than purely 
national economic growth. In Greenland, the main issues concerning the public acceptance have been 
employment and economic benefits as well as the need for a more transparent and inclusive decision-
making processes. Compared with the other case countries, Russia stands apart with the social 
acceptance of mining not being a particularly political issue. 
Considering the responsibilities and roles of different actors in promoting sustainable Arctic mining, 
the Finnish policy acknowledges the role of both the private and public sector. Correspondingly, the 
Swedish policy sees that sustainable development is to be business-driven. Greenland places more 
emphasis on the role of  industry in comparison with Finland and Sweden, by having stricter regulatory 
tools for ensuring direct benefits of  mining to the society. In Russia, business actors are likely to take 
on enhanced responsibilities in promoting sustainable development on the regional level. During the 
past decade, the Russian government has emphasized the need for closer cooperation between 
industry and local authorities in implementing various social projects, shifting part of  the responsibility 
for regional socio-economic development from the state to private actors. 
Compared to Finland and Sweden, Russia is more unstable from a regulatory perspective, especially 
in the development and implementation of environmental policies. Greenland is still in the process of 
developing its policy framework and therefore the functioning of the process cannot yet be compared 
to the other countries. But in all countries, the EIA is an obligatory process for acquiring a permit for 
mining. Also alike, public participation is a key aspect of the procedures concerning EIA. SIA is most 
actively developed in Finland and Greenland. 
CSR in the mining sector is under development in all four focus countries and even more notably in 
their Arctic regions. The historical contexts in each country also make differences in how CSR is being 
developed and implemented in each jurisdiction. It appears that the role of the state or government 
influences the practices and expectations of CSR.  The Nordic welfare states seem to have a different 
perspective than Russia and Greenland on CSR. In Finland, the mining industry and the Government 
have placed emphasis on the development of responsibility strategies after the incidents at the 
Talvivaara mine. The increased presence of international companies has also contributed to the 
development. In Sweden, the industry has been slow to address issues related to social acceptance and 
local communication. There has not been nation-wide critical debate on mining as in Finland. Often, 
companies with a long history in Sweden have gained the social acceptance over time and are only 
starting to face pressures for new types of responsibilities in terms of communication and social 
aspects. However, Finland and Sweden share the trend of international companies bringing new 
practices, and in both countries, there is a need to modify CSR to fit the Nordic welfare state model. 
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Greenland does have a tradition of CSR but once mining establishes itself, the future practices of 
social responsibility will manifest themselves over time. Nonetheless, the legal requirement for 
conducting a SIA and the model of IBA have already been established, suggesting that government 
policy perceives the consideration of the local communities to be an important issue. The mining 
industry in Greenland is expected to take on different responsibilities than in Finland or Sweden, 
including education and training activities. This reflects the vastly divergent social priorities of our 
focus countries, but the trend remains that with international companies, global standards will likely 
impact each country’s CSR policies. 
In Russia, the practices of CSR are slightly different from the other case countries. The traditions of 
CSR in Soviet times are still evident. Many big companies have chosen a philanthropic method of CSR 
implementation by donating money for regional welfare and development projects. However, 
international practices and interpretations are also emerging. This has been partly due to the actions 
taken at the governmental level as well as by the companies’ move towards new type of responsibility 
motivated by their desire to gain trust among international investors.  
In these four Arctic countries, the national mining policies for Arctic areas emphasize economic 
growth but try to develop sustainability at the same time more actively than before. The rising 
importance of a social acceptance of mining has been reflected in the recent changes in national 
governance. Often pushed by criticism from the civil society and international pressures, the national 
governments are forced to acknowledge that the traditional benefits of mining development for a 
nation state, such as employment and economic growth, are not enough. The sustainability targets are 
taken more seriously today as concerns mount in preserving environmentally and socially sensitive 
Arctic areas. National mineral strategies and the development of policy tools are being updated to 
reflect these changes in each country but at varying extents. While in Finland, the questions of public 
acceptability of mining are high on the political agenda, in Sweden and Russia the questions have not 
been so politicized, as of yet. In Greenland, mining development is closely linked to aspirations for 
economic and administrative independence, and the detailed demands and expectations from civil 
society have made mining a very political issue. 
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Notes 
1. In international debate, the term Social License to Operate (SLO) is increasingly used to refer 
to social acceptability of mining. In this article, we use only the concept of social acceptance. 
 
149  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
Tiainen, Sairinen & Sidorenko  
References 
 
 
Act on Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure. (1994). 468/1994; Unofficial translation. 
Retrieved from: http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1994/en19940468.pdf  
Act on Implementation of Environmental Impact Assessments (2010). 372/2000. Retrieved from: 
http://base.garant.ru/12120191/#block_1000  
Affolder, N. (2011). Why study large projects? Environmental Regulation’s Neglected Frontier. 
U.B.C. Law Review, 44(3):521−555. 
AHDR (2004). Arctic Human Development Report. Akureyri, Iceland: Stefansson Arctic Institute. 
Amezaga, J. M., Rotting T.S., Younger P.L., Nairn R.W., Noles A.J., Oyarzun R., Quintanilla J. 
(2011). A Rich Vein? Mining and the Pursuit of Sustainability. Environmental Science and Technology, 
45(1): 21-26 
Arctic Journal (2013a, November 15). Corporate social responsibility: Greenland’s Challenge. 
Opinion. (Christiansen, A. M.). Retrieved from 
http://arcticjournal.com/opinion/186/corporate-social-responsibility-greenlands-challenge.  
Arctic Journal (2013b, October 28). Parliamentary Uranium Vote: A Democratic Failure. Opinion. 
(Olsvig, S.). Retrieved from: http://arcticjournal.com/opinion/215/parliamentary-uranium-
vote-democratic-failure.    
Arctic Journal (2013c, October 24). Uranium Ban Overturned. (McGwin, K.). Retrieved from: 
http://arcticjournal.com/oil-minerals/211/uranium-ban-overturned Visited 12.4.2014. 
Azapagic, A. (2004). Developing a Framework for Sustainable Development Indicators for the 
Mining and Minerals Industry. Journal of Cleaner Production, 12(6): 639-662. 
Bastida, E. (2002, January). Integrating Sustainability into Legal Frameworks for Mining in Some 
Selected Latin American Countries. MMSD. Retrieved from: 
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G00577.pdf  
BBC (2014, July 30). The Reindeer Herders Battling an Iron Ore Mine in Sweden. (Hughes, S.). 
Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28547314%20Visited%204.6.2015.   
BMP (2011, January). BMP Guidelines – for Preparing an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). 
Report for Mineral Exploitation in Greenland. Retrieved from: 
http://www.bmp.gl/images/stories/minerals/EIA_guidelines_mining.pdf.  
BMP (2009, November). Guidelines for Social Impact Assessments for mining projects in 
Greenland. Retrieved from: 
http://www.impactandbenefit.com/UserFiles/Servers/Server_625664/File/IBA%20PDF/SIA
_IBA_Greenland.pdf  
Boliden (2015). Boliden Aitik. Available at http://www.boliden.fi/Operations/Mines/Aitik/.  
Bolotova A. & F. Stammler. (2010). How the North Became Home. Attachment to Place Among 
Industrial Migrants Regions. In C. Southcott & L. Huskey. (eds.). Migration in the Circumpolar 
North: New Concepts and Patterns (pp. 193-220). Calgary: Canadian Circumpolar Institute Press, 
University of  Alberta. 
150  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
 
Governance of Sustainable Mining in Arctic Countries 
Bortnikov, N., K. Lobanov, A. Volkov, A. Galyamov & K. Murashov. (2015) Arctic Metal 
Resources in Global Perspective. Arctic: Environmental and Economic Issues, 1(17): 38-47. 
Brorman Jensen, B. (2012). Why is Transparency Greenland Necessary? Available at 
http://research.kadk.dk/files/37477437/Interview_Transparency_Greendand.pdf.  
Carlsen, R. (2011). ToR for Social Impact Assessment, Kvanefjeld Multi-Element Project. Grontmij. 
Retrieved from: 
http://gme.gl/sites/default/files/field/pdf/20110714_Final_ToR_SIA%20Kvanefjeld.pdf.  
De Geer, H., T. Borglund & M. Frostenson. (2009). Reconciling CSR with the Role of the 
Corporation in Welfare States: The Problematic Swedish Example. Journal of Business Ethics, 89: 
269−283. 
Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society. (2014). To the Benefit of Greenland 
(Expert Report). Available at http://nyheder.ku.dk/groenlands-
naturressourcer/rapportogbaggrundspapir/To_the_benefit_of_Greenland.pdf.  
Development Strategy of Murmansk Region. (2013). Retrieved from: http://minec.gov-
murman.ru/activities/strat_plan/sub02/.  
Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone of Russian Federation. (2013). Retrieved from: 
http://minec.gov-murman.ru/activities/strat_plan/arkticzone/.  
Dobretsov, N. & N. Pokhilenko. (2010). Mineral Resources and Development in the Russian Arctic. 
Russian Geology and Geophysics, 51: 98–111. 
Eerola, T. (2013, June-July). A Model for Stakeholder Engagement in Mineral Exploration in 
Finland. (Presentation). 6th International Conference on Sustainable Development in the Minerals Industry. 
Retrieved from: 
http://projects.gtk.fi/export/sites/projects/kaivosakatemia/dokumentit/038_EEROLA.pdf  
Ejdemo, T. & P. Söderholm. (2011). Mining Investment and Regional Development: A Scenario-
Based Assessment for Northern Sweden. Resources Policy, 36: 14−21. 
Environmental Code (1998:808). Swedish Environmental Code (unofficial translation). Available at: 
http://www.government.se/contentassets/be5e4d4ebdb4499f8d6365720ae68724/the-swedish-
environmental-code-ds-200061.  
EU Mineral Statistics (2013). Available at: 
https://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/statistics/europeanStatistics.html 
Haley S., N. Szymoniak, N. Klick, A. Crow & T. Schwoerer. (2011). Social Indicators for Arctic 
Mining. Institute of Social and Economic Research University of Alaska Anchorage. 
Federal Book of  Russian Federation (2011). Retrieved from: 
http://federalbook.ru/files/TEK/Soderzhanie/Tom%2014/III/Donskoy.pdf. 
Federal Book of  Russian Federation (2010). Retrieved from: 
http://federalbook.ru/files/FS/Soderjanie/FS-23/VI/Orlov.pdf.  
Federal Law on Production Sharing Agreement. (1995). Federalnyi zakon o Soglasheniyah o Razdele 
Produktsii. (in Russian). Retrieved from: 
http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_8816.  
151  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
Tiainen, Sairinen & Sidorenko  
Fifka M. Pobizhan M. (2014). An Institutional Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility 
in Russia. Journal of Cleaner Production, 82: 192−201. 
Finland’s Minerals Strategy. (2010).Geological Survey of Finland, Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy. Retrieved from: 
http://projects.gtk.fi/export/sites/projects/mineraalistrategia/documents/FinlandsMineralsStr
ategy_2.pdf. 
Fondahl, G. (2014). Where is Indigenous? Legal Productions of Indigenous Space in the Russian 
North. In J. Miggelbring & P. Koch. (eds). Nomadic and Indigenous Spaces: Productions and Cognitions 
(pp. 24-28). Surrey: Ashgate. 
Fundamentals of the State Policy of Russian Federation in the Arctic up to 2020 and beyond. (2008). 
Retrieved from: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html.  
Fundamentals of Sakha’s regional policy of socio-economic development up to 2016. (2012). 
Retrieved from: http://www.sakha.gov.ru/node/242085.  
Government of Greenland (2014). Greenland’s oil and mineral strategy 2014-2018. Retrieved from 
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Publications/Raastof/ENG/Greenland%20
oil%20and%20mineral%20strategy%202014-2018_ENG.pdf.  
Government of Greenland (2012, June). Report to Inatsisartut, the Parliament of Greenland, 
concerning mineral resources activities in Greenland 2012. Greenland Self Government. 
Greenland Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum. Retrieved from: 
https://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/faelles/Report_to_Inatsisartut_on_mineral_resource_a
ctivities_in_2012.pdf.   
Government of Greenland. (2011, February). Report to Inatsisartut on mineral resource activities in 
Greenland. Spring 2011.Greenland Self-Government. Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/about_bmp/publications/Report_to_inatsisartut_on_
mineral_reousrce_activities_in_2011.pdf.  
Government of Greenland (2009). Mineral Strategy 2009. Update of objectives and plans for 
mineral exploration activities in Greenland. Retrieved December 1, 2014 from 
http://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/about_bmp/publications/mineral_strategy_2009.pdf. 
Government Offices of Sweden (2013). Sweden’s Minerals Strategy. For sustainable use of Sweden’s 
mineral resources that creates growth throughout the country. Retrieved from 
http://www.government.se/contentassets/78bb6c6324bf43158d7c153ebf2a4611/swedens-
minerals-strategy.-for-sustainable-use-of-swedens-mineral-resources-that-creates-growth-
throughout-the-country-complete-version. 
Government Offices of Sweden 2011. Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region. Retrieved from 
http://www.openaid.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Swedens-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-
Region.pdf.  
Guardian (2013, May 15). Greenland government falls as voters send warning to mining companies. 
(Mcalister, T.). Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/15/greenland-
government-oil-mining-resources.  
 
152  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
 
Governance of Sustainable Mining in Arctic Countries 
Hannibal, M. (2013). Reliance on extraction of natural resources set to increase. Energy & Natural 
Resources – Greenland. Retrieved from: 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Energy-Natural-
Resources/Greenland/Plesner/Reliance-on-extraction-of-natural-resources-set-to-increase.    
Hernesniemi, H., B. Berg-Andersson, O. Rantala & P. Suni. (2011). Kalliosta kullaksi – kummusta 
klusteriksi. Suomen mineraaliklusterin vaikuttavuusselvitys. Helsinki: Elinkeinoelämän 
tutkimuslaitos ETLA. 
Howard, R. (2009). The Arctic Gold Rush. The New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources. UK: 
Continuum. 
Humphreys D. (2011). Challenges of Transformation: The case of Norilsk Nickel. Resource Policy, 
36(2): 142-148. 
ICMM (2014, October). The role of mining in national economies. Mining’s contribution to 
sustainable development (2nd Edition). Retrieved June 29, 2015 from 
http://www.icmm.com/document/7950  
Jackson, T. (2014). Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies. Fraser Institute. Retrieved 
April 21, 2015 from: https://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-
ca/Content/research-news/research/publications/survey-of-mining-companies-2014.pdf.  
Jacobsen, M. (2014, Jul7 28). Proposed Law Amendment May Threaten Good Greenlandic 
Governance. The Arctic Institute. Retrieved from 
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2014/07/072814-proposed-law-amendment-good-
governance-greenland.html.  
Jartti, T. E. Rantala & T. Litmanen. (2014). Sosiaalisen toimiluvan ehdot ja rajat: Uudenmaan, 
Pohjois-Karjalan, Kainuun ja Lapin maakuntien asukkaiden näkemykset kaivannaistoiminnan 
hyväksyttävyydestä [Preconditions and limits to social license to operate: Perceptions on the 
acceptance of mining in the regions of Uusimaa, North Karelia, Kainuu and Lapland]. Jyväskylä: 
SopHi. 
Jartti, T., R. Sairinen & T. Litmanen. (2012). Kaivosteollisuus kansalaisten arvioinnissa: Millaisen 
kaivosalan maakuntien asukkaat haluavat? Maaseudun uusi aika. 2: 48-58. 
Jokinen, M. (2014). Mitä tekemistä kaivoksilla on luontomatkailun kanssa? Luonnosta voimaa ja 
hyvinvointia –seminaari. Luontokeskus Haltia, 25.3.2014. Presentation. Available at 
http://www.metla.fi/tapahtumat/2014/hyv-loppuseminaari/pdf/kaivokset-ja-matkailu-
v2.pdf5. 
Kaminsky V., Suprunenko O.  & Smirnov A.  (2014). Mineralno-syr’evye resursi arctickeshkoi 
kontinentalnoi okrainy Rossii I perspektivy ei osoeniya. Arctic: Environmental and Economic Issues, 
3(15): 52-61. (In Russian) 
Kauppila, P.; M. L. Räisänen & S. Myllyoja. (2011). Metallimalmikaivostoiminnan parhaat 
ympäristökäytännöt. Suomen ympäristö 29:2011. Helsinki: Suomen ympäristökeskus. Retrieved 
from: https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/37056/SY_29_2011.pdf?sequence=3. 
Kiruna Declaration. (2013). Arctic Council Secretariat. Retrieved from: http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-main-documents-from-kiruna-
ministerial-meeting?download=1757:kiruna-declaration-final-signed-version. 
153  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
Tiainen, Sairinen & Sidorenko  
Knobblock, E. (2013). Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the Welfare State: Experiences from 
Mining Communities in Sweden. In L. Lundmark & C. Sandström. (eds.). Natural Resources and 
Regional Development Theory (pp. 158-175). Umeå: Institutionen för geografi och ekonomisk 
historia, Umeå universitet GERUM Kulturgeografisk arbetsrapport. Retrieved from 
http://umu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:691738/FULLTEXT01.pdf 
Kokko, M. (2014). Kaivosteollisuus. Toimialaraportti 2/2014. Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö. Retrieved 
from: http://www.temtoimialapalvelu.fi/files/2253/Kaivosteollisuus_marraskuu_2014.pdf 5. 
Kokko, K., A. Oksanen, S. Hast, H. I. Heikkinen, H-L. Hentilä, M. Jokinen, T. Komu, M. Kunnari, 
E. Lépy, L. Soudunsaari, A. Suikkanen, & L. Suopajärvi. (2013). Hyvä kaivos pohjoisessa – 
opaskirja ympäristösääntelyyn ja sosiaalista kestävyyttä tukeviin parhaisiin käytäntöihin. Oulu: 
Multiprint Oy. Available at:  http://www.ulapland.fi/loader.aspx?id=22dfba05-2a51-438f-a9db-
c465e14dbbdc.  
Kuznetsov A. & O. Kuznetsova. (2012). Business Legitimacy and the Margins of Corporate Social 
Responsibility in the Russian context. International Studies of Management & Organization 42(3): 35-
48. 
Langston, N. (2013). Mining the Boreal North. American Scientist, 102(2): 98–102.  
Legislative Bill (2005). En effektivare miljöprövning. Regeringens proposition 2004/05:129, Sweden.  
Laukkonen, J. & H. Törmä. (2014). Suomen kaivosalan vaikuttavuuden kehitys ja haasteet vuosina 
2010–2020. Raportteja 136. Helsingin yliopisto: Ruralia-instituutti.. Retrieved from 
http://www.helsinki.fi/ruralia/julkaisut/pdf/Raportteja136.pdf.   
Liedholm Johnson, E. (2010). Mineral rights. Legal Systems Governing Exploration and 
Exploitation.  (Doctoral Thesis in Real Estate Planning). Real Estate Planning and Land Law. 
Department of Real Estate and Construction Management. School of Architecture and the Built 
Environment. Royal Institute of Technology (KTH). Stockholm, Sweden 2010. Available at 
http://kth.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:300248/FULLTEXT01.  
LKAB (2015a). Kiruna. Available at https://www.lkab.com/en/About-us/Overview/Operations-
Areas/Kiruna/. 
LKAB (2015b). Malmberget. Available at https://www.lkab.com/en/About-
us/Overview/Operations-Areas/Malmberget/.  
Local (2013, December 24). Mining Threatens Sami Reindeer Grazing. Available at: 
http://www.thelocal.se/20131224/mining-threatens-sami-reindeer-grazing-traditions.  
Longueville, A. & I. Carlman. (2013, May). How to Misuse the EIA-tool - a Swedish Example. 
Presentation. 33rd Annual Meeting of the International Association for Impact Assessment, 13-
16 Retrieved from: 
http://www.iaia.org/conferences/iaia13/proceedings/Final%20papers%20review%20process
%2013/How%20to%20misuse%20the%20EIA-
tool%20%E2%80%93%20a%20Swedish%20example.pdf?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1  
Lundqvist, L. (2004). Sweden and Ecological Governance: Straddling the Fence. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Matveev, M. (2015). The Role of the Mineral Resources Complex in the Social and Economic 
Development of the Far North. Mineral Resources of Russia: Economics and Governance, 1: 34-38. 
154  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
 
Governance of Sustainable Mining in Arctic Countries 
McMahon, F. & M. Cervantes. (2012). Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies 
2011/2012. Fraser Institute, Retrieved from: 
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/mining-survey-2011-2012-rev.pdf  
Mineral License and Safety Authority (2014). List of mineral and petroleum licenses in Greenland. 
1.9.2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.govmin.gl/images/stories/minerals/list_of_licences/list_of_licences.pdf.  
MEE (Ministry of Employment and the economy (2013). Making Finland a leader in the sustainable 
extractive industry – action plan. MEE 22/2013. Retrieved from 
https://www.tem.fi/files/37130/TEMjul_22_2013_web_04072013.pdf. 
MEE (Ministry of employment and the economy) (2012). Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös 
yhteiskuntavastuusta. Retrieved from: 
https://www.tem.fi/files/35049/vnp_yhteiskuntavastuu_2012.pdf. 
Minerals Yearbook (2012). The Mineral Industry of Russian in 2012. USGS Advance Release. 
Retrieved from: http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2012/myb3-2012-rs.pdf.  
Mines and Communities (2011, September 19). Sweden: Saami Communities Protest Against Mining 
on their Lands. Community press release. Available at: 
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=11211. 
Ministry of Finance and Domestic Affairs, Greenland. (2013). Political and Economic Report. 2013 
Autumn session/10. Retrieved August 14, 2014 from: 
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Finans/DK/Politisk%20
Oekonomisk%20Beretning/Political%20Economic%20Report%20EN.pdf. 
Multanen, A. (2013). Russian Mining Industry – Trends, Drivers and Business Opportunities. PP-
presentation. Association of Finnish-Russian Chamber of Commerce (FRCC). Retrieved from: 
http://www.svkk.fi/files/11423/Russian_Mining_Sector_3_2013_%28ID_1352%29_%28ID_
1354%29.pdf.  
Murashko, O. (2006). What is the Etnologicheskaya Ekspertiza in Russia. In E. Wilson & F. 
Stammler. Special Issue of Sibirica: The Inderdisciplinary Journal of Siberian Studies, 5(2): 77-94. 
Natalenko A., Pak V., Stavski A. (2015). Osnovnie napravleniya razvitiya mineralno-syrievoi bazy 
RF/Main Directions of Russian Mineral Development. Russian Mineral Resources: Economics and 
Governance, 1: 3-8. (In Russian). 
Nationalia. (2013, May 13). Greenland Gives Power Back to Former Ruling Party. Available at 
http://www.nationalia.info/en/news/1378.  
Näkkäläjärvi, K. (2015). Kestävä kaivosteollisuus saamelaisten kotiseutualueella. Puhe. Round table-
keskustelutilaisuus Levillä 19.1.2015. Retrieved from: 
https://www.tem.fi/files/41977/KN_19.1_kaivosseminaari.pdf.  
Oscarsson, A. (2006). Lack of Incitement in the Swedish EIA/SEA Process to Include Cumulative 
Effects. In L. Emmelin (ed.). Effective Environmental Assessment Tools – Critical Reflections on Concepts 
and Practice (pp. 92-115). Blekinge Institute of Technology Research Report (Vol. 3).  
Parliament hearings on legislative framework of Geological strategy of Russian Federation (2010).  
Parlamentskie slushaniya na temu zakonodatelnogo obespecheniya Strategii razvitia 
geologicheskoi otrasli do 2030 goda. Retrieved from: 
http://council.gov.ru/media/files/41d4536b6253abc17c80.doc.   
155  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
Tiainen, Sairinen & Sidorenko  
Petrov, O. (2010). The Capacity of Russian Mining Industry: the Current Situation and Possibilities 
for Innovational Use. Mineralno-syrievoi potentsial nedr Rossii: Sostoyanie i napravleniya 
ispolsovaniys. Regionalnya Economica, 2: 130−135. (In Russian). 
Pettersson, M., A. Oksanen, T. Mingaleva, V. Petrov, & V. Masloboev. (2015). License to Mine. A 
Comparison of the Scope of the Environmental Assessment in Sweden, Finland and Russia. 
Natural Resources, 6(4): 237−255.  
Polishchuk L. (2009). Corporate Social Responsibility or Government Regulation: An Analysis of 
Institutional Choice. Problems of Economic Transition, 52(8): 73−94. 
Prina F. (2014). Protecting the Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in the Russian 
Federation: Challenges and Ways Forward. Minority Rights Group Europe. Retrieved from: 
http://www.minorityrights.org/12793/reports/mrg-protecting-rights-minorities-indigenous-
peoples-russian-federation.pdf Visited 12.4.2014. 
Prno, J. & Slocombe, S. (2012). Exploring the Origins of ‘Social License to Operate’ in the Mining 
Sector: Perspectives from Governance and Sustainability Theories. Resources Policy, 37(3): 
346−357. 
Pölönen, I. (2012). Paikallisten osallistumisoikeudet malminetsintä- ja kaivoslupavaiheissa - Uuden 
kaivoslain arviointia. Ympäristöjuridiikka, 2: 70-105. 
Rantala, J., J. Eckhardt, A-M. Hietajärvi, T. Mäkelä, E. Kallionpää, K. Rantasila, A. Permala & J. 
Lehtinen. (2012). Mining Industry in Finland and Sweden – New Boost for European Industrial 
Future. Retrieved from: http://www.bothniangreen.se/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/%E2%80%93-New-boost-for-European-industrial-future.pdf 
Ranängen, H.; Zobel, T. (2014). Exploring the Path from Management Systems to Stakeholder 
Management in Swedish Mining Industry. Journal of Cleaner Production, 84: 128−141. 
Rasche, A. (2012, October 1). CSR – There is No Way Around. Copenhagen Business School. Available 
at: http://www.arasche.com/downloads/files/Rasche_CSR_Greenland_2012.pdf.  
Riabova L. & V. Didyk. (2014). Social License to Operate for Mining Companies in the Russian 
Arctic: Two Cases in the Murmansk Region. In L. Heininen, H. Exner-Pirot & J. Plouffe (eds.). 
Arctic Yearbook 2014 (pp. 527-537). Akureyri, Iceland: Northern Research Forum.   
Rosstat (2013). Federal State Statistical Service. Retrieved from: 
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b13_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d2/13-01.htm.  
Russian Arctic Strategy (2013). Strategiya razvitiya Arkticheskoi zone Rossiskoi federatsii. Retrieved 
from: http://minec.gov-murman.ru/activities/strat_plan/arkticzone/.  
Russian Mineral Strategy (2010). Strategiya razvitiya geologicheckoi otrasli do 2030 goda. Retrieved 
from: https://www.mnr.gov.ru/regulatory/list.php?part=1323. 
Rytteri, T. (2012). Suomessa toimivien kaivosyhtiöiden vastuustrategiat ja yhtiöihin kohdistuvat 
odotukset. Alue ja Ympäristö, 41(1): 54−67. 
Saami Council & Minerals Policy Institute (2012, November 21). United Nations Human Rights 
Complaints for Hannans. Media release. Available at: 
http://saamiresources.org/2012/11/21/289/. 
SGU 2007. Minerals Act, Minerals Ordinance. Unofficial translation of “Minerallagen” SFS 1991:45, 
“Mineralförordningen” SFS 1992:285. SGU-rapport 2007:26, Retrieved from 
156  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
 
Governance of Sustainable Mining in Arctic Countries 
http://resource.sgu.se/dokument/mineralnaring/SGU-rapport_2007-26_minerals-
act_ordinance.pdf. 
Solodyankina, S. & J. Koeppel. (2009). The Environmental Impact Assessment Process for Oil and 
Gas Extraction Projects in the Russian Federation: Possibilities for Improvement. Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal, 27(1): 77-83. 
Statsministeriet (2009). Act on Greenland Self-Government. Act no. 473 of 12 June 2009. 
Translation. Retrieved from: http://www.stm.dk/multimedia/GR_Self-Government_UK.doc.   
Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic. (2014a). Increasing Land Use Pressures in  the 
European Arctic. (Factsheet). ArcticInfo. Retrieved from: 
http://www.arcticinfo.eu/images/Facksheet/Factsheets_Final/land_pressures.pdf.  
Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic (2014b). Mining in the European Arctic. 
(Factsheet). ArcticInfo. Retrieved from: 
http://www.arcticinfo.eu/images/Facksheet/Factsheets_Final/mining_factsheets_final.pdf. 
Statistics Greenland (2013). Greenland in Figures 2013. Retrieved September 25, 2013 from 
http://www.stat.gl/publ/en/GF/2013/pdf/Greenland%20in%20Figures%202013.pdf.  
Subsoil Law (1992). Zakon o nedrah. (In Russian). Retrieved from 
https://www.consultant.ru/popular/nedr/.  
Suopajärvi. L. (2013). Social Impact Assessment in Mining Projects in Northern Finland: Comparing 
Practice to Theory. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 42: 25–30. 
SveMin. (2012). A Vision of  Growth for the Swedish Mining Industry. Retrieved from: 
http://www.svemin.se/MediaBinaryLoader.axd?MediaArchive_FileID=41275b65-4979-4c39-
bdb5-34053a57e6b7&FileName=Tillv%C3%A4xtvisionen_mini_eng.pdf.  
Söderholm, K., P. Söderholm, H. Helenius, M. Pettersson, R. Viklund, V. Masloboev, T. Mingaleva, 
& V. Petrov. (2015). Environmental Regulation and Competitiveness in the Mining Industry: 
Permitting Processes with Special Focus on Finland, Sweden and Russia. Resources Policy, 43: 
130–142. 
Tarasti, L., R. Rönn, M. Pantsar, K. Kuusiniemi & T. Kähö. (2015) Ympäristömenettelyjen 
sujuvoittaminen ja tehostaminen. Arvio toteuttamisvaihtoehdoista. Retrieved May 7, 2015 from 
http://www.ym.fi/download/noname/%7B3958E753-B749-440E-8777-
D71DD405BE87%7D/107681.  
Tarras-Wahlberg, H.N. (2014). Social License to Mine in Sweden: Do Companies Go the Extra Mile 
to Gain Community Acceptance? Mineral Economics, 27(2-3): 143−147.  
TEM (2014). Malminetsintä suojelualueilla sekä saamelaisten kotiseutualueella ja poronhoitoalueella. 
Opas. Edita Prima 4/2014. Retrieved from: 
http://www.tukes.fi/Tiedostot/kaivokset/TEM_Opas_MEKO_final.pdf. 
TEM (2015). Ympäristövaikutusten arviointimenettely kaivoshankkeissa. Opas. TEM oppaat ja 
muut julkaisut 3/2015. Available at: 
http://www.tem.fi/files/42427/TEM_opas_3_2015_Ymparistovaikutusten_arviointimenettely
_kaivoshankkeissa_12032015.pdf. 
Tiainen, H., R. Sairinen, T. Mononen. (2014). Talvivaaran kaivoshankkeen konfliktoituminen. 
Ympäristöpolitiikan ja –oikeuden vuosikirja, VII(2014): 7−76.  
157  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
Tiainen, Sairinen & Sidorenko  
UNEP (2002). Environmental Law: the Bedrock for Sustainability. Global Judges’ Symposium on 
Sustainable Development and the Role of Law. Retrieved from: 
http://www.unep.org/delc/Portals/119/publications/Speeches/Robinson.pdf.  
Uusisuo, M. (2012). Kaivosteollisuus. Toimialaraportit. Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö. Available at: 
http://www.temtoimialapalvelu.fi/files/1605/Kaivosteollisuus2012_web.pdf. 
Valtioneuvoston kanslia (2013). Suomen arktinen strategia 2013. Valtioneuvoston periaatepäätös 
23.8.2013. Valtioneuvoston kanslian julkaisusarja 14/2013. Retrieved September 8, 2015 from: 
http://vnk.fi/documents/10616/334509/Arktinen+strategia+2013/fc8d6442-daa6-4e94-b774-
84b863393977.  
Walker, S. (2011. October). Growing Interest in Nordic Mineral Prospect. Engineering & Mining 
Journal. Retrieved from: http://www.e-mj.com/features/1361-growing-interest-in-nordic-
mineral-prospects.html. 
Wessman, H., O Salmi, J. Kohl, P. Kinnunen, E. Saarivuori, & U-M. Mroueh. (2014). Water and 
Society: Mutual Challenges for Eco-efficient and Socially Acceptable Mining in Finland. Journal 
of Cleaner Production/Special volume for Mining. Retrieved September 9, 2015 from: 
http://virtual.vtt.fi/virtual/sam/files/VTT_Research_paper_Wessman_et_al_2014_Finland_m
ining_J_of_Cl_Prod__.pdf. 
Whitmore, A. (2006) The Emperors New Clothes: Sustainable Mining? Journal of Cleaner Production, 
14(3–4): 309-314. 
Wilson,  E.W. & K. Swiderska. (2009). Extractive Industries and Indigenous Peoples in Russia: 
Regulation, Participation and the Role of Anthropologists. International Institute for Environment 
and Development. Retrieved from: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/G02490.pdf. 
WWF (2007). Russian Companies in the 21st Century. Retrieved from: 
http://www.wwf.se/source.php/1158891/russian_companies_in_the_21st_century.pdf. 
 
 
Gary N. Wilson is a Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Coordinator of the Northern Studies 
Program at the University of Northern British Columbia. Jeffrey J. Kormos is an M.A. Candidate in Political Science at 
the University of Northern British Columbia.   
 
 
 
 
At the Margins:  
Political Change and Indigenous Self-Determination  
in Post-Soviet Chukotka 
 
Gary N. Wilson & Jeffrey J. Kormos 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian North has undergone a profound process of political, economic and 
social change. Nowhere is this change more evident than in the Chukotskii Autonomous Okrug (Chukotka), one of the most 
remote regions in the Russian Federation. During the Soviet period, Chukotka was the recipient of considerable state support which, 
in turn, led to the economic development of the region and an influx of settlers from other parts of the Soviet Union.  These 
developments, however, quickly overwhelmed the indigenous peoples of Chukotka, who became marginalized economically, politically 
and demographically.   
The post-Soviet period has brought new and unprecedented changes to Chukotka and its inhabitants. In the 1990s, the decline in 
state support triggered an economic collapse and an out-migration of non-indigenous settlers. Although the economic situation 
stabilized in the 2000s under the governorship of Roman Abramovich, a powerful oligarch with links to the upper echelons of 
Russian state authority, the region still struggles to cope with the challenges facing northern regions in Russia and throughout the 
circumpolar world: remoteness, harsh environments, underdevelopment, size and a dependency on government support. The fate of 
Chukotka’s indigenous peoples in this changing context has been mixed. Developments during the earlier stages of the transition 
rebalanced the demographic profile of the region, increasing the proportion of indigenous inhabitants in relation to the settler 
population, and provided some avenues for greater political autonomy, cultural regeneration and international collaboration.  
However, more recent changes, both at the federal and regional levels, have curtailed the activities of indigenous organizations, 
bringing them under the increasing control of the state.            
 
    
Introduction 
The governance of northern regions and communities is complicated by a number of factors, including 
remoteness, harsh environments, underdevelopment, size and a dependency on other levels of 
government for basic services and economic support. The challenges facing northern regions and 
communities in contemporary Russia have been exacerbated by the transition away from the Soviet 
communist system. Despite the authoritarian and controlling nature of this system, it did provide 
substantial support in the form of infrastructure and economic subsidies. By contrast, the instability 
159  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
 
Wilson & Kormos 
of the post-Soviet transition has caused a number of hardships and problems for people living in the 
north.   
One of the most remote regions in the Russian Federation is the Chukotskii Autonomous Okrug 
(Chukotka). Located in the far eastern part of the country, across the narrow Bering Strait from Alaska, 
Chukotka is nine time zones and over 6000 kilometers away from the Russian capital, Moscow. 
Throughout most of the Soviet period, the region was supported by the central government. This 
support prompted an influx of migrants from other parts of the Soviet Union in search of good wages, 
housing and other state benefits. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, central 
largesse evaporated and Chukotka, like many other northern regions in the newly constituted Russian 
Federation, underwent a dramatic demographic and economic collapse.  Although this collapse was 
stemmed by the intervention of Roman Abramovich, one of Russia’s most powerful oligarchs and 
governor of Chukotka from 2000-2008, the region and its inhabitants are still struggling to overcome 
the challenges of governance and development in a northern and remote setting.    
This chapter will examine the political and economic development of Chukotka with a particular focus 
on the fate of the region’s indigenous peoples during the post-Soviet period. Controlled politically and 
economically by the communist state and overwhelmed demographically by the influx of migrants 
during the Soviet period, Chukotka’s indigenous peoples have experienced both positive and negative 
changes as a result of the post-Soviet transition. While the wholesale collapse of state support in the 
1990s caused severe economic hardships, the out-migration of non-indigenous settlers has rebalanced 
the demographic composition of the region, a change that could signal a resurgence of the region’s 
indigenous identity, both culturally and politically. Despite the legacies of authoritarianism, the 
political transition away from the communist system encouraged the region’s indigenous peoples to 
become active in a number of domestic and international organizations and initiatives. More recently, 
however, the return of centralization and state control, especially under Russian President Vladimir 
Putin, has limited the activities of indigenous organizations across Russia, thereby curtailing the 
political aspirations of indigenous peoples in Chukotka.   
The chapter draws mainly on English-language research and secondary sources on the region. It uses 
some Russian language sources, mainly from the local media, but it does not include interviews with 
regional or local officials because of the political and logistical challenges associated with conducting 
fieldwork in such a remote and politically sensitive region. Part one situates Chukotka within the 
broader context of the Russian federal system and reviews its political transition in the post-Soviet 
period.  Part two discusses the demographic and economic challenges that the region has faced since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Part three explores the impacts of development on 
Chukotka’s indigenous peoples during the Soviet period. Part four examines the efforts by indigenous 
peoples in Chukotka, to self-determine and outlines some of the key political challenges that they face 
at the start of the 21st century.         
The political evolution of Chukotka in the post-Soviet period 
Observers of Russian federalism and regional politics have noted a series of important trends in the 
relationship between the federal and regional governments since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
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1991. Under Russia’s first post-Soviet President, Boris Yeltsin, the political system underwent a 
process of decentralization. In some respects, decentralization was planned and managed; it was part 
of a broader strategy to preserve the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation during the initial 
transition period towards liberal democracy. The bilateral treaties negotiated between the federal and 
regional governments in the mid to late 1990s were evidence of efforts to hold Russia together in the 
face of political disintegration and prevent the country from following the same fate as its Soviet 
predecessor. In other respects, however, decentralization was unplanned; it was a reflection of the 
collapse of the centralized Soviet state, the weakness of the federal government and the rise of 
powerful regions. Indeed, many regional leaders took Yeltsin at his word when he said “take all the 
autonomy you can swallow” and the result was an epic intergovernmental struggle over political 
authority and economic resources (Remington 2012). 
Since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, the power relationship between the federal and regional 
governments has shifted dramatically. During the first decade of the new century, Putin introduced a 
series of reforms that were designed to strengthen the position of the federal government vis-à-vis the 
regions. These reforms, coupled with other developments such as the emergence of the national 
political party United Russia and the taming of the oligarchs, recentralized the Russian Federation by 
(re)creating the vertikal, the centralized hierarchy of political authority under the firm control of the 
executive branch of government (Remington 2012).   
It is within this shifting context that Chukotka has undergone significant political, economic and 
demographic change. In 1991, the region declared autonomy from Magadan Oblast, a region to which 
it had been administratively subordinated since 1977. This move was consistent with the autonomy 
declarations of many other regions in the Russian Federation. That being said, Chukotka was the only 
autonomous okrug to formally separate from its “host” region.1     
Politically, the 1990s were dominated by the iron rule of Aleksandr Nazarov, Chukotka’s first post-
Soviet governor. Although the Nazarov administration faced an extremely difficult and, arguably, 
unprecedented economic and demographic collapse, as outlined in more detail below, it has been 
noted by one observer that political criticism of the government or its activities was not tolerated 
during his term in office (Diatchkova 2010).2 Despite the demise of Soviet communism, democracy 
had not yet taken root. Indeed, such authoritarian tendencies were common throughout Russia as 
regions and regional leaders attempted to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the centralized Soviet 
state.  
Nazarov was followed as governor in 2000 by Roman Abramovich, a powerful oligarch with close 
connections to both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. Abramovich served two terms as governor, 
during which time he transformed the economy and infrastructure of the region. It was rumoured that 
he invested $2.5 billion of his own money in the region and, as a result, was very popular (Jensen 
2013). After 2008, Abramovich continued to play a political role in Chukotka as the speaker of the 
regional legislature. The current governor of Chukotka is Roman Kopin, a former advisor to both 
Nazarov and Abramovich, who had served as municipal leader in the region before being appointed 
governor in July of 2008. Kopin was reelected as governor in September 2013 with almost 80% of the 
vote (Noskov 2013).   
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Economic and demographic change in the post-Soviet period  
In the decade following the collapse of communism, Chukotka, like the rest of the former Soviet 
Union, underwent a series of profound economic, social and political transitions. Such changes were 
felt across Russia, as the country struggled to create a new political system. The effects of the transition 
in Chukotka (and in many other northern regions), however, were accentuated by the particular 
circumstances facing the region, namely its remoteness from other parts of Russia, its lack of 
development and the high degree of dependency that it had on the central government during the 
Soviet period.  
Until the 1990s, Chukotka had been heavily supported by the central state.  According to one source: 
A high regional wage coefficient and the northern wage increment made the wage level 
considerably higher in Chukotka [than] those in the country in general and in the 
Magadan Oblast’ in particular. It attracted [a] qualified workforce to the region and the 
population was increasing due to the influx (Chukotka 2014).    
As a result, over the course of the post-war period, the population of the region grew exponentially 
from 20,787 in 1939 to 164,783 in 1989, largely through in-migration from other parts of the Soviet 
Union. This massive influx of outsiders made indigenous peoples a minority in their homelands. In 
1939, indigenous peoples comprised 75.4%of the total population of Chukotka. By 1989, the region’s 
indigenous population had shrunk to only 30.8% (Abryutina 2007a).3    
The break-up of the Soviet Union brought about another demographic shift that was unparalleled, 
except in times of war and extreme civil strife.  Within a decade of the Soviet collapse, the population 
of Chukotka had shrunk to 53,824, a decline of over 100,000 people (Heleniak 2001).  While the sheer 
numbers and percentages alone are dramatic, what are even more significant are the imbalances such 
shifts create in the demographic profile of the remaining population. For example, the people who 
left the region tended to be younger, educated professionals who were more mobile (Hill & Gaddy 
2003). This only exacerbated the political and economic challenges facing remote and northern regions 
such as Chukotka.   
The outmigration also had a distinctly ethnic dimension in that the majority of residents who left 
Chukotka were Russians and Ukrainians, many of whom came to the region in Soviet times in search 
of career advancement, higher wages and housing (Thompson 2008). As noted above, over the course 
of the post-war period, the settler population gradually overwhelmed the indigenous populations of 
the region. As Thompson (2008: 113) noted in his study of settler-state relations in Chukotka: 
The collapse of the Soviet Union stripped the settler of practically all those features of 
privilege that previously defined this population, and it did so with remarkable speed 
and thoroughness. Northern osvoenie [mastery] had been one of the Soviet regime’s 
most cherished projects, but the suddenness of its end showed, finally, how little 
rationale it possessed beyond Moscow’s fiat.  Settlers once lived within a zone of 
remarkable abundance and earned far more than workers on the materik [mainland]. 
Now Chukotka suffered acute shortages of everyday goods and food, and by the mid-
1990s, prices rose to the highest level in Russia. 
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As a result of the outmigration of non-indigenous inhabitants, the demographic balance between 
indigenous peoples and settlers has been partially restored to levels that have not been seen since the 
1950s.     
The post-Soviet demographic transformation was accompanied (and accentuated) by a socio-
economic crisis in the region, as subsidized industries shut down because they were unprofitable in a 
market context. Basic services in areas such as healthcare and education were starved of resources and 
traditional activities, in particular reindeer herding and fur trading, went into decline (Chukotka 2014; 
Abryutina 2007a). Despite investments in infrastructure and services during the Abramovich era, such 
problems persist today. In a recent meeting between representatives of the regional government and 
senators representing Chukotka in the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian 
parliament, Senator Aramays Dallakyan noted “the lack of funding for the implementation of the 
Strategy of socio-economic development of the Chukotskii Autonomous Okrug” (Chukotskii 
Avtonomnyi Okrug 2015). In a separate interview, the Head of the Okrug’s Department of Social 
Policy, Anastasia Zhukova, commented on the importance of continued investment in infrastructure 
such as roads airports and seaports as a key component of the overall strategy to develop the region 
(Masalova 2015).  
One area of particular concern is marine hunting, an integral part of the fishing industry in the region 
and an important part of the economic development of indigenous communities. According to the 
Deputy Head of the okrug’s Department of Agricultural Policy and Environmental Management, 
Evgenyi Marochkin, it was unfortunate that marine hunting was not included in the list of activities 
targeted by the federal program on the development of the agricultural economy, the regulation of 
agricultural products, raw materials and food for 2013-2020 (Noskov i Omruv’e 2015).  In response, 
the Head of the Regional Duma, Valentina Rudchenko, said that “[the region] must continue to work 
with federal agencies, for federal support is very important for us, as the district budget is clearly not 
enough for the implementation of government programs” (Noskov i Omruv’e 2015). These 
comments from regional officials demonstrate the hierarchical nature of politics in contemporary 
Russia. At the same time, they also reveal the underlying frustrations and dependencies that 
characterize Chukotka’s relationship with the federal government.                 
Impacts of development on Chukotka’s indigenous peoples during the Soviet 
period  
Chukotka’s diverse indigenous population consists of the Chukchi, Yupik, Even, Kerek, Koryak, 
Yukagir, and Chuvan peoples (Diatchkova 2002, 2010; Leonova 2011). Before the Soviet era, 
Chukotka’s indigenous peoples maintained their independence from the Russian empire and traded 
freely with Russians, Americans and each other. In fact:  
the Chukchi tribesmen were the only native Siberian tribe violent and warlike enough 
ever to fight the Russian invaders to a negotiated peace, concluded in 1778. Even after 
the Russian withdrawal from the ostrog of Anadyrsk4 under the terms of the treaty, the 
Chukchi remained notorious raiders of Russian settlements and caravans (Matthews 
2013.  See also Znamenski 1999).   
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The Russian Revolution, however, ushered in the era of Soviet rule, initiating the subjugation of 
Chukotka’s indigenous peoples and forever changing their relationship with the state.  
The economic activity of Chukotka’s indigenous peoples in the early Soviet era was intrinsically linked 
with the landscape. Coastal peoples such as the Yupik were sea mammal hunters, while tundra and 
inland dwellers such as the Yukaghir and Koryaks were reindeer herders. The Chukchi, the largest 
indigenous group in Chukotka, were comprised of both herders and hunters, depending on whether 
they resided on the tundra or the coast. Both occupations required a great deal of travel, and the 
indigenous peoples were either nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples (Diatchkova, 2010). Soviet 
authority was slow to penetrate Chukotka’s indigenous peoples, likely because the great distance 
between Moscow and the region coupled with their nomadic lifestyles, but also because they had 
resisted political control during the Tsarist period. Indeed, the first step to managing Chukotka’s 
indigenous peoples was sedentarization. 
According to Pika (1999), there were three stages of state policy towards northern native peoples in 
the Soviet Union.  Between 1929 and the early 1930s, the state offered “assistance oriented towards 
education, self-government, and the formation of cooperatives” (Pika 1999: 59). From the 1930s 
through the mid-1950s, the state’s concern was the development and solidification of the “totalitarian 
administrative command system” and the exploitation of the indigenous labour pool to meet state 
planning objectives (Pika 1999: 59). Finally, the mid-1950s through the early 1980s ushered in the era 
of “state bureaucratic paternalism” which was characterized by the formation of “minor privileges, 
perks and ineffective aid” (Pika 1999: 59). In the formative years of the Soviet Union, the “frontline 
strategy for civilizing the North” was the kultbaza (culture base), a Soviet school for indigenous 
children (Gray 2005: 104). The first such school in Chukotka opened in Uelen in 1923. The komsomol 
(communist youth league) was instituted to lead the “cultural revolution,” and in Chukotka 
particularly, to bring “literacy to the tundra” (Gray 2005: 101). A policy of korenizatsia (indigenization) 
was instituted to grant self-determination to Soviet indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples were 
recruited to key roles within state enterprises to create an indigenous elite, competent in Marxist-
Leninist principles and loyal to the communist regime (Gray 2005). However, as Kertulla (2000: 10) 
argues, rather than “homogenize the Union,” korenizatsia instead “institutionalized ethnic identity.” 
Over the course of the post-war period, participation in state organs by indigenous peoples 
significantly decreased. For example, in 1945, 72% of Chukotka’s komsomol members were indigenous, 
but by 1980 membership had dropped to 14.2% (Gray 2005). This decline may also have been a 
reflection of the significant decrease in the number of indigenous peoples as an overall proportion of 
the population in Chukotka, due to in-migration from other parts of the Soviet Union.  
By the 1930s, collectivization of reindeer herds had begun in Chukotka, although it would be the 1950s 
before the Soviet authorities completed the sedentarization of Chukchi herders (Thompson 2008). 
The Soviet policy of ukreplenie (consolidation) closed villages and relocated residents to permanent 
settlements for reasons of administrative efficiency in the provision of services (Gray 2001) and for 
strategic military purposes (Abryutina 2007b). The results were two-fold: post-relocation villages 
consisted of mixed Russian and indigenous populations (Krupnik & Chlenov 2007); and, control over 
the economic drivers of indigenous society was relinquished to outsiders (Pelaudeix 2012). Chukotka’s 
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indigenous peoples became state employees, losing authority over their herds to Russian specialists 
(Thompson 2008). Throughout the 1940s and 1950s the policy of ukreplenie was employed to 
consolidate residents into larger communities (Krupnik & Chlenov 2007). 
Thompson (2002) describes the early post-war period as the era of “Soviet mastery” – the extraction 
of resource wealth and the enlightenment of indigenous peoples. The key feature of Soviet mastery 
was the establishment of large, permanent settler populations (Thompson 2002). This period featured 
the large-scale and rapid development of the industrial complex of the Russian Far North (Gray 2005; 
Silanpää 2008). A massive in-migration of new skilled workers occurred and these workers were tasked 
with organizing mining operations, consolidating state farms, preparing cadres, and searching for new 
ways to organize reindeer herding (Gray 2005). Substantial development and industrialization shifted 
the demographic profile of Chukotka from a largely rural to a largely urban population and, as in other 
indigenous regions in northern and eastern Russia, indigenous peoples became outnumbered by 
settlers (Gray 2005; Schindler 1996).  
During the 1960s, infrastructure was built to support mining and nuclear energy development 
(Silanpää 2008). Indigenous peoples’ employment in sovkhozy (state farms) was largely directed at 
supplying goods to the industrial development of the Soviet Union. They were underrepresented in 
the new industrial workforce, while traditional activities such as trapping, hunting and fishing were 
unprofitable and unsuccessful, as there was no infrastructure to support traditional economic activity 
(Silanpää 2008). Chukotka’s economy was constructed to secure the supply of minerals and strategic 
resources for the development of the national economy (Krupnik & Vakhtin 2002); however, 
damaging and unsustainable practices in resource extraction resulted in multiple centers of industrial 
pollution and environmental degradation (Diatchkova 2010). 
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about another set of changes to the lives of Chukotka’s 
indigenous peoples. Between 1985 and 2000, the already low employment rate of indigenous peoples 
dropped from 59% to 21.5%, and purchasing power to buy food decreased by 12.3% (Borodin et al. 
2002). Soviet era social programs and subsidies ended, a reality that was felt particularly in remote 
villages where there was nothing to replace the lost structures. People became politically and physically 
disenfranchised. Inflation depleted savings and made pensions worthless and, as noted above, massive 
depopulation and out-migration ensued. Medical supplies and facilities were depleted, and 
unemployment increased while access to goods decreased (Kertulla 2000).  
In the 1990s, Chukotka was in an advanced state of humanitarian crisis initiated by the exodus of non-
indigenous skilled labour, the failure of shipping deliveries and the liquidation of state enterprises. As 
a result, starvation, suicide, and alcoholism became prevalent amongst the indigenous population 
(Thompson 2008). There was also a shift in the local administrative demographic. As settlers left 
Chukotka, they were replaced by villagers to fill positions in the administration of local government 
(Krupnik & Vakhtin 2002). Indigenous peoples were even more disadvantaged in terms of 
transitioning to the market economy. Traditional economic activity shifted from supporting industrial 
development to isolated economic activity, resulting in ethnic stratification and unequal access to 
goods and services (Schindler 1992). Perhaps the one positive outcome for indigenous peoples was 
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that the increased reliance on traditional subsistence activities, necessary for survival, led to increased 
cultural awareness (Kertulla 2000).   
Indigenous self-determination in Chukotka  
Against the backdrop of this socio-economic crisis, there were also some significant political and 
legislative changes that impacted indigenous peoples in Chukotka.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
new local and regional associations began to appear in Chukotka. In 1990, federal legislation entitled 
Unhindered Ethnic Development of Citizens of the USSR who live Outside their Ethnic Areas or Have no Such 
Areas Within the Territory of the USSR allowed for the creation of political associations based on 
nationality (Kryazhkov, 2013). The ‘Yupik Eskimo Society of Chukotka’ (YESC) and the ‘Association 
of Indigenous Peoples of Chukotka’5 formed to promote indigenous rights and self-determination for 
Chukotka’s indigenous peoples. These new local indigenous institutions were supported by the 
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia, and the Far East (RAIPON), a larger 
national association with members from 35 regional organizations and 41 indigenous groups (Gray, 
2007). RAIPON’s goals include greater self-determination for indigenous peoples through self-
government, human rights protection, and the legal protection of indigenous social, economic and 
environmental interests (Arctic Council 2011).  
The above mentioned collapse of central authority throughout the country reinforced the de facto 
autonomy of the regional government throughout much of the 1990s. In Chukotka, the Nazarov 
administration began to secure the region from outside influence. Indigenous organizations seeking 
political legitimacy were harassed and often co-opted by the regional authorities (Thompson 2008).  
Newly enacted federal legislation, such as the law On Guarantees of the Rights of Small-Numbered Indigenous 
Peoples was at odds with regional legislation, and enforcement by the federal authorities was 
problematic (Pelaudeix 2012), a reflection of the weakness of the federal government. While the 
indigenous rights movement in Chukotka gained some momentum in the late Soviet and early post-
Soviet periods, the regional bureaucracy opposed and interfered with local attempts at indigenous self-
determination (Krupnik & Vakhtin 2002). Indigenous peoples’ organizations sought the status of 
‘political organizations’ in order to be taken seriously by regional authorities (Diatchkova 2010). 
By the end of the 1990s, the Nazarov administration had successfully marginalized Chukotka’s 
indigenous movement by framing Russia’s new democratic principles of equality in opposition to 
‘indigenous’ self-determination (Tennberg 2010). Funding for indigenous political organizations was 
limited, and dispersed at the discretion of the regional authorities.  In 1999, the Arbitration Court of 
the Chukchi Autonomous Okrug ordered the offices of YESC to be closed and its assets liquidated 
(Ainana, Zelensky & Bychkov 2001). 
The rights of indigenous peoples are guaranteed by the Russian Federation’s Constitution (1993). 
Article 69: “guarantees the rights of indigenous peoples in compliance with the universally recognized 
principles and norms of international law and treaties concluded with the Russian Federation.” Article 
69 is legally implemented with the formal adoption of three federal statutes: On Guarantees of the Rights 
of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples (1999), On the General Principles for the Organization of Obshchiny (2001) 
and On the Territories of Traditional Nature Use [TTNUs] (2001). At the okrug level, the Charter of the 
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Chukotka Autonomous Region (1997) protects indigenous peoples’ rights in Articles 1, 3, 19, 43 and 
63 (Kriazhkov, 2006). Indeed, on paper, indigenous rights in Russia have robust protection by law. In 
practice however, terms are defined broadly and often regional and federal statutes are misaligned, 
resulting in conflicting interpretations and application of the law.6 
As outlined in more detail in the next section, the leadership of Chukotka’s indigenous political 
organizations, made up of members of the former Soviet indigenous intelligentsia, sought outside help 
from the transnational indigenous rights movement, which was particularly evident throughout the 
circumpolar north (Gray 2007). Through collaboration with the Inuit Circumpolar Council and 
Alaskan municipal associations, humanitarian aid, funding, equipment, and various projects were 
established throughout the Russian Far East to help indigenous peoples survive the transition. 
However, the new millennium would bring a new centralizing force to the Russian presidency, 
eventually curtailing international aid and reframing the debate regarding indigenous self-
determination as conflicting with nationalist principles of equality.  
Despite the initially negative effects of the transition, the changes that have taken place over the last 
two decades could provide the basis for a reawakening of indigenous identity and control in Chukotka.  
At the same time, such a reawakening must be viewed within the broader context that shapes 
indigenous-state relations in Russia at the start of the 21st century.  The following section will outline 
a number of developments that have either facilitated or hindered the political status of indigenous 
peoples in Chukotka since 2000.    
The return of the Obshchina 
In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, the issue of indigenous land rights in Russia 
garnered interest among both western and Russian scholars (Fondahl & Poelzer 2003; Fondahl, 
Lazebnik, Poelzer & Robbek 2001). In her work on land and indigenous rights in Chukotka in the late 
1990s and 2000s, Patty Gray noted movement towards the return of the obshchina, “or ‘ancestral 
community,’ a special category of land tenure defined in Russian law” (Gray 2001: 1). Although 
obshchiny existed in other parts of the Russian Federation (Stammler 2005; Fondahl 1998), in Chukotka 
they were fewer in number because the “regional authorities [under Nazarov] were more reluctant to 
give up centralized control of local production and administration” (Gray 2001: 1). The rebirth of 
obshchiny, however, was critical to the rejuvenation of traditional land tenure practices and activities.  
In many respects, these territorial formations represent a form of indigenous self-governance.  In 
2001, a new federal law on traditional resource management and the end of the Nazarov’s term in 
office brought new hope that the number of obshchiny would grow. In practice, however, requests to 
establish TTNUs of federal significance have been rejected (Kryazhkov 2013). Furthermore, a 
December 2013 amendment to the Federal Act On Specially Protected Conservation Areas removed TTNUs 
from its purview, exposing them to the possibility of unmitigated industrial development and 
expansion (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 2014b).       
The Abramovich era and beyond 
In the early 2000s, Chukotka’s second post-Soviet governor, Roman Abramovich, brought with him 
from Moscow a young and well-educated cadre of professionals to fill administrative positions in the 
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regional government (Thompson 2008). He also made significant investments in infrastructure in the 
region.  While ethnic stratification and state paternalism remained in regional decision-making bodies, 
an ‘Indigenous Representatives Council’ was established to resolve indigenous issues and reserve seats 
in the Regional Duma (parliament) for Chukotka’s indigenous peoples (Diatchkova 2010).  Despite 
these developments, however, there is still no clear indication that indigenous peoples have any 
meaningful representation in regional or federal government institutions. Survey research conducted 
through the international Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) project found that 
indigenous respondents “[considered] the governorship of Roman Abramovich especially warmly” 
(Abryutina 2007a). At the same time, at the end of Abramovich’s time in office, Diatchkova (2010: 
226) noted: 
The participants of the 2009 Congress of Chukotka’s indigenous peoples also 
discussed the absence of any critical information on regional politics or indigenous 
issues in the media. This is the main reason for the lack of knowledge in respect of 
indigenous rights among current indigenous representatives.   
Under current governor Roman Kopin, there have been some attempts to address the development 
of indigenous peoples in the region. As noted above, often this involves struggles with the federal 
government for resources to fund programs to support traditional livelihoods such as marine mammal 
hunting. In a recent interview, the Head of the Department of Social Policy, Anastasia Zhukova 
commented that “the government will continue to solve the problems of the indigenous population 
of the district” (Masalova 2015). Although the government’s intentions are clearly worded, this top-
down, paternalistic approach to development simply reinforces the power of the state over indigenous 
peoples in the region, rather than allowing them to have greater control over their lives and their land.   
Legislation on non-governmental organizations (NGOs)         
Although the Putin era has brought political and economic stability to Russia, it has also been 
characterized by increasing political repression, especially of political opponents and organizations 
that function outside the state. During the late Soviet and immediate post-Soviet period, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) were an important means to develop Russian civil society, and 
could rely on external financial support from foreign organizations (Daucé 2010). By the mid-2000s, 
however, civil society had been largely coopted by the state through the creation of bodies such as the 
Public Chamber and the increasing repression of NGOs. In 2006, the federal government passed 
legislation On Introducing Amendments into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, commonly 
referred to as the “NGO Law” (Crotty & Hall 2013). Among other things, this law required groups 
to register with the state and divulge personal information regarding their members and founders. It 
allowed state officials unrestricted access to group meetings including private policy and campaigning 
activities, and required reporting of foreign financial support, including how funds were being 
obtained and spent, effectively restricting funding to domestic sources (Crotty & Hall 2013). In July 
of 2012, additional legislation required NGOs with political activities and foreign funding to register 
as ‘foreign agents’ and submit a report of their financial activities every quarter (Crotty, Hall & 
Ljubownikow 2014). As a result, the state actively discriminates against internationally integrated 
NGOs and western-funded human rights organizations (Frohlich 2012). In fact, recently enacted 
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legislation states that members of an NGO labeled ‘undesirable’ may be subject to fines and jail time 
(Tétrault-Farber 2015). 
These changes have impacted the ability of indigenous organizations such as RAIPON and affiliated 
organizations in Chukotka such as YESC to operate and to engage with indigenous organizations 
outside Russia. In 2012 the Russian Ministry of Justice found “irregularities in [RAIPON’s] 
organizational statutes” and forced RAIPON to cease operations (Staaleser 2013). Both organizations 
were accused of failing to abide by the aforementioned legislation requiring NGOs to register with 
the state and secure themselves as ‘legal entities’ while obtaining funding from outside of Russia. As 
well, the suspensions of both organizations lasted about a year before the state determined the 
appropriate paperwork was submitted and they could return to their business. In 2014, an indigenous 
hunter’s association in Chukotka was asked to voluntarily register as a foreign agent because the 
association was using joint American and Russian funding to study walruses. Although the 
organization was not involved in political activities, the leader was a candidate for a seat in local 
government, which clearly constituted a political activity to the authorities (International Work Group 
for Indigenous Affairs 2014a). The association refused, but the authorities made it clear that they 
would be harassed, and in the end will be forced to register as a foreign agent.  
International collaboration 
The geographical proximity of Chukotka to the United States (Alaska) and Canada, coupled with 
historical connections between the indigenous peoples of this part of the circumpolar north has 
facilitated international collaboration since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In particular, the 
representatives from YESC have become actively involved in the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), a 
transnational organization representing Inuit peoples in four different countries.  During the socio-
economic crisis in the early to mid-1990s, the ICC worked with the Canadian government and other 
organizations to deliver humanitarian aid to the indigenous peoples of Chukotka and the Russian 
north (Wilson 2007). Additionally, a number of bilateral projects dedicated to wildlife management, 
cultural preservation and environmental protection were initiated between Alaska and Chukotka 
including the Chukotka Walrus Harvest Monitoring Project and the joint US/Russia Polar Bear 
Commission (Diatchkova 2010).  Such examples of collaboration between the indigenous peoples of 
Russia and other regions in the circumpolar north are important because they open the region and its 
inhabitants up to the outside world after decades of isolation during the Soviet period, thereby 
allowing for the sharing of best practices and new ideas. The Inuit peoples of Alaska, Canada and 
Greenland, for example, have made great strides over the last several decades in their quest for political 
and economic autonomy.  Their progress provides a benchmark for other indigenous peoples, not 
only in Russia, but also in other parts of the world. 
Of course, there are many barriers to continued international collaboration on the part of Russian 
indigenous peoples. In addition to the controls that the state places on non-governmental 
organizations, indigenous groups that do engage actively in international collaboration are often very 
small in numbers and have limited human and financial resources to draw on. Tatiana Achirgina, the 
President of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, Chukotka, has commented that her organization simply 
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lacks competent and persistent leaders who are able to attend international forums and work hard and 
consistently to preserve Yupik culture and traditions (Leonova 2015).         
Conclusions 
As in other regions and countries around the world, indigenous peoples in Chukotka have suffered 
greatly at the hands of the state.  After centuries of relative isolation within the Russian Empire, Soviet 
communism brought about a wholesale change in the political and economic circumstances facing 
indigenous peoples in Chukotka.  Soviet development also brought an influx of settlers from other 
parts of the Soviet Union which demographically overwhelmed and marginalized the indigenous 
populations of the region. The demise of the Soviet Union brought new and unprecedented 
challenges; namely in the form of socio-economic collapse and a massive outmigration of people from 
the region. While indigenous peoples now form a very strong plurality in Chukotka, they still struggle 
to realize and assert their traditional indigenous rights.   
As the indigenous peoples of Chukotka look to the future, there is some hope that they will be able 
to achieve some measure of self-governance and control. The stabilization of the region (at least 
relative to the chaos of the 1990s), coupled with other developments such as the prospects for 
developing obshchiny and connecting with indigenous peoples in other parts of the circumpolar north 
who have been successful in building self-governing indigenous regions, are signs that the future may 
hold some promise. As noted earlier, the indigenous peoples of this region have a long history of 
resistance and independence and, as leaders such Aleksandr Omrypkir and Tatiana Achirgina have 
argued, it is critically important that they preserve their traditions and remain united in the face of 
political and economic change.  At the same time, it is important to note the very different and difficult 
political context in which indigenous peoples in Russia operate. Whereas indigenous peoples in Alaska 
and Canada have been able to work with other levels of government to achieve self-government, the 
federal and regional governments in Russia are still suspicious of and even hostile to any attempts to 
bolster indigenous autonomy. As a result, indigenous peoples in Chukotka still find themselves at the 
margins of Russian society, politically, economically and geographically.      
 
Notes 
1. Chukotka was the only one of 10 autonomous okrugs to become independent from their host 
regions.  Since 1991, several autonomous okrugs have been politically and territorially 
amalgamated into their host regions (Wilson 2003). For a more in-depth discussion of Russia’s 
autonomous okrugs and their status within the federal system (see Wilson 2001 and 2003). 
2. Popular discontent with the Nazarov administration and the extremely poor living conditions 
in the region was also reflected in a collective letter that was sent by the residents of 
Provideniya in eastern Chukotka to the President of the Russian Federation in 1999 
(Bogoslovskaya 2000). 
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3. Similar demographic transitions were also experienced in other northern regions such as 
Khanty Mansiysk in western Siberia (see Wilson 2001). 
4. An ostrog is a stockade town that served as a colonial outpost in Siberia, the Russian Far East 
and Russian America during the Tsarist period.   
5. The Association of Indigenous Peoples of Chukotka just celebrated its 25th anniversary in 2015 
(see Kopylova 2015). 
6. Authority over lands protected for the traditional use of indigenous peoples is shared between 
the federal and regional governments. Often federal and regional statutes disagree or are in 
conflict. While the laws On Obshinas and On TTUNs were created to give indigenous peoples 
free and hereditary use and transfer of traditional lands, the Forest Code of the Russian 
Federation excludes indigenous peoples from holding land tenure rights (Laletin 2012). 
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Scientific and policy-oriented publications highlighting the magnitude of uncertainty in the changing Arctic and the 
possibilities for effective regional governance are proliferating, yet it remains a challenging task to examine Arctic marine 
biodiversity. Limited scientific data are currently available. Through analysis of marine invasions in the Arctic, we work 
to identify and assess patterns in the knowledge gaps regarding invasive species in the Arctic that affect the ability to 
generate improved governance outcomes. These patterns are expected to depend on multiple aspects of scientific research 
into invasive species threats in the Arctic, including the ways in which known marine invasions are related to different 
stakeholder groups and existing disparate national and international experiences with invasive species. Stakeholder 
groups include dominant industries (fishing, shipping, tourism, resource exploration) and indigenous communities 
(regarded as resource users, citizen scientists, and recipients of goods shipped from other locations). Governance gaps are 
examined in the context of applied national policies (such as promoting or intercepting intentional introductions), 
international agreements (regarding introductions and mitigations) and existing prevention programs (regional, national 
and international). We intend to help focus domestic and international governance and research initiatives regarding 
introduced species on the most valuable, cost effective options, given the knowledge gaps derived from systematic research 
limitations and opportunities in the Arctic environment.  
 
 
Introduction  
Decades of rigorous scientific research on the Arctic marine environment have provided useful 
insights on its rapidly changing and dynamic nature. Marine invasions present a significant harbinger 
of ecosystem boundary shifts, and with the Arctic’s increasingly weaker barriers a growing number of 
new species are expected to arrive soon on their own. The propensity to highly value anticipated 
benefits from increased human activities in the Arctic amplifies the risks of new species introductions. 
Additionally, the changing climate increases significantly the chances of new introductions eventually 
succeeding as invasions. While seasonal light conditions will not evolve with changing temperature 
and ice-cover, the photic zone is expected to experience complex shifts as ice and algal conditions 
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evolve (David, Lange, Rabe, & Flores 2015; Tremblay & Gagnon 2009). Experience to date, including 
both intentional and accidental introductions that have established and spread in the Barents Sea, 
suggests that species which are not directly affected by seasonal darkness, such as benthic habitat 
dwellers, are perhaps most likely to be initially advantaged by the new ecological opportunities. Thus 
we focus this discussion with examples of existing and potential benthic crustacean species in order 
to clearly highlight the ecological and economic interactions that foster marine invasive species threats. 
Existing research includes a significant degree of uncertainty that we argue incorporates systematic 
biases introduced by variations in the cost of accessing information in the research. As one important 
example, the harsh climatic conditions in the Arctic have so far allowed almost exclusively seasonal 
(summer) sampling and measurements, which emphasizes that our current knowledge of the Arctic 
marine environment is fraught with uncertainties that must be incorporated into decision-making. The 
resulting lack of a robust scientific baseline and incomplete knowledge of the Arctic marine world 
further complicate the scientific framework for data collection/sampling where emphasis has been 
put on certain high-visibility species (e.g charismatic megafauna or resources considered under 
pressure influencing commercial and subsistence fisheries) at the expense of others (e.g microfauna, 
diseases or parasites). These latter biases are not unique to the Arctic (Clark & May 2002; Duarte, 
Dennison, Orth & Carruthers 2008; Leather 2013; Tisdell & Nantha 2007) but further emphasize the 
biases derived from the allocation of limited resources available for research that may favor direct 
human resource use over more complex ecosystem relationships.  
Awareness of these biases should motivate both scientists and policy makers to engage themselves in 
an effort to better characterize the essential parameters governing Arctic marine ecosystem 
productivity. Until the point however when it becomes possible for the scientific community to devise 
some way to answer the numerous pending questions and thus adequately justify the research 
protocols to be applied, it is recommended to develop an umbrella strategy in order to avoid putting 
the ecosystem into peril. Building a consistent, credible and solid basis able to defend and protect the 
ecosystem from undesired introductions and ripple effects counsels adherence to approaches that 
appropriately incorporate both risk, where probability distributions over potential expected events can 
be defined, and uncertainty, where likelihoods of future events, or even the existence of future events, 
remain unknowable. Some definitions of the “Precautionary Principle”, such as the one provided by 
Gollier, Jullien & Treich (2000), where scientific uncertainty with regard to the distribution of the 
likelihood of realizing a future risk provides society with incentives for stronger prevention measures 
to shift this distribution and the expected damages, fit this bill. It is therefore advisable for research 
investments themselves to follow closely a set of premises within such a precautionary-protection-
prevention context since it is expected to confer a number of advantages, regardless of any additional 
policy challenges.  
Brief exposition of the challenges of marine invasive species in the Arctic  
Overview of the problem 
Biological invasions in marine habitats have been historically growing with trade and increased global 
transport for centuries, with the literature on an international level pointing out various different bio-
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economic patterns (Costello, Springborn, McAusland & Solow 2007; Ruiz, Fofonoff, Carlton, 
Wonham & Hines 2000). Presently, such impacts are coming to the Arctic in concert with climatic 
changes. Northern ecosystems can, in general, be characterized as “native” sink host destinations for 
invaders since the continuous climatic warming shift ecosystems away from the equator and towards 
the poles, with Arctic waters presenting the northernmost marine ecosystem that northward-moving 
species can reach. Meanwhile, climate change, together with a series of other parameters, has 
contributed to significant transformation of the Arctic environment, so that distinction between a 
“New,” more open and integrated Arctic system, and an “Old,” ice-defended and more ecologically 
pristine Arctic, is being increasingly adopted.  
The transition has the potential for significant negative environmental and ecological side effects, not 
least of which are introductions of invasive species with noticeable and potentially irreversible impacts. 
The Old Arctic’s colder temperatures have generally fended off negative impacts on ecosystem 
services of such introductions, including reductions in productive ecological capacity due to 
pathogens, parasites, microbes or other disease carriers. The ecological and economic characteristics 
of the New Arctic, and its success in sustaining human and natural habitats, will depend on the ability 
to adapt basic tenets of precaution in multiple dimensions. These tenets include costly activities such 
as (potentially incomplete) inspections of traded goods and vessels or quarantines for pathogens in 
disease prevention. According to the Precautionary Principle as defined in the Rio Declaration in 
Principle 15 (UNEP 1992), in cases of threats for serious or irreversible damage, cost-effective 
measures for preventing environmental degradation shall not be postponed in view of lack of full 
scientific certainty, urging states to apply the precautionary approach “according to their capability.” 
This expression has been widely criticized in the literature as rather weak, incomplete, and ambiguous 
from both an environmental and a legal perspective. The ITLOS Seabed Dispute Chamber released 
an advisory opinion according to which the Precautionary Principle in Rio’s Declaration was not 
regarded as binding, but since it was already “incorporated into a growing number of international 
treaties and other instruments,” a “trend towards making this approach part of customary international 
law” evolved (ITLOS 2011). 
Interdependencies between countries in the dynamically changing Arctic environment hold a 
prominent position in determining the future of marine invasions and thus cannot be overlooked. 
They add significant complexity to the situation, attributable to the multiple confounders they bring 
along. Certain Arctic marine invasions clearly display the interplay of ecology and economic behavior. 
Invasive crustacean species, for example, have pitted potential economic gains against other 
predominantly negative though uncertain ecological impacts/changes. The Red King Crab (RKC) 
Paralithodes camtschaticus is probably the most well-known example of a deliberately introduced species 
leading to invasion. Originally introduced in the Barents Sea by Soviet Union scientists in the 1960s 
(Orlov & Ivanov 1978) with the intent to create a profitable new resource for fisheries, it was only 
identified years afterwards as a potential threat for benthic diversity and biomass and thus for habitats 
and nutrient cycling in the Arctic marine environment (Falk-Petersen, Renaud & Anisimova 2011). In 
a conceptual framework and always within the geopolitical context, one of the reasons why joint 
management of resources is considered of utmost significance when it comes to invasions is the fact 
that the exclusion and control of those invasive species can be considered as a “weakest-link” or 
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“weaker-link” public good. In view thereof it is in fact the least effective provider (Burnett 2006; 
Perrings et al. 2002) that actually determines whether the ecosystem’s overall balance and well-being 
will not go out of kilter. In other words, the introduction, establishment and magnitude of spread of 
a new species hinges on those (countries) that exert the least effort to prevent and/or control 
purposeful or accidental invasions, noting decisions about prevention might differ decidedly between 
deliberately introduced and accidentally introduced invasive species. Effective control of biological 
invasions in the multi-state Arctic is a weakest-link public good and a driving force for coordinated 
proactive action.  
Climate change has also aided species movements that take on characteristics of invasions. The North 
East Atlantic mackerel have been moving westward and northward with shifts in oceanic temperatures 
and related properties, and this has sparked disputes between Iceland and the Faroe Islands on the 
one hand and Norway and the EU on the other hand. While information on the stock of the mackerel 
and the ability to estimate the overall quota to maintain a healthy fishery is well understood and widely 
distributed through the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES 2013, 2014, 2015), 
the negotiations for joint quotas covering how the catch should be distributed have been very 
problematic so far. This is particularly true regarding the newly viable coastal fisheries developing 
around Iceland where there has been a tremendous increase in stocks in recent years (Ellefsen 2013; 
Ørebech 2013). The species distribution has changed significantly since the mid-2000s, having spread 
quite a lot into East Greenlandic and Faroese waters as well, while overall stock size has also increased 
(Dankel et al. 2015). Those changes in population dynamics have apparently hindered agreements 
between mackerel fishing countries on the Total Allowable Catch, but both the competitive role of 
mackerel within the food-web (preying on other species) and the overwhelming dependence on those 
fisheries urgently call for an effective and optimal management scheme (Ørebech 2013).  
Human assisted invasive species introductions 
Directly, the role of industrial development in increasing the probability of successful invasions must 
be addressed. The burden of costs and the sharing of benefits of such measures are not evenly 
distributed, and will depend on the policy choices made (including lack of policy or implementation). 
These policies, for example, might include assignment of liability to sources of invasive species, such 
as shipping, tourist or fishing vessels that transverse a variety of sensitive ecosystems with their gear, 
or resource extractors who develop infrastructure that creates substrate and creates increased traffic 
flows to new marine locations places, in order to affect the incentives on industry and development 
to prevent damages. As an example, New Zealand’s 1993 Biosecurity Act, Section 154 includes liability 
for importers/exporters to address marine invasive species (Fernandez 2011). Alternatively, the 
absence of such liability places the burden on affected communities to deal with invasions in other 
ways – often ex post when they are significantly more costly (Olson 2006; Thomas & Randall 2000).  
On a theoretical level, assigning liabilities for environmental damages, especially in cases where 
information is scarce and expensive, such as species introductions, should provide powerful incentives 
for investing in protection measures and preventive action. In reality there are practical challenges that 
include identification of the specific sources, and counter-incentives to hide behavior to avoid 
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detection (Bernstein 1993). There are high transactions costs to determine causality and loss with legal 
processing (Fernandez 2008). Tort liabilities can be very tough to allocate when multiple tortfeasors 
are involved, which is not uncommon in cases of marine invasions. Thus far, the only internationally 
ratified policy entered into force, with 71 sovereign states and 84% of the gross tonnage of merchant 
shipping included, is the Antifouling Convention of 2001 that bans antifouling substances containing 
organotins and biocides with tributyltin from use. Violation of the ban involves penalties for those 
liable. The organotin and tributyltin substances had been commonly used to ward off sessile marine 
invasive species on hulls of ships (commercial, recreational) as well as prevent extra weight and fuel 
use from the biofouling marine invasive species create (Fernandez 2008). That convention did not 
advocate alternative antifouling substances. Segerson (1990) suggests combining liability with an ex 
ante policy, such as paying in to an insurance fund that could cover prevention and/or remediation 
activities, since liability is ex post.  
Another pathway for marine invasive species via maritime shipping, ballast water, has legally 
enforceable regulations developed by different states all over the world. However IMO’s 
(International Maritime Organization) BWM Convention (International Convention for the Control 
and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments), cannot yet enter into force as an 
international treaty (Miller 2014). Thus the limited feasibility of liability rules among states for 
compensating after environmental damages occur, coupled with the predicaments existing in 
international agreements for prevention, generate a perplexing situation. 
Legal precedents where liabilities have been imposed for invasive species exist, but are limited to some 
disputes regarding insects, weeds and cattle that had escaped from properties. This can potentially 
provide the necessary analogies for applying tort laws (Courtney 2006). Quarantines in e.g. Australia, 
New Zealand and Hawaii require ex-ante action in that deliberately introduced species must go 
through quarantines and trials funded by those intending to make the introductions in order to 
demonstrate that there should be no unexpected and costly invasions. Those introducing the species 
generally remain liable after the introduction as well (USDA 2015 - State Laws and Regulations, 
Hawaii). Another legal example is provided by Colorado Division of Wildlife v. Cox, (1992), which 
determined that exotic-free ecosystems and biodiversity are to be regarded as public rights 
encompassed by public nuisance law, with the Colorado statute referring to defendants as “liable” 
(Larsen 1995). Marine invasions are indisputably more difficult to handle, and none of these directly 
account for the potential of unintentional introductions, but as Larsen (1995) notes, public nuisance 
liability is expected to alter the behavior of shipping actors while also effectively contribute to 
prohibiting high-risk activities.   
As mentioned, the RKC was intentionally introduced in the Barents Sea by Soviet scientists in order 
to create a new lucrative fishery. The introduction proved successful and thus profitable for Russia, 
but the species unexpectedly spread west. The need for cooperative international management became 
apparent as the crab moved into Norwegian waters in the 1970s, and other species were being 
simultaneously jointly managed under the newly established Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries 
Commission (1974). RKC cooperation initially consisted of Norwegian agreement not to harvest the 
crabs, which were appearing there in small numbers. By the 1990s, however, economic damages and 
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larger populations west of the Norwegian-Russian border caused renegotiation so that Norway began 
to harvest crabs, in compensation for damages to cod and capelin gear from crab bycatch. When 
broader potential ecological impacts became more widely recognized and eventually accepted by both 
the scientific community and the policy makers in Norway, a spatially differentiated internal 
Norwegian management plan was initiated to accommodate both the economic interests of fishermen 
and the ecological interests of a broader community (Sundet 2014b).  
The most identifiable effects of the species are believed to be on the Arctic benthic habitat, despite 
the lack of adequate knowledge regarding its contribution to ecosystem services (Kaiser et al. 2015). 
With the Norwegians treating the species as invasive west of 26o E and at the same trying to maintain 
a long term fishery on the eastern part, and the Russians managing it only as long-term fishery, 
international interests seem to be at odds and Norway’s internal goals conflicting (Kaiser et al. 2015). 
Despite the spatially split management regime that was developed for maintaining a long term quota 
regulated within a restricted area and thus afterwards limiting its spread beyond the area in which it is 
currently established, tracing with accuracy its distribution (at least in Norwegian waters) has been 
riddled with difficulties (Sundet 2014b). This is in large part an outcome of research funding biases 
that favor direct economic interests over indirect ones; systematic surveying west of the 26 o E line 
does not occur, since the fishery is not regulated. Its spread in Norwegian waters has been westwards 
near coasts but has been at the same time characterized as “discontinuous” due to small populations 
identified by sporadic reports of spatially distinct individual catches in inner parts of more 
southwesterly fjords (Sundet 2014b, see Fig.1). The current prevalent assumptions indicate a 
continuous westward spread (Kaiser et al., 2015) and more particularly around Tromsø about 12–15 
nm off shore (Sundet 2014b, see Fig. 1). 
The Snow Crab (SC) Chionoecetes opilio, a more recent crustacean invasion in the Barents Sea, was first 
identified in its eastern part in 1996 by Russian fishermen (Kuzmin, Akhtarin & Menis 1998). Its origin 
of introduction is still being disputed, and genetic analyses trying to identify it are still under way. Its 
native distribution area is along the Bering Sea and the northwestern Atlantic, including the eastern 
coast of Canada and the western coast of Greenland (Sundet 2014b). Its introduction was initially 
assumed by Kuzmin et al. (1998) to have been unintentional (either though larval drift or ballast water) 
taking into consideration its limited migrating capabilities since it had neither managed to 
independently reach the seas of the Northern European Basin nor to migrate from the western to the 
eastern coast of Greenland and then to Icelandic waters. The spread of the species is indisputably 
progressing at an alarming rate (Bakanev 2014; Sundet 2014a). The crab’s tolerance for cold 
temperatures suggests a highly likely potential expansion further north towards the more pristine areas 
of the “High Arctic”, beyond the current and expected range of the RKC invasion. The current 
evidence indicates a rather successful establishment of the species in the Barents Sea, with data such 
as site identification (depths) and body structure characteristics (size) pinpointing nursery areas 
proving its successful recruitment (Agnalt, A.-L. & Jørstad 2010).  
There are both serious questions about the impacts of both species on the one hand (since they have 
not yet been fully identified) and growing interest from the fishery industry that sees favorable market 
conditions on the other hand. Fears that these economic hopes will overshadow or bias measurement 
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of ecological consequences of the invasions and their spread are well founded – the RKC fishery in 
the Barents is particularly lucrative at the moment, while for SC there is also a growing interest from 
the seafood and fishery industries (Grimsmo 2015; Olsen 2015; Ripman 2015). With SC estimated to 
produce between 25,000-75,000 tons per year within the next ten years (Hvingel & Sundet 2014), this 
attractive economic gain may hasten activities that should be delayed for improved information 
regarding the potential damages to the benthic habitat. The economic gains may even promote 
decisions that delay the research in order to avoid knowing the true ecosystem costs, creating 
additional bias in the types of scientific research undertaken.  
Climate change induced invasions 
Indirectly, climate change impacts, considered the main underlying cause of northward habitat 
migration, must also be addressed in efforts to maintain existing Arctic ecosystem function at risk 
from invasions. Habitat migration is fraught with uncertainties while often uncontrollable at local or 
even regional scales, which is an indicative example of why the benefits of the colder “Old Arctic” 
cannot be easily replaced. This initiates discussions on examining related costs within different 
contexts (economic behavior, climate change mitigation costs, etc.) in terms of endeavors to more 
appropriately distribute them amongst global inducers of climate change and/or among the above 
mentioned “development players,” rather than, through inaction, pushing the costs on to ecosystems 
and those who rely on their current services.  
Climatic changes have significant ramifications in Arctic marine ecosystems while the realm of impact 
categories differs across the scale of analysis and evaluation approaches. When it comes to marine 
invasions, two major types of introductions are being identified: the ones that pertain to species already 
ecosystem adapted (Arctic or sub-Arctic species) and the ones that pertain to species that have 
managed to adapt to Arctic climatic conditions and/or are able to survive in the ecosystem thanks to 
the increasing temperature of the water (usually northward moving species). 
Transarctic invasions are not a new phenomenon. Historical experience underlines such invasions 
about 3.5 million years ago, during the warm mid-Pliocene epoch when hundreds of marine lineages 
managed to colonize out through the Bering Strait, resulting in enriched Arctic and North Atlantic 
biotas (Vermeij & Roopnarine 2008). According to Reid, Edwards & Johns (2008) there is mounting 
evidence that interoceanic exchange is already re-occurring, with the presence of a Pacific 
planktonic diatom (Neodenticula seminae) in the Labrador and Irminger Seas that is generally found in 
the North Pacific and the Bering Sea. Reid, Edwards & Johns (2008) thus consider the return of the 
species in the North Atlantic as a sign of trans-Arctic migration, potentially leading to invasions of 
large scale similar to the ones that took place in the Pliocene trans-Arctic interchange.  
Indicatively, as the literature points out (Vermeij & Roopnarine 2008), 56 molluscan lineages that are 
currently present in the Bering and Chukchi seas, as well as the Pribilof Islands and Anadyrski Gulf, 
and that did not participate in the aforementioned trans-Arctic expansion are considered potential 
invaders. The SC may indeed be one such current example. Current theory suggests that the species 
has moved to the Barents Sea through natural dispersal routes from the Pacific Arctic (Sokolov 2015), 
while it certainly did not come from Greenland (Agnalt 2015).  
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Northward migration, on the other hand, seems to explain the introduction of the Hanasaki King 
(spiny) Crab (Paralithodes brevipes), first witnessed in Norton Sound, AK in 2003, and growing to a 
population large enough that the state of Alaska allowed commercial fishing for the crabs in 2014 
(Campbell & Regnart 2014; Webb 2015). The state is concerned about effects of this less marketable 
crab on the other Alaska King Crab harvests (Webb 2015). Its formal inclusion in the fishery allows 
for greater oversight, yet could exacerbate the ecological and economic consequences if private 
capture of market benefits increases incentives to accommodate the species’ introduction into the 
ecosystem rather than extinguish its presence. 
Institutions and policies towards invasion threats in Arctic Coastal states 
Besides regional and national policies on reducing risks of marine invasions, the first coordinated 
effort on an international level originates from IMO’s BWM Convention which was adopted in 2004 
(Miller 2014). It is worth mentioning that despite not having entered into force, awaiting ratification 
from more than 30 maritime countries constituting 35% of the global shipping merchant tonnage, 
there are already 44 contracting states the combined merchant fleets of which constitute approximately 
32.86% of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant fleet (IMO 2015), which practically means that 
it might actually be ratified shortly. As for the Arctic region, not all eight member states of the Arctic 
Council have ratified the IMO BWM Convention (the U.S and Iceland have not, Finland has signed 
though not ratified), which might look discouraging at first for a consistently organized fight against 
invasions in the pristine Arctic marine environment, but in practice at least, the federal regulations in 
the U.S. require mandatory ballast water reporting and ballast water treatment verification through the 
U.S. Federal Clean Water Act. There seems to exist among the Arctic states a common 
acknowledgment of the risk for marine invasions as well as of basic principles of ballast water 
management that help minimize risks (Miller 2014). Unfortunately, those risks arising from invasions 
are not stressed in the Polar Code; rather it pertains mostly to separate sovereign Arctic countries over 
search, rescue and operation safety (Fernandez 2014). The Polar Code applies to ships active in the 
Arctic and Antarctic, and is expected to enter into force within the next 2 years. The first draft, released 
in January 2014, has so far received a great deal of criticism for leaving out significant environmental 
threats arising from maritime activities, including marine invasions from ballast water discharge, hull 
fouling and development of maritime structures (Miller 2014). Recently, (68th session 11-15 May 
2015), MEPC (IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee) adopted the environmental 
requirements of the Polar Code through existing MARPOL (International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships) amendments, aside from the safety and rescue requirements of 
SOLAS (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea). The Polar Code still lacks any 
component regarding maritime requirements regarding the threat of marine species invasions. With 
sea ice becoming less reliable as a permanent natural barrier, the impacts of activities in the Arctic, 
including fishing, shipping, tourism, resource extraction, etc., rank very highly in importance both with 
respect to the economic future of the Arctic, and the threat of marine invasive species, particularly for 
Arctic Coastal states. Already highlighted in the report by CAFF (2013), both Canada and U.S. seem 
to be aware of how costly invasions can prove out, with billions of dollars in expected annual damages 
from invasive species. Fernandez (2007, 2008, 2011, 2014) includes these countries in analyses of the 
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effectiveness of policies and economic incentives between countries with and without marine invasive 
species policies extending into the Arctic from international maritime trade, aquaculture and aquarium 
trade pathways of invasion. Besides policies regarding ballast water that were previously described, the 
U.S. has also prioritized management and further exploration of invasive species in the Arctic, within 
the National Strategy for the Arctic Region Implementation Plan (NSAR IP). The recent U.S. 
chairmanship of the Arctic Council is also expected to address the issue, with its working groups such 
as CAFF (2013) and PAME (2013) already partly working and having committed to work further 
towards that direction. 
Iceland has significant experience from at least 14 marine species identified as non-native within the 
last 58 years, with nine of these approximately in the last decade (Thorarinsdottir, Gunnarsson & 
Gíslason 2014). The national policy indicates precaution rather than eradication which is interpreted 
practically in regulations for ballast water in force since 2010 for the prevention of discharge within 
the Icelandic 200 mile EEZ jurisdiction (Thorarinsdottir et al. 2014), as agreed through the OSPAR 
and Helsinki Commissions. Though these commissions provide some assistance for monitoring and 
enforcement (OSPAR 2015), it must be expected that such measures may at times be violated with 
relative impunity.  
Denmark’s policy (representing Greenland’s interest in the Arctic) lies in the recognition of the 
significant threat and thus the implementation and ratification of the Ballast Water Convention. 
However Denmark’s ratification of BWC does not apply for Faroe Islands and Greenland (IMO 
2015). Note that all Arctic states that are sovereign members of the IMO, and the Faroe Islands as an 
Association Member of IMO, did sign the Antifouling Convention that is in force. In Greenland, all 
vessels and drilling units involved in hydrocarbon activities need to follow IMO guidelines or the 
relevant Canadian regulations with respect to ballast water discharge (Frederiksen, Boertmann, Ugarte 
& Mosbech 2012).   
Russia and Norway have confirmed marine invasions in their waters (at a minimum, RKC and SC), 
and have been working hard towards identifying, with as much accuracy as possible, impacts on the 
ecosystems and justifying rational and effective management strategies, despite the fact that the aims 
seem to differ. While both counties have policies to address marine invasive species (Sundet 2014b; 
Sustretova, Zakharov & Etin 2012), the RKC is not being treated as an invasive species by the 
Russians, while the Norwegians act uncertain about their classification.  
As for the much newer SC invasion, management plans and intentions have not been finalized in 
either the Norwegian or in the Russian zone, since there is still ongoing research on the species itself 
as well as discussions on the desired results. The process of resolution of the scientific uncertainty is 
a case where research outcomes directly influence international policy, and where long-standing 
international policy intended for very different shared natural resources will impact incentives over 
governance of the species. This is due to the debate about whether the crab is a ‘sedentary species’, 
and therefore not regulated under the UN Fish Stocks Agreement1 but rather under international 
regulation that would give Russia decision-making power over what is now the “Loophole” of Barents’ 
international waters, where most SC fishing is currently occurring. This debate appears close to 
resolution, in favor of the SC being designated a sedentary species and closing the international 
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loophole for SC fishing (Hoel 2015; Hansen 2015). Meanwhile, it is clear that there are significant 
hopes that the crab will bring new economic opportunities to the Barents Sea (Hvingel 2015). Interest 
in the question of whether the SC is a sedentary species is particularly poignant in the Barents Sea 
because at the moment there is no authorization on fisheries on the outer continental shelf. The 
northwest spread of the species, in particular toward Svalbard, has created concerns that would 
recommend harvesting above sustainable fishery levels to reduce the spread and potential damages of 
a large and expanding SC population into more clearly valued marine habitat (Hop et al. 2002; 
Jørgensen & Spiridonov 2013; Sætra 2011), evidenced not least by the scientific effort put in to 
determining the ecosystem functioning, and will require concerted efforts to address its management 
in the Barents Sea between Russia and Norway.  
The borders between nations provide both opportunity and risk pertaining to invasive species. While 
international trade requirements may facilitate inspections, quarantines, and other preventative 
measures, borders also determine the extent of a nation’s direct control over monitoring and 
enforcement and over incentives to reduce being a source of invasive species to a neighbor. Again, 
the RKC experience in the Barents presents an example of the gaps that come at borders if research 
and information are not properly shared. When the Norwegians agreed not to harvest RKC in the 
1970s, they had little information on the Russian’s actions to transplant the crab to the Barents and 
the potential for the species to become a significant presence in their waters. This led to unanticipated 
costs to Norwegian cod and capelin fishermen in the early 1990s and inefficient policy over 
containment of the RKC in Norwegian waters, in addition to the current conflicting Norwegian 
internal policy.  
Synthetic analysis of existing research 
Misplaced emphasis? Dearth of data and existing knowledge gaps  
Before deepening the discussion of abatement costs/investments and assigning burdens, we first need 
to acquire an adequate understanding of why the above mentioned impacts are of such great 
importance. Invasions, together with the various disease vectors and pathogens, can have critical 
interactions with other drivers of ecosystem change thus causing a series of cascading effects both on 
human health and economic well-being, besides changing ecosystem dynamics.  
Nevertheless species under-representations (usually microorganisms such as invasive microbes) 
(Amalfitano, Coci, Corno & Luna 2015; Thomaz, Kovalenko, Havel & Kats 2015) and other bio-
economic biases such as funding uncertainties (Kaiser & Burnett 2010), and policy gaps between stages 
of invasions (Burnett, D’Evelyn, Kaiser, Nantamanasikarn & Roumasset 2008; Burnett, Kaiser, Pitafi 
& Roumasset 2006; Kaiser 2006) frequently present themselves in invasion-related research. The lower 
level of difficulty in detecting and fighting invasive macroorganisms compared to microorganisms is 
indisputable, but lately there has been mounting evidence for the greater significance of alterations in 
community structure and ecosystem functioning caused by the latter (Vincent 2010) that ranges from 
the contribution of microbial food webs to marine productivity, to outbreaks of diseases and parasite 
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transmission caused by microscopic pathogens (CAFF 2013). Additional research concentration in 
these areas may have high potential net benefits. 
Microorganism bio-invasions are a rather conspicuous feature of marine ecosystems overall, 
particularly because of the ballast water tanks which may carry hundreds of trillions (Society for 
General Microbiology 2008) of microorganisms on just a single tank or a hull can harbor whole 
ecosystems of microorganisms. The chances of their individual survival might be relatively low, but 
the increasing shipping activity in the Arctic increases the overall threat level. Fighting the challenge 
of microorganism invasions and managing them effectively has never been easy. One can argue that 
preventing introduction and new infestation would be an optimal solution but the limited amount of 
research to date does not allow strong conclusions (Burnett et al. 2008; Burnett, Pongkijvorasin & 
Roumasset 2012; Kaiser & Burnett 2010). Besides the general experience obtained so far, which 
indicates that particularly for marine ecosystems, preventing invasions has proved the most effective 
and economically viable way to mitigate their impacts (Carlton 2001; Williams et al. 2013), the diverse 
realm of Arctic invasions paves the way towards intensifying joint prevention efforts.  
Apart from the microorganisms discussed above, existing fears for future invasions are also informed 
by northward migrations in temperate waters and include species that range from the European green 
crab (Carcinus maenas) (deRivera, Steves, Ruiz, Fofonoff & Hines 2007), which as a voracious predator 
may pose a significant threat to Arctic marine life, to salmon (Nielsen, Ruggerone & Zimmerman 
2013). Additionally to the above, other non-indigenous species have also been identified in Arctic and 
sub-Arctic waters but cannot yet be listed as confirmed invasions (Molnar, Gamboa, Revenga & 
Spalding 2008):   
Table 1: Suspected Arctic introductions  
Species name Binomial name Higher 
Taxa 
Ecoregion/ location of identification 
Soft-shell clams Mya arenaria Invertebrate 
Mollusc 
North and East Iceland 
Hydroid Ectopleura crocea Invertebrate 
Cnidarian  
Eastern Bering Sea 
Naval shipworm Teredo navalis  Invertebrate 
Mollusc  
Eastern Bering Sea 
East Greenland Shelf  
West Greenland Shelf 
Northern Grand Banks - Southern 
Labrador 
Northern Labrador 
Baffin Bay - Davis Strait 
Acartia copepod  Acartia tonsa Invertebrate 
Arthropod  
Crustacean 
White Sea  
Zebra mussel  Dreissena polymorpha Invertebrate 
Mollusc  
Hudson Complex 
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Marine pill bug  Sphaeroma walkeri Invertebrate 
Arthropod 
Other 
Beaufort Sea - continental coast and shelf 
Source: (Molnar et al., 2008) 
Questions to be answered about these species include the means through which, and the time at which, 
they arrived at the aforementioned destinations either purposefully or accidentally. More importantly, 
perhaps, questions include what ecological and economic damages should be expected from these 
introductions if they spread, and what policy actions can and should be taken to minimize these 
damages (Burnett et al. 2006; Fernandez & Sheriff 2013; Fernandez 2007, 2008, 2011, 2014; Kaiser 
2006). It is worth mentioning that it is a viable hypothesis for all of them to have been transported 
through hull fouling and ballast water discharge. What is highly likely though, as suggested by Ruiz & 
Hewitt (2009), is that our limited taxonomic knowledge and respective capacity for biogeographic and 
taxonomic resolution together with potential biases in search efforts may have resulted in limited 
observed differences in nonnative species richness and thus in underestimation of nonnative species. 
Here again, biases in our understanding of Arctic ecosystems limit our ability to answer these 
questions. While observations of ecosystem behaviors by indigenous Arctic peoples have come to be 
greatly appreciated for their astuteness and breadth (Krupnik & Jolly 2002; Lopez 1986), such 
observations focus on direct food sources and/or threats to survival, and cannot be expected to 
include comprehensive submarine surveillance that might allow specific identification of the details of 
long run benthic habitat changes, instead of primarily the bio-economic consequences of such 
changes. 
The scale of concern for such diverse invasions and their potential consequences is very different but 
still joint consideration and common prevention strategies focused on disruption of human-induced 
introduction pathways (such as broad actions, like mitigating climate change impacts, or locally specific 
requirements, such as ballast water exchange regulations, etc.) offer considerable economies of scope. 
Fighting against more than one species at a time can be expedient towards developing common policy 
channels that will enable effectively attacking the invasion threat at once.  
Conclusions 
The threats of invasive species’ introductions in the Arctic are increasing as economic and ecological 
shifts increase opportunities for both introduction of new species and their establishment (Fernandez 
et al. 2014). In the Arctic Ocean, intentional and unintentional invasions are already underway. The 
invasions about which we have the greatest evidence are also directly profitable crustacean species. 
Two of these species, the RKC and the SC, are introductions in the Barents Sea involving international 
agreements between Russia and Norway. While the two countries have been able to agree on all other 
shared fishing stocks, they cannot agree on management of the crabs because they have different 
expectations over the potential costs of the continued presence and spread of these species. 
Furthermore, as the invasion frontier in the case of the RKC, Norway has international considerations 
with the rest of the North Atlantic that may affect its governance choices.   
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There are many more potential invaders, and yet our scientific understanding of Arctic marine 
ecosystems is sufficiently poor that we do not have an adequate baseline to know what invasions might 
threaten or indeed if new observations of species are new introductions or just new data on native 
species. Research challenges in the Arctic not only make the establishment of such a baseline extremely 
costly, but also research is limited by the seasonality of what is feasible, and by research foci that stem 
from prioritizing the gathering of more information on direct resource use rather than broader 
ecosystem functioning. This all leads to the introduction of research biases that direct both policy and 
research dollars in inefficient ways. Research efforts that aim to fill in gaps in knowledge about baseline 
conditions, seasonal ecosystem effects and interactions between trophic levels are likely to produce 
particularly valuable gains, especially if they are integrated with expectations about changes in human 
behaviors that will change the likelihoods of both deliberate and accidental introductions. A broader 
approach that includes frequently overlooked microorganisms is also recommended to capture the 
greatest returns for protection of ecosystems and the resources they support. 
The examples here highlight several important considerations for policy development and governance 
of invasive species issues. These include both bio-economic and strategic aspects of invasive species 
problems, and range from difficulties in aligning strategic incentives to fight ecosystem change, as we 
see in the Barents, to difficulties in adapting lessons from one species and location to another, even if 
they seem potentially quite similar (Kaiser et al. 2015).  
Increased coordination of Arctic marine governance at the international level in the form of the Polar 
Code has failed to include invasive species management. We anticipate this could prove to be a very 
costly mistake. Increased research and coordination of preventative measures in particular present 
opportunities for joint (cost-saving) actions across jurisdictions, resource users, species’ threats and 
ecosystems. The authors of this article and their colleagues are engaged in a long term research project 
through the Belmont Forum to investigate specifics of viable policy options for the Arctic that address 
the ecological and economic complications laid out here. It is certain that successful multilateral 
coordination efforts must address realities of both ecosystem and human behavior, so that in the case 
of marine invasions in particular, policies that front-load interception and disruption of pathways for 
introduction and establishment of exotic species rather than delay efforts until a serious problem is 
identified, are likely to be most cost effective. Furthermore, beyond international agreements, 
successful policy will require integration to identify, prevent and treat threats within communities with 
differing marine resource uses and users. The vast scope of these differences in the Arctic creates a 
particular set of challenges that add to the importance of incorporating ecosystems directly into policy 
decisions.  
Since scientific understanding of existing Arctic ecosystems is relatively incomplete, promoting 
ecosystem resilience with cooperative actions to slow climate change should be considered valuable 
investment in prevention. Still, prevention of invasive species is imperfect. We can only reasonably 
expect to delay changes. We must engage in improved monitoring of invasive species and harness the 
observational capacity of local resource users to widen the net for detection and subsequent reparative 
action. 
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Notes 
1. In Part VI, Article 76 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) describes 
the process through which coastal states can determine the outer limits of their extended legal 
continental shelves beyond the 200 nautical mile limit of their Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) and thus gain marine sovereignty rights. Sedentary species (on the continental shelf) 
are also regulated by Part VI and not Part V that focuses on coastal states’ rights and duties in 
EEZ and includes regulations for living marine resources. For sedentary species occurring 
beyond the continental shelf, the regime described seems rather unclear as the initial intention 
was to regulate mining and extraction of other non-living resources, since at the time the 
economic and commercial interest for those fishery resources had not developed to the extent 
it has today. 
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Inter-Parliamentary Institutions & Arctic Governance 
 
Michał Łuszczuk  
 
 
The participation of inter-parliamentary institutions in the processes of international cooperation, especially in the processes of 
regional governance in almost all parts of the world, has been expanding in the last few decades. The Arctic region too can be praised 
for the existence of a number of such entities, such as the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians, the Barents Parliamentary 
Conference, the Nordic Council and the West-Nordic Council. This paper aims to provide, for the first time, a comparative analysis 
of the activities of these bodies in regards to their participation in the Arctic governance system, focusing in particular on the relations 
and links between the inter-parliamentary institutions and the Arctic Council. The paper ends with a reflection on the forthcoming 
role of such institutions in the future development of multidimensional cooperation among Arctic and non-Arctic nations as well as 
the threat of a possible democratic deficit in the Arctic.  
 
 
Introduction 
One of the manifestations of the changes taking place in the Arctic over the last few years is the 
transformation of regional governance understood as structures of authority that manage collective 
regional problems (Elliott & Breslin 2011). The number of its participants has increased, the range of 
subjects of cooperation has expanded, and the the rules and mechanisms that constitute it have been 
refined (Pelaudeix 2015; Exner-Pirot 2012; Graczyk & Koivurova 2014; Molenaar 2012). Although 
the foundations of the governnance strutures, where the Arctic Council plays a central role, were 
shaped at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, its subsequent functioning  is generally quite highly rated 
in terms of normative design and institutional preformance (Young 2005; Koivurova & VanderZwaag 
2007). For example, according to some authors, “(B)y international standards, the Arctic region has 
been a leader by constantly pushing the edges of governance innovation” (Poelzer & Wilson 2014: 
183). One of the most important patterns of this ‘governance innovation’, has been the considerable 
participation of non-state actors in regional cooperation, and especially a unique status granted to 
indigenous people in the Arctic Council (AC) (Koivurova 2010; Young 2009; Duyck 2012; Stępień 
2013; Graczyk 2011).  
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However, due to many political developments taking place in the Circumpolar North since 2008, when 
the Illulisat Declaration (Ilulissat Declaration 2008) was issued, and especially the growing interests of 
non-Arctic actors in the region, the position and role of non-state actors has been challenged by 
pressures from the Arctic national governments  (Koivurova et al. 2015; Steinberg & Dodds 2015; 
Ingimundarson 2014; Duyck 2012; Graczyk 2011). If this expanding trend of intergovernmentalism 
within Arctic cooperation continues – and the significance of the Arctic grows further both globally 
and nationally – then indeed, “defining political community and legitimate participation in Arctic 
governance” is becoming increasingly important, as suggested in the Arctic Human Development 
Report II (Poelzer & Wilson 2014: 185). Furthermore, it may lead to questions about the plurality of 
the regional governance, about its democratic legitimacy and accountability, and finally, a debate on 
lack of respect for the rules of democracy in the Arctic governance – a subject that is sometimes raised 
in regard to other intergovernmental institutions (Bernstein 2011; Grigorescu 2015; Zweifel 2006). In 
fact, such voices and concerns have appeared in the past, in the early 1990s, e.g., when the Nordic 
Council’s Parliamentary Conference was organized in Reykjavik from 16 to 17 August 1993 (Samstag 
1993).  
Or maybe such concerns are exaggerated or not fully justified? Maybe Arctic regional governance 
should not be criticized, taking into account the indigenous peoples’ organizations exceptional 
consultation rights as Permanent Participants in connection with the AC’s negotiations and decision-
making process (Koivurova & Heinämäki 2006) and the development of indigenous internationalism 
(Loukacheva 2009)? Or maybe the presence of regional inter-parliamentary organizations and non-
governmental organizations as Observers in the Arctic Council provides sufficient protection against 
such objections?  
While the issue of the role of the indigenous peoples’ organizations in Arctic governance has been 
discussed in several other places (Koivurova & Heinämäki 2006; Duyck 2012; Loukacheva 2009; 
Wilson & Øverland 2007; Martello 2008), this article aims to address the problem of democratic 
accountability within Arctic governance by means of assessing the impact and significance of the 
regional inter-parliamentary organizations operating in the Circumpolar North. Rooted in the ongoing 
discussion on the development and role of inter-parliamentary institutions (Cofelice 2012; Cutler 2013; 
Kissling 2011), the present study will take a functional approach to this question, taking into 
consideration the activities of inter-parliamentary institutions operating in the Circumpolar North. 
The first section will set the general context, highlighting the progressive recognition of the 
interparliamentary organizations and their importance in regional governance, as well as the particular 
challenges relating to their roles. The second section will outline the cases of the four organizations: 
the Nordic Council, the West-Nordic Council, the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians and the 
Barents Parliamentary Conference, touching on their differing backgrounds, scopes of tasks, and 
relationship to the Arctic Council, which remains the central cooperation forum in the region. Finally, 
the results of the analysis will be discussed and prospects for further development of the Arctic 
regional governance will be considered. 
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International parliamentary institutions in contemporary international relations 
Among the many signs of change in the modern-day international community, it is useful to highlight 
the gradual structural bifurcation in levels of governance. In other words, international relations today 
are a stage where two worlds coexist or even overlap – one state-centric, the other composed of 
transnational actors (Pietraś 2009). As Pietraś suggests, “Although both ‘worlds’ are integral 
components of the same international reality, there are many distinctive qualities that characterize each 
of them, underlining the structural hybridity of entities in the international realm” (Pietraś 2009: 32). 
This hybridity, coupled with ever more intensive transboundary relations, redefines and restructures 
interactions between states, ‘imposing’ and accelerating the development of mechanisms governing 
the international arena (Pietraś 2007). Some interesting consequences of this evolution include an 
increasingly ‘saturated’ international political scene and a progressive blurring of boundaries and 
borders, of differences between the intrastate and the interstate domain (Łoś-Nowak 2013: 49). 
Furthermore, Surmacz indicates that “a change in the distribution of power in international relations 
[resulting from the aforementioned processes] has resulted in parallel changes in the diplomatic 
realm,” which in turn has led to “the modern diplomatic community [becoming] akin to a series of 
interactions among both state and non-state actors representing interests that are organized both 
territorially and non-territorially, implementing both official and unofficial forms of diplomacy” 
(Surmacz 2013: 9). One example of this relatively new situation is the increasingly dynamic expansion 
of the international dimension in the activities of different national parliaments (Torbiörn 2007; 
Puzyna 2007), which Florczak-Wątor and Czarny believe has made “international cooperation input 
from parliaments a common phenomenon in the world today” (Florczak-Wątor, Czarny 2012: 45). 
The goal of this part of the paper is to synthesize fundamental conceptual approaches surrounding 
this modern-day development trend in international relations, highlight its versatility, and especially 
move toward a clearer notion of the processes behind the creation and operation of inter-
parliamentary institutions. 
Before delving into the structural characteristics of the international community that underlie the 
growing involvement of legislative bodies in creating foreign policy, it bears establishing that “a 
parliament is a … body organized under a state that is a legitimate subject of international law and, as 
such, engages in international legal relations with other similar subjects” (Florczak-Wątor, Czarny 
2012: 45). While this formulation could be considered a response to any potential questions as to the 
legitimacy and legal foundations for such activity on the part of parliamentarians, it is at once only a 
starting point for further clarifying discussion. Jaskiernia, for instance, asks, “How do we treat these 
activities of representatives of national legislatures in the realm of foreign affairs – as instances of 
‘parliamentary diplomacy’ or beyond?” (Jaskiernia 2013: 166). In pursuing the answer to this question 
it is worth noting at the outset that, for several decades now (though the specifics vary by country), 
“parliaments no longer limit themselves to making foreign policy, but also expand into executing it” 
(Florczak-Wątor & Czarny 2012: 45; Malamud & Stavridis 2011). As far as the extent of control over 
this area of policymaking is concerned, the clout and capacity of national parliaments have indeed 
increased. 
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Returning to the question of what exactly is the international activity of parliamentary institutions 
(often called ‘parliamentary diplomacy’ (Stavridis 2002)), the answer does not seem to be entirely 
straightforward, partly as a result of the diversity of forms and goals of engagement (Šabič 2008). As 
far as forms of engagement go, we distinguish cooperation on the level of (1) houses of parliament 
operating in pleno, (2) the chairs or speakers of these bodies, (3) parliamentary committees, and (4) 
bilateral parliamentary groups (Florczak-Wątor & Czarny 2012: 52). Puzyna has offered a different 
typology, according to which six types of entities can be distinguished within the scope of inter-
parliamentary cooperation: (1) conferences or assemblies with the participation of parliamentary 
leaders and/or Speakers; (2) inter-parliamentary assemblies or other forums; (3) conferences or 
meetings of leaders or parliamentary envoys from associated standing committees; (4) inter-
parliamentary organizations, associations, or official meetings among individual parliamentarians; (5) 
meetings of the General Secretaries of parliamentary offices or secretariats; and (6) meetings and 
networks composed of employees of secretariats or parliamentary offices (Puzyna 2007, p. 40). The 
first three of these can pertain to both bilateral and multilateral relations. The primary objectives of 
the international engagement of national legislatures include: (1) exploration and acquisition of 
information on international partners; (2) exchange of knowledge and experiences between the 
parliaments of different states and mutual improvement; (3) developing a network of contacts between 
parliamentarians and the elaboration of shared policy positions on the international arena (Florczak-
Wątor & Czarny 2012: 54). 
In Weisglas and de Boer’s estimation, the growing engagement of international parliamentarians also 
serves to strengthen three key aspects: (1) the legislature’s control over the activity of its respective 
government, (2) the democratic legitimization of intergovernmental institutions, and (3) maximum 
representation of voter interest (Weisglas & Boer 2007). Torbiörn goes so far as to state that 
parliamentary groups are an ‘oxygen tank’ in some international organizations (Torbiörn 2007: 32). 
Jaskiernia looks at the issue from a different angle, suggesting that members of national parliaments 
who take part in inter-parliamentary debates might sometimes exhibit a greater tendency toward 
following their own guiding principles in their stated opinions – but this does not always lead to 
“attenuation of conflicts, which often require a more pragmatic approach” (Jaskiernia 2013: 185). 
With respect to the geographical range of the cooperation spearheaded by international parliamentary 
institutions, we distinguish five varieties thereof: global, intercontinental, continental, interregional, 
and regional (Florczak-Wątor & Czarny 2012: 59). Florczak-Wątor and Czarny correctly point out that 
multilateral parliamentary cooperation:  
[I]s by definition general and broad, not specialized. It cannot simply be reduced to 
collaboration among parliaments and parliamentarians in one given domain of social 
life in each country. This is a result of the powers and competencies conferred to the 
legislative of each country in the wide realm of social issues. Irrespective of this, we 
generally encounter a degree of consistency in the level of priority attached to specific 
topics in specific forms of cooperation, as it is rather difficult to spontaneously 
undertake only the problems that are relevant in a given moment” (Florczak-Wątor & 
Czarny 2012: 59–60; Puig 2004).  
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Two more categories of cooperation can be distinguished by analyzing the international activity of 
different national parliaments: prescribed (when the activity stems from the provisions of an 
international treaty defining the participants’ roles in a given international entity) and optional (when 
the activity stems from the sovereign decisions of the parliamentarians) (Florczak-Wątor & Czarny 
2012: 60). In presenting this typology, it is also worth noting that inter-parliamentary cooperation can 
be self-generated (autonomous) or complementary (incorporated into the operations of a given 
organization) (Florczak-Wątor & Czarny 2012: 60). It can also be either consistent and 
institutionalized or temporary and provisional (Florczak-Wątor & Czarny 2012: 61). As shown above, 
the evolution of the international activity of parliamentary institutions is a highly complex process, 
which renders its evaluation difficult and the effectiveness of the institutions themselves problematic 
(Supranational parliamentary and interparliamentary assemblies in 21st century Europe 2007; 
Supranational parliamentary and interparliamentary assemblies in 21st century Europe 2007; Šabič 
2008: 261). 
At this juncture, I will focus on the most important of the many currents that come under this 
‘transnational parliamentarianism’ (Marschall 2007) – one which manifests itself in international 
parliamentary institutions, otherwise known as parliamentary assemblies. Its origins can be traced to 
the creation of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1899, though it was not until the 1940s and 1950s 
that it entered the phase of dynamic growth in which it remains today (Tedoldi 2014). The 1980s and 
1990s saw a significant increase in the overall number of parliamentary assemblies, which derived both 
from the end of long-standing Cold War rivalries and from accelerated European integration (Herranz 
2005) coupled with the march of globalization. Marschall points out that modern-day parliamentary 
assemblies, despite their European heritage, exist across the world, and will continue to proliferate 
even more dynamically outside of Europe in tandem with increasing regionalization and 
democratization (Marschall 2007: 3-4). 
Today, two of the basic qualities of parliamentary assemblies are the fact that they are composed of 
delegations from different national parliaments, and the fact that they pursue a consistent and 
institutionalized agenda, typically outlined in a charter or statute. Many parliamentary assemblies lift 
institutional approaches (e.g. in structure or manner of operation) that work effectively on the national 
level (Marschall 2007: 12). A large majority of assemblies are affiliated (though in different ways) with 
intergovernmental organizations, and many of them additionally form an integral part of the structures 
of other transnational institutions (Marschall 2007). This ‘tethering’ has an important effect on the 
range of issues they undertake, the effectiveness of their policy decisions, and the sway they hold over 
decision processes on both the national and international level. Marschall clarifies, however, that the 
real clout of parliamentary assemblies is manifested in their contribution to the development of 
multilevel parliamentarism (Marschall 2007), which is gaining importance in governance as it is 
envisioned by modern international relations (Jancic 2014; Crum, Fossum 2009). 
To round out these considerations on the various forms of international activity of parliamentary 
institutions, it should be noted that the legislatures of the Nordic countries have always played an 
active role in their development (Götz 2009, 2005). Close collaboration among the Nordic parliaments 
has been ongoing since the end of the 19th century, and in 1907 this collaboration was formalized in 
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the form of the Nordic branch of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, known as the Nordic Inter-
Parliamentary Union (Piotrowski 2006b). Subsequent phases of this collaboration enabled the creation 
of new institutions (Schouenborg 2012; Fasone 2013), including those that later get engaged in the 
Arctic region.  
Inter-parliamentary organisations in the Arctic  
In the Arctic, regionalization does not take place like it does elsewhere, hampered by the 
transcontinental nature of the region, low population density, sparse infrastructure, and its landscape 
of endless sea and ice (Łuszczuk 2013; Knecht 2013). These difficult conditions did not, however, 
prevent the states of the region from establishing inter-parliamentary cooperation in the Arctic 
immediately after Cold War rivalries started to fade. This process began among the Scandinavian 
countries, but subsequently spread to other corners of the Arctic (though with the Nordic countries 
still in a clear dominant role). 
The so-called ‘Scandinavian Parliament’ (Piotrowski 2006b: 107) has been a crucial component in the 
process of tightening cooperation among the countries of Northern Europe. Its initial incarnation was 
the Nordic Inter-Parliamentary Union, which first convened in 1907. It was under this entity that the 
countries decided, in 1951, to breathe life into the idea of a ‘pan-Nordic parliament’ (parliamentary 
council) composed of parliament members from individual Scandinavian countries as well as 
representatives of their respective governments. Further work on this project led to the adoption of a 
statute for a new Nordic Council. The subsequent evolution of the Council increased the number of 
participating countries (since 1970, the five Nordic countries have opened participation in sessions of 
the Nordic Council to include representatives from local parliaments in the Faroe and Åland Islands, 
while Greenland was invited in 1983) as well as ever greater diversity in the subject matter, but also 
had a structural-institutional aspect (e.g. in the creation of the Nordic Council of Ministers in 1971) 
(Piotrowski 2006a; Nowiak 2001). 
The results of the Nordic Council’s activity (both positive and negative) as well as the vast swathes of 
territory it covered paved the way to the creation of another inter-parliamentary assembly in 1985 – 
the West Nordic Council. At the same time, changes in geopolitical conditions in the region 
contributed to the diversification of contacts and connections within the region, eventually bringing 
about the establishment of the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians in 1993. However divergent the 
range and, in particular, the method of operation of each of these North European-dominated 
parliamentary institutions, each of them has, in its own way, expanded its level of engagement in Arctic 
issues in the first two decades of the 21st century.  
The Nordic Council 
Given that the genesis of the modern Nordic Council is strictly tied to the international engagements 
of parliamentarians from individual Scandinavian countries, it should not come as a surprise that, from 
the outset and until the creation of the Nordic Council of Ministers in 1971, the primary operational 
body of the Nordic Council was the parliamentary assembly (Piotrowski 2006a). The group of 87 
delegates from eight national parliaments and governments make up its current incarnation, though 
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governmental representatives are not given the right to vote. The assembly traditionally convenes 
annually for regular sessions (5-10 days in the capital of each successive member state), with additional 
special sessions organized when necessary. The delegates are arranged in their seats alphabetically by 
last name, and each of them is entitled to one vote. The parliamentary assembly of the Nordic Council 
passes non-binding recommendations and statements addressed to national governments and the 
Nordic Council of Ministers; the sessions typically feature debates on issues raised by the governments 
that make up the Nordic Council. Representatives of the Nordic Council are at once delegates to the 
Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference, the Barents Parliamentary Conference (BPC), and the 
Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians. 
The Nordic Council’s interest in the Arctic region, which after all represents a considerable portion 
of their collective land mass and territorial waters, was not initially a key area of focus for the Council, 
whether at the external or the internal level. At most, it fell into broader operations and policy 
initiatives such as environmental protection or fomenting forms of regional cooperation in the Arctic 
(e.g. through providing an initial stimulus for the creation of the CPAR) (Bohlin 2010: 28). For all the 
activity described above, the Nordic Council only initiated its Arctic Co-operation Programme in 1996 
and has been systematically expanding it since then in organizational,1 financial,2 and functional (areas 
of interest) terms (Stokke 2007). It should be clearly noted here that the chief body responsible for 
the Nordic Council’s engagement in the Arctic is the Nordic Council of Ministers, which has held 
Observer status with the Arctic Council since 2000. In this case, the role of the parliamentary assembly 
of the Nordic Council is to provide support to the Council of Ministers via active participation in 
drafting successive versions of the Arctic Co-operation Programme during the assembly’s special 
sessions3 as well as practical input into the debates held during the Arctic Council’s conferences on 
the Arctic region.4 It is possible that one way in which the Nordic Council’s parliamentarians could 
get further involved in the near future could be in creating a common Nordic strategy for the Arctic; 
the intent to do so was accepted by the Presidium of the Nordic Council in 2013 (Nordic Council 
2013). 
Furthermore, the Nordic Council may have an important input in the future pathways of parliamentary 
diplomacy in the Arctic.5  In this respect, Annika B. Rosamund suggests an interesting scenario where 
the Nordic Council could play the role of a mediator between the Arctic Council and the European 
Union (Bergman Rosamond 2011: 26). This development seems relatively plausible given that 
cooperation between the different parliamentary assemblies (NC, EP, and CPAR) has been ongoing 
and free of major complications for the last several years (European Parliament 2009; Ojanen 2004). 
The West Nordic Council 
The West Nordic Council was founded in 1985, during a meeting in Nuuk, as the West Nordic 
Parliamentarian Council of Cooperation. It is composed of representatives from Iceland and two 
autonomous territories of the Kingdom of Denmark: Greenland and the Faroe Islands. According to 
Nielsson, the factors that came into play in the decision to create the Council included, on the one 
hand, the ever-greater sovereignty of the Danish territories, and on the other, the myriad similarities 
that linked these three countries, strewn as they are across the wide expanse that divides Europe and 
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North America (Nielsson 2014; Eyþórsson & Hovgaard 2013). It is pertinent to add that the political, 
economic, and sociocultural ties between the other Nordic countries and Iceland, Greenland, and the 
Faroe Islands gradually unraveled in the post-war period, which at once generated aspirations among 
them to play a more independent, self-representing role, perhaps not yet on a fully international level, 
but at least insofar as Nordic cooperation was concerned. One argument that supports this assessment 
is the agreement signed between the Nordic Council and the West Nordic Council on the terms of 
cooperation between these two assemblies (Nordic Council 2006); other authors point out the 
reluctance and distrust of these countries towards the European Union (Bailes 2014). 
In 1997, the Council was renamed the West Nordic Council, its statute was revamped and expanded, 
and the mechanisms of cooperation were extended from just the sociocultural to the political and 
economic spheres (Nielsson 2014). Today, the West Nordic Council encapsulates its objectives in five 
points: (1) to promote West Nordic (or North Atlantic) interests; (2) to protect and preserve the 
resources and culture of the North Atlantic and support West Nordic governments in promoting their 
interests, beyond such vital concerns as resource management and pollution; (3) to sustain and expand 
West Nordic intergovernmental cooperation; (4) to cooperate with the Nordic Council and act as an 
intermediary in overall Nordic cooperation; and (5) to act as a parliamentary intermediary for other 
West Nordic organizations, participating in parliamentary cooperation across the Arctic region (West 
Nordic Council 2015). 
The Council is made up of 18 members (6 delegates from each country), and its focus and direction 
are indicated by a three-member presidium augmented by the Council secretariat, based in Reykjavik. 
The West Nordic Council convenes twice a year – once for a general plenary session, which elects the 
presidium for a one-year term, and once for a special session dedicated to a topic considered important 
to the interests of the West Nordic community. These assemblies typically produce joint 
recommendations, which are then conveyed to the parliaments of the three member states for 
discussion, and eventually find their way to the governments of each. Nielsson points out that the 
recommendations made by the West Nordic Council in recent years have touched on a variety of 
issues, though many of them had a distinct Arctic dimension, e.g. issues of resources and 
transportation, environmental protection, or international relations (Nielsson 2014). 
The issue of greater participation in cooperation on matters pertaining to the Arctic was taken up by 
the West Nordic Council relatively late, namely at in the early 2010s (Hovgaard & Eythórsson 2013). 
In 2012, following a scientific conference on the geopolitical conditions surrounding West Nordic 
cooperation, the Council adopted a resolution that encouraged the governments of the three countries 
to promote cooperation in matters of the Arctic as well as evaluate the possibility of designing a 
common Arctic strategy. 
Several months later, during the Council’s session in Narsarsuag, Greenland, the parliamentarians 
decided to prepare a tentative analysis of this issue. The conclusions were as follows: (1) a common 
West Nordic Arctic policy would strengthen regional cooperation and bolster the West Nordic states’ 
international standing; (2) economic cooperation gives these three countries promising perspectives, 
and should be geared toward an eventual free trade agreement as well as a common economic zone; 
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and (3) the West Nordic countries should jointly strive for international support for their plans, e.g. 
by attracting foreign investors. 
The issue of a common strategy on the Arctic and the reinforcement of the relative standing of the 
three West Nordic countries was a subject of debate during the 2014 session of the West Nordic 
Council, which took place in Reykjavik in mid-September 2014 (Ryggi 2014). As a result, the Council 
communicated a request to the governments of Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands to develop 
such a strategy (Konradsdóttir & Nielsson 2014). This matter has been also expected to top the list of 
topics of discussion at the next session of the West Nordic Council in 2015 (Ryggi 2014). It would 
appear that the spheres of operation that could create a foundation for a common Arctic policy among 
these three countries include: extraction of energy resources, natural resource management, 
development of transport infrastructure, and the promotion of tourism. A real step in the direction of 
strengthening the position of the West Nordic countries in Arctic cooperation was the West Nordic 
Council’s petition for Observer status with the Arctic Council, made in August 2013. 
The Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians (CPAR) 
Another of the institutions selected for this analysis – but one focused strictly and exclusively on the 
Arctic region as a whole – is the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians (CPAR), which takes place 
every two years (Puig 2008: 99). Its roots can be found in the conference organized by the Nordic 
Council in Reykjavik on August 17, 1993 (The Nordic Council's International Conference for 
Parliamentarians on Development and Protection of the Arctic region 1993). The announcement 
made after the conference had declared the creation of a new body – the Standing Committee of 
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region. The Committee began operations in September 1994; its 
members met three or four times a year to discuss the current situation in the region as well as to 
evaluate the impact of previous announcements and resolutions promulgated by the Conference. The 
first role of the Committee was to support the initiative to create the Arctic Council.6 Once this 
formally occurred in 1996, the Standing Committee took the role of an Observer entity (formally from 
1998). The members of the Standing Committee also function jointly to represent Arctic interests as 
Observers in the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) (Langlais 2000: 28). In 1999, the Committee 
drafted and recognized its own overall rules and regulations, and the rules of the Conference were also 
laid out (Langlais 2000: 29). 
Meetings of the Conference are attended by delegations from the parliaments of the eight Arctic states 
as well as the European Parliament, while the proceedings also feature input from ‘Permanent 
Representatives’ of organizations that represent the indigenous peoples of the Arctic as well as envoys 
from different international organizations or Observer countries of the Arctic Council. In recent years, 
both the Conference and the Standing Committee are clearly involving themselves in deliberations on 
shipping, education and social development, as well as climate change in the Arctic. In the Declaration 
of the participants of the 11th (and most recent) Conference, which took place on September 9-11, 
2014 in the Canadian town of Whitehorse, a number of additional areas of interest were indicated, 
including: (1) infrastructure for balanced development, (2) management models and decision 
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processes, (3) economic development, resource extraction, and building potential in the High North, 
and (4) new challenges in environmental protection in the Arctic. 
A summary evaluation of the roles and capabilities of the Conference and the Standing Committee of 
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, we must inevitably note that while these institutions indirectly 
enjoy indirect popular legitimacy and a ‘social mandate’ in Arctic affairs, their role in the Arctic Council 
is largely limited to that of observers, not inspirers, pacesetters, or commanders. One expression of 
this relatively weak position is the proposal to organize meetings of the Conference not every two 
years, but annually, which would allow greater flexibility and clout in its relations with the Arctic 
Council. The fact remains, however, that relations are sometimes strained, difficult, and hardly 
congenial, as evidenced in the barring of Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) from participating in the 
Conference in March 2014 (CPAR 2014). It seems that this is not only a symptom of the 
‘intergovernmentalization’ of cooperation in the Arctic, but also a sign of narrowing possibilities of 
open debate on the future of the Arctic through the vehicle of the Arctic Council. 
The Barents Parliamentary Conference 
Although cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region has developed since 1993 primarily on two 
levels – intergovernmental (Barents Euro-Arctic Council – BEAC) and inter-regional (Barents 
Regional Council – BRC) – it also encompasses the interparliamentary dimension, as each BEAC 
chairmanship organizes a Barents Parliamentary Conference (International Barents Secretariat 2015; 
Hasanat 2010). Because the chairmanships run on two-year periods, the parliamentary conference 
takes place biennially. The participants of the Conference can be elected members of local and regional 
as well as national and indigenous peoples’ assemblies in the Barents Region (International Barents 
Secretariat 2015).  
At their meetings, the representatives focus on “topical issues and practical aspects of cooperation for 
further consideration by national and regional executive bodies” (International Barents Secretariat 
2013). These debates are usually concentrated around such topics as: health and social well-being, the 
rights and traditional livelihoods of indigenous peoples, environmental protection, and strengthened 
cooperation in the region in the realm of culture, education, and economy (Barentsobserver 2009). 
The first meeting of the Barents parliamentarians – called also the Barents Forum – was held in 
Kirkenes in 1997. Interestingly, although the first conference was organized in 1999 in Alta, the 
following one was held six years later, in 2005, in Bodø. 
During the 6th Barents Parliamentary Conference, which took place in April 2013 in Harstad, Norway, 
“the parliamentarians decided to include representatives from the Barents parliamentary cooperation 
in the delegations to the BEAC ministerial meetings and to the meetings at the Regional Council and 
Committee levels” (International Barents Secretariat 2013). They also recommended that the national 
and regional governments of the Barents region strengthen the ties between the intergovernmental 
entities as well as their corresponding parliamentary assemblies and bodies (Barents Parliamentary 
Conference 2013). This development does not denote any immediate and significant change of 
position of the Conference in the cooperation structures of the Barents region. It still remains a forum 
of debate, although in some documents it is also named as one of “the two key forums for Arctic 
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interparliamentary cooperation” (Thórdarson & Gallagher 2013). Since the Barents region is a sub-
region of the Arctic, virtually all discussion taking place during the Conference meetings are relevant 
for the Arctic. At the same time, without any standing body, the Barents Parliamentary Conference 
has no formal and working relations with the Arctic Council, and the representatives of the latter are 
just participants of the conferences. 
According to Ari Sirén, former Head of the International Barents Secretariat: 
In spite of the fact that political issues are not dealt with by the Barents Cooperation, 
a political instrument in the form of biennial parliamentary conferences is nevertheless 
significant. Taking into consideration the increasing international role of Arctic 
cooperation the parliamentarians from member states could perhaps discuss Barents-
related issues more often. Brainstorming is, after all, needed when coming up with 
good idea (Sirén 2012). 
Conclusions 
To summarize the findings and reflections presented in this paper, firstly, there are many differences 
in the foundations and level of engagement of the four assemblies in cooperation on matters of the 
Arctic. The institutions in question were formed at different stages of development of Arctic 
cooperation, while for two of them – the Nordic Council and the West Nordic Council – the Arctic 
region became only one of many areas of interest, and did not even gain immediate priority when the 
respective Councils were created. The Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians represents the opposite 
case, where exclusively Arctic issues were in the spotlight from the outset. The Barents Parliamentary 
Forum’s attention is focused mainly on a part of the European sector of the Arctic region; moreover, 
its activities have reflected the ups and downs of the Barents cooperation. 
This complex situation of the four institutions under scrutiny here has its impact on the differential 
degrees of activity of the different assemblies with respect to issues affecting the region, as well as 
their different roles in the Arctic governance system. One interesting feature of all four institutions is 
their openness to mutual contact, collaboration, and effectively warmer relations. This supports the 
notion that parliamentary diplomacy in the Arctic is an attractive and dynamic form of regional 
cooperation that elicits great interest from its participants, with the willing engagement of individual 
parliamentarians as the glue that binds them together. Finally, out of the four assemblies, only the 
Standing Committee of the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians possesses the authority to 
contribute to the proceedings of the Arctic Council as an Observer; the West Nordic Council is only 
in the process of petitioning for this status, while neither the Nordic Council nor the Barents 
Parliamentary Forum seem interested in applying for it. 
The varying degree of participation of each of the institutions in Arctic cooperation does not indicate 
any vital role of the ‘Nordic dimension’ in ensuring their continued success and activity. What is more, 
a breakdown of the motivations underlying each institution creates the impression that only the 
Nordic Council is truly interested in chiseling out common Nordic responses to questions affecting 
the Arctic. At the same time, it is difficult to estimate the extent to which its resolutions and 
recommendations have even a marginal, indirect effect on the operations of the Arctic Council. Jointly, 
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they may constitute a step towards a common Nordic strategy on the Arctic. With respect to the West 
Nordic Council, it is possible to draw the conclusion that it does not simply promote the ‘West Nordic 
lobby’ or detached positions benefiting the West Nordic nations, but rather genuinely protects the 
interests of its member states in the Arctic. At the same time, in many cases the key areas of operation 
of these four assemblies with regard to the Arctic are similarly perceived and managed. 
In analyzing these four parliamentary assemblies and their cooperation in the Arctic as a proxy for the 
roles these kinds of institutions play in contemporary international relations, three issues are worth 
pointing out. First, they are indeed ‘messengers’ voicing the opinions and interests of publics, and as 
such, they can ensure the democratic legitimacy of decisions made on a supranational level, often 
regarding transborder issues. The weight of democratic legitimacy in the overall process, however, is 
a separate issue. Second, through their familiarity with many pertinent issues from a practical 
perspective, parliamentarians working in inter-parliamentary institutions can have valuable inputs 
infused with a unique understanding of international relations, and useful for making optimal 
decisions. Third, it is in evidence that parliamentary diplomacy is now a mature phenomenon – one 
inscribed in the mechanisms of contemporary international relations – and its further development 
may make for an interesting ‘counterweight’ to inter-governmental diplomacy on the one hand, and 
different modern-day forms of ‘paradiplomacy’ on the other. 
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Notes 
1. For example, an Advisory Expert Committee was established in 2002, comprising Nordic 
members of the Arctic Council and envoys from the autonomous territories (Nordic Council 
of Ministers 2015a). Defining the specifics of the Programme and the evaluating its results are 
the responsibility of the Nordic Working Group on Sustainable Regional Development in the 
Arctic (Nordregio 2015). 
2. The funds allocated by the Programme in 1996 amounted to 1 million Danish crowns; in 2009, 
it was 8 million; and today it stands at 10 million (Nordic Council of Ministers 2015b). Since 
2009, the research institute Nordregio has been in charge of managing the Programmes. 
3. This was the case in 2012, during a special session that was held on March 23, in Iceland 
(Nordic Council 2012). Another debate of this kind took place at the 66th Session of the Nordic 
Council in late October 2014, in Stockholm ( Nordic Council 2014).  
4. The Nordic Council has already organized several conferences and seminars on Arctic issues, 
including “Common Concern for the Arctic” in 2008, “Arctic – Changing Realities” in 2010, 
and “An Arctic Agenda” in 2011. 
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5. One interesting example of cooperation among the parliamentary assemblies is the fact that 
the Arctic Co-operation Programme for 2009 was consulted with the Sami parliaments 
(Bergman Rosamond 2011: 25). 
6. The declaration made by the Second Conference, which took place in March 1996 in the 
Canadian city of Yellowknife, the tasks of the Standing Committee were to include: (1) 
monitoring the execution of recommendations and responsiveness of governments and 
international organizations to the requests of the Conference, (2) observing the process of 
consolidation of the Arctic Council and ensure an appropriate role and level of participation 
for parliamentarians in its work, and (3) probing for future forms of interparliamentary 
cooperation among the Arctic states and reporting on this topic at the following Conference 
(Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region 1996). 
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Governance of Arctic Offshore Oil & Gas Activities:  
Multilevel Governance & Legal Pluralism at Stake 
 
 
Cécile Pelaudeix 
 
 
This article analyses the governance process of offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic with the concept of multilevel governance 
and legal pluralism to address both issues of management of the environment and public participation. The analysis goes beyond the 
single issue of fragmentation pertaining to the international and supranational levels, to encompass national and regional levels and 
evaluate how the interactions between those levels structure the policy process and impact the efficiency of environmental management 
and public participation.  
Four paths of reflection arise from the analysis. First it is unlikely that a dualistic vision opposing a normative option and an 
enabling option opens new avenues for solutions but the evolution of international law and customary international law deserves 
attention and a certain level of harmonisation may be welcome, for instance to cooperate efficiently on the prevention of an oil spill 
and the response to it. A second path relates to the institutional settings and proposes considering the stress lines pertaining to the 
entanglement of public and indigenous rights and authorities and the consequences at the local level. A third path suggests options 
pertaining to contract law to not only optimise the operator-regulator interface, but also more generally to offer a stable framework 
for inclusive dialogue between actors. In the end, the analysis of the rationale for engaging in offshore activities in the Arctic region, 
from a state perspective and from regional government, indigenous shareholders and corporation perspectives, could be helpful in 
providing relevant actors with arguments to weigh the decision on seismic and drilling activities in relation to risk acceptance. 
 
 
The concept of governance, which first emerged in the field of public policy, entered the field of 
international relations to allow the analysis of decision-making processes in societies as they become 
more complex, and to highlight the role of non-state actors in the mechanism of political regulation. 
As a concept underlying the fact that state governments no longer possess a monopoly on legitimate 
authority, how should the governance of offshore hydrocarbon activities be analysed when states 
usually retain jurisdiction over these activities? The question is of particular relevance in the Arctic 
region, which is impacted by globalisation mechanisms including the expansion of international law, 
which creates obligations on state parties and exercises a normative pressure on non-state parties, and 
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which is also impacted by devolution processes to the benefit of territorial governments and other 
sub-national actors. 
The governance of offshore activities in the Arctic has been mainly studied with regard to international 
law (Johnstone 2015) and the issue of fragmentation (Koivurova & Hossain 2008, Humrich 2013). 
Fragmentation is defined as “the division of legal systems in various sectors, each of them having its 
own goal and values that can contradict with other branches of international law” (Koivurova 2014: 
7), and the issue has triggered academic debates on the creation of an overarching international regime 
– the necessity of which the five Arctic coastal states denied in 2008 (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). 
Various analytical paths have emerged favouring a normative, critical, functional or pragmatic 
approach of governance (Pelaudeix 2014, Humrich 2013, Young 2011, Koivurova & Molenaar 2009). 
The aim of this article is to provide an evaluation of governance that goes beyond the single issue of 
fragmentation pertaining to the international and supranational levels, to encompass national and 
regional levels and analyse how the interactions between those levels structure the policy process and 
impact the efficiency of environmental management and public participation. 
The Arctic region is characterised by particularly vulnerable ecosystems which are already under 
pressure of ongoing changes, which include warming and economic development (CAFF 2013), and 
by the presence of indigenous coastal communities who rely on marine species as a means of 
subsistence leading to the question of their participation in consultation and decision-making.1 Indeed, 
the Arctic region presents huge challenges for offshore exploitation owing to extreme natural-climate 
conditions (icing, icebergs, ice floes, high winds, darkness), to remoteness of the region from basic 
infrastructure, and the low sustainability of the region’s ecosystems. To properly address the risks of 
oil spill but also environmental consequences of offshore drilling, there is still a need for increased 
scientific knowledge, and progress in technology, in particular the modeling of offshore drilling 
activity, local weather forecasting, observing and monitoring sea-ice and icebergs mobility, oil spill 
detection in ice-affected waters and oil fate in sea ice (Barber et al. 2014a, Barber et al. 2014b).  
While the Arctic is said to hold immense reserves of gas and petrol2 and while some reserves are 
depleting in conventional fields – like the Prudhoe onshore field in Alaska, or in the North Atlantic – 
Arctic states are looking up north for offshore potential, including in the deep offshore. Arctic 
offshore exploitation has already begun in Norway (Snøhvit field, Barents Sea) and in Russia 
(Prirazlomnaye field, Pechora Sea), and exploration is taking place in many areas in the US, Canada, 
and Greenland.  
In the present analysis, governance is understood with reference to the definition of the Commission 
on Global Governance, which characterises governance as “the sum of many ways individuals and 
institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which 
conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action taken. It includes 
formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements 
that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest” (Commission on 
Global Governance 1995: 4).  
Offshore governance in the Arctic involves many different actors: states, international law and regional 
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agreements, territorial governments, advisory bodies, governmental agencies, corporations, 
organisations representing indigenous peoples and non-governmental associations (NGOs), for 
instance. The article analyses the governance process to address both issues of management of the 
environment and public participation. It does not focus on a gap analysis, even though some 
shortcomings are highlighted. To answer these questions, the analysis also relies on the concept of 
multilevel governance (MLG). As an analytical tool, MLG allows one to tackle the overlapping 
competencies among levels of governments and the interaction of various actors (across those levels).  
Various levels of jurisdiction are involved in the offshore oil and gas activities and the analysis focuses 
on cases where regional governments are in place – for instance in Greenland, where the government 
has taken responsibility over offshore activities in the EEZ, or in Nunavut, which has no offshore 
jurisdiction but where Inuit rights are protected through various mechanisms.  
Acknowledging the importance of the legal dimension of governance, the analysis also refers to the 
concept of legal pluralism which indicates that we inhabit a world of multiple normative communities 
(Zumbansen 2011; Callies & Renner 2009). Normative communities include the nation-state 
governments and courts familiar to legal scholars, but many other normative communities articulate 
norms without formal state power behind them. Indeed, many actors from the private sectors 
(including transnational corporations) as well as NGOs can also design norms and values in the 
offshore activities, potentially leading to a situation of legal pluralism where legal systems overlap 
(Berman 2007). Pluralism is conceived here principally as a descriptive, not a normative, framework 
to study the interplay of norms, and it does not propose a hierarchy of substantive norms and values 
(Berman 2007: 1166).  
The article is structured in three parts: it first deals with interactions of authorities between the national 
level (state) on one hand, and the international and supranational levels (international law and the EU) 
on the other hand. The second part analyses multilevel governance cases involving national and 
regional (sub-state) authorities. In a third part, the role of non-governmental actors such as companies 
and NGOs in governance processes is assessed at both international and national levels. The article 
concludes with suggestions on paths to improve the efficiency of environment management and 
public participation.  
Interactions between national level and international/supranational level  
Fragmentation of international law 
Offshore activities take place in the EEZ or on the continental shelf of Arctic coastal states, where 
under UNCLOS states enjoy sovereign rights over resources (article 56 and article 77) and their 
domestic legislation applies to activities in their own area. These sovereign rights carry with them the 
duty of due regard for the rights and duties of other states (article 56) and minimum standards to 
protect and preserve the marine environment (articles 192 and 193). In addition to domestic law, and 
although no international convention is dedicated to offshore oil and gas activities, many international 
rules and international or regional agreements apply to the EEZ in the Arctic region when it comes 
to pollution at sea. 
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Difficulties arise from the diversification and expansion of international law (Koskenniemi 2006) and 
this is particularly true for environmental conventions and protocols. When it comes to offshore 
exploitation, no international agreement with all the Arctic states as parties exist, but international 
rules and international or regional agreements apply to the Arctic region (e.g. with regard to pollution 
caused by shipping: MARPOL 73/78, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships and the Polar Code).  
This situation leads to the issue of fragmentation of law, geographically or functionally limited treaty 
systems potentially creating not only gaps but also problems of consistency. The UNCLOS provides 
applicable legal principles which are fairly general and vague (Koivurova & Hossain 2008), the OSPAR 
convention for the protection of the marine environment of the Northeast Atlantic covers pollution 
from offshore sources (article 5), but geographically it only covers the North-East Atlantic (and half 
of Greenland). It is ratified by three of the European Arctic states (Norway, Iceland and Denmark 
including Greenland), but Russia is not a party. Another example of the limited duties ascribed to state 
parties is the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 
1990 (OPRC) which does not require that states meet minimal requirements concerning the 
positioning and deployment of oil spill equipment and personnel (Byers & Stoller 2013).  
The issue of international law and offshore hydrocarbon activities has been well documented 
(Johnstone 2015, Byers 2013). This includes the issue of ratification – for instance the Espoo 
Convention that sets out the obligations of parties to assess the environmental impact of activities at an 
early stage of planning is poorly ratified in the Arctic – or legal uncertainties pertaining to sovereign 
rights claims (in Svalbard or the Beaufort Sea for instance). I will thus focus on recent treaties. 
The Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response (2013) signed 
by the Arctic states and the Faroe Islands under the auspices of the Arctic Council stands as an 
essential agreement for a coordinated response between Arctic states. It is yet considered a “weak and 
incomplete response” to the risks associated with Arctic offshore oil (Byers & Stoller 2013) on the 
grounds that it does not create any new obligations to existing regulations. In addition, the 
implementation of the agreement is subject to the capabilities of the parties to the agreement and the 
availability of relevant resources (article 15). A state could thus meet its obligations of due diligence 
without spending the funds necessary for actual preparedness. Moreover, the outcome of disputes 
between parties under the agreement is basically unenforceable: indeed, disputes arising between states 
“shall be settled by direct consultations”; “no weaker provision could have been drafted” (Johnstone 
2015: 161).  
The adoption of the Polar Code (International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters 2015) by the 
IMO in May 2015 leaves some uncertainties. What happens when the regulation is less strict than 
domestic norms? For instance, the carriage and use of heavy fuel, which is banned in Antarctica 
(regulation 43 of MARPOL Annex I) is not banned in the Arctic, where shipping activity has increased 
in the Northern Sea Route. A recommendation in the Polar Code “encourages the application of 
regulation 43 in Arctic waters” (Polar Code 2014).3 Norway imposes a ban on the use of heavy fuel 
oil in some areas around Svalbard (AECO 2015). The new EU Directive (2012/33/EU) as regards 
the sulphur content of marine fuels4 follows the MARPOL Annex VI to reduce the transport of heavy 
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fuels and the sulphur emission from shipping, which harms human health and the environment and 
contributes to acid deposition. Both rules have different obligations in regional areas: the obligations 
are not strong in the Arctic area where the Polar Code applies, but are stronger in the North Sea under 
Directive 2012/33/EU which, on the initiative of the EU is categorised as an Emission Control Area 
(ECA), whereas the North Atlantic is not an ECA. These obligations regarding the maximum sulphur 
content of heavy fuel oil and gas are implemented in Danish law.5  
The coexistence of many regulations results in a very patchy regulatory framework to manage air 
pollution in the Arctic. But the long-range transport of pollutants is already affecting the region, and 
recent studies show that sulphur particles not only have a negative impact but also function as a 
transport container for black carbon in the Arctic (Massling et al. 2015). 
Interpretation of law and political settings 
In addition to the fragmentation of law, difficulties in managing the environment also arise from 
differences in the interpretation of law. As indicated with the example of sulphur emission, some 
Arctic coastal states share their legal authority with the European Union through the Agreement on 
the European Economic Area (1994) or as members of the Union. The migration of different legal 
and social norms as well as legal practices across territorial boundaries does have an impact on the 
governance system. Even though it is specifically designed to have EEA relevance, Norway has 
deemed that the EU Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on the 
safety of offshore oil and gas operations – the Offshore Directive (European Parliament and Council 
2013) – does not apply to its EEZ. Norway argues that the EEA does not extend to the EEZ, and 
that the Norwegian security policy is stricter than that of the EU (The Nordic Page 2013). The deadline 
for implementation was 19 July 2015. 
As an EU member state, Denmark has to transpose EU law in its legislation. The implementation of 
the Directive on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations (2013/30/EU) was carried out in 
Denmark by amending several existing Danish acts, including the Environmental Marine Protection 
Act.6 A new Section 34b of the Environmental Marine Protection Act rules on the prevention of 
major accidents by a public risk management planning. None of these rules cover the marine areas 
around Greenland (Basse 2014). Greenland has taken responsibility for offshore activities in the EEZ, 
but has not taken responsibility for the protection of the marine environment beyond its territorial 
sea. The Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic 
stipulates that Greenland is responsible for responding to oil spills at sea wherever they occur, but 
only Denmark (and the Faroe Islands) – and not Greenland – has signed this agreement.  
More generally, the extent to which EU environmental law covers the EEZ around Greenland should 
be thoroughly examined (Pelaudeix in press). This also includes the strategy for the marine environment 
which relies on a Directive (2008/56/EC) that establishes a common framework and objectives for 
the protection and conservation of the marine environment as this directive has been implemented by 
the above-mentioned Environmental Marine Protection Act – but with only the 2004 version covering 
Greenland.  
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Public and indigenous participation: accession, ratification and interpretation 
Several international legal instruments are relevant when it comes to public and indigenous peoples 
participating in consultation processes or decision-making related to offshore oil and gas activities: the 
UNDRIP and the Aarhus Convention are two of these instruments, and they incite various interests 
amongst Arctic states. In the Aarhus Convention, which aims at guaranteeing access to information, 
public participation and access to justice in environmental matters, Denmark made a reservation for 
Greenland. Whereas the Self-Rule government of Greenland has competences over the development 
of natural resources, and whereas the content, form and practice of consultation processes are 
criticised in Greenland (Olsen & Hansen 2014), this reservation was questioned in the Greenlandic 
Parliament. The Self-Rule government consequently commissioned a report to assess the conditions 
under which Greenland could accede to the Convention. A 199-page report was submitted to the 
government of Greenland in May 2014 and should be presented to the parliament. In June 2014, the 
government of Greenland proposed amendments to the 2009 Mineral Resources Act in order to 
reduce public access to documents for the purpose of making decisions pursuant to the Act. Finally, 
after much concern in Greenland about the issue, the restriction of access has been removed from the 
proposed amendments on pre-consultation and consultation. 
Canada endorsed the UNDRIP in 2010 and announced it would do it “in a manner fully consistent 
with Canada’s Constitution and laws” (Canada 2010). This conditional endorsement has been critically 
analysed by legal scholars as being inconsistent with the principle of good governance; Joffe deems it 
undermines the status of this vital instrument and prevents its application whereas the “Declaration 
can be effectively used in litigation in Canadian courts” (Joffe 2010).  
Recently, a case was brought before the Supreme Court of Canada regarding seismic tests in Nunavut. 
The Hamlet Council of Clyde River, its Mayor and the Hunters and Trappers Organization-Clyde 
River tried to reverse a 2014 National Energy Board (NEB) decision to allow a consortium of three 
seismic companies7 to survey in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait, to determine if there is any potential for 
oil and gas extraction (Federal Court of Appeal 2014). The plaintiffs argued that seismic tests could 
impact upon marine mammals which the Inuit rely on for subsistence.  
The rights of indigenous peoples are protected in Canada in the Constitution and through court 
decisions, as developed further in the second part of the article dealing with interactions between the 
federal and territorial level in Nunavut. In the case of Clyde River, the judge, who did not cite the 
UNDRIP, concluded on the issue of consultation that the Crown had fulfilled its duty to consult and 
the consultation was properly conducted: “The consultation process does not dictate a particular 
substantive outcome. Thus, the consultation process does not give Aboriginal groups a veto over what 
can be done with land pending proof of their claim. Nor does consultation equate to a duty to agree.”8 
The judge dismissed the application for judicial review. 
By contrast, the UNDRIP contains provisions on reaching the consent of indigenous peoples. Article 
19 indicates that the consultation should result in a “free, prior and informed consent before adopting 
and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.” Some legal scholars 
deem that due to the normative pressures from the international community, the non-consideration 
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of UNDRIP might change. Koivurova and Stepien (2011) are of the opinion that “the Canadian 
position that the UN Declaration does not codify customary international law will be called into 
question”. 
This first part of the article has shown that not only legal fragmentation but also legal interpretation 
is at stake, and that the effective implementation of existing regulations and norms is challenging. The 
next part deals with the interactions between national level and regional level, where legal pluralism 
and multi-level governance are at stake in the governance of offshore oil and gas activities.   
National and regional levels 
Aboriginal self-government as a means to institutionalize an Aboriginal voice in the Canadian federal 
system can create complex government arrangements (Rodon 2014). Multi-level governance in the 
Canadian territories involves several jurisdictions (local, territorial/provincial and federal). Inuit rights 
are well-anchored in Canadian law, in the Constitution under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act 
which recognises the existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, 
through Supreme Court decisions according to which the Crown has a duty to consult (Haida and 
Taku River decisions in 2004, the Mikisew Cree decision in 2005, and in the more recent decisions of 
Rio Tinto and Little Salmon Carmacks 2010).9 Inuit rights are also protected through settled land claim 
agreements which are treaty based. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) for example 
provides in its preamble that the parties agree on the objectives “to provide for certainty and clarity 
of rights to ownership and use of lands and resources and of rights for Inuit to participate in decision-
making concerning the use, management and conservation of land, water and resources, including the 
offshore” (NLCA 1993). The territorial government of Nunavut is negotiating a devolution agreement 
for land and resources management with the federal government: the federal government has full 
jurisdiction of land and resource development in Nunavut, but the Crown has a duty to consult.  
Still in 2010, the Qikiqtani Inuit Association (QIA) brought a case before the Court to stop seismic 
tests in the Lancaster Sound because of the major potential impacts on the marine mammals that Inuit 
rely on for subsistence. The QIA is a regional association affiliated with Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. 
(NTI), the legal representative of the Inuit of Nunavut, a non-profit corporation established to ensure 
that the NLCA is fully implemented by the government of Canada and the government of Nunavut. 
The QIA has authority to commence actions on behalf of the beneficiaries of the NLCA. The seismic 
tests were approved by the federal government and the territorial government, the latter through two 
agencies, the Nunavut Research Institute and the Nunavut Impact Review Board. The QIA alleged 
that the federal government and the government of Nunavut failed to meet their constitutional and 
common-law duties to consult. The judge of the Nunavut Court of Justice reminded the court that 
the duty to consult does not mean a duty to reach an agreement or a veto right on government 
decisions (Nunavut Court of Justice 2010). She considered that at this stage the true nature or the 
value of the consultations that did take place could not be determined – but that there were serious 
issues to be addressed. Even so, the injunction stated that the potential for significant harm that the 
testing posed to the Inuit was greater than the losses that would be incurred if the injunction was 
granted and the testing was not completed as scheduled (Nunavut Court of Justice 2010).10 
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In 2015, five years later, another case, as mentioned in the first part of this article,11 was brought before 
the Federal Court of Appeal, and the ruling resulted in a different decision. In the first part of the 
article I raised the issue of the application of UNDRIP in answering the issue of the requirement for 
adequate consultation in that particular case. Another issue, out of a total of four, was addressed in 
this case: do the applicants have the standing to bring the application? If one connects this issue with 
domestic law, it can be related to the interactions between national (federal) and regional (territorial) 
level, and the empowerment of public and ethnic local institutions. The lawyers for the consortium, 
as well as the Crown, argued against the applicant’s right to file the legal challenge, suggesting it should 
instead have been filed on their behalf by a regional or territorial Inuit association which enjoys specific 
rights under the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (Rogers 2015). The lawyer representing the 
companies claimed that none of the applicants were granted collective rights under the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement, and that none of them had the right to be consulted (Rogers 2015).  
Interestingly, on the issue of public standing the judge concluded that HTO-Clyde River had a real 
stake and genuine interest in the issues and should be granted public interest standing. The judge did 
not consider the case of the hamlet of Clyde River (nor the case of its mayor), considering it sufficient 
that one of the applicants had the standing to assert issues relating to Aboriginal or treaty rights12; she 
explained that had she found it necessary to decide on the Hamlet public interest, she would have 
seen relevant to consider that while the respondents rely on the participation of the applicants to claim 
that the consultation was a robust one, on the other hand they deny them the right to challenge the 
Decision. As explained in part 1, the case was lost: the judge ruled that consultation processes were 
adequately conducted. 
These two cases illustrate the difficult process of implementation of Land Claims Agreements and the 
complex governance setting in Nunavut, where the public government (the government of Nunavut) 
and an Inuit organisation (Nunavut Tunngavik Inc.) are both involved in the governance of the 
territory, a situation which has been characterised as a horizontal governance system (Loukacheva 
2007; Rodon 2014) creating the potential for conflict in various areas. This is the case in the offshore 
hydrocarbon resources area where public authority at the federal and regional level and indigenous 
organisations are involved in the governance process. In these arrangements, various interests but also 
legal systems interact, pertaining to the rights of indigenous peoples, constitution law and 
administrative law, civil law, realising vertical but also horizontal legal pluralism, and contributing to a 
complex governance setting of offshore oil and gas activities. 
It remains to be seen what could be the empowerment of the local level in the issues of the impact of 
offshore activities when claims are based upon Aboriginal or treaty rights. The judgment of HTO-
Clyde River, Clyde River v. Canada did not answer the question of whether the hamlet, whose purpose 
according to the Hamlet Act includes providing good government and developing safe and viable 
municipalities, had standing in an application. According to the current governance system, the 
legitimacy of an Inuit organisation (like the QIA) to oppose a public government decision appears to 
be stronger than a local public administration (the Clyde River Hamlet). This sheds light on the 
decision of the Nunavut Association of Municipalities to support the Clyde River Hamlet and pass a 
resolution to call on the governments of Canada and Nunavut to respect the local council and its 
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concerns over marine development (Varga 2014). Meanwhile, the federal government has started a 
public comment period to gather experiences and learn the views of Aboriginal groups, federal, 
provincial and territorial officials and industry stakeholders about the duty to consult to help Canada 
improve the way the federal government manages consultation processes (Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada 2014). 
A multi-level governance setting can create the conditions for legal pluralism. This is the case in 
regions where the devolution of power is granted to accommodate indigenous people rights. Under 
the Act on Greenland Self-Government, a number of policy areas have been transferred from the 
Kingdom of Denmark to the government of Greenland. The Act also lays down which matters can 
be taken over by the Greenlandic authorities (Mortensen 2013). This is the case in the area of mineral 
resources, which was taken over when the Self-Governmental Act was passed. As Greenland has been 
granted self-government pursuant to the people’s right to self-determination, it is nevertheless a public 
government. Anyone born in Greenland is considered a Greenlander.  
The regulations related to mineral (including oil) resources do not contain any specific provision or 
protection of indigenous rights: “With the authorities of the Greenland Self-Government having 
assumed full responsibility for mineral resources, there is no longer any need to have special rules 
concerning the right of indigenous peoples” (Vermont Law School Institute for Energy and the 
Environment 2011: 18). In Greenland, where the land cannot be considered an individual property, 
this comes with some challenges. Aqqaluk Lynge, former President of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, 
emphasised in 2009 the growing gulf between the political discourse of Greenland leaders and the 
social and environmental realities (Lynge 2009). He invoked the founding texts of international law in 
this area, starting with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (1965), and continuing to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (2007) in order to hold the government to its duty to obtain a free agreement from the affected 
communities concerning all initiatives and projects for development.  
Offshore exploration can take place in areas where the hunters are of the opinion that customary 
rights exist, areas with hunting or fishing rights held by specific individuals whose identity they know 
thanks to oral accounts (Olsen 2014; Brøsted 1986). These customary rights have not been translated 
into law and they are not accepted by the acts passed by the Greenlandic government. In addition, the 
Western conception of land property relying on a strict delineation of a geographical area is at odds 
with the traditional Inuit conception of ownership which is rather a user right and custodianship that 
comes with social responsibilities, and is very often flexible depending on the resources move, e.g. 
mammals or fish (Dahl 1998). Until Home Rule, management of the land followed customary rules 
of the community, a situation that changed dramatically with the introduction of Home Rule, and a 
centralised (Nuuk-based) authority disconnected from territorial social control (Dahl 1998). 
Various legal orders are at stake in Greenland: the indigenous legal order (which is not necessarily 
monolithic, and which is made of social norms and relies on a community-based control), and the 
self-rule legal order which borrows some features both from a former colonial order (a centralised 
authority) and from Inuit culture (no individual property). As Usher writes, “there is a crucial 
distinction between common property in the state system and communal property in the indigenous 
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system” (Usher 1987: 6). No special rules for indigenous peoples govern the consultation processes, 
whose content, form and practice are already being criticised in Greenland, as mentioned in the first 
part of the article (Olsen & Hansen 2014). Such legal pluralism also creates uncertainties when it comes 
to compensation rights. In case of an oil spill in Greenland, it is unclear how hunters without a licence 
(when their income from hunting is less than 50% of their gross income) could get compensation 
rights.13  
Non-governmental actors interacting with states and international regimes 
Strong private actors (multinational and transnational, as well as national and local companies) can 
design norms to manage offshore activities. Approaches to regulation can be characterised as either 
prescriptive or as performance-based (goal-based) (DNV-FNI 2012, Baker 2012). Many regulatory 
regimes for offshore drilling include elements of both approaches. A prescriptive approach, which is 
how the US approach is mainly designed, gives a fixed check list of things that must be done to meet 
a statutory requirement. Performance-based or goal-based regulations identify outcomes, but allow 
companies considerable flexibility to determine how they will proceed. The EU Offshore Directive 
advocates the goal-setting approach that was first adopted by the North Sea countries.  
With the use of a goal-setting approach in the regulation, companies are required to continually 
demonstrate that they are taking measures to minimize the risk of oil and gas releases to as low a level 
as reasonably practicable. Such an approach enables companies to adapt their management to new 
and safer standards without having to wait for the legislation to incorporate such standards (DNV-
FNI 2012: 21; Dagg et al. 2011). This regulatory design raises the issue of corporate social 
responsibility (Mikkelsen & Langhelle 2011). Indeed, the failure to adequately manage risks, as assessed 
in the Kulluk rig case (United States Coast Guard 2012), could have disastrous consequences. Some 
observers deem that the real effect on behaviour does not lie in the regulations themselves, but in the 
way in which the meeting of the goals regarding minimization the risks established by the regulations 
can be met to avoid what Carson identified as an “institutionally tolerated non-compliance” (Carson 
1981). In this perspective, it is important to note that some normative authorities as well as advisory 
bodies are not necessarily prone to accept such tolerance.  
In Canada, the National Energy Board remains the regulator of oil and gas activities offshore, 
operating under existing federal legislation and with quasi-judicial powers, and the rights and privileges 
of a superior court, as established by the National Energy Board Act: its decisions are all enforceable 
in law.14 This applies to all offshore hydrocarbon activities in Canadian territories, even when a 
devolution agreement on resources development has been established.  
The situation in Greenland is different, because here an advisory agency, the Danish Center for 
Environment and Energy (DCE) – the former National Environmental Research Institute (NERI) at 
Aarhus University – provides consultancy services to the Greenlandic government, i.e. to the 
Environment Agency for Mineral Resources Activities in connection with the production and 
transportation of minerals and petroleum in Greenland. DCE provides recommendations. The 
Environment Agency for Mineral Resources Activities cooperates closely with the DCE to implement 
the provisions of the Mineral Resources Act stating that assessments and decisions of the Mineral 
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Resources Authority regarding environmental issues must be based on assessments and proposals for 
decisions from one or more scientific and independent environmental institutions (Government of 
Greenland 2013). This includes the preparation of strategic environmental impact assessments, the 
drafting of guidelines for environment impact assessments (performed by the licensee), and the 
examination of the EIA before they are put out to public consultation and final approval by the 
government of Greenland (Government of Greenland 2014: 27). In addition, the DCE works as a 
consultant for the inspection regarding compliance with the environmental requirements for drilling 
operations (Government of Greenland 2012: 20). It is true that compliance is not always achieved: the 
quantity of chemicals used by Cairn as a lubricant in its drilling campaign in Greenland has been highly 
criticised a posteriori by the DCE which found such practice in contravention with international 
agreements [OSPAR] on discharges to the marine environment (the “anti dumping convention”). In 
addition, transportation of the discharged chemicals over great distances by ocean currents is possible, 
and the fate of the chemicals is unknown (DCE 2012). 
This situation has led some scholars to address the question of governance through a focus on the 
contract between a public authority, which has monitoring rights and duties, and a licensee who will 
also establish subcontracts with other companies. It has been shown that governance mechanisms for 
handling complex procurements involving several actors (incentives, authority and trust) complement 
each other: and furthermore that there is a complex interplay between the specific uses of the different 
mechanisms with a multiplier effect (Olsen et al.  2005).
 
Debates also question the nature of the 
licence: is it a contract (private law), or is it public law? To what extent does the design of a licence 
pertaining to contract law allow for more powerful leverage in terms of the enforcement of terms and 
the protection of the environment? What is the potential of relational contracts (emphasising long-
term relations, and obligations such as commitment and loyalty) versus transactional contracts (which 
focus more on short-term competitiveness and effectiveness) in the offshore industry to overcome 
the issue of increased risks through subcontracts and ensure the effective fulfilment of monitoring 
duties? Developing knowledge in this area could open new perspectives when the governance of 
offshore oil and gas activities involves an increasing number of actors. 
Even though they are non-state actors with few formal powers over international or national decision-
making, non-governmental organisations such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council and the WWF actively 
promote norms, be they environmental or related to human or indigenous rights. As another example 
of legal pluralism, the ICC has contested the sovereignty as defined by the Arctic coastal states in the 
Ilulissat Declaration (2008) and has provided an “Inuit Declaration of Sovereignty” which states that: 
“Sovereignty is a contested concept […] and does not have a fixed meaning. […] Sovereignties overlap 
and are frequently divided within federations in creative ways to recognize the right of peoples” (Inuit 
Circumpolar Council 2009). In this declaration, the ICC associates the notion of a territory (“Inuit 
Nunaat”) and of a people, with a different notion from that of authority, which is traditionally used 
for states: instead, the ICC associates the notion of Inuit people and territory with the notions of 
“rights and responsibilities.” The ICC founds the legitimacy of its sovereignty on the notion of self-
determination that is granted to indigenous peoples through international law (UNDRIP 2007): 
“Issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights must be examined and assessed in the context of our long 
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history of struggle to gain recognition and respect as an Arctic indigenous people having the right to 
exercise self-determination over our lives, territories, cultures and languages.”  
The ICC requires that Inuit be partners of states, industry and other actors, and also requires that Inuit 
land claims and self-government agreements be respected. In accordance with this goal, the ICC 
launched in May 2011 a Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Development Principles in Inuit 
Nunaat (Inuit Circumpolar Council 2011), defined in an official communication as “Inuit homeland” 
(Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami 2011). This declaration mentions the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples as the basis for further progress. With these declarations, the ICC is contributing 
to the formation and diffusion of norms and values that are expected to compete with the traditional 
conception of state sovereignty, characterising a situation of legal pluralism. Through its status of 
Permanent Participant at the Arctic Council, the ICC also enjoys a strong position in an inter-
governmental forum that results in the chance to form better coalitions with all the policy actors in 
the Arctic and to influence the projects conducted in the working groups of the Arctic Council, as 
well as the design of the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines (PAME 2014, Koivurova 2011). 
As an Observer to the Arctic Council, the WWF is an environmental organisation that also contributes 
to the formation and diffusion of norms in order to have an impact on the outcomes of policy-making. 
The WWF constitutes a science-policy interface through the commission of scientific reports on issues 
such as the management of the Arctic Ocean, or (very recently) on marine fuel alternatives for use in 
the Canadian Arctic, in order to promote new norms for government and industry to consider and to 
contribute to higher and stricter standards than those included in the Polar Code, which has just been 
adopted without banning the use of heavy fuel in the Arctic (Vard 2015). As an Observer of the Arctic 
Council, and the only circumpolar environmental NGO, the WWF actively takes part in working 
groups meetings to promote the protection of Arctic biodiversity and the sustainable use of natural 
resources to influence governmental policies.  
Conclusion 
This article has analysed the governance of offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic with an 
approach relying on the concepts of multi-level governance and legal pluralism. It shows that in order 
to identify paths to increase efficiency in environmental management and public participation, it is 
useful to take into account the interactions of the various levels of governance involving actors with 
diverse interests, authorities and cultures.  
First, the interactions between the international and national levels show that if the current state of 
governance of offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic is characterised by an expansion of 
international law leading to fragmentation and problems of consistency, more issues are at stake which 
also hinder the efficiency of environment management and public participation and which pertain to 
the interpretation of law. States can manoeuver with the regulation of various aspects such as air 
pollution or pollution at sea (e.g. the use of heavy fuel in the Polar Code, or in the regulations in the 
North Atlantic), safety and liability rules (incorporation of Directives in national legislation), 
indigenous peoples rights (UNDRIP), and access to information (Aarhus convention). In this context, 
the Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response, a binding 
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agreement signed under the auspices of the Arctic Council, offers a useful framework for coordinated 
response to oil spill; but in addition to not being enforceable, it does not place many duties on the 
parties. Even so, the Arctic Council plays an important role in discourse-shaping and in the promotion 
of values and standards of best practices. 
Second, when it comes to national and regional levels, two main features have been highlighted. First: 
the entanglement of indigenous and public rights and authority. Both governments in Greenland and 
Nunavut are public, but very diverse settings are in place. Nevertheless, in both cases devolution 
happens to be implemented at the expense of the local level. The entanglement of indigenous and 
public rights and authority constitutes a source of tension in political relations, observed both in 
Nunavut and in Greenland, and it also generates inefficient processes of decision-making resulting in 
high court costs for Nunavut.  
Third, as far as non-governmental actors are concerned, the WWF and the ICC, through their 
respective statuses in the Arctic Council, have the opportunity to play a constructive role in raising 
awareness on important issues and producing scientific reports. As for corporations, they play a crucial 
role in the governance of offshore hydrocarbon activities, especially when the goal setting approach 
is favoured in the regulation, thereby raising the issue of corporate social responsibility. In this context, 
regulatory and advisory agencies enjoy very different degrees of leverages. In both cases regulation is 
not the be all and end all, and the issue of enforcement remains central as activities take place in 
remote areas lacking infrastructure (for instance the disposal of drilling wastes onshore when this is 
possible) and in a harsh environment.  
What path of reflection lies ahead? Taking into account the interconnection between the three levels 
definitely calls for a comprehensive understanding of governance of the offshore sector. Four paths 
of reflection arise from our analysis.  
First, it is unlikely that a dualistic vision opposing a normative option and an enabling option opens 
new avenues for solutions. If normativity alone is definitely not a solution, still the evolution of 
international law and customary international law deserves attention and a certain level of 
harmonisation may be welcome, for instance to enable states with different norms to cooperate 
efficiently on the prevention of an oil spill and their response to it (Baker 2012). Further research 
could focus on a comparison between the governance approaches of Canada and 
Greenland/Denmark, as Canada and Denmark signed an Agreement for Cooperation Relating to the 
Marine Environment in 1983, and have a 3,000-kilometre maritime border.  
A second path relates to the institutional settings and proposes considering the stress lines pertaining 
to the entanglement of public and indigenous rights and authorities and the consequences at the local 
level. It is to be expected that with conflicting interests between local populations on the one hand, 
and corporations (where indigenous peoples may also have shares in some regions) and 
regional/national governments on the other hand, the development of offshore resources will lead to 
an increase in the number of cases ending up in court.  
The third path to enhance efficiency in both environmental management and public (including 
indigenous) participation bears a more procedural feature. As enforcement appears crucial, some 
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options pertaining to contract law may not only optimise the operator-regulator interface and ensure 
the effective performance of monitoring, but also more generally offer a stable framework for 
inclusive dialogue between actors and develop a culture of trust, in particular in terms of risk 
acceptance. This is what relational contracts emphasise: long-term relations and obligations such as 
commitment and loyalty.   
In the end, the analysis of the rationale for engaging in offshore activities in the Arctic region, from a 
state perspective (e.g. energy security), and from regional government, indigenous shareholders and 
corporation perspectives, could be helpful in order to shed light on the current governance settings 
but also to provide relevant actors with arguments to weigh the decision on seismic and drilling 
activities in relation to risk acceptance.   
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Notes 
1. For a discussion on the influence of international law on national policy and law related to 
indigenous peoples in the Arctic, see Koivurova and Stepien, 2011. 
 
2. In 2008 the US Geological Survey estimated the reserves would amount 13% of the 
undiscovered reserves of oil and 30 % of the undiscovered gas reserves (USGS 2008). 
 
3. Our emphasis. Polar Code, Part II-B, Article 1. Regulation 43 of MARPOL Annex I applies 
to Antarctic waters and prohibits the carriage in bulk as cargo, or carriage and use as fuel, of 
heavy fuel. http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx  
 
4. EU Directive 2012/33/EU amending the Sulphur Directive (1999/32 as amended by 
Directive 2005/33/EC). 
 
5. Statutory Order no. 640 of 12 June 2014 on the Content of Sulphur in Solid and Liquid Fuel. 
 
6. Act no. 1499 of 23 December 2014. 
 
7. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA, Petroleum GeoServices and MultiKlient Invest 
AS. 
 
8. At paragraph 47. 
 
9. In the Rio Tinto and Little Salmon Carmacks decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
further explained that the duty to consult is a constitutional duty. 
 
10. The legal argument for the injunction relied on the Supreme Court of Canada's 1997 
Delgamuukw decision, which acknowledged an inherent aboriginal right to land, plus the two 
rulings (Haida in 2004 and Mikisew in 2005) which require the Crown to consult first nations 
even if a treaty is settled. 
 
11. Hamlet of Clyde River, Nammautaq Hunters & Trappers Organization – Clyde River, and 
Jerry Natanine versus TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA (TGS), Petroleum Geo-
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Services Inc. The applicants tried to reverse a 2014 National Energy Board (NEB) decision to 
allow a consortium of three seismic companies to survey in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait. 
 
12. At paragraph 25. 
 
13. Compensation could be based on the liability rules that are decided by Danish law on liability. 
See also Johnstone 2015, 90. 
 
14. The NEB has the powers to regulate, make decision on licensing and judicial powers, but it is 
possible to bring a case before the Federal court of Appeal as mentioned in the two first parts 
of the article. 
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Large-Scale Disaster Response in the Arctic:  
Are We Ready?  
Lessons from the Literature on Wicked Policy Problems 
 
Rebecca Pincus 
 
 
The cruise liner Crystal Serenity plans to conduct a cruise from Alaska to New York in August 2016. This will be, by far, the 
largest commercial cruise transit of the Northwest Passage ever attempted. The journey raises questions about the capacity of 
governments to respond to a large-scale environmental or human disaster in the Arctic maritime realm. Mass rescue operations in 
the Arctic are technically complicated by the extreme cold and enormous distances present in the region, and operationally complicated 
by governance challenges, including multiple and overlapping jurisdictions, networks of responders, and state-to-state variations in 
capacity, commitment, and funding schemes for disaster response.  
The challenges of disaster response policy in the Arctic make this issue a “wicked” policy problem. Wicked policy problems pose 
special challenges to policymakers. This class of public policy problems involves a diversity of stakeholders holding varying 
interpretations of causes and solutions, and is closely interconnected with many other problems. The theory and literature that have 
developed around wicked problems offer a number of lessons about how actors and networks address these complex governance 
challenges. 
This paper will address the challenge of effective disaster response in the Arctic, using the analytic framework of wicked problems. 
First, the wicked aspects of disaster response in the Arctic will be analyzed, using the Crystal Serenity as a case study; second, 
lessons from the literature that identify strategies for managing wicked problems will be identified; finally, the paper will draw 
practical conclusions about readiness in the Arctic.  
 
 
Introduction 
On August 16, 2016, the Crystal Serenity will depart Seward, Alaska, en route to New York City. The 
cruise liner will turn north, pass through the Bering Strait, and bear east through the Chukchi and 
Beaufort Seas before entering Canadian waters and the Northwest Passage.1 With nearly 2000 
individuals aboard (passengers and crew), this will be the first large cruise liner to transit the Arctic. 
The next-largest transit, just a quarter of the size of the Crystal Serenity, was made in 2012 by The World, 
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which carried 508 passengers and crew (George 2012). The transit naturally raises questions about the 
availability and capacity of response services in the region, particularly those capable of responding to 
large-scale incidents.  
Outside of the Nordic area and some areas proximate to Russian ports, there is little infrastructure in 
the Arctic to support large-scale emergency response. As a result, any response will likely be delayed 
by the time required to transfer assets: by ship, air (fixed or rotary-wing aircraft), or surface transport. 
In addition, the scarcity of infrastructure will complicate this process. There are few ports in which to 
dock and unload ships; few airfields at which fixed wing aircraft can take off and land; few roads; few 
facilities that can serve as centralized coordination points for crews and equipment; few hospitals; and 
few hotels or other mass housing facilities.  
Without infrastructure, the challenge of large-scale emergency response is magnified. The Arctic 
Council’s 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) noted concisely that, “growth in Arctic 
marine tourism is outpacing infrastructure investment, development and support throughout the 
region” (AMSA: 172). Additionally, further complications arise from the nature of the Arctic region 
itself: intense cold, extreme weather, and rapid shifts in conditions add risk and delay. Paradoxically, 
the extreme conditions that hamper response efforts increase risk of mortality through exposure, 
increasing the urgency of response. In short, emergency response in the Arctic is both extremely 
important, given the harsh environment, and also extremely challenging, due to distance, conditions, 
and lack of infrastructure.  
As ship and air traffic increases, governments are confronted with a policy problem: how to increase 
emergency response capacity in order to satisfy public need. At first glance, this might seem like a 
fairly straightforward policy problem: identify the problem (lack of adequate emergency response 
capacity); identify various options (different locations for infrastructure, funding mechanisms, 
implementing agencies); select the best option; and implement. All students of public policy will 
recognize this model.  
However, upon closer scrutiny the question of improving emergency response capacity across the 
expanses of the North American (including Greenland) and Siberian Arctic regions is far more 
complex and difficult than a typical policy problem. This paper will argue that the challenge in fact 
comprises a “wicked” policy problem, and will apply lessons from the theoretical literature on wicked 
problems to explore more fully the challenge of emergency response in the Arctic region.     
Wicked problems: theory and literature  
The challenge of managing the increase in human activity in the Arctic can be understood as a 
“wicked” policy problem. Wicked policy problems pose special challenges (Rittel & Webber 1973; 
Roberts 2000; Bueren, Klijn, & Koppenjan 2003). A wicked problem seems to be endless, and 
endlessly difficult to define: “it is experienced as ambiguous, fluid, complex, political, and frustrating 
as hell. In short, it is wicked.” (Roberts 2000: 2). Wicked problems proliferate across the policy 
spectrum, since by nature they challenge many public policy structures. Wicked problems are “cross-
cutting”, and therefore difficult to address through “narrow, vertical” arrangements found in 
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governmental agencies (Ferlie et al 2011). Frameworks and theory of wicked problems have been 
applied to a diverse array of policy areas, including publicly financed dentistry (Quiñonez 2012), 
human tissue in medicine (Lewis 2008), and maritime security in Southeast Asia (Bateman 2011). This 
sampling indicates that wicked problems are found wherever there is “chronic policy failure” (Ferlie 
et al 2011).  
Wicked problems, as Dryzek implies, are often found “at the intersection of ecosystems and human 
social systems”, where the complexity of each system further challenges comprehension and effective 
management (Dryzek 2005: 9). The effects of global-scale changes like climate change or economic 
globalization may lead to wicked problems in which processes and actors at local scales are influenced 
by global-level changes beyond their control (Chapin et al 2008). Wicked problem theory has 
frequently been applied to human-environmental issues, including eutrophication (Thornton 2013), 
Alaskan wildfires (Chapin et al 2008), coral reef protection (Hughes, Huang & Young 2013), and the 
Yellowstone National Park (McBeth & Shanahan 2004; McBeth et al. 2010).  
There are several ways of unpacking the complex nature of wicked policy problems. Although 
frameworks differ, the underlying elements of wicked problems are repeatedly identified. Wicked 
problems are hard to know: information may be inadequate, problems may be continually evolving, 
and the problem may seem like a “black box”, without clear connections between contributing factors 
and resulting effects. Furthermore, the number and diversity of actors involved in wicked problems 
means that these problems are hard to manage: different actors may understand and define problems 
differently and desire different approaches. Given this complicated group of stakeholders, wicked 
policy problems demand careful management in order to minimize conflict and/or stalemate, and 
ensure that all actors are working together in a coordinated effort to manage the problem through 
time. The temporal aspect of wicked problems is important: since they can never be solved, creating 
structures to manage wicked problems over time may be an effective strategy. The following section 
will examine several different frameworks by which wicked problems can be understood.  
Rittel and Webber’s foundational work on the subject (1973) laid out ten “distinguishing properties” 
of wicked problems: there is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem; wicked problems are 
never solved; solutions are not true/false, but good/bad according to stakeholders; solutions to 
wicked problems will create “waves of consequences” that cannot be traced in advance; therefore, 
every solution is a “one-shot operation” and is “consequential”; there is also no “enumerable” set of 
potential solutions; every wicked problem is “essentially unique”; it can be considered a symptom of 
another problem; it can be explained in numerous ways; and given these stakes, policymakers seeking 
to address wicked problems have “no right to be wrong” (161-167).  
Weber and Khademian (2008) identify three aspects: the unstructured, cross-cutting, and relentless 
characteristics that distinguish tame from wicked problems. Wicked problems are “unstructured”: 
causes and effects are difficult to distinguish and the problem is dynamic, creating a constantly moving 
and evolving target. They are also “cross-cutting”: involving a multiplicity of stakeholders, knowledge 
sources, and perspectives, and therefore containing a high probability of conflict. Wicked problems 
are “relentless”: there is no final resolution to the problem, so the best outcome policy managers can 
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hope for is the development of a long-term problem solving or management capacity (Weber & 
Khademian 2008).  
Van Bueren, Klijn and Koppenjan (2003) point to three types of uncertainty that characterize wicked 
problems: cognitive, strategic, and institutional uncertainty. Cognitive uncertainty reflects the basic 
lack of technical knowledge about the “causes and effects” of wicked problems, and also about the 
causal relationships between issues involved (van Bueren et al 2003: 193). Strategic uncertainty grows 
out the number of actors involved, who have differing perceptions of the problem, differing solutions, 
and therefore differing strategies for engaging with the problem. These differences can lead to conflict, 
stagnation, and potentially unexpected outcomes (van Bueren et al 2003: 193). Institutional uncertainty 
is a result of the “highly fragmented” institutional setting in which wicked problems are addressed. 
Decision-making is distributed across a variety of institutional arenas. “Often, decisions are only 
loosely coupled and sometimes not at all” (van Bueren et al. 2003: 194). Given these conditions, 
“dealing with wicked problems is—to a large extent—a problem of interaction” (Ibid).  
Wicked problems are frustrating, complex, and pose special challenges to policymakers. They 
challenge assumptions about rational and logical approaches to addressing public policy problems.  
Arctic emergency response: a wicked problem  
All of the characteristics discussed previously as distinctive of wicked problems are in ample evidence 
in the maritime Arctic realm. Although May et al. (2005) use the label “policy incoherence”, much of 
their analysis also characterizes wicked policy problems: they note the uncertainty and “limited shared 
basis for constructing definitions of problems” in the Arctic (2005: 4). The fundamental difficulty in 
the Arctic is twofold: responding to a rapidly warming regional climate and simultaneously managing 
an increase in human activity. Change is cascading through both human and environmental systems 
in the Arctic region, and the difficulty of managing and adapting to these changes is therefore 
significantly more challenging. The realm of emergency response is perhaps the most pressing 
challenge facing governments in the North American and Siberian regions of the Arctic, where 
increased human activity is occurring in the absence of fully developed infrastructure.  
Although the policy solutions to inadequate emergency response infrastructure may appear simple—
build infrastructure and increase staffing—this simplicity is deceptive. Construction and maintenance 
of infrastructure in the far North is complicated by the extreme climate, which requires special 
materials, techniques, and maintenance. These considerations multiply costs considerably. Seasonal 
limitations on construction exist. In addition, the costs of transporting construction materials to 
remote Arctic locations are significant. For example, while the price of a gallon of gas in the “lower 
48” of the US was around $2.50 during April 2015, in Barrow, Alaska, it was approximately $7.00. 
While infrastructure development is a costly undertaking in any circumstance, the enormous additional 
costs of Arctic development pose challenges for policymakers.  
Compounding the extreme cost of infrastructure development for emergency response in the Arctic 
is the uncertainty associated with ship traffic. If policymakers commit to public spending now in order 
to improve emergency response, and traffic does not increase, the money will be seen as going to 
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waste. Conversely, if policymakers delay spending until traffic has increased to a level that demands 
enhanced response capacity, there is a chance that the spending will come too late—that a large-scale 
human or environmental disaster will occur, and the responsible government will be perceived to have 
failed.  
This dilemma can be described in terms of two hypothetical scenarios involving the Crystal Serenity. In 
the first case, the US or Canadian government decides to enhance emergency response in order to 
develop the capacity necessary to respond to a large-scale human disaster in the Arctic. This requires 
the expenditure of large sums to build deep water ports, airfields, hangars, communications, storage 
facilities, bases, and housing in remote Arctic communities, as well as staffing, equipment, and support 
services for these facilities, all of which are unavailable for other spending priorities farther south. The 
transit of the Crystal Serenity is uneventful, and the large expenditures are criticized as wasteful and 
misguided. In the second case, policymakers consider the overwhelming probability of a safe transit, 
and do nothing to enhance response capacity. An incident occurs, and the government is attacked for 
abdicating its responsibility.  
Table 1: Policy dilemma: increase SAR capacity or not? 
  No incident Serious incident 
Enhance capacity X ✔ 
No additional 
capacity ✔ X 
 
Beyond the immediate considerations of the Crystal Serenity lies the even thornier question of future 
passenger vessel traffic in the North American Arctic. Will more cruise ships follow the Serenity? How 
many? When? These difficult questions all shape policy solutions to the problem of emergency 
response in the Arctic region.  
At the crux of the problem lies that fact that large-scale cruise ship disasters are vanishingly unlikely, 
but have devastating consequences—and these consequences are magnified in the Arctic. While it is 
very probable that the Crystal Serenity’s transit will be uneventful, regular reports of incidents involving 
cruise ships remind us that prevention cannot be a perfect cure. Furthermore, the regular incidence 
of large ferry disasters that kill many people, generally in developing countries, is a reminder that 
progress must continue to be made on maritime safety globally.2  
In both 2011 and 2013, Carnival cruise ships experienced fire and engine failure. In 2010, 400 
passengers aboard the Celebrity Mercury contracted norovirus (Cline 2013). Famously, the Costa Concordia 
ran aground in the well-charted waters of the Mediterranean in 2012, killing 32 (Povoledo 2014). This 
very brief list illustrates that leisure cruises regularly experience unforeseen incidents that can threaten 
human safety and environmental integrity. The sheer bulk of modern cruise vessels, along with the 
magnitude of passengers (which today can run well into the thousands), multiply the scale of any 
incident, particularly in precarious environmental situations. The harsh Arctic environment further 
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increases risk to ships, since any incident will be compounded by the factors previously described. 
Risk of mortality, particularly if passengers end up in the water, is significantly higher in the Arctic due 
to low water temperatures.  
Policymakers seeking to improve emergency response capacity in the Arctic must therefore weigh the 
very high cost of enhancement against the very low probability of a major incident; consider the 
unknown pace of increasing ship traffic (particularly high passenger volume ships like cruise vessels); 
balance competing demands from other sectors of government, including maritime emergency 
response; and prepare for potentially significant criticism should their decision prove wrong. Here the 
wickedness of the problem can be seen more clearly. The wicked characteristics of Arctic emergency 
response can also be identified through the application of theoretical frameworks of wicked policy 
problems.  
Applying theoretical frameworks to Arctic emergency response 
While there are many frameworks for analyzing wicked problems, reviewing just one or two will be 
adequate to demonstrate that emergency response in the Arctic has all the characteristics of such a 
problem. Weber and Khademian (2008) identify three criteria: unstructured, cross-cutting, and 
relentless. Similarly, Van Bueren et al. (2003) note three types of uncertainty: cognitive, strategic, and 
institutional. These two frameworks highlight important aspects of Arctic emergency response.  
Information is both inadequate and evolving, in both human and environmental spheres, in the 
maritime Arctic: ship traffic in the Arctic has been variable in recent years,3 and the rate of change of 
both ship traffic and ice conditions is unknown. Cognitive uncertainty is clearly present; this problem 
can also be described as unstructured. The problem is dynamic, and it is not directly clear how various 
interventions affect outcomes.  
The cross-cutting nature of wicked problems is closely linked to strategic uncertainty: both 
frameworks highlight the number of actors and different perspectives involved in managing a wicked 
problem. The involvement of many different actors implies a high probability of conflict, as each actor 
will have a different problem definition, objective, and preferred approach. Bringing many different 
viewpoints and styles to a manageable consensus is one of the great challenges inherent in addressing 
a wicked problem. This challenge can be seen in the Arctic, where different states, state agencies, local 
agencies, industry groups, and nongovernmental actors all define adequate emergency response 
differently, and may seek to manage it differently as well.  
At this point, differences in the frameworks emerge. Weber and Khademian (2008) highlight the 
relentless nature of wicked problems: they persist and require long-term management. As the very 
nature of the Arctic continues to evolve far into the future, emergency response capacity must evolve 
as well: there is no solution that can be implemented in 2015 that will be appropriate in 2025 or 2050. 
Therefore, emergency response in the Arctic can be described as a relentless problem.  
Van Bueren et al (2003), in contrast, emphasize the institutional uncertainty inherent in wicked 
problems. Decisions that pertain to the problem are dispersed widely, and decisions in one area or by 
one actor may not be linked to decisions by another. Institutional uncertainty can be combatted at the 
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local and national level by coherent policy management. At the international level, the Arctic Council 
and the forthcoming Arctic Coast Guard Forum will play important roles in combatting institutional 
uncertainty pertaining to emergency response in the Arctic region, by harmonizing policy and linking 
decisions.  
Taking a closer look: institutional uncertainty 
The eight Arctic states are all parties to the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue in the Arctic (hereafter referred to as SAR Agreement4) negotiated under the auspices 
of the Arctic Council, and are therefore bound to respond to a search and rescue situation in 
accordance with the articles of that Agreement. However, the language of the treaty is deliberately 
vague: an “adequate and effective search and rescue capability” is left undefined, as is the nature of 
the promptness that is required in communications between parties. While tasking states with the duty 
to respond, the Agreement leaves a great deal of latitude. The case study of the Oryong 501, a South 
Korean trawler that sank in the Bering Sea under high seas in November 2014, serves to demonstrate 
that national SAR capacity and culture varies in ways that create institutional uncertainty and 
contribute to the wickedness of emergency response in the Arctic.  
On November 30, 2014, the Oryong 501 took a large wave onboard while hauling in pollock, and water 
flooded the boat’s storage chambers.5 The captain ordered the crew of 60 to abandon ship nearly 109 
miles away from land. The incident occurred in waters delegated to Russian SAR responsibility under 
the 2011 Agreement, but near to the border with the US zone of responsibility.  
According to reports and interviews, the designated Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator, the 
Russian Kamchatka Border Guard Directorate (KBGD), did not immediately respond to the incident. 
The US Coast Guard 17th District Command Center was notified of the incident by Oryong 501’s 
emergency locator beacon alert signals and immediately contacted the Russian Rescue Coordination 
Center in Vladivostok (Honings 12/19/14). Although the US Coast Guard offered assistance, Russia 
did not accept help until the next morning, December 1st, 2014. Throughout the search, Russia did 
not provide a base or aircraft support to aid what should have been an international search and rescue 
effort (Klint 2014).    
Extensive assets were utilized throughout multiple search efforts by the United States Coast Guard 
and the South Korean Navy (Miller 2014). The US Coast Guard deployed US Coast Guard Cutter 
Alex Haley, US Coast Guard Cutter Munro, several C-130 Hercules aircraft based out of Air Station 
Kodiak, a MH-65 Dolphin helicopter from Kodiak, and two SAR planners from Juneau to assist South 
Korean Navy P-3 aircrews in Anchorage (Honings 12/15/14). US assets were requested to divert 
from their original missions to support the search. Additionally, Good Samaritan vessels played a large 
role in search efforts and the rescue of seven survivors.  Of Oryong 501’s 60-crewmembers, seven 
survived, 27 crewmembers were recovered deceased, and 26 people remain missing in the waters. A 
week after the incident, the South Korean Navy aircrafts relieved the US Coast Guard of aeronautical 
searches.  During its involvement in the search and recovery efforts, the US Coast Guard conducted 
24 searches, covering more than 4,576 square miles (US Coast Guard).    
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The Oryong 501 incident illustrates that, while the 2011 SAR Agreement may have been a step in the 
direction of greater coordination and reduced uncertainty, there is still work to be done in combatting 
institutional uncertainty in Arctic emergency response. At this point it should be noted that 
institutional uncertainty is the area in which the most effort has been expended to manage the 
wickedness of Arctic emergency response: the other criteria identified by the two frameworks 
employed above (unstructured/cognitive uncertainty; cross-cutting/strategic uncertainty; and 
relentless) are even less amenable to policy intervention.  
The Oryong 501 case study, as well as the earlier application of two frameworks for analyzing wicked 
problems, should make clear the wicked nature of Arctic emergency response. Rather than framing 
the issue of emergency response in the Arctic as a purely technical problem for which a solution can 
be engineered using risk assessment techniques, and applying regulatory tools, it is important to 
recognize the unique aspects of wicked problems that are resistant to management efforts. What 
lessons can be drawn from the literature that may help policymakers as they seek to address this 
challenging issue? 
Lessons from the literature on wicked problems  
McBeth and Shanahan (2004) observe that wicked problems resist technical, scientific, and economic 
solutions. Technical approaches often “reignite” or cause additional conflict (2004: 322). Scientific 
evidence is “disputed, ignored, or manipulated” by stakeholders. While economic compensation often 
fails to reduce conflict intensity, economic arguments for adaptation also fail to move opinion, and 
market-based solutions are rarely employed (McBeth & Shanahan 2004: 323-4). Finally, they note that 
values often lead to unnecessary conflict: “Because of values and emotions that stand outside rational 
calculation of economic self-interest, policies get stuck in ideological cement even when technical, 
scientific, and economic arguments are plausible for both sides” (Ibid: 326). The failure of rationally 
grounded policy tools in the face of human factors like values and emotions demonstrates the political 
challenge of building consensus around the management of wicked problems.  
Applying a wicked problem framework can yield insight into approaches that may defang some aspects 
of these problems. Chapin et al. (2008) lay out an approach to addressing wicked problems: first, by 
identifying “simple” solutions at the local scale that address the central problem as defined by many 
of the actors; next, determining linkages among processes and key intervention points to reduce 
impact; finally, by identifying and addressing secondary problems that emerge. Their approach 
“involves beginning with a central problem and incorporating only those additional layers of 
complexity that enable one to address or more inclusively define the central problem.” (Chapin et al. 
2008: 532). Chapin’s approach emphasizes the importance of human factors, highlighting the need for 
shared problem definition and the acceptance of linkage to other processes and problems. However, 
Chapin’s approach may seem, in its simplicity, to leave unanswered the basic challenge of wicked 
problems.  
Roberts (2000) takes a realist approach, and identifies three types of solutions to wicked problems: 
authoritative, competitive, and collaborative. “Authoritative strategies are ‘taming strategies’” (Roberts 
2000: 4), which can only be employed by a small number of stakeholders who have (or have been 
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given) the power to both define a problem and choose a preferred solution. The other stakeholders 
must acquiesce to the decision made by the small group. While this type of strategy holds the appeal 
of simplicity, “experts can be wrong”, both in their understanding of the problem and in their chosen 
solution, and in a small group, learning is unlikely to occur (Roberts 2000: 4-5). Competitive strategies, 
on the other hand, spur innovation, as stakeholders compete for the power to define and solve 
problems on their own terms. While challenging the entrenchment of power, competitive strategies 
can produce undesirable outcomes, including stalemate, gridlock, and conflict (Roberts 2000: 5-6). 
Collaborative strategies seek to satisfy all stakeholders, avoiding the zero-sum approach present in 
competitive strategies. Collaboration can improve efficiency, reduce costs, and enable stakeholders to 
focus on their individual strengths and interests. However, collaboration is difficult, and raises 
transaction and communication costs. In addition, “collaboration requires practice; it is a learned skill” 
(Roberts 2000: 7).  
From this quick review of the literature, it appears there are few clear-cut strategies for managing 
wicked problems. In trying to improve emergency response capacity in the Arctic at the international 
level, no state can act alone nor compel action by other states; as a result, a collaborative approach is 
the only option. However, the task of building collaborative strategies across international boundaries 
is heightened by increased transaction and communication costs. Cultural differences may intensify 
challenges associated with human factors: values may differ widely between state agencies tasked with 
emergency response, which may have been demonstrated in the Oryong 501 case; in addition, the 
political calculus of domestic politics may drive emergency response agencies in different directions. 
The strategy described by Chapin et al (2008) does offer some promising avenues. Focusing on central 
areas where all or most actors share a common problem definition, and identifying key intervention 
points and linkages that will result in change, may be helpful strategies for Arctic states. The 
operational level of emergency response may serve as common ground around which consensus can 
be built. The forthcoming Arctic Coast Guard Forum may serve as a platform that can contribute to 
consensus around operational emergency response issues, and midwife emerging norms and best 
practices. Much as the Arctic Council has nurtured collaboration and the emergence of shared norms 
relating to environmental protection and sustainable development in the Arctic region, the Arctic 
Coast Guard Forum may prove to be a useful mechanism for building relationships at the operational 
level among Arctic emergency response agencies, which may lead to more consensus around problem 
definitions and may decrease the communication and transaction costs associated with collaborative 
solutions to wicked problems.    
Are we ready for the Crystal Serenity?  
Fortunately for the Crystal Serenity, the Arctic Council is planning on facilitating the execution of a 
large-scale international rescue exercise during late summer 2016, which will likely coincide with the 
cruise. According to the Department of State, in the summer of 2016, “we’ll have an actual full-scale 
operational exercise for search and rescue”.6 Although details are not yet available, it is likely that this 
exercise will occur during the Crystal Serenity transit, providing a safety net for the voyage.  In addition, 
the annual Arctic Zephyr exercise conducted by US DoD may coincide with the Crystal Serenity transit 
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as well. U.S. European Command and U.S. Northern Command co-sponsor a regular multilateral 
tabletop exercise called Arctic Zephyr that focuses on search-and-rescue issues in the Arctic (Miles 
2013). While the execution of this exercise remains tentative, it may provide another layer of security 
during the cruise. In light of these planned exercises, it is likely that the Crystal Serenity will have plenty 
of responders available, at least in US waters.  
At this point, readers may be wondering about the recently adopted IMO Polar Code.7 While the Polar 
Code does not go into effect until 1 January 2017, after the Crystal Serenity’s transit, it may be said that 
the requirements of the code are such that accidents will be prevented. However, as was noted earlier, 
accidents regularly occur despite regulatory guidance. While the Polar Code will decrease the likelihood 
of maritime disaster in the Arctic, the idea that regulation is capable of achieving total prevention has 
little supporting evidence. Nicholas Taleb’s famous body of work is not the only case for the 
importance of outlier, or “black swan” events, and the failure of predictive models to forecast the 
future.8 Furthermore, by placing the burden on operators to prevent any incident, those who point to 
the Polar Code as a solution to the problem of emergency response in the Arctic effectively justify 
stasis on the part of response agencies: the idea that if an operator ‘just follows the rules’ then nothing 
bad can possibly happen. This dangerous logic ignores the reality that accidents can and do frequently 
occur. And accidents are not the only type of incident to befall cruise vessels, it is important to 
remember: a vessel in perfect compliance with the Polar Code may suffer engine failure, or the 
outbreak of infectious disease, or encounter a rogue wave9—all scenarios that have struck cruise ships 
in the past decade—and if emergency response agencies have not developed enhanced capabilities in 
the Arctic region, outcomes could be quite undesirable. The question is whether policymakers, 
confronted with daunting cost estimates for enhancing emergency response capacity, are willing to 
wait—and for how long. 
Connecting the question of emergency response to theories of wicked policy problems highlights the 
challenges inherent in enhancing Arctic response capacity. It is vital that policymakers and scholars 
alike recognize that this challenge is more than technical. The evolving nature of conditions in the 
Arctic region, and of human behavior, challenge decision-making. The large number of actors makes 
consensus on even basic problem definition and solution identification difficult. The low-
probability/high-cost nature of Arctic disasters raises the stakes for policymakers. Finally, this is truly 
a relentless problem, one that can never be solved—but only managed.  
Once the wickedness of emergency response in the Siberian and North American Arctic is recognized, 
management informed by the literature on wicked problems may improve effectiveness by focusing 
on specific areas highlighted by this theoretical analysis: (1) specific analysis of maritime industry 
planning forecasts for Arctic traffic, particularly focusing on cruise vessels; (2) building consensus and 
streamlining decision processes and authorities; (3) targeting policies to address highest-cost 
outcomes; and (4) taking a long view that emphasizes ongoing management and communication rather 
than one-step policy delivery. While public policy theory may seem far removed from the operational 
reality of Arctic emergency response, careful application of theoretical analyses may offer practical 
strategic approaches to this Gordian knot.    
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Notes 
1. More information about the Crystal Serenity can be found on the website of Crystal Cruises, 
http://www.crystalcruises.com/northwest-passage-cruise/northwest-passage--6319.  
2. For more information on the frequency and scale of ferry disasters, see Worldwide Ferry 
Safety Association, www.ferrysafety.org, or in-depth reporting in Mother Jones by James 
West, 3 June 2015; and Foreign Policy, by Elias Groll, 16 April 2014.  
3. For a discussion of ship traffic in the Arctic, please see Allianz Safety and Shipping Review 
2015 p. 27-28. The report is available here: http://www.agcs.allianz.com/about-
us/news/shipping-review-2015/.  
4. The full treaty is available: https://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/N813EN.pdf.  
5. For more information on the sinking of Oryong 501, see the article by Sang-hun (NYT, 
2014); Honings (19 December 2014 and 15 December 2014); Klint (KTUU, 2014); Miller 
(Juneau Empire, 2014); and US Coast Guard (27 January 2015).  
6. “Background Briefing on Arctic Council Preview”, Department of State, 24 April 2015. 
Available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/04/241067.htm 
7. For more information on the Polar Code, see IMO, 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/default.aspx.  
8. In books like Fooled by Randomness (2005) and The Black Swan (2010), and others, Taleb argues 
for the significance of outlier events not captured in predictive models, and points to the 
impact of chaos and human error. 
9. For a fascinating look at rogue or freak waves, see the MAXWAVE project conducted by a 
German-led consortium based out of the Institute of Coastal Research, Geesthacht, 
Germany. 
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In spite of its arguable relevance the question of the role of the chair in the Arctic Council (AC) has until now received relatively 
little academic attention. When in 2013 Canada assumed the AC chairmanship, which rotates on the biennial basis among the 
Council’s Members, the Arctic Council entered the second round of chairmanships, with the first one being over after sixteen years 
since the formation of the AC in 1996. In the meantime, in result of processes of climate change and globalization the Arctic region 
has gone through profound transformation and the United States, the AC Chair from 2015 to 2017, has evolved from one of the 
greatest opponents of the Council to its outspoken proponent. Yet most of the rules pertaining to chairmanship have remained intact 
since AC rules of procedure were adopted during the first AC Ministerial meeting in Iqaluit in 1998. What tasks do they assign 
to the Arctic Council chair? What is the actual role of AC the chairmanship? To address these questions, this article first looks 
into theoretical insights on the influence wielded by formal leaders in international cooperation and multilateral bargaining. It then 
turns its attention to origins of the institutional setup of circumpolar cooperation and continues with application of theory to rules 
and practice of the Arctic Council, complemented by inclusion of effects of the external developments on the course of the AC. In 
conclusion, it offers an initial assessment of the role exerted by the country chairing the Arctic Council. 
 
 
Introduction 
Many of the recent debates on the Arctic have revolved around the role of the Arctic Council (AC) in 
emerging regional governance structures. This high-level forum for circumpolar cooperation has been 
recognized as the primary body in the region not only by the eight Arctic states, but also by numerous 
non-Arctic actors as reflected in the number of applications for Observer status received before the 
AC Ministerial meetings in Kiruna in May 2013 and in Iqaluit in April 2015. The Ministerial meeting 
in Kiruna drew a great deal of attention, in particular, because of much-awaited decisions on the 
applications of five major Asian economies and the European Union (EU) for Observer status. With 
China, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Italy welcomed, and the EU’s application deferred, 
discussions about the role of AC Observers continued, along with other major developments of 
importance such as the finalization of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Polar Code, the 
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establishment of the Arctic Economic Council, and the potentially grave consequences of Russia’s 
March 2014 annexation of Crimea for circumpolar cooperation. These developments came at the time 
when Canada, sixteen years after the inception of the Council, held the AC chair for the second time, 
from May 2013 to April 2015. Whereas a number of articles have addressed the second Canadian 
chairmanship (Exner-Pirot 2011; Fenge 2013; Spence 2013) and others have anticipated the second 
US chairmanship from 2015 to 2017, the question of the role of the chair in the Arctic Council - and 
its influence on Arctic politics- has until now received relatively little academic attention.1 To address 
it, this article first looks into theoretical insights on the influence wielded by formal leaders in 
international cooperation and multilateral bargaining. It then turns its attention to the debates over 
the institutional setup of circumpolar cooperation, which evolved during the negotiations leading to 
the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996. It continues with application of theory to rules and 
practice of the Arctic Council, complemented by inclusion of effects of the external developments on 
the course of the AC. The paper concludes with an initial assessment of the role exerted by a state 
chairing the Arctic Council. 
Theoretical approaches to the chair 
The scant attention offered to the question of chairmanship is by no means limited to the context of 
the Arctic Council. As Jonas Tallberg points out, the power of the chair is a topic that “so far has 
received limited systematic attention by international relations (IR) theorists” (Tallberg 2010: 241), 
despite important implications that the concept of formal leadership holds for our comprehension of 
multilateral bargaining. Typically, negotiations have been “conceptualized as a process between actors 
that enjoy the same formal status, but differ in terms of power capabilities, preferences, information, 
ideas, and alternatives to negotiated agreements” (Tallberg 2010: 242). Indeed, the influence wielded 
by a formal leader may be severely constrained by both formal (i.e. decision-making rules) and informal 
(expected norms of behavior) limitations, however this does not mean that the chair should be 
considered as a function with no impact over the outcomes of the process.  
Studies of power and effectiveness of the chair (Blavoukos, Tsakonas & Bourantonis 2006; Tallberg 
2004, 2010) are to large extent informed by the rational approach to the design of international 
institutions, which presumes, in broad terms, “that states use international institutions to further their 
own goals, and they design institutions accordingly” (Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal 2001: 762).  In line 
with this approach, the design features of specific institutions are a “result of rational, purposive 
interactions among states and other international actors to solve specific problems” (Koremenos et 
al. 2001: 762). To this end the position of chair is a functional response to problems relating to 
collective action and bargaining in a multilateral context: potential failures of agenda, negotiation and 
representation. Through tasks typically conferred upon the chairmanship - namely agenda 
management, brokerage and representation - states seek to address difficulties of overcrowded or 
shifting agendas, the inability of parties to identify underlying areas of agreement, as well as handling 
relations with non-members and representing the institution vis-à-vis third parties.  
Agenda management involves activities related to agenda-setting (introduction of new issues on the 
policy agenda), structuring (emphasizing or de-emphasizing issues already on the agenda) and agenda 
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exclusion (active barring of issues from the policy agenda).2 Moreover, as leaders of individual sessions, 
chairs open and close meetings, structure their agenda, allot the right to speak to participants and 
summarize the results of sessions (Tallberg 2010: 246). Brokerage, rather than involving a formal 
concession of powers to the chair by the other parties, refers to the situation where a chair serves as 
a channel of information among states who, for tactical reasons, conceal their true preferences but 
share information about them with the chair who thus gets privileged access to information that may 
then be used to construct compromise. In addition, oftentimes the chair’s mandate gives it a right to 
produce a single negotiating text as a basis for consensus. Finally, representation involves the chair 
being empowered by the other parties to speak on their behalf, since institutions typically cannot be 
represented by all their constituent members in relations with the outside world (Tallberg 2010: 245).  
According to Tallberg, “the office of the chair, once vested with power of process control, offers a 
political platform for influencing outcomes of the process” (Tallberg 2010: 245). Even though the 
chair is usually expected to conduct assigned functions with a view to promoting collective gains, 
holding a chairmanship may be seen by certain actors as a ‘window of opportunity’ to shift the agenda 
and distribution of gains in pursuit of their national interests. Additionally, a comparison study carried 
out by Tallberg on three alternative ways of organizing the office of the chair - rotation between states 
(like the Presidency of the European Union), appointment of a supranational official (as in the case 
of the WTO Trade Negotiations Committee) and election of one state’s representative (UN 
environmental conferences) - points to the rotating chairmanship (like the Arctic Council one) as a 
model particularly open to distributional influence and generating a process of logrolling, strengthened 
furthered in situations where the state in office controls multiple chairs of sub-groups within the 
organization and where the chairmanship of all or most of those sub-groups shift from one state to 
the other at the same time (Tallberg 2010). 
Yet chairs do not operate in a world without constraints and the mere fact that a chairmanship rotates 
between state representatives is not a guarantee for patterns of distributional impact. Blavoukos, 
Bourantonis and Tsakonas differentiate between three groups of parameters that affect the chair’s 
ability to perform the assigned roles and tasks.3 First, they point to the international environment and 
the nature of the issue under consideration. Since international institutions do not operate in a vacuum, 
“the systemic power configuration creates an international climate within which the chair operates” 
(Blavoukos et al. 2006: 150). A polarized, conflictive climate constraints not only the chair’s resources 
(e.g. privileged access to information) but also limits its assigned roles to merely procedural tasks and 
formalities. As for the nature of issue under consideration, its salience and the degree of controversy 
associated with it both affect the chair’s ability to perform its functions. In general, the more salient 
the issue is for the parties, the more difficult it is for the chair to succeed. The same is true with the 
degree of controversy. For example, matters of ‘hard’ military security and sovereignty are usually 
more sensitive and therefore more difficult to handle than ‘soft’ matters such as economic cooperation 
or environmental protection, with the Arctic Council being an excellent example of this. 
The second group of parameters affecting the chair is institution-specific and involves the institutional 
design of the chairmanship, the resources available to a chair, and the formal and informal constraints 
put upon it. The institutional design of the chairmanship – the three alternative ways of organizing 
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the office of the chair are outlined above - is the critical factor, since it affects both the quality and 
quantity of the chair's resources as well as the formal and informal constraints. More specifically, what 
matters is the intervention capacity given to the chair (i.e. control over agenda management and 
brokerage) as well as institutional continuity and the duration of the chairmanship. In short, the greater 
the chair’s control over process, the more institutional continuity and the longer the duration of its 
tenure, the more effective the chair will be (Blavoukos et al. 2006: 152). When it comes to the resources 
available to the chair, these include the already mentioned asymmetrical access to information and 
legitimacy of the chairmanship office. With regard to formal constraints placed upon the chair, these 
include the mandate, decision-making rules and control mechanisms within the institution. The 
mandate – or, like in the case of the United Nations Security Council and the Arctic Council, rules of 
procedure – outline tasks and functions assigned to the chair, thus defining its intervention capacity. 
Again, the less detailed the mandate, the more the institutional autonomy of the chair. Similarly with 
decision-making rules, the more demanding the rule (for example special majority, unanimity or 
consensus), the less maneuvering space for the chair and the more curtailed its role. As for control 
mechanisms, these usually take the shape of appointment as well as administrative and oversight 
procedures, while informal constraints include behavioral norms that are often implicit but which the 
chair is nevertheless expected to follow. Most often, these are the norms of efficiency, neutrality and 
impartiality, as well as the presumption of the chair as an ‘honest broker’ in the process (Blavoukos et 
al. 2006: 154-155).  
Finally, the last group of parameters conditioning the effectiveness of the formal leader concern 
personnel-specific features which can help (or impede) procedural and bargaining efficiency, as well 
as country-specific attributes that may affect political status and ease the performance of the chair’s 
functions (Blavoukos et al. 2006: 156). As much as the focus of this article is on states performing the 
role of the chair in the Arctic Council and the detailed examination of all individuals holding the 
position of the chair of the Senior Arctic Officials4 throughout the AC history goes beyond the scope 
of this paper, it is important to recognize the leadership function that the chair as individual can 
execute. Even though Oran Young proposed a distinction among three forms of leadership (structural, 
entrepreneurial and intellectual) in reference to regime formation, arguably it can be equally applied to 
the functioning of the institution once it is in place. In particular it is worth noting here the 
entrepreneurial leadership, where the leader is an individual who “leads by making the use of 
negotiating skill to influence the manner in which issues are presented in the context of institutional 
bargaining” (Young 1991: 288) and who helps to “broker deals acceptable to parties engaged in 
competitive-cooperative interactions” (Young 1999: 806). Importantly, the entrepreneurial leader is 
not a third party in a bargaining process and “[u]nlike mediators, [those leaders] (...) are typically agents 
of actors that possess stakes in the issues at hand and participate in the negotiations in their own right” 
(Young 1991: 295) -  similarly to the individual holding position of the SAO chair during the given 
AC chairmanship period.  
To conclude this theory section, although the role of chair has been oftentimes overlooked in the IR 
literature, and especially in the literature on the Arctic Council, the evidence points to the chairmanship 
as a particularly powerful platform for leadership in international negotiations and multilateral 
bargaining (Tallberg 2010: 261). Despite the procedural character of most of the chair competences, 
251   Arctic Yearbook 2015 
Smieszek & Kankaanpää 
the political importance of the chair should not be underestimated as the conduct of the chairmanship, 
particularly in a rotating system, gives states some maneuvering space that they can use to their own 
advantage and in pursuit of their national interests. For this reason, we can expect the institutional 
mechanism of the chairmanship of the Arctic Council to have some influence on the direction of 
Arctic international relations. 
From the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy to the Arctic Council 
Before going into specifics of the AC chair and provisions regulating its role in the Council, the 
theoretical insights above can help us understand the struggles carried over the shape of the Arctic 
Council. According to rational choice institutionalism, states construct institutions to advance their 
goals and support their interests. They spend time and effort negotiating institutions and fighting over 
their design not only because the institutional setup affects the outcomes, but also because the 
institutions, once in place, cannot be changed or adapted quickly to world’s changing conditions and 
configurations of international power (Koremenos et al. 2001:762) - the UN Security Council being 
the primary example here. At the same time, wrangles over the design and the procedural issues 
represent in fact debates on more fundamental questions of purpose and direction - as it was in the 
case of the Arctic Council (Scrivener 1999: 57). Whereas the paragraph below does not focus 
exclusively on the AC chair, it offers instead a bigger picture of negotiations towards establishment of 
the Council and how position take by the United States at that time affected today’s shape of this 
institution.  
The origins of the Arctic Council date back to the early post-Cold War period when in June 1991 
representatives of eight Arctic states (today’s members of the Arctic Council) adopted the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) to protect the environment of high north latitudes (see: 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 1991; Koivurova & VanderZwaag 2007; Nilson 1997; 
Young 1998). In view of some states, however, the narrowly defined focus of the AEPS did not allow 
to address all relevant matters pertaining to the Arctic. In particular, Canada was in favour of 
establishing an umbrella-type of political body to handle a wider set of issues in framework of 
sustainable development in the region (Canadian Arctic Resources Committee 1991; English 2013). 
The Canadian initiative for the establishment of the Arctic Council met yet a great deal of resistance 
and, until the last moment, it was uncertain whether it would come to a successful conclusion. The 
greatest opposition came from the United States which opposed broadening the environmental 
cooperation of the AEPS into a broader framework for several reasons, including the participation of 
indigenous peoples, the use of the concept of sustainable development, issues of military security and, 
finally, a low degree of interest in the Arctic among Washington officials and politicians (English 2013: 
188-193).5 The US was not in favour of creation of new international organizations and it consistently 
held a minimalist view of the Arctic Council as a purely consultative forum with limited functions.6  
Even the signature of the Ottawa Declaration in September 1996 did not end the discussions over the 
shape of what came to be “a high-level forum” for Arctic cooperation and coordination, and regardless 
of the fact that as the “outgrowth” (Bloom 1999: 712) of the AEPS the AC inherited most of its 
structures, the drafting of rules of procedure for the Council continued well into the first years of the 
Arctic Council when Canada held its chair. From the outset of the negotiations the US argued that the 
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role of the AC chair should be confined largely to the actual ministerial meetings of the Council. This, 
it seems, was intended to deprive the chair of the right to speak or act on behalf of all Arctic states in 
relations with outside countries or international organizations. Similarly, the US insisted that the 
functions of the Council’s Secretariat should be reduced to a minimum (Scrivener 1999: 55-56) and 
handled primarily by the chair (at that time ‘the Host Country’), thus further reducing the Council’s 
scope for independent action. Finally, after much protracted debate, the rules of procedure of the 
Arctic Council were adopted at its first ministerial meeting in Iqaluit in September 1998. In many 
respects, they remain intact today, despite certain revisions in 2013. 
Main tasks of the chair of the Arctic Council 
According to the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, the Council should normally 
meet on a biennial basis (Article 4) and responsibility for hosting meetings of the AC, including 
provisions of secretariat functions, should rotate sequentially among the Arctic States (Article 5) 
(Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council 1996). The AC rules of procedure of 1998 did not 
speak of the chair of the Arctic Council but the Host Country, meaning “the Arctic State which chairs 
the Arctic Council during the particular period in question” (Arctic Council 1998). However, as the 
term Host Country was replaced by the one of Chairmanship in the revised Rules of Procedure 
adopted during the Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna, Sweden in May 2013 (Arctic Council 2013), the 
term chairmanship will be used subsequently in this text. In addition, the revised rules from 2013 are 
numbered, unlike the ones from 1998; therefore, the numbers in brackets below refer to revised 
provisions. Finally, in cases where the revised rules altered or added to the wording of original 
provisions, the relevant information is provided. 
As stipulated in the rules, the Chairmanship is to act as the AC Chair from the conclusion of a biennial 
Ministerial meeting to the conclusion of the next biennial Ministerial meeting, and coordinate 
arrangements for Ministerial meetings. These functions were complemented in the revised rules from 
2013 by the responsibility “for facilitating preparations for Ministerial and SAO meetings, in 
coordination with the Secretariat, and carrying out such other tasks as the Arctic Council may require 
or direct” (Rule 10). After consultation with Arctic states and Permanent Participants, the 
Chairmanship may place reasonable limits on the size of all delegations for a meeting and shall notify 
all delegations accordingly (Rule 13) and, subject to the approval of the Arctic states, designate the 
Chairperson for Ministerial meetings (Rule 16). As laid out above, in accordance with article 5 of 
Ottawa Declaration, the chair of the Arctic Council shall rotate among the Arctic states and prior to 
the conclusion of each Ministerial meeting, the Arctic states shall confirm the host of the next meeting 
(Rule 17). The Chairmanship shall propose a date and the location for a biennial Ministerial meeting 
at least six months in advance of the proposed date (Rule 18) and, after consultation with Arctic states 
and Permanent Participants, circulate a draft agenda which - after revision - is to be adopted by a 
decision of the Arctic states at the opening session of each Ministerial meeting (Rule 19). According 
to Rule 22 the Chairmanship shall provide the chairperson for the SAO meetings, subject to the 
concurrence of the Arctic states there represented, while meetings of SAOs should take place at least 
twice yearly at the call of the Chairmanship, after consultation with the representatives of the 
Permanent Participants (Rule 25). With regard to public communications, the Chairmanship is 
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responsible for preparing a report of the meeting as well as releasing any minutes, communications 
and documents – subject, in all instances, to the approval of the relevant officials of each Arctic state 
(Rule 45). With respect to communications with the AC, the Chairmanship shall designate a point of 
contact for communications and inform all Arctic States, Permanent Participants and Observers 
accordingly (Rule 46).7 It shall as well make reasonable efforts to provide for Russian interpretation at 
Ministerial and SAO meetings (Rule 42). 
When the Arctic Council reached its tenth anniversary, at the time when Norway assumed its 
chairmanship in 2006, the discussions began on the review process and evaluation of the Council’s 
work, in order to improve its effectiveness and efficiency (Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006). 
Yet, whereas many were of the opinion that the AC required strengthening and considered enhancing 
capabilities of the chair, it took another seven years before the new rules of procedures were eventually 
adopted. The major difference between rules from 1998 and 2013 refer to the Observers and the role 
of Secretariat, illustrating well not only the impact of external developments (i.e. much greater interest 
of non-Arctic actors in the Arctic), but also the evolution of the approach taken by the Arctic states 
towards the AC as an institution. The first AC rules of procedures did not contain detailed provisions 
on the status of Observers, which were developed only during the Danish chairmanship (2009-2011) 
in response to rapidly growing interest of outside actors in the Arctic affairs. They were adopted in 
the Ministerial meeting in Nuuk in 2011 and subsequently included in the Annex 2 to the revised rules 
of procedure from 2013. With respect to the AC chair, the new rules give the Chairmanship a role in 
managing the reception and circulation of applications for Observer status to all Arctic states and 
Permanent Participants (Art. 1-2 of Annex 2).8 In addition, Observers are expected to submit to the 
Chairmanship up to date information about their relevant activities and contributions to the work of 
the Council (Art.4 of Annex 2) before the Ministerial meetings where the review of Observers is to 
take place;9 and the Chairmanship shall distribute this information to all Members and PPs together 
with a list of accredited Observers (Art.5 of Annex 2). 
Whilst original AC rules of procedure from 1998 assigned secretariat support functions to the Host 
Country which was “responsible for facilitating preparations for forthcoming Ministerial and SAO 
meetings, liaison and coordination, providing secretariat support functions and carrying out such other 
tasks as the Arctic Council may require or direct”(Arctic Council 1998), Rule 32 of the revised rules 
of procedure from 2013 makes the Secretariat responsible for the support functions set out in its 
separate Terms of Reference (Arctic Council 2013). The permanent Arctic Council Secretariat was 
established by a decision from the 2011 Nuuk Ministerial meeting. Located in Tromsø, Norway, it 
became operational on June 1, 2013. According to its terms of reference, the AC Secretariat is to, inter 
alia, assist the Chair in drafting meeting documents including final reports, developing strategic 
communication and outreach plans and other documents under the direct supervision of the Chair, 
as well as providing other services and functions as may be required and directed by the Arctic Council 
and its Chair (Art. 2.2) (Arctic Council 2012). Furthermore, many of the duties of the Secretariat's 
director are associated with the SAO Chair (as provided by the chairing country): the director reports 
to SAOs through the SAO Chair, receives tasks from him or her, is under his or her direction and 
shall consult him or her on all matters of importance (Art. 3.3). In addition, when directed by the SAO 
Chair, the director represents the AC Secretariat externally (Art. 3.4) and performs such other 
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functions as may be required and directed by the SAOs and the SAO Chair (Art. 3.6g). Finally, when 
it comes to the administrative budget of the Secretariat, the Chair carries the costs, others than listed 
in the Art.6.1, as per current practice and the rules of procedure, including renting rooms and 
providing interpretation at the meetings of SAOs, deputy ministers and ministers (Art. 6.1). In 
conclusion, the establishment of a standing Secretariat gave the AC an administrative capacity and 
institutional memory that it did not possess previously and which was difficult to maintain with 
rotating chairmanships. However, as a more detailed examination of the Secretariat’s terms of 
reference shows, much discretion and margin of maneuver is still left to the Chairmanship, in 
particular through the control that the SAO Chair maintains over the director of the Secretariat who 
has the overall responsibility for the management, administration and the day-to-day functioning of 
the Secretariat (Art. 3.2. and 3.4).  
AC chairmanships - between theory and practice  
When Canada assumed the AC chairmanship in 2013, the cycle of rotating chairmanships among the 
eight Arctic states began anew. In the first cycle, states proposed themselves as the next country to 
hold the chair which consequently moved from Canada (1996-1998) to the United States (1998-2000), 
Finland (2000-2002), Iceland (2002-2004), Russia (2004-2006), Norway (2006-2009)10, Denmark 
(2009-2011) and finally to Sweden (2011-2013). For their two-year term of office Arctic states typically 
have proposed a program of objectives or actions that they would like prioritized during their tenure. 
Arguably it is through advancement of those priorities that the chairmanship may be seen as a ‘window 
of opportunity’ to shift the agenda of the AC closer to the national interest of the state in office, even 
if constrained by the consensual nature of AC decision-making process.  
According to theoretical insights, states typically confer upon the chair the tasks of agenda setting, 
brokerage and representation in response to problems related to bargaining in a multilateral context - 
even if in the case of the Arctic Council much of the evidence shows the United States resisting 
allowing the Council any resemblance to an international organization, and thus confining the actual 
role of the chair. Under the significant constraints of a consensus-based decision-making body (in 
concordance with the Article 7 of the Ottawa Declaration), the customary practice of suggesting the 
priorities for two-year rotating terms has nevertheless allowed the chairing country to play something 
of a leadership role in defining the AC objectives throughout its tenure (Spence 2015). In light of the 
culture of dialogue and the practice of round-table discussions within the AC and its subsidiary bodies 
(e.g. working groups) (Fenge & Funston 2015), the brokerage function is conceivably of lesser 
importance, whereas representation of the Arctic Council in other international fora requires more 
careful examination on a case-by-case basis11 – since the AC rules of procedure allow not only the 
chairmanship, but also an Arctic state or other subsidiary body to undertake communications on AC 
matters “as may be agreed to in advance by the Arctic States” (Rule 11 of Revised Rules of Procedure, 
Arctic Council 2013). Moreover, the AC cannot represent its member states in international 
negotiations.  
The parameters conditioning the chair’s performance include the international environment, the 
nature of the issue, the institution-specific features and finally the chair’s personal skills. In the case of 
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the Arctic Council, both the external circumstances of relative détente in the aftermath of Cold War 
and the upfront explicit exclusion of military security from deliberations of the Council not only 
created favorable conditions for the development of circumpolar cooperation, but also enabled the 
chair to carry out functions that extended beyond strictly assigned procedural tasks and formalities. 
On the one hand, the applied model of a chairmanship rotating every two years (a relatively long 
duration for a rotating chair system) has brought about space for the chairing country to promote its 
own priorities, e.g. through presented programs, with the implicit acquiescence of the other members 
(yet formally under the rule of consensus) as all the Arctic states eventually receive the same privileged 
opportunity of heading the AC. On the other hand, however, a two-year period may oftentimes be 
not enough to address effectively some of the major challenges identified in the Arctic. For that reason 
three Scandinavian countries: Norway, Denmark and Sweden decided to pursue next to their national 
objectives also a set of common priorities, to endorse continuity in the work of the Arctic Council 
during their consecutive chairmanships (Norwegian, Danish, Swedish common objectives for their Arctic Council 
chairmanships 2006–2012).12 Yet, it did not prevent them from presenting as well their individual 
undertakings, reflective of their distinctive interests and concerns (Nord 2013) as much as of the 
changing external environment which for example pushed the Danish chairmanship to take upon the 
question of Observers to the Council (The Kingdom of Denmark 2009; see also: Graczyk 2011). It 
was for the first time during the Danish chairmanship period that the SAO chair, Mr. Lars Møller, 
attended the Observers’ meeting in 2010 in Warsaw, followed by the Swedish SAO chair, Mr. Gustaf 
Lind, in March 2013 and the Canadian SAO, Ms. Susan Harper, who replaced the SAO chair at the 
“Warsaw Format” meeting with the AC Observer states in March 2015. Whereas similar meeting with 
the US SAO chair may be anticipated later into the US chairmanship, the United States has been active 
on the Observers’ issues from its early days in the chair office, initiating for example a series of joint 
phone calls with the Observers to enhance with them channels of communication and exchange of 
information.13 
Somewhat loosely defined rules of procedure leave some degree of discretion to the chair (for example 
in its relations with the AC Secretariat), albeit again under the requirement of consensus of all the AC 
Members for all decisions taken by the Council and its subsidiary bodies. Another form of what could 
be considered a safeguard mechanism to curtail the chair’s autonomy has been the division of chairs 
over various AC working groups and task forces, where most of the Council’s work is being done, 
among all the Arctic states. In concordance with Tallberg’s findings a system where a state in office 
controls multiple chairs of sub-groups within the organization and where the chairmanship of all or 
most of those sub-groups shift from one state to the other at the same time is particularly open to a 
process of logrolling. In the Arctic Council, however, different Arctic states chair different working 
groups (with exception of Sustainable Development Working Group headed usually by the AC chair) 
and task forces, while the working group’s secretariats ensure the continuity of carried projects and 
further shield them from too erratic shifting of the Council’s priorities.  
Finally, it is worth noting the role of individuals and potential of the SAO chairs as of the 
entrepreneurial leaders in the chairmanship process. As it was underlined earlier, entrepreneurial 
leaders are typically agents acting in the name of states (like the SAO chairs) or organizations,  “subject 
to removal if they neglect (...) [their] interests” (Young 1991: 296). However, as much as they represent 
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states’ interests, the success of bargaining and institution’s regular functioning depends many times on 
the chair’s personal skills to formulate issues in the fashion agreeable to all parties, to overcome 
impediments and finding common grounds to proceed. Conceivably, for example, the success of 
Icelandic chairmanship (2002-2004) drew upon the commitment and dedication of Icelandic SAO 
chair, Mr. Gunnar Pálsson (Fenge 2013). 
Impact of domestic politics and international developments 
As states construct institutions to advance their goals and support their interests, those institutions 
become a part of a broader matrix of national and foreign policies of their members, oftentimes 
influenced as much by changes at the domestic level as in the external environment. Similarly, the 
approach taken towards the Arctic Council as well as countries’ proposed objectives reflect larger 
national and foreign policy interests of eight Arctic states, where the AC can be considered an arena 
for their pursuit of interests of greater or smaller importance, depending on the country's profile and 
importance of the Arctic in its domestic politics.  
The good case in point here is the United States, the 2015-2017 chair of the Arctic Council, and the 
impact its domestic politics as well as foreign policy stances have had on the evolution of its approach 
towards the AC. As it was outlined earlier, the Arctic Council was very much a Canadian initiative. 
However, since its inception met so much resistance from the United States and many issues remained 
unresolved at the time of signing of Ottawa Declaration, the first Canadian chairmanship was almost 
entirely dedicated to drafting of rules of procedure, adopting terms of reference for the new 
sustainable development program (the primary extension from the environmentally focused AEPS) 
and making the body operational. Thus, in words of Evan Bloom, “as chair, the United States [was] 
(...) in charge of facilitating the first active phase of the Council’s existence” (Bloom 1999: 717). Whilst 
the Arctic was not high on the overcrowded agendas of politicians in Washington DC, the actions 
pursued within the Council corresponded well with the climate policies of the Clinton administration 
ahead of the Kyoto conference in 1997 and led to launch of one of the most important and successful 
Arctic Council projects, namely the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) (Koivurova 2009; for more 
details on the ACIA process see: Nilsson 2007).14 At the same time, the process of ACIA illustrates 
how changes in domestic politics in the US, even beyond the chairmanship period, can translate into 
differences in the approach taken towards Arctic-related projects. In 2003, under George W. Bush 
administration, the instructions received by the US representative in the ACIA policy drafting 
committee proposed delaying the drafting of policy recommendations, which seriously hampered the 
policy part of the process (Fenge 2013; Nilsson 2007). Nonetheless, after significant public pressure 
on the United States, the final policy document was eventually agreed and the ACIA scientific report 
published in 2005.15   
The political importance of the ACIA-fed projections of an opening Arctic Ocean was much 
reinforced two years later, when planting of the Russian flag on the seabed under the North Pole in 
2007 caused the worldwide media frenzy and created a surge in international interest in the Arctic. 
This event illustrates well how external factors and developments may influence the course of action 
and the evolution of the AC substantive agenda, as it was the case with the Danish chairmanship, 
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which addressed in its programme the question of greater involvement of Observers in the work of 
the Arctic Council. Moreover, whereas occurrence of the Arctic Five format that followed signing of 
the Ilullisat Declaration in 2008 only by Arctic rim states raised a number of questions about the 
legitimacy of various forums relevant for debating Arctic issues, the Arctic Council eventually came 
out of those debates “revived and even strengthened” (Pedersen 2012: 205), when in the Ministerial 
meeting in Nuuk in 2011 ministers announced the first legally binding agreement (on search and 
rescue) negotiated under the auspices of the AC and decided to “respond to the challenges and 
opportunities facing the Arctic by establishing a standing Arctic Council secretariat” (Arctic Council 
2011).16  
However, external events may have also potentially strong adverse effects on circumpolar cooperation. 
At present, one much discussed issue is whether cooperation at the Arctic Council can continue after 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, an act strongly condemned by the other Arctic states. 
Even though the situation is still unfolding, arguably the AC chair can play a role in those processes.  
We may be seeing this happening presently, with the United States in its position as AC chair, taking 
a much more conciliatory approach towards Russia on Arctic matters than it is able to take on non-
Arctic matters. Such appeasing, rather than belligerent, rhetoric adopted by the US AC officials helps 
to insulate the Council from broader geopolitics as well as maintain the circumpolar platform as an 
open channel of communication and collaboration at times of tensions and much worsening relations 
in other parts of the world.   
Conclusions  
It seems fair to say that the office of the Arctic Council chair has grown in stature over time by default 
rather than design. In course of negotiations over establishment of the Arctic Council, wrangles over 
the design and the procedural issues, as noticed by David Scrivener, represented in fact debates on 
more fundamental questions of purpose and direction (Scrivener 1999: 57). Since the United States 
strongly opposed an idea of a new international organization with circumpolar focus, it consistently 
held the minimalist view of the role the Council, objected to the creation of a permanent secretariat 
and insisted on confining the actual role of the AC chair. Yet it appears that the AC rules of procedure 
approved first in 1998 and revised in 2013 left enough scope for action for the Arctic states, as they 
consecutively assumed the chair office, to use it to advance their national priorities and interests, even 
though they were constrained to some degree by the consensual nature of decision-making in the 
Council. In addition, the international environment and relative détente following the end of Cold 
War, along with the upfront exclusion of controversial, military security matters from the Council 
deliberations enabled the chairs to carry out functions extending beyond strictly assigned procedural 
tasks and formalities. Perhaps the most noticeable example of the AC chair’s discretion has been the 
customary practice of presenting country’s program of objectives for its AC tenure - providing 
directions for the Arctic Council in two-year time spans and playing much of the agenda-setting role 
typically conferred to chairs in international organizations. The Arctic states have acquiesced in this 
because the system of rotating chairmanships ensures to them a reciprocal advantage, in that all states 
eventually get the similar privileged opportunity to head the AC. At the same time, the division of 
chairs over the working groups and task forces, where most of the AC work is done, among all the 
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eight Arctic states and not linking them to the AC chairs puts in place a system of checks and balances 
(further strengthened by the use of consensus), which shields the institution from erratic shifting of 
priorities linked to the domestic interests of the state currently holding the lead office.   
International institutions, however, do not operate in vacuum. The Arctic Council is no exception to 
this rule, as it has tried to adapt to the unprecedented attention paid to the Arctic as a result of 
processes of climate change and globalization. At present, one of the main challenges concerns 
insulating the Council from the increased international polarization that followed Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea in March 2014. Since the Arctic Council is a consensus-based body, the endorsement of its 
actions by all Arctic states is essential to its continued functioning. On the one hand, the conditions 
of animosity may significantly reduce the scope of action for the chair and limit its potential to deliver. 
Yet on the other hand, they may potentially increase the importance of the Arctic Council chair in 
brokerage, identifying underlying areas of agreement and finding common ways to further 
cooperation.  
 
 
Notes 
1. For a study dedicated solely to the Swedish AC chairmanship see Nord 2013. 
2. More on the agenda-shaping power see: Tallberg 2003. 
3. Slightly different qualifications for the power of the chair in international cooperation are 
presented by Tallberg according to whom influence of formal leaders is conditional upon a 
demand for leadership (so where states cannot come on their own to consensus over the 
agenda, negotiated text etc.), alternative solutions for leadership (like international secretariats 
or even influential individuals), decision-making rules governing the conduct of negotiations 
(the more demanding rule, the lesser space for manouver by the chair) and finally design of 
the chairmanship (three models described in the main text). 
4. As the AC Rules of Procedures stipulate, Chairmanship means the Arctic state which chairs 
the Arctic Council from the conclusion of a biennial Ministerial meeting to the conclusion of 
the next biennial Ministerial meeting. However, the term chair in the AC context is often used 
in relation to the chair of the Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) who is also provided by the country 
chairing the Council.  
5. At that time neither the AEPS nor the Arctic Council were seen in the U.S. as strong tools of 
foreign policy where, when it comes for example to relations with Russia, other bilateral 
platforms of cooperation already existed (Russell 1996). 
6. One could plausibly argue that the approach taken by the United States towards circumpolar 
collaboration was to large extent dictated by the overall setting of the 1990s. At the time, the 
world was clearly unipolar with “[t]he center of world power [being] (...) the unchallenged 
superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies” (Krauthammer 1990: 23). 
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7. In addition, two rules, which refer, but not exclusively, to the chairmanship and the chair are 
Rule 11 which stipulates that “the Chairmanship, an Arctic State, or other subsidiary bodies 
may undertake communications on Arctic Council matters with other international fora as 
may be agreed to in advance by the Arctic States” and Rule 12 according to which “[d]uring 
the discussion of any matter, a representative of an Arctic State or Permanent Participant may 
rise to a point of order and the point of order shall be decided immediately by the chairperson 
in accordance with these Rules.”  
8. The provision regulating applications by a potential Permanent Participant remained 
unchanged and the Chairmanship shall circulate it to all Arctic States and Permanent 
Participants at least 90 days prior to the Ministerial meeting at which the matter is to be decided 
(Rule 35).  
9. In practice, though, the reports are submitted to the AC Secretariat in Tromsø, Norway. 
10. As agreed in Norwegian, Danish and Swedish common objectives for their Arctic Council 
chairmanships 2006-2012, “the Ministerial Meetings could be moved to the spring to take 
advantage of the more favorable weather conditions in the Arctic during the season” 
(Norwegian, Danish, Swedish Common Objectives 2007), which resulted in postponing of the 
Ministerial meeting ending the Norwegian chairmanship from fall 2008 to spring 2009.  
11. One example of such case happened back in 2002 when the SAO Chair was authorized by the 
Council to speak on its behalf at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in South 
Africa (Fenge & Funston 2015: 18). 
12. The common objectives of the three countries included climate change, integrated 
management of resources, the International Polar Year (IPY), indigenous peoples and local 
living conditions, and management issues (Norwegian, Danish, Swedish common objectives for their 
Arctic Council chairmanships 2006–2012). 
13. The point, however, which remains to be addressed relates to the already mentioned reports 
on relevant activities and contributions of the Observers to the AC work. So far those 
submissions (from 2013 and 2015) did not receive any feedback from the Council, leading 
thus some of the Observers to question the point of this requirement.    
14. The work plan for the assessment was developed from the initiative of Robert Corell during 
the US AC chairmanship and approved in the AC Ministerial meeting in Barrow, Alaska in 
2000. The United States not only chaired, but also largely financed the project, leading to its 
completion in 2004 and publication in 2005. 
15. The increasing importance of climate change on the US national agenda is also presently 
reflected in the US priorities for its chairmanship period which, next to improving living 
conditions for Arctic communities and the Arctic Ocean stewardship, include addressing 
impacts of climate change. 
16. The temporary dismissal of the Arctic Five (A5) format could be partially linked to the effect 
of changes in the US domestic politics on position of the United States vis-à-vis the Arctic 
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cooperation when the US withdrew its support to the A5 in 2011, after Barack Obama 
succeeded George W. Bush as president and Hillary Clinton was appointed as secretary of 
state. The debates about the Arctic Five, however, again renewed, when five Arctic littoral 
states signed the moratorium on unregulated fishing in the central Arctic Ocean in July 2015.   
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The ‘Common Arctic’: 
Legal Analysis of Arctic & non-Arctic Political Discourses 
 
 
Kristin Bartenstein 
 
This paper takes a closer look at the references to commonality, which are a salient, albeit ambiguous feature of the current discussion 
on Arctic governance. It does so from a legal perspective and with the purpose to unveil a twofold divide in the discussion. Legal and 
political purposes intersect and they vary depending on whether they are made from an Arctic or a non-Arctic perspective. Despite 
similar rhetoric, intentions may differ greatly and it is not unusual that different players refer to the law in irreconcilable or 
controversial ways. In a first step, the variety of references to commonality is charted and the underlying rhetorical strategies are 
carved out. In a second step, the references’ legal accuracy and their conceptual contribution to the development of a legal framework 
for Arctic cooperation are analysed. This should enable a better understanding of the diverging intentions and strategies at play in 
the discussion and the difficulties to reach a common understanding of how to govern the Arctic region. 
 
Introduction 
The idea that certain areas, resources, interests and concerns can be common was embraced rather 
recently in public international law. As a consequence of the ‘Westphalian’ conception of international 
law as a regulatory means to govern relations between sovereign States, the international legal order is 
characterized by mainly “relative” (Verdross 1965: 126), decentralized law-making and enforcement. 
In the absence of a central authority, interstate negotiation and cooperation have proven indispensable 
for the States’ common interests to emerge and to be addressed (Brunnée 2008: 551). Environmental 
protection is a field where the shift from bilateralism to “community interests” is particularly marked 
(Simma 1994: 235 et s.). International environmental law developed from a classic bilateral law in its 
earliest manifestations (Trail Smelter case, 1938 and 1941) towards a law based on community concerns 
thanks to rising awareness, starting in the 1960s, that resources are finite and that pollution problems 
are often of a global nature (Simma 1994: 238 et s.). These community interests notwithstanding, state 
sovereignty remains key in interstate relations.  
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This said, arguments put forward in recent debates on Arctic governance by Arctic and non-Arctic 
states alike frequently revolve around what will be called here ‘commonality’. The word ‘commonality’ 
is used as a generic term to capture diverse terms and expressions that seem intended to frame a 
‘common Arctic’ in some way or another. The precise meaning of these references to commonality 
varies significantly depending on the context and the perspective in which they are expressed. States’ 
invocations, or even incantations of commonality regarding the Arctic, in particular if they are 
expressly linked to environmental concerns, must be considered in this apparently contradictory 
context.  
The new interest in the Arctic and the related question of the future of Arctic governance has drawn 
considerable attention in recent years. Much of the discussion focuses on the question of who are the 
legitimate players in Arctic governance. Beyond doubt, the states located in the Arctic are entitled to 
play an active role and they have done so, both individually and collectively. After the end of the Cold 
War, Arctic cooperation first concentrated on environmental issues under the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy (Declaration on the Protection of Arctic Environment, 1991). Since the creation 
of the Arctic Council in 1996, Arctic cooperation has been based on an embryonic institutional 
structure and its scope broadened to include the wider issues of sustainable development and of well-
being of the inhabitants. The main actors of Arctic cooperation are the eight “Arctic States,” the Arctic 
Councils’ full members – namely Canada, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, 
Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Denmark/Greenland –, and the Permanent Participants, as are 
called the representatives of indigenous peoples (Ottawa Declaration, 1996). Non-Arctic states and 
non-state actors may be granted Observer status, provided they have relevant interests and expertise 
and display adequate deference to the Arctic States’ rights and interests (Observer Manual, 2013). 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom are longstanding state 
Observers, whereas China, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore and India became observers in 2013. 
Although the Observer status is coveted by non-Arctic States, many of them clearly seek an even more 
active role in Arctic governance. 
This paper scrutinizes the discourse of some players in more detail: China, as an emerging power and 
new Observer with no official Arctic strategy, but certainly an Arctic agenda (Chen 2012: 369; 
Jakobson 2010: 2 and 9; Liu et al. 2012: 366); Germany, as a longstanding Observer with a well-
articulated policy and a century-long history of Arctic research (Germany 2013: 11); the European 
Union, as a prospective Observer that is expected to issue, after tortuous debates, an official strategy 
in 2015 (E.U., 2012); and the Arctic states, as the group with the most genuinely Arctic discourse, at 
least geographically speaking.  
The discussion on Arctic governance is shaped by several characteristic features pertaining to the 
region’s natural and legal/political situation. The Arctic is a remote region with a harsh environment 
and vast stretches of wilderness. It is ecologically sensitive and suffers from serious pollution problems 
and rapidly warming temperatures. The Arctic might hold considerable undiscovered resources 
(USGS 2008), which are of interest to Arctic and non-Arctic States and their industries. It includes 
international areas as well as areas where Arctic states exercise jurisdiction or even sovereignty. The 
Arctic’s warming, the resulting new threats and opportunities, the complicated legal framework and 
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its complex geopolitical links to other parts of the world have given rise to political destabilization in 
the region (Luedtke & Howkins 2012; Martin-Nielsen 2015). Recent developments in Ukraine further 
complicate the issue by altering the relations between several states with Arctic interests and the 
Russian Federation. In this context, states’ behaviour suggests that defining a new balance of power 
and devising an appropriate governance model has become increasingly urgent, while the challenge is 
to bring all of the relevant aspects into the frame and to develop a coherent and manageable balance.  
This paper takes a closer look at the references to commonality, which are a salient, albeit ambiguous 
feature of the current discussion on Arctic governance. It does so from a legal perspective and with 
the purpose to unveil a twofold divide in the discussion. Legal and political purposes intersect and 
they vary depending on whether they are made from an Arctic or a non-Arctic perspective. Despite 
similar rhetoric, intentions may differ greatly and it is not unusual that different players refer to the 
law in irreconcilable or controversial ways. In a first step, the variety of references to commonality is 
charted and the underlying rhetorical strategies are carved out. In a second step, the references’ legal 
accuracy and their conceptual contribution to the development of a legal framework for Arctic 
cooperation are analysed. This should enable a better understanding of the diverging intentions and 
strategies at play in the discussion and the difficulties to reach a common understanding of how to 
govern the Arctic region. 
Commonality in discourses on the Arctic  
With respect to the Arctic, commonality is referred to in many different fora, including in political 
statements, official policy papers and pleas made by diplomats in academic settings. Most of these 
references do not seek exclusively – if at all – to be convincing from a legal perspective, but they all 
strive to be politically compelling. And yet, they are often made in contexts where politics and law are 
inextricably intertwined and where the law is even expressly mentioned – albeit at times in ways that 
cast doubt on whether the law is correctly interpreted or understood. How is commonality referred 
to? What do these references reveal about the legal stances taken by states with regard to the Arctic 
and what messages do they convey? These are the main questions addressed in this first part. 
References to commonality… 
The following review of expressions recently used or reported is admittedly anecdotal and focuses on 
the clearest and therefore sometimes most contentious references. The purpose is to provide a good 
sense of the variety of references to commonality that may be encountered in the debate on Arctic 
governance, as they all potentially influence the legal framing of the region and Arctic cooperation.  
Different formulations notwithstanding, the references always correlate to either a perspective of 
regional Arctic commonality or a perspective of global commonality regarding Arctic issues. The 
distinctly Arctic perspective of commonality is characteristic of the Arctic states’ view. The Ottawa 
Declaration, which establishes the Arctic Council as a facilitator of cooperation among Arctic states 
“on common Arctic issues”, according to article 1 (a), is clearly based on the concept of a regional 
common. Rothwell (2008: 247) explains that the Arctic Council’s mandate is to promote “discussion 
of issues of common interest amongst the Arctic states”, obviously considering Arctic commonality 
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as the main motivation for the Arctic Council’s establishment. Canada’s Northern Strategy stresses 
the Arctic Council’s key role in developing a “common agenda” among Arctic states (Canada 2009: 
35). It underscores the need for Canada to work closely with its Arctic neighbours to achieve the 
Arctic states’ “common goals” and emphasizes interests that Canada shares with its Arctic neighbours, 
such as climate change adaptation, oil and gas development, oceans management and scientific 
cooperation (Canada 2009: 33 and 35). The United States’ National Strategy for the Arctic Region, for 
its part, insists on “common interests” that make Arctic states ideal partners of cooperation (U.S. 
2013: 9). It highlights the successful cooperation within the Arctic Council, considered a facilitator of 
cooperation on “myriad issues of mutual interest,” and notes that cooperation has led to “much 
progress on issues of common concern,” such as search and rescue as well as pollution prevention 
and response (U.S. 2013: 2 and 9). Although the Strategy concedes that Arctic states share “common 
objectives in the Arctic region” with non-Arctic states and other non-Arctic stakeholders, it asserts 
that these objectives must be advanced “in a manner that protects Arctic states’ national interests and 
resources” (U.S. 2013: 10). Yet, John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, when taking over the chairmanship 
of the Arctic Council in Iqaluit in 2015, explicitly called on the “entire world” to address climate 
change, the region’s biggest challenge (Kerry 2015). It remains to be seen whether this marks a shift 
in attitude and whether this “shared responsibility” will indeed yield greater weight for non-Arctic 
states in Arctic cooperation, as these states have long sought.    
Statements from the realm of non-Arctic states have indeed long conveyed the idea that the Arctic is 
a global common, or at least of global interest. One of the clearest and most striking expressions of 
global commonality has been to label the “Arctic” as “common heritage of mankind” (Shackelford 
2009). The former German Foreign Minister, Guido Westerwelle (2012: 3), used this qualification to 
describe the Arctic Ocean, whereas Georg Witschel (2010: 34), legal adviser of the German Foreign 
Office, mentioned it with reference to the high seas of the Arctic Ocean, clarifying however that “[t]his 
[concept was] particularly relevant as far as sea-bed resources [were] concerned.” 
While Chinese academics are more vocal than Chinese officials (Alexeeva & Lasserre 2013), some 
striking statements are attributable to the official realm. Qu Tanzhou, director of the Chinese Arctic 
and Antarctic Administration, is quoted as having mentioned the concept of “common heritage of 
mankind” in a blurred reference to the Arctic high seas and “resources in the seabed” (Wang 2010; 
Chinese (slightly different) version: 王茜 2010). Hu Zhengyue, China’s assistant Foreign Minister, called 
on Arctic states to bear in mind the relationship between the extended continental shelf and the 
international seabed areas, “which are a common heritage of humankind” (Hu 2009). In their English 
translation, his words were sometimes received as establishing a link between the coastal States’ 
continental shelves and the international Area (Chao 2013: 482; Wright 2011: 29). The Chinese Rear 
Admiral, Yin Zhuo is quoted as saying in 2010 that “[a]ccording to the UN law of the Sea, the North 
Pole and areas surrounding it do not belong to any country but are common wealth of the whole 
human population” (Kopra 2013: 110). Yin Zhuo reportedly said, with respect to the Arctic Ocean, 
that “except for areas of territorial sea, all other parts [were] international waters” and thus a “common 
legacy of humankind,” which he considered a longstanding legal basis (Anonymous 2013a). 
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In these statements, not only the term ‘common’, but also the words ‘mankind’ and ‘human’ convey 
the idea of global commonality. The latter signal furthermore that the interest in the Arctic is not a 
matter of sheer geographical proximity. Rather, all of humanity, not first and foremost States, has 
stakes in its inherited wealth, irrespective of the world’s political organisation and of the Arctic’s 
remoteness.  
A variation to the ‘common heritage of mankind’ is put forward by Witschel’s (2010: 34) description 
of the Arctic region as an “ecological heritage of mankind”. In this expression and its focus on the 
heritage’s ecological dimension, the interest of humanity appears even more natural. Transboundary, 
even global commonality unmistakably emerge from this emphasis on humanity over statehood.  
The idea of commonality is less obvious, but still perceptible in references that do not use the words 
‘common’ or ‘human(kind)’, but underscore shared interests or concerns. Indeed, Huang Xing, the 
Chinese Ambassador to Finland, reportedly said that the healthy development of the Arctic “is a 
matter which not only concerns the surrounding countries of the arctic [sic] but also concerns other 
members of the international community” (Anonymous 2013b; Chinese version: 李骥志 2013). A 
spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, Hong Lei, is quoted as having declared that “Arctic-related issues 
are not only regional matters, but also cross-regional matters involving climate change and navigation” 
(Kopra 2013: 110). According to the EU, the Arctic states and the EU have “a shared interest” in 
sustainably developing the Arctic’s economy in sectors such as mining, shipping, fishing, sealing and 
tourism (E.U. 2012). Much in the same way, Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines stress the need for 
“Arctic resources [to be] used in a sustainable way, in the interest of the Arctic countries and of the 
international community” (Germany 2013: 11). 
… and their connotations and intended meanings  
All these references to commonality arguably pursue specific rhetorical and political objectives that 
deserve to be investigated. Political discourse relies mostly on ordinary language, as it is meant to be 
understood by specialists and laymen alike. And even if technical language is used, it might not be 
recognized as such, so that it is interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words 
used. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2014), the semantic field of the term ‘common’ 
covers several meanings of ‘natural commonality’ including to be “of general, public, or non-private 
nature”, of “belonging equally to more than one […]” or even of “belonging to all mankind alike 
[…]”, but it also extends to ‘stipulated commonality’ of “belonging to more than one as a result or 
sign of co-operation, joint action, or agreement”. The noun ‘commonality’ means notably the “state 
or quality of being in common with, or shared by, others” and “a shared feature”. 
What conclusions can be drawn regarding references to the word ‘common’ or variations thereof in 
discussions on Arctic governance? First of all, commonality implies two different, but related 
meanings: the idea of collectiveness and, in legal terms, of collective entitlement and the idea of 
sharing. While the idea of collectiveness suggests that every member of a group that arises out of a 
given commonality has a legitimate interest, or in some cases even a legal right, in taking part in the 
shaping of the group’s destiny, the idea of sharing points to the joint – and not exclusive – benefiting 
from the common good, but also to the joint bearing of related burdens. 
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The connotation of benefiting and of burden-sharing both resonate in the debate on Arctic 
governance. Non-Arctic states clearly voice their interest in the Arctic’s natural resources (cf. EU 2012: 
9). Some of the Arctic’s significant deposits of natural resources have been exploited for many years, 
at least on shore. The 2008 U.S.G.S. report, which estimates that one fifth of the Earth’s undiscovered 
and recoverable resource deposits of oil and gas are located in the Arctic, further fuelled the non-
Arctic states’ interest. At the same time, non-Arctic states, in particular members of the European 
Union, have also expressed concern as to the preservation of the fragile Arctic environment and to 
the necessity of limiting the risk of pollution and other environmental destruction that increases 
significantly with growing commercial and industrial activities, such as navigation and resource 
exploitation (EU 2012: 6; see also Germany 2013: 1).   
Furthermore, the idea of commonality has strong appeal because it implies natural relatedness to the 
issue(s) at stake. However, as the distinction between an Arctic and a global perspective of 
commonality reveals, the notion of relatedness is, in fact, very malleable. When conceived in a global 
perspective, as by non-Arctic states, commonality suggests inclusiveness, converging interests and 
coinciding concerns. Consequently, the interest in having a say appears as if it were a natural right: if 
the Arctic’s development and protection is a global concern, its governance cannot be left to the Arctic 
states alone. Non-Arctic states indeed mention the physical changes in the Arctic triggered by global 
warming in the same breath as environmental risks caused by human activity in the Arctic, including 
resource exploitation and shipping (cf. Germany 2013: 4; EU 2012: 2), which links the issue of global 
warming to issues that, from a legal viewpoint, are not international issues to the same degree 
(navigation and research) or even international issues at all (resource exploitation) (LOSC 1982: parts 
V, VI, VII, XI, XIII). Associating global warming, which undeniably requires global action, with 
various aspects of Arctic governance arguably intends to tie Arctic governance to global action. 
The Arctic states’ approach, which seeks exclusiveness, is in stark contrast to this reasoning. Instead 
of a general, all-encompassing commonality, these states advocate a specific, functional commonality. 
Their understanding of commonality is selective, as affiliation to the community depends on a set of 
conditions. Such agreed commonality led to the establishment of the Arctic Council, whose members 
cooperate upon the (implicit) criterion that they are “Arctic States” given that part of their territories 
stretch north of the Arctic Circle (Ottawa Declaration 1996).  
The difficulty with such selective commonality is to identify a politically and legally convincing 
specificity. While the ‘Arctic Eight’ have similar problems and interests, their Arctic nature does not 
bestow upon them the same kind of functional commonality shared by the ‘Arctic Five’, i.e. the coastal 
states (Canada, the United States, the Russian Federation, Norway and Denmark/Greenland). These 
states’ commonality is indeed rooted in the law of the sea, which invests them with particular powers 
and rights and, thus, a particular role in the Arctic. This was underscored by the Arctic Five at an 
exclusive conference held in 2008 in Ilulissat (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). Concerned that the larger 
Arctic community could be divided and weakened, the remaining three Arctic states disapproved of 
the conference, as well as of the following Arctic Five conference held in 2010 in Chelsea (Dodds 
2013; Petersen 2012). Since that time, the Arctic Council’s members have achieved a balanced 
compromise between the coastal states’ and the non-coastal states’ interests. In the Vision of the Arctic, 
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adopted at the 2013 Arctic Council’s ministerial meeting held in Kiruna, Sweden, the eight Arctic 
states, after recalling that they have, among other things, “achieved mutual understanding and trust, 
addressed issues of common concern”, reassert their primacy over non-Arctic states in Arctic affairs. 
Consequently, they confirm that full membership in the Arctic Council and decision-making remains 
exclusively with them. They also reiterate their commitment to the law of the sea, acknowledging 
implicitly the coastal states’ pre-eminence regarding several issues. While accounting for their varying 
legal situations, the Arctic states clearly set themselves apart as a distinctive group with specific 
interests and concerns that warrant their predominant bearing on the region’s governance and in doing 
so, mean to ward off sweeping claims of cooperation coming from non-Arctic states. 
The law – and politics – of a ‘common Arctic’ 
There is little doubt that Arctic states are entitled to participate in Arctic decision-making. However, 
the opinion prevailing among non-Arctic states to the effect that international cooperation on the 
Arctic is warranted requires some scrutiny. The discourse promotes the idea of a ‘global common 
Arctic’ and often confirms explicitly that interstate relations regarding Arctic matters should take place 
within the existing legal framework. Yet, what precisely would make the Arctic a common issue from 
a legal perspective? What is the legal value and accuracy of references to the ‘common heritage of 
mankind’ and similar expressions? Is there any legal value to affirmations of the international 
community’s ‘interest’ or ‘concern’ regarding the Arctic? This part will provide some thoughts on 
these questions. 
Variations on the theme of ‘common heritage of mankind’  
From a legal perspective, references to the ‘common heritage of mankind’ have potentially far-
reaching consequences, but it is questionable whether the concept is always referred to properly in the 
Arctic debate. Emerging amidst newly independent states’ growing concern for resource allocation 
and their nascent calls for better (economic) chances and a new international economic order (c.f. 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 1974), it was put forward 
in 1967 by Arvid Pardo, a Maltese diplomat with the United Nations (Malta 1967; Pardo 1967). Pardo’s 
speech contributed to spark off negotiations that eventually led to the conclusion of the 1982 LOSC. 
The latter confers to the deep seabed – or “Area” – and its resources the status of common heritage 
of mankind (LOSC: article 136). The initial legal regime underwent substantial modification prior to 
the convention’s entry into force (Implementation Agreement 1994). However, the Areas’ status still 
entails that it is an international space (LOSC: article 137), that its exploitation is internationally 
supervised and that the resulting proceeds are subject to some measure of international redistribution, 
for the “benefit of mankind” (LOSC: article 140).  
The sharing of the benefits for the sake of equity among states and regardless of the individual state’s 
capacity to actually undertake resource exploitation is the most distinctive feature of the concept of 
common heritage of mankind (Lodge 2012). The concept’s language further imbeds the resource 
management in a long-term perspective: regardless of individual States’ capacity to exploit the 
resources at a given moment, all of humanity, present and future, should benefit from their wealth.  
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The concept appeals to non-Arctic states, for all states are required to respect the Area’s international 
nature, but are also entitled to participate in its management and wealth. The concept’s territorial scope 
is however limited to the Area, that is, “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction” (LOSC: article 1 (1)). The concept therefore only applies beyond the 
continental shelves’ outer limits. The coastal states’ extensive claims on the Arctic continental shelves 
suggest that there will be only small pockets of the Area left in the Arctic Ocean (see following map; 
see also Kullerud et al. 2013). What is more, located in the middle of the ocean, likely to remain under 
permanent ice for some time and arguably not very resource-rich, thee pockets currently seem of little 
economic interest.  
 
It is the indiscriminate way the common heritage of mankind is referred to in recent debates that make 
these statements questionable. Considering “the Arctic Ocean” a common heritage of mankind 
conflates the different maritime zones and ignores the sophisticated distinctions in the law of the sea. 
It is no less legally inaccurate to regard “the high seas of the Arctic Ocean” as a common heritage of 
mankind. The high seas, although not subject to sovereignty either (LOSC: article 89), are governed 
by the principle of freedom of the seas (LOSC: article 87). It is of course possible for the international 
community to collectively limit the freedom. The ‘Arctic Five’, for example, recently appealed in the 
Declaration concerning the prevention of unregulated high seas fishing in the central Arctic Ocean 
(2015) to the international community to join efforts to protect Arctic living resources. Under the 
auspices of the UN General Assembly, preparatory work is underway on a much more comprehensive 
project, a treaty on the conservation and use of marine biological biodiversity in areas beyond national 
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jurisdiction (Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group 2015). However, the fact remains that none 
of the characteristics of the Area’s legal regime – international management and benefit sharing – 
currently applies to the high seas.  
Statements that mention the Arctic’s Area, continental shelves and high seas in the same breath as the 
common heritage of mankind carry the risk of confusion. Deliberately or not, by omitting to 
distinguish thoroughly between the different maritime zones, they may create the impression that the 
whole (marine) Arctic is considered a common heritage of mankind. 
With respect to statements made by Chinese officials, translation problems may compound 
misunderstandings, misinterpretations or misuses. Zhuo, for example, while articulating the view that 
all parts of the Arctic Ocean, except the territorial sea, are international waters and, as such, part of 
the “common legacy of humankind”, does not use the exact English expression of the LOSC, but 
nevertheless expressly refers to the legal concept (CRI 2013). According to Chinese legal scholars, 
such Chinese statements do not imply that the Arctic as a whole is indeed a common heritage of 
mankind, but are meant to remind Arctic coastal states of the consequences of their claims on 
extended continental shelves for the remaining international seabed (Liu et al. 2012: 375 and 378). 
While this interpretation seems to be in line with “the Chinese persistent principle of respect for 
sovereignty and the international affairs of other states” (Liu et al. 2012: 375), it is difficult to reconcile 
with several statements’ wordings. And as Jakobson (2010: 13) cautions, there is a risk that repeated 
misuse of certain legal concepts in political discourse leads to their perception as the prevailing legal 
situation.   
Legally questionable conflation can result from imperfect knowledge of the law or be a rhetorical 
strategy. As both can be mutually supportive, it may be impossible to tell them apart. In either case, 
collective management and benefit-sharing might be taken to apply to zones that do not qualify as 
common heritage of mankind, be they international– i.e. the high seas – or under coastal state 
jurisdiction – i.e. the continental shelves and the exclusive economic zone. Slightly different 
expressions, such as “ecological heritage of mankind” and “common legacy of humankind”, do not 
give cause for criticism from a strictly legal point of view. The first phrase in particular seems to move 
intentionally away from the legal term. While neither expression has any legal value, both might 
however do the political trick. Their lexical proximity to the legal concept, depicting the Arctic as an 
international space, draws upon connotations that insinuate that the Arctic’s resources call for 
international management and sharing.  
Even references to the principle of common heritage of mankind that are legally correct may appear 
in a twilight. Winkelmann (2013: 329), for instance, puts emphasis on the support the principle lends 
to the non-Arctic states’ interest, or entitlement, to take part in discussions that he does not further 
specify and that would be, from a strictly legal perspective, of a far more limited scope than the one 
that seems to be politically intended. 
Innovations through the concept of ‘common concerns’? 
Statements that merely imply commonality, considering Arctic issues of “concern” to or as “a shared 
interest” of the “international community”, seem driven by a different strategy and less ambitious 
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objectives, for the terms apparently lack legal connotations. Despite the less blunt approach, however, 
states still convey the wish to be heard and involved in Arctic governance. 
Environmental problems that extend beyond borders are arguably best addressed by cooperation (Rio 
Declaration, 2012: Principle 7). Yet, as Simma (1994: 247) states, it is one thing to recognize 
community interests such as environmental protection, but quite another to draw meaningful 
conclusions. Although the international legal order’s cardinal principle of state sovereignty has been 
questioned for hampering collective action to address serious environmental problems, it 
systematically prevails in international instruments and practice (Bothe 2006). Even the duty to 
cooperate for the benefit of the global environment is still based on the principle of states’ sovereignty. 
In this legal context, it is not surprising that whenever non-Arctic states suggest a more cooperative 
approach to Arctic governance, the Arctic states insist upon their sovereignty and jurisdiction.  
While the duty of cooperation is well-established in international environmental law, it provides little 
operational guidance. States are left on their own to choose the appropriate modi operandi and to 
determine their cooperating partners. Consensus emerges on a case-by-case basis among interested 
states. Regarding the Arctic, the political wrangle over the best governance model and legitimate, 
legally relevant participants is in full swing (Young 2011). The related question of the best legal 
approach has given rise to the idea of basing Arctic governance on a comprehensive treaty (see 
discussion by inter alia Jabour 2015; Charron 2015; Young 2011, Duyck 2011; Huebert 2009; 
Koivurova 2008). While the Antarctic model, as favoured initially by the European Parliament (2008: 
para. 15), is unacceptable to the Arctic states, the option of a comprehensive legal framework for 
Arctic governance – provided it takes into consideration the presence of sovereign states in the Arctic 
– is certainly not per se unreasonable. So far, however, the Arctic states have consistently balked at this 
option.  
Meanwhile, non-Arctic states, keen to strengthen their role, assert that their participation in 
cooperation is as useful as it is warranted and legitimate. They highlight the input they may provide, 
such as scientific knowledge and expertise (EU 2012: 6) or support for law-making (Germany 2013: 
7). They emphasize the Arctic (coastal) states’ obligations, particularly regarding navigation and 
scientific research (Germany 2013: 7; Gao 2012: 143), insisting on what Baker (2014: 490) calls “shared 
sovereignty”. Most importantly, however, they do not tire of stressing the need to combat climate 
change, the fragility of Arctic ecosystems and the effects that changes in the Arctic cause beyond (EU 
2012: 6 et s.; Germany 2013: 4 et s.).  
In this context, Liu et al. (2012: 378) contend that the concept of “common concern of humankind” 
offers a basis for China’s participation in Arctic affairs. Its uncertain legal status and scope and its 
absence in the political discourse notwithstanding, the concept might provide a potential alternative 
to traditional legal devices that, rooted in a transboundary rationale, fail to yield satisfactory solutions. 
Regardless of whether they originate within or beyond national jurisdiction, environmental concerns 
are captured by the concept for they are common to states in the sense that all states benefit from 
protective actions (Brunnée 2008: 564; c.f. Birnie et al. 2009: 128 et s.). The concept can be traced back 
to the 1946 Whaling Convention’s slightly different “common interest” (Kiss & Shelton 2004: 32), 
but it is the Rio instruments that give the “common concerns of humankind” their concrete meaning 
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(Rio Declaration 1992; UNFCCC 1992; CBD 1992). Further treaties address issues of common 
concern (e.g. Ramsar Convention 1971; UNESCO World Heritage Convention 1972; Vienna 
Convention 1985; Montreal Protocol 1987) and arguably the LOSC and the Fish Stocks Agreement 
(1995) are among them (Birnie et al. 2009: 128). The concept is currently confined to treaty law, where 
consensus on complex issues and detailed legal regimes are more easily achieved (Brunnée 2008: 565). 
The obvious question then is what legal impact, if any, the concept has. Brunnée (2008: 566) suggests 
that it “signals that states’ freedom of action may be subject to limits even where other states’ sovereign 
rights are not affected in [a direct transboundary way]” and she proposes accordingly to “conceive of 
the concept of common concerns as entitling, perhaps even requiring, all states to cooperate 
internationally to address the concern.” 
The concept’s contribution therefore appears to boil down to another, perhaps broader, duty to 
cooperate. However, even if states might agree that the environmental changes in the Arctic are of 
common concern, uncertainties would remain as to the issues to be addressed collectively, as to the 
states entitled to participate in cooperation and as to their respective roles. The current wrestle to 
come to grips with these aspects takes place against the backdrop of fragile institutional achievements, 
delicate relationships among Arctic states and the latter’s apprehension of uncontrollable shifts in 
power and influence, which make the consensus-finding process very complex. All these aspects are 
intricately interwoven and the concept of common concerns provides no real guidance to address 
them.  
Recent use of the concept might even bear the risk of discrediting it. Indeed, Liu et al. (2012: 379), 
drawing on the consideration that climate change in the Arctic is a common concern, argue that 
climate change negotiations should also address related problems, including Arctic biodiversity, 
navigation, fisheries and indigenous rights. While the authors insist on the coastal states’ sovereignty, 
their argument implicitly plays down the Arctic states’ particular situation. Their rights and interests 
as well as the concern of finding tailor-made solutions to Arctic problems might indeed get lost in 
climate change negotiations that have their own focus and follow their own dynamics. 
The concept of common concerns may perhaps benefit the Arctic debate insofar as it reminds states 
that “sovereignty is not unlimited or absolute” (Birnie et al. 2009: 130). A more cooperative approach 
might indeed “smooth the hard edges of state sovereignty” (Archer 2014: 404). However, the concept 
does not question state sovereignty as a pivotal feature in interstate relations, nor can it be used to 
contest the Arctic states’ leading role in Arctic affairs, which remains justified by the law. 
Conclusion 
It is the tragic irony of the Arctic that the tremendous natural disaster of rising temperatures and 
melting ice is perceived by many states as an opportunity. New seaways, new resource exploitation 
sites, new geopolitical areas of influence seem to emerge and have stirred up some political excitement. 
The physical changes, new activities and evolving interests in the Arctic have caused the need to adapt 
the governance of the region. In this context, the framing of a ‘common Arctic’ appears as a strategy 
used by Arctic and non-Arctic states alike in order to position themselves on the international 
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chessboard. Interpretations of what a ‘common Arctic’ means diverge however greatly. The Arctic 
states, interpreting the Arctic as a regional common, insist on their priority for geographical reasons 
and related territorial sovereignty or sovereign rights. Non-Arctic states, for their part, construe the 
Arctic, at least in some respects, as an international common, relying on resource-related or on 
environment-related (quasi-)legal concepts. 
As the legal analysis shows, the resource-related concept of common heritage of mankind is misguided 
and misguiding, as it does not apply to the whole Arctic, but only to a marginal part of the central 
Arctic Ocean. The environment-related concept of common concerns, is of uncertain legal status, but 
might be a useful reminder that cooperation should be favoured to address the Arctic’s environmental 
problems. However, the ongoing power game in the Arctic must be seen against the backdrop of 
economic and geopolitical opportunities. Although environmental problems receive indeed much 
attention in the current debate on Arctic governance, there is reason for concern that references to 
environmental issues are mere tokenism. Only incisive decisions to address the Arctic’s environmental 
problems and determined action to slow down global warming could prove wrong those who see in 
the environmental arguments only a fig leaf in the struggle over influence and involvement in Arctic 
issues. 
This is not to say that a comprehensive cooperation scheme could not emerge from an environment-
focused collaboration. Given the frequent interrelation between environmental problems and 
economic and geopolitical issues, the latter would inevitably have to be addressed, at least incidentally. 
Whatever the scope of cooperation, however, Arctic States’ sovereignty and sovereign rights must be 
respected. This means that measures related to international areas or activities require a different 
approach than measures related to areas or activities subject to coastal states’ jurisdiction or 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Arctic states would benefit from acknowledging non-Arctic states’ 
rights and legitimate interests. Regarding the protection of the Arctic environment, the duty of 
cooperation on environmental matters and the concept of common concern provide good legal 
arguments for an inclusive approach. In the context of ongoing negotiations for a new balance of 
power in and over the Arctic region, the challenge for Arctic states is to not let their – of course vital 
– awareness of non-Arctic states’ more self-serving interests stand in the way of cooperation. Whether 
the Arctic Council provides the appropriate forum for broader and more inclusive cooperation and 
whether such cooperation would benefit from a treaty-based approach instead of the prevailing ad 
hoc approach are questions that are beyond the scope of this article, but no less relevant. What seems 
important to note here is that there is more than one way to conceive of a ‘common Arctic’. Although 
they may seem contradictory at first sight, these different approaches can be used in a complementary 
manner. Indeed, ‘common’ does not necessarily entail identical status, rights and influence for the 
interested states. A ‘common Arctic’ could be a fruitful project, if it means that interested states pursue 
the shared goal of cooperating on Arctic issues in a peaceful, efficient, environmentally sound and 
politically differentiated way. 
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Foreign & Domestic Discourse on the Russian Arctic 
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The strained relations between the West and Russia regarding influence in Ukraine may lead to an increase in tension in other 
regions. The Arctic may become a potential zone of conflict due to its rich natural resources, new transportation routes, military 
significance, and unsolved territorial issues. The aim of this paper is to identify the governmental discourse of Russia’s top officials 
describing Russia’s state policy on the Arctic for foreign and domestic audiences. The paper focuses on the period from 2013 till 
2015 when tensions in the relationship between Russia and the West increased due to the crisis in Ukraine. The units of analysis 
are public statements by senior officials of the Russian Federation in speeches and reports in the media. The major finding is that 
the Arctic should serve in Russian-Western rapprochement rather than becoming the next geopolitical hot spot. 
 
 
Introduction: the regulatory framework of Russian Arctic discourse 
This article aims to identify how Russian senior officials are communicating Russia’s policy on the 
Arctic, the main guidelines of which are defined in several documents. The basic documents that the 
Russian government mentions as being the key decisions on Arctic operations (Government of the 
Russian Federation 2015) include: Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 
and beyond (2008, September 18); The Development Strategy of the Russian Arctic and national security for the 
period until 2020 (2013, February 20); State Program of the Russian Federation ‘Socio-economic development of the 
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period till 2020’ (2014, April 21); Regulations on the State Commission 
on the Development of the Arctic (2015, March 14); and The Northern Sea Route Comprehensive Development 
Project (2015, June 8). The first, Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and 
beyond, is the seminal document that lays the grounds for the implementation of state policy in the 
Russian Arctic. The development strategy document and the state program of socio-economic 
development of the Arctic zone document logically and sequentially follow on from the first 
document. The establishment of the State Commission on the development of the Arctic document 
is a significant step in the improvement of Russian Arctic governance. The project on the Northern 
Sea Route is aimed at the development of navigation up to 2030, but this document is classified.  
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Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and beyond defines the main 
objectives, tasks, strategic priorities and mechanisms of  the Russian Federation’s state policy on the 
Arctic, as well as a system of measures on the strategic planning of socio-economic development and 
Russia’s national security in the Arctic. According to the document, Russia’s national interests in the 
Arctic include: 1) the use of the Russian Federation’s Arctic zone as a strategic resource base for the 
Russian Federation, in this way providing a solution to the social and economic development problems 
of the country; 2) the preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation; 3) the 
conservation of the unique ecosystems of the Arctic; and 4) the use of the Northern Sea Route as a 
national integrated transport communication route for the Russian Federation in the Arctic 
(Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and beyond 2008: 2). So, Russia’s key 
areas of national interest in the Arctic are natural resource extraction, international cooperation, 
environment and logistics.  
In the seminal document, Russia’s main goals in the Arctic are structured around six areas that are 
also defined as priorities in the development strategy: 1) socio-economic development – to expand 
the resource base for Russia’s need for raw materials; 2) military security and the defence and 
protection of the state border – to ensure a favourable operational regime; 3) environmental safety – 
to protect the environment of the Arctic; 4) information technology and communication – to create 
a unified information space in the Arctic; 5) science and technology – to accumulate knowledge and 
to create modern scientific and geographic information bases for the management of the Arctic 
territories; and 6) international cooperation – to provide mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation with the Arctic states (Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 
and beyond 2008; The Development Strategy of the Russian Arctic and national security for the period until 2020 
2013: 3-4).  
The foundations document also sets a time frame for the implementation of Russia’s national interests 
in the Arctic. The three stages of development highlight the key milestones in the implementation of 
Russia’s state policy on the Arctic. During the first phase from 2008 till 2010, Russia must prepare 
materials to justify the external border of its Arctic zone, broaden international cooperation, and 
implement various target programs and investment projects on the basis of public-private partnership. 
The main tasks of the second phase from 2011 till 2015, are to ensure international legal formalization 
of the external border of the Arctic zone, to restructure the economics of the Arctic zone based on 
the mineral-resources and aquatic biological resources in the region, to establish and develop 
infrastructure and a management system for Northern Sea Route communications for Eurasian transit, 
and to complete the establishment of a unified information space in the Arctic. The third phase from 
2016 till 2020, should ensure the transformation of the Arctic zone into the leading strategic resource 
base of the Russian Federation.  
In general, the implementation of state policy in the medium term should allow Russia to maintain its 
role as the leading Arctic power and is aimed at increasing comprehensive competitive advantages for 
the strengthening of Russia’s position in the Arctic (Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the 
Arctic through 2020 and beyond 2008: 9-10). The subsequent documents specify the ways for achieving 
this goal. The Development Strategy of the Russian Arctic and national security for the period until 2020 (2013) 
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defines the basic mechanisms, and the ways and means to achieve the strategic goals and priorities for 
the sustainable development of Russia’s Arctic zone and its national security. The State Program of the 
Russian Federation ‘Socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period till 2020’ 
(2014) includes the activities of the Russian Federation’s sectorial national programs being 
implemented in the Arctic zone.  
The State Commission on the Development of the Arctic is a coordinating body, providing for 
interaction between federal executive bodies, the executive bodies of subjects of the Russian 
Federation, other state agencies, local governments and organizations in addressing the socio-
economic and other tasks related to the development of the Russian Federation’s Arctic zone and its 
national security. The objectives of the commission are the protection of the Russian Federation’s 
national interests in the Arctic and the achievement of the strategic objectives defined in Foundations 
of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and beyond, as well as a radical increase in the 
efficiency of governance in the Russian Federation’s Arctic zone (Regulations on the State Commission on 
the Development of the Arctic 2015).   
Method 
Discourse analysis has become a widely used research method in the study of international relations 
(Milleken 1999; Holzscheiter 2014). This is due to the fact that the political process, to a large extent, 
is constituted by acts of communication, and discourse analysis is a useful tool for understanding the 
relationships between concrete language use and wider social and cultural structures (Titscher, Meyer, 
Wodak & Vetter 2007: 149). Political text and talk have political functions and implication (Van Dijk 
1997: 14), therefore discourse analysis makes it possible to clarify the strategy behind political 
communication. The aim of the paper is to identify and compare foreign and domestic governmental 
discourse on the Russian Arctic as it is used by top officials from the Russian Federation. The analytical 
approach in this paper is based on the three stage discourse analysis process as is defined by N. 
Fairclough (1996: 26). The first step is the selection of the text units being used in the analysis. The 
next steps are interpretation and explanation by putting the text into a wider political context.  
The documents containing the text units have been selected by using Google search results with the 
keywords being the surname of the Russian Federation official in combination with the name “Arctic.” 
The selection of the top officials, whose statements and speeches were used in the analysis, was based 
on the consideration that the strategic level of Russia’s state policy on the Arctic relating to the 
implementation of its national interests in the region and its interaction with other countries had to 
be covered. Obviously, it is not possible to draw a clear line between the officials’ foreign or domestic 
discourse, because their statements can be perceived by both audiences. However, the discourse 
addressed to foreign audiences was identified by using officials who are authorised to represent 
Russia’s foreign policy, the context of the discourse (for example, if it has been used at an international 
conference); and the source of the information (for example, an interview given to foreign media). 
Domestic discourse was identified by using officials whose activities are primarily focused on domestic 
issues and the sources of information – Russian news agencies and media, and the Russian language.  
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Statements by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Senior Arctic Official Vladimir Barbin, 
former Senior Arctic Official Anton Vasiliev, and Russia’s Envoy to NATO Alexander Grushko were 
primarily selected for understanding the foreign discourse. Statements by the President of Russia 
Vladimir Putin, the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for International 
Cooperation in the Arctic and Antarctic Artur Chilingarov, and Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu were 
very much targeted at both audiences. Domestic discourse was identified by using the viewpoints from 
the Chairman of the Arctic Commission Dmitry Rogozin, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai 
Patrushev, and sectoral ministers.  
The messages for foreign audiences were searched using the keywords in English, whereas for 
domestic audiences, in Russian. In total, more than 40 documents – publications and broadcasts in 
the media, and the speeches of officials – were selected. The selection of documents was completed, 
when no new relevant information for the period from 2013 to 2015 was provided. The analysis was 
qualitative and inductive. The analytical categories were defined through text analysis, based on the 
interpretation and explanation of the researcher. It is especially important to mention that foreign and 
domestic discourse cannot be treated as separate entities – they have to be viewed in interaction, 
because in this way a better insight into its political use by Russia is provided.  
Governmental discourse on the Russian Arctic  
Five categories of analysis were defined for structuring Russian Arctic foreign and domestic discourse 
as used by Russian officials: 1) Russia’s national interests in the Arctic; 2) international cooperation; 
3) Russia’s perception of other countries’ strategies; 4) militarization of the Arctic; and 5) symbolic 
actions. The statements by Russian officials were arranged and analysed according to these categories. 
Table 1 at the end of the article contains a summary of the findings. 
Russia’s national interests in the Arctic  
The Arctic is a region of historical importance for Russia’s strategic development and its national pride 
(Laruelle 2014). In the last decade, it once again became one of the priority regions for Russia after a 
period in oblivion during the collapse of the USSR. The strategic importance of the Arctic has been 
stressed by several top officials. In 2013, V. Putin noted that Russia had returned to a very promising 
region – the Arctic; therefore it should have all the levers for the protection of security and national 
interests there (Forbes 2013). Around the same time, the importance of the Arctic was also underlined 
by S. Shoigu (Rossiya 1 2013). A. Chilingarov stated that Russia’s future was inextricably linked with 
the fate of the polar regions, and their development should be a national priority. This is mainly 
because, in the future, the Arctic will become the main resource base for the country – it is estimated 
that by 2050, the Arctic shelf will provide 20 to 30% of total Russian oil production (Rikin 2014).  
During the meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation in 2014 on the implementation 
of state policy in the Arctic, V. Putin pointed out the main steps to be taken to preserve influence in 
the region. He defined six key tasks: 1) to improve the quality of governance by establishing the Arctic 
Commission; 2) to implement the State Program of the Russian Federation ‘Socio-economic development of the 
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period till 2020’; 3) to implement the international legal 
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formalization of the outer borders of the continental shelf of Russia in the Arctic Ocean; 4) to develop 
the Northern Sea Route; 5) to provide environmental security; and 6) to provide integrated security 
for the Russian Arctic zone and to create a new generation unified system of surface ships and 
submarines (Kremlin 2014).  The tasks named by V. Putin are in accordance with Russia’s national 
interests in the Arctic as defined in Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 
and beyond. 
As a priority region, the Arctic, for Russia, also has geopolitical significance. In A. Chilingarov’s view, 
during the first two decades of the 21st century, Russia will primarily be associated with the 
development of the Arctic shelf in a similar way as the space exploration and large-scale infrastructure 
projects in Western and Eastern Siberia at the time of the Soviet Union (Rikin 2014).  D. Rogozin has 
admitted that without the Arctic, Russia cannot maintain its status as a great power (Bolotin 2015). 
He even places the development of the Arctic into the context of the annexation of Crimea as a general 
strategic direction for Russia: 
Russia is beginning to feel the space and express the claims to the borders and its 
interests. Last year was a historic event – the restoration of the territorial integrity of 
Russia, a reunion with Sevastopol and the Crimea. This year there is a new look, a 
powerful new emphasis on the development of the Arctic. These are things of the 
same order (Staalesen 2015). 
Linking the Crimean annexation with Russia’s activities in the Arctic may indeed lead to concerns that 
the Arctic might be the next hot spot in Russia’s relations with the West, although the foreign 
discourse on the Russian Arctic is different. The statements addressed to foreign audiences also 
include a focus on the targeted implementation of Russia’s national interests in the Arctic (Vorobyov 
2013), but they stress Russia’s willingness to act within the framework of international legal norms. 
For example, one of the main points of the agenda, as explained by S. Lavrov, is the submission of a 
request regarding the continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (Sputnik 2014b). Thus, the foreign policy discourse is aimed primarily at 
demonstrating that Russia will implement its national interests in the region according to the accepted 
norms and principles of international cooperation. In N. Patrushev’s view, with the increasing role of 
Arctic resources in the global economy, this region is becoming an important arena for Russia’s 
relations with foreign partners in the field of international, military, energy and information security 
(Egorov 2013). So, in terms of Russia’s national interests in the Arctic an internal political ambition 
to be the leading power in the promising region can be detected, but at the same time there is a rational 
understanding of the need for international cooperation and respect for international legal norms as 
well.   
International cooperation  
According to Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic through 2020 and beyond (2008: 3) 
some of the strategic priorities of Russian state policy in the Arctic are to maintain good-neighbourly 
relations with other Arctic states, both bilaterally and within regional organizations, including the 
Arctic Council and the Barents/Euro-Arctic region, to promote economic, scientific and cultural 
cooperation in the Arctic, as well as cross-border cooperation, including in the field of the efficient 
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development of natural resources and the preservation of the environment in the Arctic. This is in 
contrast to the somewhat arrogant domestic rhetoric from D. Rogozin that Russia “should come to 
the Arctic and to make it hers” and that it does not care for what other countries think about its 
activities in the Arctic (Vzgljad 2015). In his view, the development of the Arctic is characterized by a 
battle over the first-mover advantages in the region (Vzgljad 2013). 
The foreign discourse on the Russian Arctic is very much focused on the importance of international 
cooperation, mutual understanding and peaceful solution of the problems. A. Vasiliev gives a specific 
argument as to why there is no race for Arctic resources among the Arctic states. He stresses the fact 
that “according to Danish experts, up to 97% of proven reserves are located in the exclusive economic 
zone of the Arctic States”.  In the view of this experienced diplomat, everything has already been 
divided up in the Arctic, and it is much more effective to pursue national interests in this region 
together (Vasiliev n.d.).  In its foreign discourse, Russia emphasizes that there is a harmony of interests 
with other actors and indicates that there are no substantial contradictions that might lead to 
disagreements. For example, S. Lavrov has said: 
The priorities of the starting Canadian chairmanship in the Council are close to us – 
development of resources of the North, the use of the Arctic maritime transport route, 
support of inhabitants of the Arctic region. They are largely concordant with The 
Development Strategy of the Russian Arctic and national security for the period until 2020 (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013). 
One of the slogans often used in foreign discourse is similar to the name of the international 
conferences which have been organized by the Russian Geographical Society since 2011, “Arctic – 
the territory of dialogue.”  For example, this slogan was used by V. Barbin for stressing that 
cooperation in the Arctic Council is resistant to such external challenges as the crisis in Ukraine over 
which there are disagreements between Russia and the other countries of the Council (News.rin.ru. 
2015). From Russia’s perspective, the Arctic Council is the best platform for international cooperation. 
S. Lavrov states that the Arctic Council ensures the legitimate rights of the states which have direct 
access to the Arctic Ocean. This institution sets the rules of engagement in the region, as well as the 
safe and careful use of its enormous wealth. In S. Lavrov’s view, no one is mentioning any conflict or 
talking about confrontation at this forum. Everyone is interested in the Arctic being developed 
through cooperation and respect for international law, including decisions about the boundaries of 
the continental shelf (RT 2014). A. Grushko’s idea, that members of the Arctic Council proceed from 
the fact that the Arctic states have enough instruments to solve problems that might naturally emerge 
in this region by means of talks, cooperation and on the basis of international law, can be added to 
this (The Arctic Monitor 2015).  
A. Chilingarov has expressed the view that Arctic development could actually melt the ice between 
Russia and the West (Rosneft 2014). His view is based on previous positive experience, for example, 
the Russian and Norwegian maritime delimitation agreement signed in 2010, as well as common and 
interdependent interests. In A. Chilingarov’s view, Russia can develop the Arctic shelf on its own, but 
it would be more effective and less expensive for all sides to do this together with the Western partners 
(Rikin 2014). Here, the term “the Western partners” can be understood to include not only countries, 
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but also such actors as energy companies like Exxon Mobil, Total and others that are interested in 
cooperation with Russia, despite the sanctions. The joint US Coast Guard’s and Russian Border 
Guard’s international exercises that will take place in the autumn of 2015 can also be mentioned as 
another example of continuing cooperation (Sputnik 2015). 
Russia’s perception of other countries’ strategies 
The tense relations between Russia and the Western countries have been transferred at a rhetorical 
level to the Arctic due to the conflict in Ukraine. Russia’s involvement in Ukraine provides solid 
grounds for the West to promote the image of Russia as an aggressor and a potential threat. In 2014, 
former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that Canada and the US need a united front in 
response to Russia’s aggressive reopening of military bases in the Arctic (Peritz 2014). Likewise, the 
former Foreign Minister of Canada, John Baird, told a Danish newspaper that Ottawa was determined 
to promote and defend the sovereignty of Canada in the Arctic against the Russian threat that manifested in the 
reactivation of a Soviet-era base on its north-eastern coast, and fly-bys by Russian aircraft (RT 2014).  
S. Lavrov reacted to such rhetoric with a strict statement: “There are accusations flying about that we are 
trying to make a land-grab during a latter-day gold rush. This is nonsense. We don’t want the Arctic to become an 
arena of conflict” (RT 2014). It should be emphasized, however, that an exchange of sharp words 
between Russia and Canada in relation to the Arctic had already been present before the crisis in 
Ukraine. For instance, in 2011, A. Vasiliev also had to respond to Canada’s complaints about Russia’s 
provocative behaviour in the Arctic. At that time he said that such views arise from a lack of knowledge 
of reality, and the inertia of human mentality (Blanchfield 2011). S. Lavrov rejected Western efforts 
to present Russia as being aggressive in the Arctic by stressing that Russia has legitimate rights to 
pursue its interests in the Arctic like any other country: 
The countries that have northern borders must ensure their security, including in the 
northern region, like in any other part of their territory. This is an axiom: wherever 
you are and whoever surrounds you, you have to think about your security, including 
military security. It would be naive to imagine that because we are talking about the 
Arctic this principle does not apply (Vorobyov 2013). 
While some of the political leaders of Western countries attempt to strengthen the image of Russia as 
a potential threat in the Arctic region, Russian officials promote the idea that it is other countries that 
are attempting to make the Arctic a conflict zone. For describing the strategy of the Western countries 
as a whole, Russian officials often refer to NATO. In the view of S. Lavrov, NATO doctrines and 
analyses occasionally say that the military factor is likely to grow in the Arctic in the context of the 
intensifying battle for natural resources (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2014). 
A. Grushko says that there is no clear NATO strategy in the Arctic, but from time to time, certain 
forces in NATO try to push the idea that the Arctic may soon become a battle-ground and that the 
alliance must secure access to energy resources in the Arctic (The Arctic Monitor 2015). Likewise, in 
D. Rogozin’s view, NATO countries have been thinking since 2009 about building up military activity 
in the Arctic (Vzgljad 2013). Thus, there are no contradictions between foreign and domestic discourse 
with regard to the description of NATO’s increasing interest in the Arctic region.  
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S. Shoigu also noted that developed countries that do not have direct access to the polar regions are 
striving insistently for the Arctic. They are taking certain political, military and economic steps in this 
direction (RT 2015). N. Patrushev also stressed that Arctic resources are attracting the attention not 
only of the Arctic countries, but are also of interest to the EU, China, Japan, South Korea and other 
countries. Their interest, firstly, has been determined by natural resources and new transport routes 
(Ivanov 2013). But according to S. Lavrov, this will not lead to an “Arctic Race,” because:  
International law on Arctic waters clearly determines the rights of both coastal and 
other states. This includes access for developing the extraction of mineral resources, 
oil and gas deposits, as well as managing marine biological stocks. International law 
also regulates the ability of countries to expand the external border of their continental 
shelf. Today’s complicated international situation does not create any significant 
changes to the established order (Sputnik 2014a).  
The same position has been expressed by V. Putin who has said that although many perceive Russia’s 
activity in the Arctic with caution and are afraid of it, Russia will act in the framework of international 
law (TASS 2014).  
Militarization of the Arctic  
The discourse around the militarization of the Arctic is the most contradictory, but it arises from the 
so called ‘security dilemma’ when an effort by one side to maximize its security increases threats to 
the other, thus escalating tension in international relations (Herz 1950). Russia’s increasing military 
presence in the Arctic is based on the grounds that other countries pose a threat to Russia. V. Putin 
recalled that there are US nuclear submarines along the coast of Norway and that the flight time of 
missiles launched from them to Moscow is just 16-17 minutes (Forbes 2013). According to N. 
Patrushev, there is regular US Navy and Royal Navy submarine activity in the Arctic, that there are at 
least three weekly flights of patrol aircraft, and that about 10 major events in operational and combat 
training are planned to be held there every year. The US has also created a united armed forces base 
in Alaska, Canada is building a port in Nanisivik and a military training facility in Resolute, and 
Denmark has created a united command for the armed forces of the Arctic. N. Patrushev concluded 
that in such circumstances Russia cannot just watch war preparations by foreign countries near its 
borders (Ivanov 2013). Two years later, S. Shoigu announced that “a permanent military presence in 
the Arctic and the ability to protect the state’s interests by means of armed struggle is seen as an 
integral part of the overall national security policy” (Shoigu 2015). 
A. Vasiliev provided additional pragmatic and more neutral arguments for the increasing military 
factor in the Arctic. In his view, the Russian military build-up is based on Russia’s concern with 
defending its northern regions due to climate change.  Russia has a 20,000 kilometre border on the 
Arctic Ocean. Previously, it was a secure border of frozen ice, but it is now melting because of rising 
temperatures. Therefore, there is a need to strengthen Russia’s military presence to protect the country 
from illegal border crossings, illegal immigration, organized crime and terrorism (TASS 2014). The 
position of a US Senior State Department Official during the Background Briefing on the Arctic 
Council Preview complements the peaceful discourse of A. Vasiliev, which is intended to underline 
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that there are no actual grounds for tension in the region because of increasing military activity by 
Russia: 
Arctic maneuvers [sic], military operations, I’m not – I have not seen anything that 
goes much above and beyond what we’ve seen in the past decade or so from the 
Russians. What has happened is, for instance, the Norwegians and the Russians have 
been conducting joint military exercises up until when the sanctions were invoked. 
Because of the sanctions, we’re not allowed to have military-to-military contact and 
operations, so they’ve done it separately. When the Norwegians did their exercises, it 
got no notice. When the Russians did their exercises, it was portrayed as Russian 
aggression. I’m not sure that they’ve done anything more than they’ve done in the past, 
and they have a right to take necessary steps to preserve their sovereignty of the waters 
that they’re responsible for (U.S. Department of State 2015). 
From S. Lavrov’s point of view, there are no problems in the Arctic that require NATO’s involvement 
or any military solutions at all (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2014). In his 
view, the Arctic region is not influenced by the current difficult international situation (Sputnik 2014b). 
From Russia’s viewpoint, the Arctic is a peaceful region and there are no direct military risks. 
Therefore, the Arctic should remain a zone with a minimum of military activity (Sputnik 2014).  
Symbolic actions 
Geopolitical competition in the Arctic also has a symbolic dimension. One of the most significant 
episodes of this kind of tension occurred in 2007 when a Russian expedition to the North Pole headed 
by A. Chilingarov planted Russia’s flag in the seabed of the North Pole. This was perceived with 
outrage in the West, because from their point of view it was a symbolic act by Russia in claiming the 
Arctic territories. However, in recent years, Russia has placed an emphasis on cooperation rather than 
its solo achievements in the Arctic. S. Lavrov, in a speech in the Arctic Council in 2013, stressed that 
there was a rather symbolic trip to the North Pole by senior officials of the Arctic Council together 
with N. Patrushev and A. Chilingarov. During the trip, photos were taken with a background of the 
flags of eight countries and the flag of the Arctic Council that had high historical value (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013). It was a diplomatic gesture that Russia respected the 
interests of other countries. During this speech, he also invited his international colleagues to the third 
international Arctic Forum organized by the Russian Geographical Society. The title of the conference 
also carries a symbolic meaning – “Territory of Dialogue,” which highlights Russia’s efforts for 
cooperation with other states.  
Table 1. Foreign and domestic discourse on the Russian Arctic 
Category of analysis Foreign discourse Domestic discourse 
Russia’s national interests The implementation of Russia’s 
national interests in the Arctic is 
based on international 
cooperation within the 
framework of international legal 
norms. 
The Arctic is a very important 
region for Russia. The Arctic is 
an integral part of Russia as a 
great power. Russia is a leading 
power in the Arctic. 
290  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
 
Foreign & Domestic Discourse on the Russian Arctic 
International cooperation The Arctic Council is the best 
platform for international 
cooperation. There is no 
confrontation in the Arctic 
Council. The Arctic may promote 
rapprochement between Russia 
and the West. 
There is a battle over the first-
mover advantage in the Arctic. 
The Arctic should be Russia’s.   
Russia’s perception of other 
countries’ strategies 
The Western countries are 
attempting to make the Arctic a 
conflict zone by presenting 
Russia as being aggressive.  
The increased interest by other 
countries in the Arctic creates 
security risks for Russia.  
Militarization of the Arctic Russia’s military build-up is a 
legitimate ensuring of its national 
security, a reaction to the military 
activity of other countries and 
the effects of climate change. 
There is no need for military 
solutions in the Arctic.  
Russia is ready to protect its 
interests in the Arctic by military 
means. 
Symbolic actions The Arctic is a territory of 
dialogue. Photos with the Arctic 
partners at the North Pole.  
Solo photos of Russia’s explorers 
and officials at the North Pole.  
 
Conclusions 
The foreign and domestic discourse on the Russian Arctic balances between the need to maintain 
favourable relations with international partners and, at the same time, to achieve competitive 
advantages in the region. In the domestic governmental discourse there is a stress on the strategic 
importance of the Arctic for Russia. The development of the Russian Arctic is vitally important for 
Russia as a great power. Russia’s geographical location and historical achievements in the region give 
it a natural competitive advantage for being the leading power in the region. The strategic aim of 
Russia’s state policy in the Arctic is to keep that status and to develop it further. “Making the Arctic 
Russia’s” is the essence of the domestic discourse which contradicts its cooperation-oriented foreign 
discourse, but these discourses serve different purposes. Since the domestic discourse is targeted to 
internal audiences, one of its functions is to maintain national pride, and at a symbolic level, Russia’s 
achievements in the Arctic provide the foundation for that. 
Whereas the aim of the foreign discourse is to maintain favourable relations with partners, there is an 
emphasis on cooperation. However, this contradiction can be used in arguing that Russia is hiding its 
true intentions and is misleading other states. Some of the leaders of Western countries are indeed 
attempting to portray Russia as an aggressor in the Arctic. However, it would be more appropriate to 
say that Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic is primarily a tool of strategic deterrence. That assertion 
is based on the consideration that all the major players in the Arctic region are developing their military 
presence, and that Russia is indeed placing an emphasis in its foreign policy on the interdependence 
of interests in the Arctic, the necessity for cooperation and respect for legal norms. Therefore, it is 
much more likely that the Arctic could serve instead for Russian-Western rapprochement rather than 
becoming the next geopolitical hot spot. At the same time, using a peaceful and defensive foreign 
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discourse, Russia is winning time to strengthen its position in the region, which does not exclude the 
possibility of an escalation of conflict in the future. 
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This paper explores the history behind today’s Arctic governance architecture, potential areas for realignments, and the analytical 
efficacy of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a guiding analogue. Calling upon a vast body of scholarly 
work on Arctic governing regimes, the author identifies weaknesses and voids limiting the ability of Arctic states and, most critically, 
the Arctic Council as the governing nucleus, from harnessing historic regional momentum. Grounded by international relations 
theories on regionalism, regional security, functionalism, and international law, the paper serves to instruct both the international 
affairs scholar and the regional policy-maker. Where previous papers have looked to the Circumpolar South and the Antarctic 
Treaty System as an analogue, the author instead finds value in the ASEAN analogue and the parallel structures, actions, and 
passions therein. The paper closes with various policy prescriptions for the Arctic Council in cooperation with Arctic states, 
indigenous peoples, and the region’s vibrant epistemic community. The author’s analysis seeks to answer this paper’s guiding 
question: Considering the region’s history alongside existing governing structures, what is the most instructive analogue to guide 
further regional integration in the Arctic and how can these lessons be best applied?    
 
 
Introduction: the Arctic’s promise 
Driven in large part by newly accessible economic opportunities found in the resource rich region, the 
Arctic has emerged as a trending topic in international affairs. The prevailing vision of the Arctic as a 
vast tundra with little interest to the global community is yielding to a more dynamic image, that of a 
region both militarily and geopolitically active. But developing the Arctic is not just about unlocking 
the resources lurking below the ice; the real challenge is in developing the productive, yet nascent, 
governing regimes1 on the surface (Krasner 1983: 2). Up to this point, the Arctic states, indigenous 
groups, and scientific community have done a remarkable job avoiding conflict and seeking out 
cooperation. However, existing structures have failed to integrate the region into a cohesive whole, 
and a broader regional identity is absent. It is the aim of this paper to explore other regional analogues 
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and perspectives that are instructive when approaching how best to expand the capacity of existing 
governing regimes. 
The first part of this paper explores the history behind, and structure of, current governing 
arrangements in the Arctic. When considering relevant governing analogues, scholars often turn to 
the Antarctic Treaty System. This author argues the comparison is inappropriate. Competing resources 
claims, territorial disputes, differing governing priorities, and fundamental geography make the two 
regions polar opposites, or as phrased by Oran Young, “antipodes in more than geography” (Young 
1992: 184).  
The second part of this paper identifies five areas for governing realignments; these concepts are 
drawn from the region’s history, existing structures, and tactics already employed. Covered in the 
discussion are ad hoc, bilateral and multilateral governing structures, functional strategies, regional seas 
agreements, and a comprehensive Arctic Treaty. 
The second part of the paper primes the analogue introduced in part three – the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). With the introduction of the ASEAN analogue, a relevant regional 
model is introduced. Sharing similar high-political stresses (military tension, resource and territorial 
disputes) and low-political norms (a zone of peace doctrine, a non-legal governing personality) with 
the High North, ASEAN’s success in achieving peaceful regional integration holds tremendous 
promise for the Arctic. The need to view challenges in the Arctic beyond the domestic political lens 
makes the analogue valuable as ASEAN leaves the domestic political escape hatch open; states are 
free to step away from the multilateral table where they see independent comparative advantages. It 
should go without saying that obvious features make Southeast Asia and the Arctic distinctly different 
regions; however, distinct similarities merit scholars’ attention and consideration. Making the leap 
from theory to practice, the paper closes offering a series of policy prescriptions – ostensibly derived 
from the ASEAN analogue – for Arctic policy-makers. From working toward an Arctic economic 
community to adopting a declaration of non-interference, it becomes evident that shared issues with 
tried solutions unite Southeast Asia and the Arctic.  
The desire for cooperation in the Arctic is both genuine and demonstrated. When a non-regional 
perspective and a globalized attitude are adopted, it quickly becomes evident Southeast Asia offers 
instructive prefabricated structures that are ready for adoption in the Arctic. It is the intention of this 
paper to make some of those key linkages both evident and accessible. 
The Antarctic analogue 
As touched on in the introduction of this paper, Antarctic governance has been called upon, in both 
academic and policy-making circles, as an analogue for Arctic governance. Specifically, the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959 is brought into focus as a worthy analytical frame through which Arctic regimes can 
be considered. Most critically, the locus of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) is a declaration in Article 
I that “Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only” (ATS 1959). Keeping in mind that the 
Antarctic Treaty was signed while the Cold War was in full swing, the front-and-center emphasis 
placed on peaceful activity should not come as a surprise. A second defining feature of the ATS can 
Toward an Arctic Way 
298  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
 
be seen in Article IV with the declaration “No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force” (ATS 1959). 
In effect, what Article IV succeeded in doing was freezing Antarctic territorial boundaries so as to 
avoid any tectonic geopolitical shifts. Even if such a provision were to be introduced in the 
Circumpolar North, it would be unreasonable to draw the conclusion that a military draw-down would 
ensue as the Arctic falls within the territorial confines of five littoral states.  
So how does the Antarctic Treaty specifically relate to the Arctic? While the ATS stands as the letter 
of the law in the Circumpolar South, components of the treaty – with a special emphasis on Articles 
I and IV – have underpinned the spirit of the law in the Circumpolar North. Specifically, elements of 
the Antarctic Treaty System are evident in the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, mapping of underwater 
ridges, and Arctic Council declarations. Polar law scholar Sébastien Duyck is bullish on the analytical 
value the ATS holds in the Arctic, particularly with respect to regional environmental regimes, 
although he concedes, “As the two polar regions differ in many respects, we do not claim that there 
can be a one-size-fits-all model for Polar governance” (Duyck 2011: 683). Moreover, the governance 
flag follows the dollar as Arctic and Antarctic “regional governance regimes have evolved under similar 
economic characteristics,” namely a presumed financial windfall from natural resource rents (Duyck 
2011: 684). 
While the Antarctic Treaty System has earned its place in any discussion on Arctic governance as the 
ATS serves as the de facto analogue, it is the belief of this author that any comparisons between the 
mature ATS and a nascent Arctic governance regime are misguided. In terms of geography, economic 
potential, competing territorial claims, and – most critically – indigenous population considerations, 
the Arctic and Antarctic could not be more different. The ATS is a document that cleared the way for 
an Antarctic scientific community, and any agreement in the Circumpolar North will need to move 
away from the low-political nature of the ATS and instead confront the high-political challenges in 
the High North. As captured by Oran Young, “There is a natural temptation to compare the Arctic 
with other remote areas and, consequently, to suppose that it is both desirable and feasible simply to 
demilitarize the whole region” (Young 1992: 207-8). With an increasingly intransigent Russia in mind, 
it is impossible to confront Arctic governance from a non-militarized standpoint; an armed Arctic, 
which does not necessarily presuppose conflict, is a reality that must be accommodated. Moreover, 
even if the littoral Arctic states were willing to pass a sweeping regional agreement on the same scale 
of the ATS, the terrestrial differences and competing visions of the two poles would necessitate an 
entirely new treaty defined by new priorities. So while it is responsible to cover the ATS in this 
discussion, we will dispense with any comparisons as the analogical efficacy is minimal at best. The 
two regions, in terms of geography and political challenges, are truly polar opposites.  
Options for governance realignments 
Despite major policy breakthroughs in Arctic governance, there is substantial pressure on Arctic states 
to both streamline and expand regional governing arrangements. As Arctic ice sheets retreat, there is 
an increasing urgency to address interests and concerns from regional and non-regional actors. 
Regimes in the Circumpolar North, in their present configurations, are not equipped to confront 
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opportunities and challenges ahead. Simply put, the Arctic is having growing pains. As framed by 
Arctic Institute Director Kathrin Keil, “institutional cooperation [in the Arctic] depends on keeping 
this cast of characters only ‘as-big-as-necessary,’ rather than ‘as-big-as-possible,’” or what this author 
identifies as a tension between inclusion and efficiency (Keil 2014). Despite this limitation, the last half-
century of Arctic governance has revealed a variety of governing arrangements worthy of discussion 
as Arctic states consider governance realignments.  
The Ilulissat approach 
Following the controversial 2007 Russian scientific expedition to the North Pole which saw a flag 
planted on the seabed, nationalist fervor amongst the Arctic states peaked. The Arctic Ocean 
Conference, held in Ilulissat, Greenland in May 2008, was the natural outgrowth of this geopolitical 
discomfort. At the Conference, the five littoral Arctic states affirmed their “commit[ment] to this legal 
framework [UNCLOS] and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims” (Ilulissat 
Declaration 2008). The concern guiding the conference was the Arctic moving from Gorbachev’s 
“zone of peace” to a “zone of conflict,” and the language of the Ilulissat Declaration was designed to 
dispel these fears. The Declaration also concluded that with UNCLOS as a guide, there is “no need 
to develop a new comprehensive international regime to govern the Arctic Ocean” (Ilulissat 
Declaration 2008). The Ilulissat Declaration has gone on to be hailed as evidence that the Arctic can 
remain a conflict-free region, but we should not rush to agree with this conclusion.  
Despite the seemingly successful nature of the Arctic Ocean Conference, there was a major deficiency; 
some, not all, Arctic states were parties to the agreement – Sweden, Finland, and Iceland were excluded 
due to geographical technicalities. For Alun Anderson, this exclusion crystallizes the point that “Even 
within the Arctic nations, not all are equal. […] The Ilulissat meeting was a reminder that the Arctic 
coastal states see the Arctic Ocean as their own lake” (Anderson 2009: 120). But the affront extended 
beyond the exclusion of the three residual Arctic states; the Declaration intimated that the 
international community, most notably those states in Asia with a heightened interest in the Arctic, 
should direct their political activism elsewhere.  
Unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral approaches 
As evidenced by the absence of armed conflict in the Arctic, the Circumpolar North has, up to this 
point, been a region of cooperation. Undertaking an inventory of Arctic strategies, Lassi Heininen 
observes that “International cooperation, largely multilateral […] has emerged and expanded since 
that time, at which there was less cooperation” (Heininen 2011: 80). Multilateral cooperation has 
proven to be the most common variety of Arctic cooperation, especially in areas of scientific research. 
The Arctic Council member and observer states have been active participants in the International 
Arctic Science Committee (IASC) and its issue-specific working groups; another bright spot can be 
found in the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP).  
The international cooperation found in the Arctic is couched by the “sovereignty and national 
security” priorities defining the unilateral strategies of the five littoral states (Heininen 2011: 81). The 
Arctic states and other groupings have been active in issuing strategy documents (Anderson 2009: 
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104). Given that these White Papers are often built at the domestic level without bi/multilateral 
considerations, the conclusions are traditionally out of lockstep with the priorities of other Arctic 
states and unions leaving any cleavages to be reconciled on an ad hoc basis, as was the case with the 
Ilulissat approach. Oran Young attributes the limits of cooperation in the Arctic to the fact that “no 
state has a clear-cut decision-making process for Arctic matters, much less a coherent policy” (Young 
1992: 188). 
In spite of the deficiencies found in unilateral White Papers, there have been notable bilateral successes 
where policy priorities align. Project LORITA, a joint effort by Denmark and Canada in Lomonosov 
Ridge bathymetry, “will benefit from a joint plan for the investigation of the Lomonosov Ridge saving 
cost, sharing personnel resources and maximising the outcome of data” (LORITA 2006). So long as 
unilateral policy directives remain stunted due to policy incoherence, bilateral cooperation within 
specific issue areas will be the direct beneficiary.                 
Functional multilateralism 
Within the international relations discipline, the theory of functionalism is often cited as a model for 
regional integration. Tracing its roots to Western European international integration, the 
functionalism model is well situated – both geographically and analytically – lending itself to any 
discussion of potential Arctic governance realignments. Broadly defined, functionalism is understood 
as “working together in common institutions helps to create political community at the popular level; 
within this community there is a working peace system: war is less likely because of functional 
cooperation” (Taylor 1996: 290).2 The “peace in parts” system exemplified by functionalism is 
recognized and has a proven track record (Nye 1971). Two unique phenomena occur as an outgrowth 
of functionalism. The first, spillover, occurs when cooperation is successful and “popular support 
presses for further integration and more common institutions” (Taylor 1996: 290). Spillback, the 
second, takes place when cooperative regimes fail to achieve their designed goal – these are typically 
economic failings – and countries believe more successful outcomes can be achieved on an individual 
basis. The father of functionalism, David Mitrany, suggests that the “essential principle is that activities 
would be selected specifically and organised separately – each according to its nature, to the conditions 
under which it has to operate, and to the needs of the moment” (Mitrany 1992: 502). Put into practical 
terms, functionalism – when the nature and needs of an activity are synthesized – results in a system 
that is not internally competitive being established. It should be evident that the functionalism regional 
integration model has not only played a major role in Arctic development to date, but also holds clues 
as to the nature of future cooperation. 
Examples of functionalism are readily available when considering Arctic governance; both the Nuuk 
and Kiruna Declarations illustrate areas of functional cooperation targeting a particular issue. 
Moreover, knowledge sharing between Arctic states through institutions such as IASC and AMAP 
highlight scientific integration within the region. The reason for Arctic functional cooperation is self-
evident: the Arctic states are entering into functional agreements only where all parties see clear 
benefits. And therein lies the current dilemma. Cooperation in the Arctic in 2014 is slowing – not 
speeding up – and we are seeing functional cooperation cresting the natural carrying capacity. This 
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timid spillover can be attributed to what Kathrin Keil calls the “exclusive club” principle, or, put more 
directly, “the eight Arctic states will be the ones most active in their Arctic areas, and it will be they 
who are most directly affected by any activities, possible accidents and environmental threats” (Keil 
2014). This is not to advocate that only the Arctic eight should play an active role in Arctic affairs; 
rather, it must be acknowledged that the first on scene will always be those states holding territory in 
the region.   
Thus, within the “exclusive club” of Arctic states we see a narrow topography of issues where issues 
align for all states. Returning to Mitrany’s words, “We have already suggested that not all interests are 
common to all, and that the common interests do not concern all countries in the same degree” 
(Mitrany 1992: 501). Mitrany’s point highlights a weakness in the Arctic governance structure today; 
there are not nearly enough cooperation contact points for the Arctic states to see that the A-level 
issues at hand are uniting, and not dividing, topics.  
Regional Seas Agreement 
One of the more creative solutions that has surfaced as a potential Arctic governance realignment is 
a regional seas agreement. The concept of a regional seas agreement in an area of geopolitical tension 
is not without precedent; both the 1974 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the Baltic Sea (Helsinki Convention) and the 1976 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean 
Sea Against Pollution (Barcelona Convention) are analogues (Young 1989: 183). In 2008, Rob Huebert 
and Brooks B. Yeager published a policy paper suggesting a regional seas agreement in the Arctic. The 
paper emphasized “The capacity of the Arctic nations to manage the Arctic Ocean environment 
through an ecosystem approach could be considerably strengthened by the development of a regional 
seas agreement” (Huebert & Yeager 2008: 29). The authors took this argument a step further and 
suggested the Arctic Council evolve “into a regional environmental management convention” 
(Huebert & Yeager 2008: 35). Considering that the Arctic Council has a footprint extending far beyond 
the environmental realm, it would seem that Huebert and Yeager’s suggestions are capacity limiting 
rather than capacity building.  
While regional seas agreements can be, and often are, productive, such a move in the Arctic would fail 
to capture the dividends that forthcoming prescriptions could capture. Notably, regional seas 
agreements tend to focus on low-politics topics as illustrated by the Helsinki and Barcelona 
Conventions where the environment is the focus. The challenges facing the Arctic are many, and while 
environmental degradation is problematic, a regional seas agreement would not be a complete 
solution. The legal inviolability of a regional seas agreement is questionable; Michael Byers notes that 
while agreements can be backed by UNEP’s Regional Seas Programs, “it may be questioned whether 
the mere existence of a regional sea creates legal obligations” (Byers 2013: 214).  
Arctic Treaty 
Returning to the point that opened this discussion – the Antarctic Treaty System as an analogue for 
Arctic governance – there have been high-level calls for such realignments. In October 2008, the 
European Parliament (EP) held discussions on Arctic governance and passed a resolution suggesting, 
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“the Commission should be prepared to pursue the opening of international negotiations designed to 
lead to the adoption of an international treaty for the protection of the Arctic, having as its inspiration 
the Antarctic Treaty…” (European Parliament 2008). The calls for an Arctic Treaty were situated 
within the context of the 2007 Russian North Pole flag planting; domestic political conditions within 
the European Union demanded a firm response to Russia’s overstepping. The EP’s suggestion was 
not well received by the US; similar to UNCLOS, the US objects on the basis of sovereignty 
infringement. 
Feedback from the epistemic community3 of Arctic observers also conveyed a lack of enthusiasm for 
an Arctic Treaty. Rather than issuing a wholesale dismissal of the idea, Oran Young crafted a 
comprehensive response where he argued “legally binding agreements are attractive to the extent that 
they generate a greater normative pull than more informal arrangements affecting the actions of those 
expected to comply with their provisions” (Young 2010: 181). What his comment brings to the fore 
is that Arctic governing arrangements, as situated around the Arctic Council, do offer a considerable 
“normative pull” as evidenced by recent declarations passed and actors hoping to join as observers. 
Rather than using valuable political capital to pass what will be a dead-on-arrival Arctic Treaty, “we 
should make every effort to maintain and even enhance the effectiveness of the Arctic Council” 
(Young 2010: 184). But to achieve this, the conversation needs to shift.  
The challenges confronting Arctic states are largely viewed as domestic issues. This is problematic 
because the Arctic ice retreat, overlapping territorial claims, natural resources, and other topics are not 
confined to one state. And while domestic political discussions matter, the conversation needs to 
change to one defined by foreign policy articulation and implementation. This is where the analytical 
value of considering a regional analogue, such as ASEAN, can be found. Successful regional 
institutions, such as ASEAN, leave the domestic political escape hatch open; once international 
cooperation has been exhausted, states are not constrained in retreating from multilateral discussions. 
The concept of subsidiarity best illustrates the capacity of a state to pull back from an issue area, being 
approached by a variety of states and actors, and instead confront the topic alone (Van Kersbergen 
2007). Having the ability to step away from the table in an area where a state has a comparative 
advantage, while simultaneously being engaged at the multilateral level in various other issue areas, is 
a powerful position for a state to be in. Having two feet firmly planted across issue thresholds is how 
cooperation can be reconciled with control.     
The ASEAN analogue 
In exploring how best to expand the governing capabilities of states and regimes in the Circumpolar 
North, Southeast Asia may seem a strange place to look for an analogue. But today’s hyper-globalized 
world forces us to consider other regional perspectives, and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) stands as a worthy analytical frame through which potential Arctic governing 
realignments can be considered. Despite “differing histories, cultural traditions, resource bases, and 
political-economic systems,” ASEAN has succeeded in integrating Southeast Asia into a “coherent 
whole” (Dayley et al. 2013: 3). Not only can the Arctic Council learn from ASEAN’s creation of a 
highly-functioning regional organization, but Arctic states stand to benefit from closer interaction with 
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their Southeast Asian counterparts expressing an ever-increasing interest in Arctic affairs. History is 
not proprietary, and the forthcoming discussions of ASEAN’s work – while far from exhaustive – will 
highlight the decisions and structures that hold so much promise for the Arctic states, Council, and 
broader region. 
Founding ASEAN 
In the early-1960s, the thought of a regional association of Southeast Asian states was anything but 
natural. With diverging political, economic, and cultural priorities, and a flat-lining South East Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO), any sort of region-wide cooperation was thought to be unlikely. But 
by the mid-1960s, several factors changed the calculus. With the Vietnam War raging, the Cold War 
in full swing, and – most critically – a rising China casting an increasingly tall shadow into the region, 
the need for an informal regional organization was identified. In August 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. As 
enunciated in the Bangkok Declaration, the first purpose of the association was to “accelerate 
economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in 
the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and 
peaceful community of South-East Asian nations” (ASEAN 1967). With the establishment of “a weak 
subregional security regime whose members agreed not to pursue their disagreements by force, the 
five founding ASEAN states, if only for a brief moment, overcame the “Balkans of the East” portrayal 
of the region (Buzan et al. 2003: 135). 
Yet ASEAN’s future was anything but auspicious. Similar to the Arctic Council, ASEAN was 
established with certain foundational constraints that limited the scope of the young association’s 
actions. At its core, ASEAN aspired to be a conflict prevention organization – everything else, from 
economic development to human security concerns, would be a lower priority. But in ASEAN’s case, 
the association “had to avoid military cooperation in order not to be perceived as a front for the West, 
or a SEATO through the back door” (Acharya 2009: 55). As all international relations students learn, 
conflict prevention requires conflict (i.e. military) cooperation. Complicating matters were cross-
cutting cultural cleavages; far from a monolith, the region was not a naturally occurring cultural 
formation. The great challenge for ASEAN became integration; “Since cultural and political 
homogeneity could not serve as an adequate basis for regionalism, the latter had to be constructed 
through interaction” (Acharya 2009: 54). This too should strike a chord with Arctic scholars – in terms 
of politics, economy and culture, Russia has no more in common with the US than Singapore with 
Burma (Myanmar). Despite differences, ASEAN brought a region together.  
The regionalism challenge 
The regional glue that binds ASEAN is anything but natural, and many Southeast Asia scholars 
question whether the region is in fact distinct from the East Asian regional complex. Similar questions 
arise in the Arctic, a region long regarded as a minute sliver between American, European, and Asian 
spheres of influence. But the picture of the Arctic is changing, and as the region thaws and comes 
alive a broader discussion of regionalism is appropriate. While geography is an important factor in 
regionalism, other variables exist adding a level of complexity to any discussion. On the topic, Donald 
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K. Emmerson defines regionalism as a “process” where “proximate states, societies, or economies” 
work together with the end goal of “forming or nourishing a shared identity, improving conditions 
and solving problems, or projecting influence beyond the region” (Emmerson 2008: 12).4  
As evidenced by the latter portion of Emmerson’s definition, hard power plays a central role in 
regionalism. When security considerations begin to dominate intraregional linkages, another 
phenomenon, known as a “regional security complex (RSC),” emerges. Here a second definition is 
necessary. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver make the case for a Southeast Asian RSC noting “In order to 
qualify as an RSC, a group of states or other entities must possess a degree of security interdependence 
sufficient both to establish them as a linked set and to differentiate them from surrounding security 
regions” (Buzan et al. 2003: 48). While a Southeast Asian RSC may be more easily visible than an 
Arctic RSC, we should be careful not to overlook the fact that military activity is taking place beneath 
Arctic ice. Furthermore, as ice levels decrease, the High North only becomes more distinct from 
neighboring RSCs. ASEAN proved a region could be constructed where one previously did not exist, 
and this example should resonate with Arctic policy-makers. 
Non-interference and conflict resolution 
Founded as a regional association and not as a formal rule-based organization, ASEAN has succeeded 
in crafting a normative mosaic that is forceful yet non-invasive. One could describe ASEAN 
membership as an “outpatient procedure” with respect to sovereignty protections. The core norm 
written into the ASEAN Declaration is that of non-interference; the Association is “determined to 
ensure their [member states’] stability and security from external interference in any form or 
manifestation” (ASEAN 1967). This doctrine was taken a step further in 1971 with the five founding 
ASEAN states proclaiming “South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), 
free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers” (ASEAN 1971). Clearly the rhetoric 
has aligned with reality; since 1967, no armed conflict has emerged between any of the ASEAN 
member states. The parallel could be drawn between ZOPFAN and Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech 
where he argued for: “a radical lowering of the level of military confrontation in the region. Let the 
North of the globe, the Arctic, become a zone of peace. Let the North Pole be a pole of peace” 
(Gorbachev 1987). However, more can be done and the Arctic Council would be wise to consider a 
non-interference declaration. 
While ASEAN has made inroads in realizing its vision of a conflict-free region, it would be naïve to 
assume that Southeast Asia is dispute-free. Quite the contrary, both ASEAN and its member states 
have had to contend with decades of disputes – such is the cost of constructing an association in a 
region lacking socio-political cohesion. So how has ASEAN ensured that disputes do not boil over 
into trade embargoes, or worse armed conflicts? The answer is two-fold: pressure and/or adjudication. 
When a dispute extends beyond formal territorial boundaries, ASEAN takes an active roll in bringing 
aggrieved parties to the negotiating table. In certain circumstances, a written rebuke in a joint 
communiqué can be issued at the annual summit.  
Where legal intervention is necessary, ASEAN has been effective in nudging states to take disputes to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Consider the Pedra Branca Island dispute between Singapore 
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and Malaysia; after an initial debate in 1979, both states agreed to take the case to the ICJ and vowed 
to honor the outcome (Ting 2008). When the ICJ ruled in favor of Singapore, the matter was closed. 
Arctic states have, on occasion, adopted a similar approach as seen with Denmark/Greenland and 
Canada’s dispute over Hans Island, but a deepened commitment to ICJ adjudication should be 
considered.  
The enthusiasm for these governance additions in the Arctic must be disciplined. It is easy to suggest 
that participation within the Arctic Council and broader region should be expanded, and also 
straightforward to suggest that adjudication take place through the ICJ, but great power resistance – 
from forces such as Russia and the US – make these developments challenging and unlikely. While a 
region-wide doctrine of non-interference could assuage fears of sovereignty violations, the very nature 
of ICJ adjudication makes it difficult to see great power involvement. However, that does not mean 
the prescription should not be put forth. Additionally, for every easy example of ASEAN cooperation 
cited, there certainly exists a complicated one, and it is impossible not to acknowledge ASEAN’s 
hobbled approach to recent tensions in the South China Sea. Far from being an issue leader, ASEAN 
has been in the passenger seat on the issue of South China Sea conflicts. Hiding behind the veil of 
non-interference, ASEAN – pulled in different directions by the constituent states – has failed to 
leverage its position and serve as a force for reconciliation in the region. Similar challenges have, and 
will always face, regional institutions, and the Arctic is not exempt.   
The “ASEAN Way” and Charter 
The words and norms that underpin ASEAN do not always go far enough. Recently, ASEAN has 
come under fire for sweeping conflicts under the rug instead of pushing for lasting resolutions. This 
has led the ASEAN Way, widely understood to be “informality, organization minimalism, 
inclusiveness, intensive consultations leading to consensus and peaceful resolution of disputes,” to be 
downgraded (Acharya 2009: 78). In its place, Southeast Asia observers and policy-makers have pushed 
for an ASEAN Charter to formally and legally codify the Association’s informal structures. The goal 
of a charter would be to transform “ASEAN from being a non-binding association to becoming an 
international organisation with a legal personality” (Acharya 2009: 267). In November 2007, such a 
vision was realized with the adoption of an ASEAN Charter ratified by all member states. Beyond 
offering a formal legal foundation for ASEAN, the Charter also expanded ASEAN’s institutional 
reach making it possible to develop new working groups, increase ministerial meeting frequency, and 
expand the Secretary General’s governing power.   
A defining difference 
Before closing with Arctic policy prescriptions, it is incumbent upon the author to acknowledge a 
principal difference between the Arctic and ASEAN: structure. As has been discussed, while ASEAN 
has enjoyed superpower engagement – often from the US or China – this is of a peripheral nature as 
the superpowers must work with a light footprint when seeking to influence regional policy. Blocking 
for the economic outliers (i.e. Singapore and Brunei), at ASEAN’s core are a collection of developing 
countries. On the other hand, the Arctic’s cast list is composed of heavyweights; the US, Russia, 
Canada, and a league of highly developed middle powers (i.e. Nordic states) set the regional policy 
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agenda. What is more, not only are the Arctic states at the core of the regional governance structure, 
but they are also the rule-makers in the broader international system. The same cannot be said for 
ASEAN’s constituent states. These differences do not negate the ASEAN analogue case for the Arctic 
made in this paper. However, before suggesting policy prescriptions derived from ASEAN’s 
experience, responsible analysis demands this structural difference be acknowledged.   
Prescriptions for the Arctic Council and states 
While there is no single ready mix analogue solution for the current challenges confronting the 
Circumpolar North, there are measures ready for adoption that would prime the region for continued 
stability and future dynamism. As the previous section illustrated, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, and the broader regionalism narrative therein, may offer added relevance and value to the 
Arctic than the oft-cited Antarctic governing analogue. While this paper lacks the space for an in-
depth history of ASEAN, the critical moments or inflection points discussed capture the relevance of 
Southeast Asia’s regional integration model. Where most papers would end, the author believes that 
making the leap from theory to practice – from policy to prescriptions – is a critical step in advancing 
the existing body of scholarly work. The following policy prescriptions are directed toward the Arctic 
Council in cooperation with Arctic states, indigenous peoples, and the region’s vibrant epistemic 
community.     
Recommendations for policy shifts 
Adopt a doctrine of non-interference 
The Arctic Council does not actively involve itself in the foreign affairs of member states and, pursuant 
to the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, security (i.e. military) related matters are not policy topics. 
However, it is impossible to remove the military variable from the Arctic governance equation. Passing 
a non-interference declaration would serve two purposes. First, as seen in Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s 
non-interference declaration is “the key factor as to why no military conflict had broken out between 
any two member states since 1967” (Acharya 2009: 70). In addition to extinguishing the potential for 
conflict, a declaration would reaffirm sovereignty protections. To an increasingly intransigent Russia 
and a more inward-focused US, such sovereignty guarantees would be well received. Furthermore, an 
Arctic doctrine of non-interference has the potential to motivate a US ratification of UNCLOS, 
although at the present time domestic political constraints in the US make this unlikely. 
Conflict resolution through the ICJ 
When disputes between states arise in the Arctic, as they have and inevitably will, the Arctic Council 
should act as a mediator. To best accomplish this, the AC can establish a “Conflict Resolution 
Working Group” staffed by international law scholars, scientists, and policy-makers – in sum an Arctic 
epistemic community microcosm. In the event that an amicable agreement cannot be reached, the 
states should agree to have their case heard by the International Court of Justice requiring an 
understanding that the verdict, whichever side it falls, will be upheld and respected. Conflict resolution 
through the ICJ has been an effective mechanism in ASEAN as evidenced by the Pedra Branca 
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outcome, and the recent Hans Island resolution highlights the promise of the ICJ model for the Arctic 
region. As noted earlier in this discussion, the resistance such a policy shift would face from great 
powers in the region would be considerable, but this structural challenge should not strike the idea 
from the policy menu.   
An Arctic Council of 8, not 5+3 
The Ilulissat Declaration was, without question, a major policy achievement for the Arctic states; 
however, the exclusion of Sweden, Iceland, and Finland was a major policy misstep. By excluding the 
three non-littoral states from the Declaration, the scope of the agreement was not only reduced and 
weakened, but positive relations with three major stakeholders in the Arctic suffered. As seen in 
Southeast Asia, ASEAN grew from five states to ten, and this expansion committed more states “to 
the regional code of conduct on territorial integrity and peaceful resolution of disputes” (Acharya 
2009: 139). In the future, the Arctic Council should be a forum for multilateral gatherings as this will 
serve to strengthen and legitimize the preeminent governing body in the region. As an outcome of 
utilizing the AC as a forum, the Arctic Eight, not to mention permanent and ad hoc Observers, will all 
be contributors in discussions and stakeholders in outcomes. 
Elevate appointments to the Arctic Council 
The degree of importance the Arctic Council holds, and nature of the issues that should be 
approached, varies from actor-to-actor within the regime. Canada’s Arctic Council Chairmanship 
(2013-2015) confirms this assertion as the Honorable Leona Aglukkaq, an Inuk from Nunavut, serves 
as Chair reflecting Canada’s “commitment to ensur[ing] that the region’s future is in the hands of 
Northerners” (Canada 2014). For the United States, it is impossible not to remove traditional security 
and sovereignty concerns from Arctic Council initiatives, hence the appointment of Admiral Robert 
Papp (Ret.), a longtime Coast Guard Commandant, as US Special Representative for the Arctic 
(United States 2014). And the Arctic Council leadership picture only becomes more complicated when 
Permanent Participant indigenous groups are thrown into the mix. While it is impossible to assign a 
uniform rank for all AC representatives, all members should endeavor to appoint representatives to 
the Council who have a wealth of regional knowledge. The success of ASEAN has made 
representative status within member states a coveted position, and, one hopes, the same will be true 
for all Arctic Council participants. 
Building an Arctic defense community 
One of the bright spots in Circumpolar North regional cooperation is surely scientific knowledge 
sharing, but then again, nobody is talking about a scientific security dilemma. The Arctic states, 
through the Arctic Council, should move to deepen defense cooperation in the region. Looking at 
ASEAN, joint military exercises and the exchange of intelligence across state lines have served to 
deepen cooperation while securing the region. Even though intelligence sharing within ASEAN is 
often mere window-dressing, having a structure in place for unifying emergencies – such as the 
disappearance of MH370 – alone justifies the cooperation. Moreover, direct military cooperation 
provides a front-row seat to another state’s capabilities; thus, there is a compelling case from the 
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defense hawk corner as well. Alongside the Arctic’s scientific community, an intelligence community 
should be constructed with an Arctic Intelligence Forum at its core. Properly constructed, this forum 
should serve to transparently display security developments across the region, not just through a 
military lens but also a military-industrial one. Where possible, Arctic states should also engage in joint 
military exercises. And finally, as use of the Northern Sea Route increases, both tourism and trade are 
bound to increase in lockstep. To help coordinate efforts across the region, an Arctic Coast Guard, 
bringing together the resources and manpower of the eight Arctic states, would be the strongest 
showing of cooperation yet. 
Arctic regional forum 
Lowering the barriers to entry and bringing in a diverse set of voices to complement those of 
stakeholders has been the hallmark of ASEAN as exemplified by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 
When the forum is held, dozens of states join in consultation to discuss the region’s defining issues. 
As framed by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, ARF succeeds in building “security 
with others rather than against them” (Acharya 2009: 199). Arctic states and the Arctic Council have 
endeavored to be more inclusive through rhetoric, but in reality there remains a void. As discussed in 
the third policy prescription, Arctic cooperation needs to do a better job including non-littoral states. 
Similarly, the Arctic states, again working through the Arctic Council, should strengthen 
communication and cooperation with non-regional actors expressing interest in the region. Asian 
states, as diverse as China, Singapore, and India, have sent ministers to the Circumpolar North to 
build partnerships, and often these overtures are met with a cold reception. The present Arctic 
governing culture viewing interest by non-regional actors with suspicion should be replaced by a 
culture of tempered trust, and an Arctic Regional Forum can help to break down those barriers 
through constructive engagement. 
Arctic Economic Community 
Hardly unique to Southeast Asia, but certainly a defining economic feature of the region, is an 
integrated economic community. Arctic states need not look that far for an economic exemplar – 
functionalism thrives in their backyard through the European Union (EU). Building on the EU model, 
Oran Young has suggested the creation of an “Arctic Development Bank,” especially when 
considering that “Arctic communities exhibit a number of features that are characteristic of less-
developed economies” (Young 1992: 222). While the establishment of such a bank would have to be 
parallel to, and not within, the Arctic Council governing nucleus, such economic cooperation could 
help to lift the tide of poverty found in indigenous communities. Not only helping to improve the 
condition of depressed communities, an Arctic Development Bank would share fiscal risk across 
Arctic states. Thus, a mutually assured (financial) destruction system would persist whereby if one 
state becomes intransigent, all parties will suffer economic repercussions. Spillover and biased options 
of this nature will help to secure the region.  
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Closing Thoughts 
Taken together, these policy prescriptions should build governing linkages in the Arctic region that 
expand, strengthen, and reinforce the current governing structure. The author remains committed to 
the Arctic Council serving as the core governing nucleus in the region; however, cooperation does not 
know boundaries and cannot remain a regional undertaking. Elegant regimes are not constructed 
overnight – ASEAN took a half-century to get where it is today – and Arctic states should take 
advantage of the momentum driving interest in the region. Through the same informality and 
minimalism that has allowed ASEAN to accumulate regional sway, the Arctic states should work 
toward formalizing a nascent “Arctic Way” defined by inclusiveness, non-interference, and peaceful 
cooperation.       
Conclusion: toward an Arctic way 
There is great potential above the Arctic ice, not just below. Within the space of three decades, the 
Arctic Council, states, indigenous groups, and epistemic community have done a remarkable job of 
creating a robust governing structure. These regimes have the flexibility to grow; yet there has been 
an aversion to creating parallel and synergistic governing structures in the region. Instead, loose 
cooperative arrangements between states, and a series of non-binding governing agreements, have 
come to populate the space. The Arctic community can, and will, do more, and hopefully these actions 
will parallel those suggested in this discussion. And while the prescriptions explored serve to reinforce 
existing structures and expand regional capabilities, we must recognize that there can be no silver 
bullet for the present lack of a cohesive Arctic vision. 
This author identifies an “Arctic Way” as the end goal for all stakeholders in the region. Those who 
call the Circumpolar North home should work to rise above regional divisions and build a vibrant 
identity of inclusiveness and cooperation. An “Arctic Way” vision will live up to the promise the 
region holds and capture the spirit and hope – in a word momentum – that has so recently come to 
define the Arctic. Returning to the words of David Mitrany, “Peace will not be secured if we organise 
the world by what divides it” (Mitrany 1992: 503). The time has come to recognize – and organize – 
the Arctic by the shared passions that unite the region.  
 
Notes 
1. A regime is defined as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area in international 
relations” (Krasner 1983: 2).  
2. Full definition: “Functionalism: Gradualist but not greatly concerned with details of decision-
making; stresses way in which integration may attract popular support if it is seen as beneficial; 
working together in common institutions helps to create political community at the popular 
level; within this community there is a working peace system: war is less likely because of 
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functional cooperation; popular support presses for further integration and more common 
institutions, which lead to more popular support in the political community, and so on: this is 
the integrative dynamic; form follows function, i.e. every task should be approached at that 
level and in that manner which is most appropriate to that particular task.”    
3. An epistemic community is “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area” (Haas 1992). 
4. Full definition: “Regionalism is a process. It is the intentional bringing together of physically 
more or less proximate states, societies, or economies, in various ways and to varying degrees, 
for ostensibly common purposes and activities – forming or nourishing a shared identity, 
improving conditions and solving problems, or projecting influence beyond the region whose 
nature is thereby purposely created or shaped.” 
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Big Fish in a Small (Arctic) Pond: 
Regime Adherence as Status & Arctic State Identity in Norway 
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Despite frequent reassurances that the Arctic region’s regime of governance rests soundly on two mutually reinforcing pillars: the 
Arctic Council intergovernmental cooperation and the international UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), doubt 
is still cast time and time again on the durability of Arctic peace and stability. Explanations for the regime’s strength are often 
based on classical theories of international relations, wherein traditional concepts of power-struggles ensure the relative benefit of state 
cooperation in the region. However, the case is here made that adherence to the present Arctic regime of governance is not just a 
matter of material or strategic importance for the eight so-called Arctic states. It is also a matter of status, pride, and identity; 
indeed, perceptions of a state’s role in the world are a powerful and often underestimated force in determining interstate relations.  
Examining the specific case of one Arctic state, Norway, the paper explores how a state identity linked to the status granted by the 
current regime of governance guides political practices. This is done by drawing on a range of interviews with Norwegian state 
officials. For these, Arctic statehood is tied to political status, leverage, and legitimacy, thereby contributing to a positive self-
perception and an advantageous international position. Furthermore, this is linked to pre-existing idea(l)s of ‘essential’ Norwegian 
history, culture, and values.  Thus, through adopting a self-perception founded on the present Arctic regime of governance, the latter 
is discursively and normatively strengthened and reified, showing the potential potency of a political, state identity. 
 
 
Introduction 
Melting, thawing, ‘opening’, and high on the international agenda – there is no denying that the Arctic 
is changing. For many, a changing region spells a seemingly unstable region, and time and time again 
doubt has been cast on the durability of Arctic peace. Trying to keep pace with sensationalist headlines, 
covering the full gamut from doom and gloom to riches and routes, experts have repeatedly reassured 
the world that there is no Arctic ‘free-for-all’, no ‘scramble’, ‘race’, nor impending ‘Cold War’ (see e.g. 
Arbo, Iversen, Knol, Ringholm & Sander 2013; Wilson Rowe 2013). On the contrary, both academics 
and politicians stress that the Arctic is governed by an internationally recognised regime resting on 
two mutually reinforcing pillars: the Arctic Council (AC) intergovernmental cooperation and the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (see e.g. Hoel 2009; Young 2009). Although they are 
far from the only institutions of political significance in the Arctic, they are key to the construction of 
a circumpolar region where rights and responsibilities are distributed based on a political and legal 
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framework among eight sovereign states, the ‘A8’ (Keskitalo 2004; Dodds 2013a; see also Knecht 
2013). 
Frequently, pundits offer explanations of Arctic regime strength based on classical theories of 
international relations, wherein a traditional concept of power-struggles ensures the relative benefit of 
state cooperation in the region. However, adherence to the present regime of governance is not just a 
matter of material or strategic importance for the eight Arctic states (A8). Rather, regime adherence 
in the Arctic is also a matter of status, pride, and identity. Indeed, domestic perceptions of a state’s 
role in the world are a powerful and often underestimated force in determining interstate relations. 
Accordingly, the regime’s strength lies not so much in provisions per se, nor in any ability to bind and 
govern actors in a top-down manner, but in its discursive power. That is, the implicit power of defining 
how the region comes to be understood, thereby rendering ideas, actions, behaviours, and futures 
possible or impossible to imagine. Through normative influence, the combination of AC membership 
and UNCLOS acknowledgement has come to not just provide a regulatory framework for the region, 
but moreover, to reify and legitimise a specific practice of Arctic politics that is recognised and normalised 
by the international community. Consequently, belonging to the group of A8 has come to signify more 
than merely a chair at yet another political roundtable. Indeed, with the added participation of 
indigenous organisations and permanent observance by a global community, being a member of this 
exclusive club is a privilege the states in question are well aware is not to be scoffed at. As such, one 
of the reasons behind the persistence of and adherence to the current judicio-political system in the 
Arctic is arguably the construction of a political, state-level identity based on being a so-called Arctic 
state – thereby linking Arctic policies to deep-rooted sentiments of national identity and belonging, 
which in turn internalise both rights and responsibilities as essential aspects of the states’ role in the 
world. 
Examining the specific case of one Arctic state, Norway, this paper explores the state-level discourses 
– understandings, articulations, statements, and imaginations – that construct an Arctic state identity, 
and how this in turn influences regime strength and adherence; indeed, how it may guide political, 
interstate relations in the region. Firstly, the concept of ‘state identity’ is briefly explained – as related 
to, yet distinguished from national identity – and its potential influence on political behaviour. This is 
followed by a presentation of the Arctic region’s current interstate regime of governance, as based 
specifically on the mutually reinforcing UNCLOS and the AC. The specific example of Norway 
illustrates how those representing an Arctic state may adopt a political identity based on, inter alia, 
rights laid down in UNCLOS and AC membership, thereby reifying the present-day regime. This 
section draws on interview data from a range of Norwegian state officials, who shared their 
perceptions on what it means to be an Arctic state. Through their reflections, a certain 
conceptualisation of Arctic statehood becomes clear, linking regime adherence to core idea(l)s of the 
Norwegian nation-state. For them, Arctic statehood is tied to political status, leverage, and legitimacy, 
thus contributing to a positive self-perception of the country as well as an advantageous position 
internationally. Furthermore, this state identity becomes connected to pre-existing notions of what 
the country is in terms of values, culture, and history; thereby reifying and legitimising Arctic statehood 
as a natural, unquestionable extension of the Norwegian ‘essence’.   
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As such, the paper argues that when assessing Arctic governance – not least in a time when many 
worry about spill-over effects from international conflicts elsewhere – it is insufficient to examine 
merely material or strategic factors of seemingly dehumanised, ‘rational’ states. Rather, the current 
Arctic regime of governance, founded on UNCLOS and the AC, has come to hold underappreciated 
normative power through discursive processes of reification and internalisation among those 
performing the practices of Arctic statehood. This demonstrates the potential potency of governance 
regimes when their normative bases are adopted as inherent features of perceptions within the state 
itself of its own role in the world: its state identity. For this to happen, however, this relational self-
perception of status among other states must be conceived as positive and advantageous to the state 
in question, at times even contributing to a sense of relative superiority. In other words, although the 
Arctic governance regime does not conduct states’ political practices, it leads them to conduct themselves 
in certain ways. 
State identity 
By guiding how states act and interact, the Arctic regime of governance has arguably come to hold 
underappreciated power. Based on a combination of international law, diplomacy, and science, part 
of the regime’s viability lies in its adoption, rather than incursion, into states’ ‘identities’. That is, their 
identities as states – political organisations within a seemingly bounded, given territory – as distinct 
from national identity. Conversely, national identity refers to belonging to a so-called ‘imagined 
community’, a nation, perceived to exist among fellow nationals (Anderson 1983). Although the terms 
nation and state are often confused, conflated, and even hyphenated, it is important to note the deeply 
political (and problematic) nature of assuming a bordered correlation between people and territory 
(Antonsich 2009; Sparke 2005). Hence, state identity here refers to the perception at the political level, 
i.e. among policy-makers and political leaders, of the country’s ‘self’, its role in the world. Of course, 
the state-level perception of identity does not exist isolated from a popular (the nations’) sense of such 
(e.g. Hopf 2002), and vice versa, (foreign) policy can be highly influential in shaping national identity 
(Campbell 1992). Particularly in democratic states, leaders are (to varying degrees) supposed to be 
representative of the population at large (Breuining 2007; Jacobs & Shapiro 2000). However, as 
publicly known figures, political leaders’ understandings and framings of the country’s essential 
character (be they deliberate or not) is not the be-all and end-all, but one among several important 
factors guiding action; arguably, an often neglected factor in assessing political behaviour in the Arctic 
and beyond. Thus, the aim in the present paper is not to assess national Arctic identity among the 
population (see e.g. Medby 2014), but rather to address an official-level, political identity that 
permeates the governing system, thereby potentially influencing political behaviour in the region (see 
e.g. Fearon 1999; Jones 2007; Mitzen 2006; Wendt 1994).  
The Arctic region & regime 
The Arctic is no singularly defined space, but a contextually and topically dependent region with a 
number of definitions. Common ways of delineating the Arctic include the 10°C July isotherm, the 
tree line, and several other climatological, biological, or geographical markers. Politically, however, the 
AC’s reliance on the Arctic Circle’s latitude – 66° 33’ north – has become the most widely accepted 
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definition, where the eight states with territories north thereof (five of which also hold Arctic Ocean 
continental shelf claims) are recognised as the so-called Arctic states, the ‘A8’: Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark/Greenland, Iceland, Russia, Canada, and the United States. Nevertheless, as largely 
ocean space, the Arctic has often been thought of as a terra nullius and a free-for-all; an unclaimed and 
unclaimable liquid space, where no lines or boundaries may be drawn on the rolling waves (Steinberg 
2001).  
It is often based on this view that fears of inadequate governance or regulation will lead to a ‘scramble’ 
or ‘race’ to claim the Arctic’s potentially rich resources have been allowed disproportionate levels of 
publicity. However, contrary to such concerns, the Arctic is subject to a number of regulatory 
mechanisms, firmly placed within a jurisdictional framework of international law (Dodds 2013b). In 
fact, as the Arctic is defined on a number of nested (and at times overlapping) scales, it has become a 
region whose governance is highly multilaterally complex, even seemingly messy in all its intricacy 
(Dittmer, Moisio, Ingram & Dodds 2011; Young 2004). As state, sub-state, inter-state, multi-state, 
trans-state, and supra-state actors interact in the various topically defined ‘Arctics’, institutional 
interplay and a wide array of interests mean that the region is highly dynamic – not just physically 
(Jakobsson, Ingólfsson, Long & Spielhagen 2014), but also politically (Stokke 2011, 2013; Underdal 
2013; Young 2009). However, although Arctic governance is often described as idiosyncratic in its 
intricate multilateralism and inclusion of e.g. indigenous peoples’ organisations in AC deliberations, 
actual authority has repeatedly been affirmed to lie with the eight Arctic states. Indeed, as regional 
cooperation increases and the range of active stakeholders have expanded far beyond northern 
latitudes (see e.g. Bennett 2014), the maintenance of state sovereignty remains a key priority for the 
Arctic states (Heininen 2012; Knecht & Keil 2013; Steinberg & Dodds 2013). 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
Whereas territorial sovereignty on land above the Arctic Circle is distributed and bordered among the 
A8, the application of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) provides 
the legal framework for delimitation and distribution of rights and responsibilities among the five 
coastal states in the Arctic Ocean. This establishes that, contrary to common notions of a ‘global 
commons’, the Arctic Ocean is not to be considered high seas at all (bar a few ‘loopholes’), but neatly 
segmented into territorial seas, exclusive economic zones (EEZ), extended continental shelves, and 
so on – all with their own rules and frameworks for orderly usage. The process of Arctic mapping and 
boundary-drawing, or ‘cartopolitics’, is therefore instrumental in producing a specific space of state 
governance (Strandsbjerg 2010, 2012). Guided by scientists’ descriptions of the sea-floor’s geological 
features, this ‘strategic science’ with long historical roots (Doel et al. 2014) constructs a narrative of 
the Arctic as unquestionably, obviously like any other ocean; already inherently a part of the five states’ 
spatial extent (see Steinberg, Tasch & Gerhardt 2015).  
Despite the seeming neutrality of science and the seeming rigour of international law, the process of 
UNCLOS-based delimitation is therefore undeniably political, with interpretations of both law and 
geological data being malleable depending on interest (Brekke 2014). Submissions for extended 
continental shelves, for example, will only ever be reviewed after any bilateral territorial questions have 
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been resolved – a circumstantial dependency of which the applauded Norwegian-Russian Barents Sea 
delimitation was a case in point (Henriksen & Ulfstein 2011). Ratification of UNCLOS is still 
outstanding for the ‘last reluctant Arctic power’, the USA (Huebert 2009); although, their signing of 
the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration arguably confirmed the state’s commitment thereto. Nonetheless, the 
2008 meeting of the five Arctic coastal states, excluding Iceland, Sweden, and Finland on the basis of 
UNCLOS’ supposed irrelevance to their specific relationships to the Arctic region, caused a political 
hubbub (see e.g. Dodds & Ingimundarson 2012). As with the region writ large, defining precisely 
where the Arctic Ocean begins and ends is no straight-forward task, not least as currents and fish 
stocks move Arctic waters. When the five states again met exclusively in 2015 in order to negotiate 
and sign a declaration on fishing in the Arctic Ocean, this was, unsurprisingly, met with Icelandic 
criticism. As their authorities stated, fishing in Arctic Ocean international waters concern them 
perhaps more than most other Arctic (and non-Arctic) states. Furthermore, according to their 
statement, an Arctic Ocean EEZ was clearly not a condition for participation, as Norway does not fit 
that description either (I.M.F.A. 2015). The latter point is also one of some controversy, as the details 
of Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard and its surrounding waters are laid down in the 1925 Svalbard 
Treaty; that is, a treaty made before UNCLOS, and importantly, extended continental shelf 
delimitation-rules were agreed upon. Whereas the Treaty establishes all signatories’ rights to conduct 
activity on the archipelago, the exact conditions of this once more became a topic of debate when the 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin landed on Svalbard in April, despite prohibition of entrance 
to Norway due to political sanctions (BBC 2015). Albeit strongly criticised by the Norwegian 
authorities, the incident illustrated the inherent ambiguity and interpretative nature of Arctic Ocean 
matters and international law more generally, as well as the question of appropriate enforcement.   
The ostensibly indisputable scientific-legalistic basis of which UNCLOS is portrayed as an objective 
framework thus retains much of its power in precisely the voluntary and advantageous nature of 
adherence thereto; even constructing a hierarchy among the A8 of which five are further privileged. 
Moreover, UNCLOS has been highly successful in motivating interstate cooperation reaching further 
and deeper than the surface of formal diplomacy, such as necessitating scientific collaboration on sea-
floor mapping in order to make submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (Dodds 2010; Numminen 2010). Thus, the promotion and performance of UNCLOS towards 
particularly non-Arctic states interested in the region – such as the large states India and China – 
simultaneously constrain and enable the Arctic states’ own political practices in the region.  
The Arctic Council 
With UNCLOS providing the legal pillar of Arctic governance, the Arctic Council (AC) serves as its 
political counterpart: an intergovernmental forum for cooperation. In addition to the noted eight 
member states with territories north of the Arctic Circle, the AC also includes six indigenous peoples’ 
organisations as ‘Permanent Participants’, who have to be ‘consulted’ on all matters (Graczyk 2011; 
Koivurova & Heinämäki 2006). Other states and stakeholders may apply to observe – as an increasing 
number of states have done in recent years. As such, they are not party to decision-making, but may, 
of course, observe decisions being made and actively partake in working groups and projects (Graczyk 
& Koivurova 2014). Since its inception in 1996, the AC has evolved from a primarily environmentally 
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focused forum for cooperation to a wide range of issue topics relating to regional development 
(Axworthy, Koivurova & Hasanat 2012; Pedersen 2012). This marks both the growing importance of 
the Arctic region in general, as well as the growing importance of the AC itself, as the ‘pre-eminent 
forum for international cooperation in the Arctic’ (Clinton, quoted in Pedersen 2012: 149). A few 
recent binding agreements aside, one of the major successes of the AC may be the sheer interaction of 
states on an equal playing-field; in particular states whose officials are otherwise prone to bilateral 
dialogue-aversion (see e.g. Byers 2010). 
Nevertheless, with no decision-making abilities, but only ‘soft’ power, relying on the cooperative spirit 
of the member states, concerns have been raised that the AC remains a weak institution, ill-equipped 
for the concurrent surge in Arctic interest, stakeholders, and temperatures (Heininen & Nicol 2007; 
Koivurova 2010; Koivurova & VanderZwaag 2007; Young 2012). However, the AC has since its 
nascent days been seen as demonstrative of peaceful cooperation in the Arctic (Young 2005), and has 
consequently taken on a symbolic significance, reifying states’ positions in anticipation of Arctic 
prosperity (Steinberg, Bruun & Medby 2014; Steinberg & Dodds 2013). These hopes of prosperity 
are, of course, particularly linked to future shipping and resource opportunities, which in turn are 
contingent on peaceful and orderly relations. It is also, as international law’s diplomatic counterpart, 
mutually reinforcing and reinforced by UNCLOS, recently making recognition of the latter a criterion 
for Observer status in the former (Graczyk & Koivurova 2014). Thus, albeit it holds no ‘hard’ power 
to determine states’ behaviour in the region, the AC is instrumental both for norm-setting and for the 
reification of a specific Arctic understanding where cooperation is the only obvious, and indeed 
possible, political practice.  
Norway: A case study of Arctic state identity  
As one of the A8, and also among the even more exclusive five littoral states, Norway has both land 
and sea territories in the Arctic, is home to an indigenous Sami population, and has a long history of 
polar exploration. The basis upon which an ‘Arctic identity’ may be constructed are therefore 
numerous, and have led the government to designate the Arctic, or ‘the High North’,1 as Norway’s 
‘most important strategic priority area’ (N.M.F.A. 2014). Norway may indeed be particularly 
advantageously positioned in the current political ordering of the Arctic, as it grants them both high 
status (Wilson Rowe 2014; see also Carvalho & Neumann 2015) and a ‘great power’-role in e.g. 
hydrocarbon extraction (Rottem, Hønneland & Jensen 2008; see also e.g. Hønneland & Jensen 2008; 
Jensen 2007; Kristoffersen & Jensen 2012). Thus, as a state with much to gain from its formal status 
as an Arctic state, Norway serves as an illustrative example of how this rather recent title may (or may 
not) translate to a self-perception among state officials as representing such; and, furthermore, to what 
extent this status may impact governance and regime adherence in the Arctic.  
In order to assess how state representatives perceive Norway’s role in the region a series of anonymous 
interviews were conducted with officials in various positions at the state-level.2 Altogether 16 
interviewees shared their reflections on the topic, allowing for qualitative analysis of dominant 
discourses that may serve to legitimise or de-legitimise options of political behaviour available at the 
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state-level (see e.g. Neumann 2008). As Oran Young (2009: 431) explains in relation to Arctic 
governance: 
Although they do not prescribe detailed answers to specific questions about policy, 
the influence of such discourses is enormous. They often shape the way we formulate 
questions, and they can direct our thinking in ways that favour some answers and rule 
out others.  
As such, the discourses and conceptualisations of the Arctic region and own role therein held by state 
representatives hold a powerful potential to guide their approach thereto.3 
Main findings 
Arctic statehood was for the majority of the Norwegian state officials primarily conceptualised as a 
result of geographically and geologically based provisions laid down in UNCLOS. Although a status 
as a so-called Arctic state is often derived from territory north of the Arctic Circle, oceanic rights 
clearly constructed an internal hierarchy among these, thereby granting Norway an elevated status 
even within the group. As a small state, this chimes well with Norway’s quest for international status 
and influence – a desire to be heard on the international stage (Carvalho & Neumann 2015). As one 
official explained: 
There is kind of an ‘A’ and a ‘B’ team in the AC, as there are five states that have 
borders to the Arctic Ocean, and Norway is one of those. [...] So that is, in a way, the 
‘A’ team, those who have direct interests and territories in the Arctic Ocean, while the 
other states – with areas north of the Arctic Circle, but no border to the Ocean – they 
are kind of part of this game without participating to the same extent (G). 
Hence, the specific way in which the Arctic is defined becomes significant for relative status; in this 
case, emphasising the oceanic definition as it is of particular advantage. Interestingly, the officials’ 
understandings of (dis)similarity between the two terms ‘the Arctic’ and ‘the High North’ were highly 
inconsistent, showing the definitional malleability of the region depending on topical context and 
favoured political outcome (Skagestad 2010). Among the more reflexive comments on the utilisation 
of either term, one mused: “That sort of depends on who defines what things are; you often define 
things depending on your own interests” (F).  
In other words, UNCLOS grants Norway international status, also within the region itself; a status and 
particular interpretation of Arctic statehood that may advantageously be employed in certain contexts. 
Land territory north of the Arctic Circle, i.e. Norway’s three northernmost counties, was seen as a 
further legitimising factor of Arctic statehood, and instrumental in the privileged role as one of the 
A8. The phrase ‘region of opportunities’ (‘mulighetenes landsdel’) was repeated by many, highlighting the 
optimism tied to economic resource development in the northern areas benefitting the whole country. 
This particular focus on Northern Norway granted legitimacy not just abroad, but also among a 
domestic electorate; in turn necessitating specific political action to match the rhetoric in the form of 
investment in the northernmost counties: 
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Building an [Arctic] identity, you build a brand – that is, Norway: a brand – which 
requires that the state – the government and Parliament – have to deliver something 
within it. So it drives development. (H). 
Just as domestic pressure drives political behaviour, the international implications of Arctic statehood 
are no less significant. In fact, several noted that being an Arctic state means more internationally than 
domestically, as a status that gives Norway added leverage in diplomatic negotiations. The Arctic state-
status was described as “an important asset for Norway” (E), which officials “use deliberately in 
communication outwards” (B).    
As several pointed out, Norway’s Arctic statehood allows it an equal role alongside the so-called great 
geopolitical powers, Russia and the USA. On the one hand, this may have led to “a Norwegian self-
perception that is a bit bigger than it has reason to be” (J). On the other, Norway’s northern border 
to Russia also serves as a reminder of the country’s small size, leading to e.g. heightened defence 
spending (J), while simultaneously reinforcing a positive image of Norway as particularly successful at 
international cooperation (B, I). Thus, for a small state with big ambitions, the Arctic provides an 
opportunity for Norway to take on a role as a ‘great power’, exerting influence far beyond its 
population number would suggest: “I think the other countries consider us a key state in the Arctic 
cooperation” (K). Or, as another phrased it: “we are not the largest nation in the Arctic, but at least 
we are a leading nation in the Arctic” (H). Being an Arctic state is therefore both advantageous for 
international relations as well as generating and reinforcing a positive self-perception among the 
population and officials alike, chiming well with an imagined identity of pride and patriotism. 
Further adding to this heightened status, several of the interviewed officials pointed to Norway’s 
history of polar exploration as yet another point of legitimacy in the governance of the region. The 
very same ideas and ideals that were drawn upon in the construction of a national identity at the turn 
of the 20th century, framing Norway as distinct from Denmark, now feature in constructing it as an 
Arctic state. Additionally, highlighting Norway’s history as an Arctic (or indeed, polar) state creates a 
historical national narrative, linking shared past experiences to shared future prospects in the north. In 
concert with UNCLOS-based rights as an Arctic coastal state, many pointed to a deep-running 
Norwegian identity as a coastal culture with essential ties to the sea as indisputable; indeed, attributing 
it with causal power in shaping the nation’s character: “My theory is that there is something different 
about people who grow up, through generations, by the coast and look outwards, seeing the 
opportunities that are out there” (F). 
In this way, Arctic statehood and coastalness were conceptualised as a natural extension of a pre-
existing Norwegian identity, thereby rooting it in an ‘unquestionable’ and timeless Norwegian essence. 
This also included the cognitive connection between being ‘Arctic’ and so-called Norwegian values:  
Of course, the Norwegian agenda – with responsible exploitation of resources, to 
summarise – is very much rooted in Norway, or the Norwegian, as a hunting and 
fishing nation, explorer nation; and there has always been a connection between 
Norway as a polar nation, a research nation, that wanted to exploit resources. They 
have historically also gone hand in hand (G). 
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The particular role thereby constructed for Norway through its Arctic statehood, as based on the 
present regime of governance, was one of unquestionable need for presence and leadership. In other 
words, for the Norwegian state officials, being an Arctic state grants political status, legitimacy, and 
leverage – both internationally and domestically. Furthermore, this identity of Arctic statehood was 
reified and internalised by linking it to pre-conceived notions of the very core of what it means to be 
Norwegian – rooted in a re-interpretation of history, a coastal identity, and supposedly national values. 
This, in turn, constructs a specific self-perceived role for the country at the state-level; a state identity 
that simultaneously enables and constrains political behaviour in the Arctic region and beyond. 
Conclusion  
As the Arctic region is attracting ever more attention from near and afar, alarming headlines casting 
doubt on the stability of regional governance appear with increasing frequency. Sensationalism 
remains persistent despite the repeated reassurances from both political and academic pundits of the 
strength of the current regime of governance, resting on the mutually reinforcing pillars of 
international law: UNCLOS; and international diplomacy: the Arctic Council. Arguably, strictly 
material or strategic explanations of states’ relative benefits of regime adherence are unsatisfactory in 
explaining the durability of current governance mechanisms. Significant as these weights and balances 
no doubt are to states’ leadership, it is also necessary to consider the importance of discourses of state 
identity in legitimising or de-legitimising specific political practices in the region.  
Using the example of one Arctic state with particular gains to be made from its status as such, Norway 
illustrates how Arctic statehood may be internalised as a seemingly inherent element of the state’s 
‘identity’. In other words, how those representing the state – officials at the state-level – adopt a 
particular understanding of the country’s role in the Arctic region and the world writ large. In this 
specific case, officials articulated Arctic statehood as tied to heightened political status and sense of 
importance for an otherwise small state, legitimacy within the region, and political leverage both 
internationally as well as domestically. Furthermore, this rather recent re-articulation of Norway as 
essentially, naturally ‘Arctic’ was constructed as rooted in Norwegian history, coastal culture, and 
‘typical’ values. As such, the status and identity – the specific discourses of Arctic statehood – granted 
through the current regime of governance simultaneously enable and necessitate specific political 
practices as well as constrain and rule out others. Most notably, regime adherence becomes an intrinsic, 
unquestionable part of self-perceived role for the respective state, thereby rendering alternative 
governance arrangements or deviance therefrom wholly ‘out-of-character’. 
In sum, as illustrated by the case of Norway, by internalising an identity of Arctic statehood based 
upon the current regime of governance, state officials consequently invest it with a discursive and 
normative power that ought not to be neglected when assessing its strength and durability. Albeit 
Arctic governance as represented by UNCLOS and the Arctic Council does not hold the power to 
conduct the ‘cacophony of voices’ (Young 2004: 212) that wish to be heard in the region, it is 
instrumental in guiding the concert of Arctic states and stakeholders in how they conduct themselves.  
Adherence to international governance regimes based on symbolic status and state identity is clearly 
significant beyond the specific case of Norway; indeed, beyond the Arctic region. Albeit Norway is 
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unique in its particular constellation of identity factors, the concept of Arctic state identity is 
undoubtedly relevant elsewhere too. While Russian authorities emphasise its long polar history, and 
the Icelandic draw on its connection to the oceans, there are clearly many ways in which national 
narratives and identity become intertwined in Arctic policy. However, as a state with much to gain 
from its Arctic statehood, potential internalisation and reification of current governance will inevitably 
manifest differently elsewhere than in Norway – not least among those not privy membership therein. 
Nonetheless, the Norwegian experience – granting a small state a big role in this exclusive region – 
serves as an illustration of how state identity and governance may at times be intimately interwoven, 
thereby contributing to understandings of Arctic governance beyond and beneath the material surface 
of interstate relations. 
 
Notes 
1. The Norwegian government often favours the term ‘The High North’; in Norwegian 
‘nordområdene’, literally ‘the northern areas’. 
2. To ensure full confidentiality the respondents are only referred to by alphabetic letter 
according to the time of their interviews. The interviews were conducted mainly during July 
2014, and distributed as: four in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; one in the Ministry of 
Defence; one in the Ministry of Justice and Public Security; one in the Ministry of Climate and 
the Environment; one in the Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation; one in the 
Ministry of Education and Research; and seven Members of Parliament. Note that this is part 
of a larger, ongoing study on Arctic statehood and political identity in Norway, Iceland, and 
Canada. 
3. All translations from Norwegian are by the author herself, as close to the original as possible. 
Of course, relying on a snowball strategy and general willingness to participate, the 
participants’ views are not necessarily generalisable, but rather illustrate how individuals at the 
state-level perceive their state as being (or not being) ‘Arctic’.  
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A new chapter in Arctic relations opened when Danish diplomats submitted five boxes of evidence to the UN’s Commission of the 
Limits of the Continental Shelve (CLCS) in New York. Denmark’s claim to 895,000 km2 of Arctic seabed that includes the 
geographical North Pole surprised analysts by going all the way from Greenland’s northern boundary to the border of the Russian 
EEZ. The claim is likely to overlap with future Canadian and Russian claims. Observers soon warned that this could lead to an 
unfortunate Russian reaction and spark tensions between Moscow and Copenhagen. This article examines how the Canadian, 
Danish, and Russian claims may spark tensions between the Arctic states, based on a review of the Arctic studies literature. How 
does the UNCLOS process fit within the political dynamics of the region and does the Ukraine crisis make a peaceful agreement 
less likely? The article argues that the claims process is largely disconnected from the geopolitical logic of the region and there is no 
reason to expect it to cause significant tensions between the High North states. As several authors have pointed out, most resources 
are located outside of the disputed areas. Instead, the process is driven by domestic concerns. Ownership of the Arctic is symbolically 
important in all three states, albeit in different ways. Whereas Arctic ownership is crucial for both Canadian and Russian audiences, 
in Denmark the claims process has more to do with the complex Danish-Greenlandic relationship. However, the Ukraine crisis 
may disrupt this peaceful state of affairs. The crisis may alter the Putin regime’s power base and thus force Moscow to become more 
attentive to domestic voices that call for a more bellicose approach to the Arctic. 
 
 
A new chapter in Arctic relations opened on a cloudy December day last year, when a Danish 
delegation with five moving boxes arrived at the headquarters of the UN’s Commission of the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in New York. The boxes contained evidence that had been gathered 
over the last decade to support Denmark’s claim to an 895,000 km2 area - roughly the size of Germany 
and France - that stretches from the northern part of Greenland’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 
across the North Pole, to the Russian EEZ, overlapping an area claimed by Russia in 2001 (Danish 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Government of Greenland 2014: 8). In the coming years, three Arctic 
coastal states (Canada, Denmark, and Russia) will divide a large part of the central Arctic Ocean, 
including the North Pole, between them under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
The claims are part of a wider delimitation process in the High North that also involves Norwegian 
and American continental shelf claims.  
Some media outlets portray this process as an Arctic great game, a competition for virgin lands, ripe 
with untapped resources and opportunities that comes with the risk of military conflict in the High 
North (Withnall 2014; Anonymous 2015c; Hopper 2014; Anonymous 2015b; Jacobson 2014). Most 
Arctic scholars believe that these warnings are overstated (Young 2009; Young 2011; Keil 2014; 
Brosnan, Leschine, and Miles 2011). They point to the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, in which the coastal 
states declared that they would respect international law when settling the delimitation lines in the 
Arctic region (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). They also stress the fact that most of the resources in the 
High North are located along the coasts, in areas that have already been divided between the Arctic 
littoral states. However, as some scholars have emphasized, one cannot simply disregard the conflict 
potential in the Arctic by pointing to the current state of affairs (Huebert 2013). It is important to 
understand why the states currently cooperate and under what circumstances the delimitation process 
could ignite tensions between the High North states. This paper suggests that this can be done by 
examining how the delimitation process is shaped by the interaction between law and geopolitics. 
Geopolitics is not just static geographical facts about where states lie and what territories they occupy 
– geography has to be placed in a dynamic context with other political factors. Resources and territorial 
disputes must be understood together with the intricacies of international law and the immediate and 
long-term political goals and means of the great powers. Non-Arctic events, most importantly the 
Ukraine crisis, affect global politics and such changes may alter how Washington, Moscow, 
Copenhagen, Oslo, and Ottawa view the Arctic region and the delimitation process.  
This piece examines how Canada, Denmark, and Russia are likely to approach the delimitation process 
around the North Pole through analyzing the interaction between international law and geopolitics. 
Specifically, it seeks to understand whether the UNCLOS process is likely to lead to tensions between 
the three states? It argues that Canada, Denmark, and Russia most likely will cooperate to divide the 
territory between them peacefully. Even from a purely Realpolitik point of view, the states have an 
interest in solving any disputes peacefully and international law provides procedures and rules that 
facilitate interstate coordination and an orderly settling of disputes. Domestic politics may complicate 
matters if governments or domestic political actors try to capture voters by following or demanding a 
more assertive course in the High North. The Arctic plays a symbolically important role in the national 
narratives of most of the states and domestic forces may pressure governments to problematize the 
process if outcomes do not match expectations. The Ukraine crisis exacerbates this potential and one 
cannot reject the possibility that future global political ruptures may cause problems down the line.  
There are several types of territorial and legal logics at play in the Arctic. The present piece focuses 
on the extended continental shelf claims – that is, claims made by states based on article 76 through 
85 of UNCLOS, specifically Canada, Denmark, and Russia’s claim to area around the North Pole. The 
conclusions of the piece can easily be extrapolated to also be relevant for other continental shelf claims 
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in the High North. Furthermore, the article only examines whether and how the claims process may 
lead to tensions between the states – it does not aim to predict how the claims themselves will be 
settled. The analysis of the legal structures in the following section only aims to unpack the relationship 
between international law and geopolitics. It does not provide a complete overview of the many 
complex intricacies of the UNCLOS sections on continental shelves.  
The argument progresses in three steps. The first section examines how international law structures 
the Canadian, Danish, and Russian claims and where one finds the boundary between law and 
geopolitics. The second section focuses on the geopolitical reasoning that guides how the states 
approach the delimitation process. The final section then uses international law and geopolitics to 
outline the current state of the claims process.  
International law: the principles of delimitation 
The continental shelf process is dictated by both legal and political considerations. UNCLOS provides 
a structure for allowing the states to make claims to the Arctic sea-bed, based on its geological and 
geographical features. As stated in UNCLOS’ Article 76 (1),  
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a 
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not 
extend up to that distance (UNCLOS 1982: 76(1)). 
Within 200 nautical miles, states can demand the right to exploit the sea-bed as defined by the EEZ 
regime (Byers 2014: 94). Canada, Denmark, and Russia have already extended their EEZs to the 200 
nautical miles line under this regime, so the current process revolves around the section that allows 
states to claim rights over the continental shelf that extents as “the natural prolongation of its land 
territory” beyond 200 nautical miles. Claiming the continental shelf thus entails detailed geological 
analysis to show that it is indeed a natural prolongation of the state’s land territory.  
If a sea high is determined to be a natural prolongation of a state’s land territory, the size of the 
claimable areas depends on whether the sea highs are submarine ridges or submarine elevations. The 
former entitles the states to claim an area up to 350 nautical miles from the baselines drawn at the 
coast; while the latter entitle the states to also claim areas that are within 100 nautical miles of the 
2,500 isobath of the continental shelf. In other words, states can potentially claim a larger area if they 
can argue that a sea high is a submarine elevation and not a submarine ridge. Determining the type of 
sea high involves relatively complex criteria, including the crust type and connection to the continental 
margin and CLCS emphasizes that it determines how to evaluate the evidence on a case by case basis. 
The distinction between the two types is also debated amongst international lawyers (Byers 2014: 99–
104). Both principles are relevant for the Arctic claims.  
The rights that states have over the continental shelf are quite limited. They have rights to the soil and 
subsoil, but not the water column or the airspace above the continental shelf. They can exploit certain 
living and dead resources (oil, gas, minerals, and “organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are 
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immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the 
seabed or the subsoil”) found in the soil and sub-soil. Because they have no rights over the water 
column or the airspace, they cannot regulate or interfere with civilian and military traffic (UNCLOS 
1982: 77–82; Byers 2014: 93).  
States can block the UNCLOS process if they find that it is in their best interest to do so. UNCLOS 
only provides a set of rules for how much territory states can claim, while determining the final 
delimitation lines depends on political agreements between the states. One state can disrupt the 
process by challenging the content of other states’ claims or by refusing to compromise at the 
negotiation table. In that sense, the process depends largely on political considerations (McDorman 
2002). 
The role of CLCS is to evaluate the scientific validity of the states’ claims, before the states can sit 
down at the negotiating table. CLCS does not determine the legality of the states’ claims, but only 
determines whether the scientific evidence provided by states supports their claims regarding the 
nature of the continental shelf. CLCS’s power lies in the legitimacy that states assign to its 
recommendations. This power enables it to facilitate a facts-based process by supplying information 
to other potential parties and thus decreasing transaction costs for states. CLCS also limits the extent 
of the claims that states can reasonably make, because it forces the states to present scientific data to 
show the legality of their claims (McDorman 2002).  
The claims process basically runs through three phases: submission of claims, evaluation of claims, 
and recommendation from CLCS. First, states submit their claims based on scientific data. Norway, 
Denmark and Russia have made claims to the Arctic Ocean, while Canada has yet to submit its claims 
to CLCS (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Government of Greenland 2014; The Russian 
Federation 2001; The Russian Federation 2015; Kingdom of Norway 2006). Norway does not claim 
the North Pole and there are only minor overlaps with other nations’ submissions (Kingdom of 
Norway 2006; The Russian Federation 2015; Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Government of 
Greenland 2014).  
Second, the CLCS then evaluates the scientific assertions in the claims. CLCS can only make 
recommendations if other nations do not make claim to the same area and protest against CLCS 
considering the evidence. States can thus use this mechanism to disrupt the process. For instance, 
when Russia submitted its first claim in 2001, several of the other states argued that the Russian 
submission did not provide enough data to allow them to form an opinion (Permanent Mission of 
Canada to the United Nations 2002; Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations 2002). 
The states have since agreed to allow CLCS to consider their claims (The Russian Federation 2015; 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Government of Greenland 2014).  
Third, CLCS provides its recommendations, based on the evidence provided by the states. If a state 
is dissatisfied with its findings, the state can submit new evidence. Once CLCS recommendations have 
been reached, the involved states can use them to negotiate a final settlement of any overlapping 
claims. Non-involved states can probably influence the process by protesting against any final 
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boundaries. Control of territory ultimately depends on state recognition and protest would show that 
the protesting state does not recognize the claims as legitimate (Byers 2014: 125–26).  
In sum, international law provides the states with rules and processes that allow them to transfer 
information in an orderly fashion. The states can disrupt the process, but UNCLOS and CLCS are 
both considered to be legitimate and unpartisan institutions and doing so thus comes at the loss of 
reputation for states (Mercer 1996; Downs and Jones 2002; Brooks & Wohlforth 2005: 514–17). The 
key question is if states’ interests in disturbing the process outweigh these political costs. One cannot 
understand the delimitation process without considering why states have a geopolitical interest in a 
peaceful settlement of the Arctic delimitation question.  
Geopolitics makes states adhere to international law 
Geopolitics link the geographical features of a specific area with economics and international and 
domestic politics to understand state behavior within that area. Understanding the Arctic’s importance 
entails understanding its material production value, its military and symbolic importance, and existing 
domestic and international political dynamics.  
At Ilulissat, the coastal states agreed to follow international law when dividing up Arctic territories 
and to cooperate through regional institutions (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). Of course, declarations are 
but mere words and it would count for little were it not for the fact that it rests on a foundation of 
shared state interests. As the following sections will show, even when viewed from a purely Realpolitik 
point of view, the states have much to gain from adhering to the UNCLOS set-up and this has so far 
kept the process on track. Basically, the geopolitical logic behind this support consists of geo-
economic, grand-strategic, and domestic dynamics. In the following, each of these dynamics is 
analyzed separately to show that the states have an incentive to divide the territory peacefully, but that 
domestic politics may disrupt the process.  
Arctic geo-economics 
There is no established consensus about the meaning of the term “geo-economics” and definitions 
include the economic effect of geopolitics, the geopolitical effects of economic phenomena, and the 
geographical distribution of economic activity (Luttwak 1990; Dicken 1998; Baru 2012). In this piece, 
I define the term narrowly as the subset of geopolitics concerned with the economic potential of 
geographical features, including transport routes, minerals, energy resources, and animal stocks. That 
is, geo-economics tells us how certain territories enable the production of wealth.  
The geo-economics of the Arctic indicate that the UNCLOS process should be relatively 
unproblematic, as the undistributed areas are unlikely to contain significant resources and even if they 
do so, they will be very difficult to exploit. As mentioned above, the process does not give states rights 
over some of the most important Arctic resources, such as fish stocks or sea lanes. Instead, a geo-
economical analysis should focus on resources found on the seabed or in the subsoil beneath, the 
most important of which are oil and gas.  Any analysis of the resources in the undistributed areas will 
be based on estimates based on sparse data, but available analyses indicate that the vast majority of 
Arctic hydrocarbons are located along the coasts, within the existing boundaries of the High North 
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states (Gautier et al. 2008). Minerals or other valuable resources may be found on the bottom of the 
sea, but they are still very difficult to exploit, as the sea floor is covered by 500 to 4,200 meters of 
water and an ice-sheet that is unlikely to disappear for decades.  
Of course, the very possibility of finding exploitable resources at some point in the future gives the 
states an incentive to maximize their piece of the Arctic territory. The value of potential future gains 
is, of course, not the same as the value of a certain gain in the present. The uncertainty of their very 
existence is the first major problem. Even if they do exist, their value is also time-discounted, meaning 
that resources that may lie centuries down the road have a lower value for two reasons: first, the time-
value concept of money tells us that the present value of an asset decreases as the time to potential 
exploitation increases.  Second, events in the meantime may prevent states from actually exploiting 
those resources, feeding into the uncertainty argument.  
Thus, states must consider how pursuing uncertain and highly discounted resources stacks up again 
the certain and undiscounted political costs of pursuing a large stake at this point in time. Claiming 
Arctic territory entails an effort to substantiate the validity of the claim and the risk of creating 
animosity in other states. States will be unwilling to incur political costs, if they gain from political 
cooperation. The political costs are determined by the grand strategic goals of the states in question, 
which will be analyzed in the following section. Arctic policymakers have previously shown that they 
are willing to compromise in order to avoid incurring political costs. For instance, concerns for the 
stability of Arctic cooperation and an unwillingness to incur political costs played a key role when the 
Arctic states decided to give six non-Arctic states, including China, India, and Japan, Observer status 
in the Arctic Council. Russia was skeptical at the onset, but Moscow was eventually convinced to 
widen the circle of Observers, because Russian diplomats feared that blocking the decision would 
complicate Arctic governance and hurt Russia’s reputation in the Council (Solli, Rowe & Lindgren 
2013: 262–63). 
In sum, the unclaimed territories may have some geo-economic value, as they may contain resources 
that are exploitable at a future date. However, this geo-economic value is rather miniscule. It is 
uncertain if there are any resources and even if resources are to be found, they are almost impossible 
to exploit even in the long term. As the following section shows, the Arctic states gain from regional 
cooperation and they will thus typically be unwilling to suffer unnecessary political costs.  
Grand strategy and the Arctic 
Just pointing out that the areas contain few exploitable resources does not necessarily show that states 
are likely to respect the UNCLOS process. Instead, the states may have a grand strategic interest in 
disrupting the process if it enables them to gain political power in the international system. Grand 
strategy is the “national policies in peace and war that both set out the goals of the state in international 
politics and prescribe how a broad range of national resources should be utilised in pursuit of those 
goals” (Kitchen 2010: 121). It enables analysts to understand how states rank certain ends vis-à-vis 
other ends. A brief review of the grand strategies and regional strategies of the states involved in the 
Arctic before the Ukraine crisis shows that they all had an interest in preserving the status quo that 
outweigh the benefits of disrupting the UNCLOS process.1  
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Russia’s long-term goal is to remain a great power and a dominant state in its near-abroad. It stands 
somewhat outside of the current global order and has shown in Georgia and Ukraine that it is willing 
to pursue revisionist policies to achieve those ends (Tsygankov 2010). Russia wants to retain the ability 
to survey and operate militarily in the region. Russia also has significant geo-economic interests in the 
Arctic that make Moscow interested in keeping the peaceful regional order that currently defines the 
High North. The Russian economy depends on the continuous exploitation and export of oil and gas, 
which make up half of government revenues, and the Arctic off-shore make up a crucial new frontier 
for the energy industry (Laruelle 2014: 254; Gustafson 2012: 456-73; International Energy Agency 
2011; Henderson & Loe 2014). Oil and gas dwarf all other Russian economic interests in the region, 
including minerals, fisheries, and the new sea-route through the North-East Passage. Even though 
these interests are, of course, important for the Russian state, they are not essential for Moscow’s 
long-term position in the international system. This need for hydrocarbons makes Moscow dependent 
on the West. Russian companies, like Rosneft and Gazprom, lack the necessary capital, technology, 
and know-how to develop and explore these resources and they have consequently established 
partnerships with Western companies that can supply these elements (Henderson & Loe 2014; 
Gustafson 2012: 470-72; Bradshaw 2010). Military and political tensions in the Arctic may discourage 
Western companies from engaging in these partnerships and Russia consequently has an interest in 
supporting peaceful cooperation in the region.   
The remaining coastal states are all part of the American alliance system that dominates the global 
order. The United States has few grand strategic interests in the High North. The American Arctic 
contains some hydrocarbons and mineral resources and the US generally has an interest in keeping 
shipping lanes open for global traffic and attaining domain awareness and military maneuverability in 
the region (White House 2013: 6-7). However, none of these interests are essential for American grand 
strategy in the same way as Russia’s Arctic interests play a crucial role for Moscow. Instead, the High 
North is mainly important for political reasons. The US benefits immensely from the current global 
order and Washington aims to prevent potential rivals, like Russia and China, from pursuing revisionist 
policies by showing them that they too stand to gain from the status quo. In the High North, for 
example, China gets influence over regional decision-making and Russia gets access to partnerships 
with Western oil and gas companies. However, the White House can soon deny the two states access 
to these benefits if they pursue destabilizing policies.  
Extra-regional powers, like China and Japan, have few interests and little influence in the region, but 
as long as the delimitation lines have not been settled, they can challenge the legitimacy of the 
UNCLOS process by disputing any agreements (Byers 2014: 125-26; Tonami 2014; Kai Sun 2014; 
Brigham 2014). This course of action would not bring these states any material benefits, but it could 
be part of a revisionist approach aimed at destabilizing the current world order. No extra-regional 
great powers currently show sign of going down the revisionist track, but world political currents can 
change fast and one cannot disregard the possibility that non-Arctic states will challenge the UNCLOS 
process.   
The smaller Arctic coastal states also benefit from the current order and they support the American 
course, although they have some leeway to stake out an independent course. Denmark and Canada – 
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the two smaller states with claims to the North Pole – are both integral members of NATO and they 
therefore both have an interest in maintaining the Western alliance and both countries’ governments 
emphasize international cooperation in the region (Government of Canada 2010; Government of 
Denmark, Government of Greenland, and Government of the Faroe Islands 2011). Smaller states 
concurrently tend to prefer international cooperation and both Canada and Denmark should be more 
interested than the great powers in avoiding tensions in the High North. Denmark is smaller and 
located closer to Russia, so one would expect Copenhagen to be more willing than Ottawa to 
compromise with Moscow.  In sum, the current constellation of interests supports a cooperative 
approach to Arctic politics and to the UNCLOS process.  
The Arctic in domestic politics 
Domestic politics also play an important role for the UNCLOS process. The polar region plays a 
crucial role in the national imaginaries of most of the coastal states and governments and domestic 
political forces can strengthen their own position by playing on these imaginaries. In Russian national 
identity, for instance, the Arctic forms a final frontier for civilization, a “Wild North” akin to the “Wild 
West” in the US. The High North represents a normative mission (to bring civilization to the North), 
while also serving an instrumental purpose for Russia as a region of wealth that will finance Russian 
greatness in the 21st century. Protecting Russia’s rightful claim to the Arctic is seen as part of a wider 
quest of protecting Russia as such from foreign encroachment (Laruelle 2014, 24-46). The 2007 
planting of a Russian flag on the North Pole sea bed can be seen as a case in point (Chivers 2007). 
The event had no legal repercussions – states do not acquire territory simply by planting flags on it – 
and it should instead be seen as an attempt at shoring up support domestically (Laruelle 2014: 10).  
Similarly, the High North plays a crucial role in Canadian identity, as a unique territory from which it 
derives national characteristics of ruggedness and manliness that separates it from other liberal, Anglo-
Saxon states (Williams 2011). This emphasis of Arctic sovereignty has been strengthened during the 
current Harper government (Dodds 2011). As some authors point out, emphasizing Canada’s need to 
assert its sovereignty over the Arctic enables the conservative government to push for a strengthening 
of national defense and to appeal to nationalistic sentiments amongst segments of Canadian voters 
(Coates et al. 2008: 169-87). Some observers also argue that the sizeable Ukrainian diaspora in Canada 
explains Ottawa’s strong stance against Russia during the Ukraine crisis (Carlson 2014; Harper 2014; 
Hoppe 2015). 
The High North also plays a role for Danish politics, albeit in a more indirect manner. While the Arctic 
plays only a marginal role in Danish political identity, the continental shelf question is a crucial 
component of the complex relationship between Denmark and Greenland, an autonomous territory 
within the Kingdom of Denmark. The Danish government has ultimate say in foreign and security 
policy matters, but it constantly has to reaffirm the legitimacy of this arrangement by showing that it 
works to further Greenland’s interests (Rahbek-Clemmensen 2011). According to at least one line of 
thinking, a minor claim designed not to antagonize Moscow could have been weakened Copenhagen’s 
legitimacy in Greenland (Breum 2014: 186-91). However, little is known about how the continental 
shelf claim actually resonates in Greenland.  
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In sum, domestic politics has thus so far played a marginal role for the UNCLOS process, but it may 
disrupt the Arctic delimitation process in the future. Domestic forces may pressure governments to 
pursue a more demonstrative course, even though it is not in the best interest of the state. The Russian 
planting of a flag on the Arctic seabed in 2007 provides a case in point. The event, which was organized 
by leading members of the incumbent United Russia Party, did nothing to strengthen Russia’s claim 
to the pole, but it led to raised eyebrows in the other Arctic capitals (Chivers 2007).  
The geo-economic features of the Arctic and the grand strategies of the Arctic coastal states thus 
support the UNCLOS process. The area around the North Pole probably contains very few, if any, 
exploitable resources and the states generally have an interest in keeping the region peaceful. Domestic 
politics is the great unknown in the strategic calculus. The question has significant symbolical value 
for several of the coastal states and domestic forces may pressure Arctic governments to throw a 
wrench in the UNCLOS machinery.  
The present and future of the delimitation process 
The states have so far accepted the conditions outlined in Ilulissat and they have allowed the UNCLOS 
framework to run its course. Before the Ilulissat meeting, in 2001, Russia made a claim that extended 
to, but did not include, the geographical North Pole (Russian Federation 2001). Canada and Denmark 
found that the claim lacked data and they were unable to form an opinion (Permanent Mission of 
Canada to the United Nations 2002; Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations 2002). 
The US argued that the ridges that Russia claimed to be part of its continental shelf (the Alpha-
Mendeleev Ridge and the Lomonosov Ridge) were, in fact, free-standing oceanic ridges and 
Washington recommended that the CLCS should request more data, if it was unsure about the Russian 
claim (Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations 2002). Norway 
accepted that CLCS considered the claim (Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations 2002; 
The Russian Federation 2015). Overall, CLCS found that the claim lacked sufficient data and requested 
a new submission (Russian Federation 2015; Byers 2014: 107-09). 
Denmark’s claim from December 2014 covers an 895,000 km2 area and is more extensive than 
observers had expected. It overlaps with the previous Russian claim from 2001 as well as with the 
2015 Russian claim and it will most likely overlap with future Canadian and Norwegian claims. None 
of these states have opposed to CLCS considering the Danish claim (Danish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Government of Greenland 2014). For long, the Danish and Canadian governments 
worked to make a coordinated submission, where the two states would not make overlapping claims. 
However, Canada reportedly rescinded on the deal in 2013 as Canada would most likely claim territory 
that would overlap with the Danish claim. The deal would give Ottawa no claim to the geographical 
North Pole and observers speculate that the Canadian change of course was an attempt to shore up 
popularity by the government (Breum 2014: 189-91; Chase 2013).  
Russia resubmitted its Arctic claim in August 2015. The new Russian claim covers an area of 1.2 
million km2, including the geographical North Pole, and it is more extensive in the central Arctic 
Ocean than the 2001 claim (The Russian Federation 2015).2 However, it still signals that Russia is 
willing to compromise with the Danes and the Canadians. Given that Denmark argued that the 
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Lomonosov ridge was an extension of both Asia and North America, Russia could have claimed the 
entire ridge to North America. Having made a large claim would arguably give Moscow more room 
for compromise and would thus have been a sensible negotiation tactic for the up-coming talks with 
Canada and Denmark. By refraining to do so, Russia showed that it is dedicated to settle the 
delimitation process peacefully. If anything, Russia is more restrained than Denmark, when it comes 
to its claims to the central Arctic Ocean. The other Arctic coastal states have accepted that CLCS 
evaluates the Russian submission (Russian Federation 2015: 10-12). The Danish and Russian claims 
and the other states’ reactions thus show that the Ilulissat consensus still remains intact.  
Although the delimitation process has hitherto run peacefully, there are some clouds in the horizon 
that may complicate matters down the line. The Ukraine crisis is making Arctic politics more 
confrontational and this may affect the UNCLOS process.3 So far, the impact of the crisis has been 
mild in the High North, compared to its impact on other regions. Military tensions have increased as 
joint exercises have been cancelled (Østhagen 2014; Pettersen and Nilsen 2014). Russia and the West 
have shown their military strength in the region through exercises and military demonstrations (Nilsen 
2014; Staalesen 2014; Anonymous 2015a). However, there have been fewer demonstrations in the 
Arctic than in other regions. For instance, Norwegian scrambles of Russian military planes have gone 
up 20%, compared to a 200% increase in NATO scrambles over the Baltics (Anonymous 2014; 
Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Lithuania 2014a; Ministry of National Defence, Republic 
of Lithuania 2014c; Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Lithuania 2014b; Ministry of National 
Defence, Republic of Lithuania 2014d; Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Lithuania 2015; 
Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Lithuania 2014e; Ministry of National Defence, Republic 
of Lithuania 2014f). None of the episodes that occurred between High North nations in the Arctic in 
2014 are on par with the episodes from other regions, which include the alleged Russian abduction of 
an Estonian border guard, the alleged intrusion of a Russian submarine to the Stockholm archipelago, 
or several provocative incidents between military platforms in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea (Frear, 
Kulesa & Kearns 2014; Frear 2015).  
The crisis has also complicated diplomatic cooperation in the region. Sergey Lavrov, the Russian 
foreign minister, did not attend the 2015 Arctic Council Ministerial, thus missing his first Ministerial 
since 2004 (Myers 2015). Although Russia sent Sergei Donskoi, its minister of natural resources and 
the environment, it is difficult not to see Lavrov’s absence as a Russian protest, caused by the events 
in Ukraine. Shortly before the meeting, Dmitry Rogozin, the controversial head of Russia’s Arctic 
Commission who is banned from entering most Western countries, made a provocative visit to 
Svalbard. Although not a violation of the Norwegian sanctions of Russia, the visit led to audible 
protests from Oslo (Myers 2015; Pettersen 2015b). In 2014, Canada and the US boycotted an Arctic 
Council task force meeting that was scheduled to be held in Moscow (Mackarel 2014).  
In spite of these controversies, Arctic cooperation continues. For instance, the aforementioned 2015 
ministerial showed that the Arctic states agree to continue and expand the Council’s project portfolio 
in the coming years. For example, the states agreed to implement several existing initiatives in areas 
such as climate protection, oil spill prevention, and marine protection and to take new initiatives, such 
as a telecommunications infrastructure experts group (Arctic Council 2015). Also, the Council 
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deferred the controversial questions regarding the role of Observers and whether the EU should be 
granted Observer status to 2017 (Arctic Council 2015). This shows that the states were unable to reach 
an agreement about one of the more controversial matters in current Arctic Council politics and it 
seems reasonable to argue that the Ukraine crisis added an additional layer of complexity to the matter. 
However, had one of the states wanted to halt Arctic cooperation, protesting or blocking discussion 
of the Observer question altogether would have been a natural course of action. Bilateral cooperation 
also continues in spite of the crisis. For example, Norway and Russia still maintain non-military 
cooperation, including the annual Barents emergency drill (Pettersen 2014; Pettersen 2015a).  
Most importantly, the Western sanctions of Russia deliberately target Moscow’s oil and gas interests 
in the High North, making it impossible for Western energy companies to engage in partnerships with 
their Russian counterparts (European Union 2014; United States Department of State 2014). The 
sanctions thus target the very backbone of the cooperative order in the Arctic and they may push 
Russia towards a more confrontational position for two reasons. First, the sanctions mean that 
potential partnerships with Western companies no longer function as a carrot for Russia. Moscow 
simply benefits less from Arctic cooperation, compared to the pre-crisis years, and one would expect 
that Russia would be less willing to make concessions to preserve the current order. Second, this 
downturn is destabilizing Putin’s power-base. The Russian government has so far rested on a wide 
coalition that encompasses both moderates who care about economic growth and the nationalist right 
(Charap 2013). The combination of the sanctions and the drop in energy prices means that Russia 
may face years of economic stagnation, which makes it more difficult for the Putin regime to gain 
support from moderates. Moscow faces a choice between de-escalation and escalation in Ukraine. If 
it chooses the latter path, the Kremlin may decide to bolster its own domestic position by 
strengthening the nationalist right through a more bellicose and provocative foreign policy.  
The UNCLOS process may prove to be the perfect arena for Russian posturing. The issue is 
symbolically important in Russia as well as in the other High North states and provocations are likely 
to result in harsh reactions from Ottawa and Copenhagen and perhaps even Washington. Russia’s 
reaction to the Danish claim (which was made ten months after the beginning of the Ukraine crisis) 
shows that Moscow still respects the Ilulissat consensus. Although Russia disagreed with 
Copenhagen’s interpretation, Moscow accepted that the claim was made according to the principles 
stipulated by CLCS and did not oppose that the commission considered the claim (The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2014).  
In sum, the delimitation process thus still runs peacefully and it seems reasonable to expect that state 
of affairs to continue in the future. However, policymakers and observers should be aware of the risk 
that domestic forces may push the states to disrupt the peaceful process and that that risk has been 
exacerbated by the Ukraine crisis.   
Conclusion 
The purpose of this piece was to use legal and geopolitical theory to examine whether Canada, 
Denmark, and Russia’s continental shelf claims are likely to lead to tensions between the three states. 
It showed that international law provides principles that the states have to follow if they want to claim 
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Arctic continental shelves, but that states can also block this process. The core states currently stand 
to gain from the peaceful settlement of the issue, which has been reflected in the somewhat restraint 
shown thus far by the states.  
Domestic politics is the big unknown. The Arctic plays a symbolically important role in the national 
narratives of all three states and it is not unlikely that domestic forces will pressure governments to 
make extensive claims or to block the UNCLOS process. The delimitation process thus entails 
managing domestic expectations. Furthermore, policymakers and observers should note that the 
Ukraine crisis may be changing Moscow’s strategic calculus by making cooperation less beneficial, 
while concurrently strengthening the regime’s dependence on nationalistic domestic forces. The 
Kremlin may decide to use posturing and a disruption of the UNCLOS process to stoke the flames 
of nationalism.  
The delimitation process is still on track, but policymakers and observers should be aware of the 
bumps ahead and should plan their policies and reactions to avoid that the process gets derailed. Timing 
seems to be absolutely essential. Policymakers should – if possible – make claims and counterclaims 
at times when the tide of nationalism is ebbing and they should avoid stoking the flames of nationalism 
through provocations or posturing, when other states make their claims. Furthermore, they should 
not take foreign posturing too seriously, but rather strive to separate identity politics from actual 
concrete political measures. The current constellation of interests seems to favor a peaceful 
delimitation of the High North, but it requires cool heads in the Arctic capitals to ensure that favorable 
conditions lead to optimal outcomes.  
 
Acknowledgments 
The author would like to thank Thorbjørn Bugge Daniel, Vincent Keating, and the participants at a 
seminar held at the University of Copenhagen for their helpful feedback and comments to earlier 
versions of this article. The research for this article was funded by the Carlsberg Foundation.  
 
Notes 
1. The following review is based on Rahbek-Clemmensen 2015. 
2. The 2001 claim included an area bordering Norwegian territory in the Barents Sea. Norway 
and Russia had settled this question in the meantime and this part of the claim was not included 
in the 2015 claim. 
3. For a comprehensive analysis of the impact of the crisis on Arctic politics, see Rahbek-
Clemmensen (2015).  
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The Arctic Security Community: 
Proving Ground or Sub-Plot of a Tensed European Security 
Environment? 
 
Benjamin Schaller 
 
For a long time, economic, environmental and human challenges to security dominated the governmental discourse on Arctic security 
and the work of the Arctic Council. Projects and procedures of cross-border co-operation negated opportunities for any geopolitical 
tension in the region. Even the widely cited Arctic ‘dispute’, on the yet-to-be defined maritime borders in the High North, has so 
far followed international law under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. As a result, diplomats and many 
scholars optimistically assess the future of Arctic security. One could come to the conclusion that the Arctic represents “a 
transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change,” or a potential 
‘Arctic Security Community.’ The rising geopolitical tensions surrounding the Ukrainian crisis, however, may have now stopped, 
probably even reversed, the long, slow and difficult process towards such a security community in the High North. One reason, as 
this article argues, is that over the years, military security has been excluded from much of the Arctic security discourse. This 
incomprehensive security approach has made the region vulnerable to spillover effects of geo-political tensions. Worse, this approach 
now seems to slowly threaten even the good track record of cooperation in economic, environmental and human security dimensions. 
Since many government-to-government contacts, especially military-to-military ones, are currently completely immobilized, this article 
not only argues for a more comprehensive approach towards Arctic security, but also for a strengthening and inclusion of the region’s 
strong levels of cross-border co-operations between research institutions, civil society actors and indigenous peoples into a 
‘Comprehensive Arctic Security Environment.’ If such a comprehensive approach can be achieved, this article argues finally that the 
Arctic might even be able to serve as a proving ground for restoring mutual trust and confidence beyond its regional borders, within 
the currently tensed European security environment.  
 
 
Introduction 
On March 9th, 5000 troops launched the military exercise “Joint Viking,” Norway’s largest military 
drill in Finnmark, Norway’s northernmost county (‘fylke’), since 1967 (Nilsen 2015a). On the other 
side of the border 38,000 Russian soldiers, more than 3000 military vehicles, 41 naval vessels as well 
as 15 submarines and over a 100 military aircraft of the Russian Northern Fleet were put on full 
combat alert on March 16th (Nilsen 2015b). Carried out as a so-called “snap-exercise” – without prior 
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notification to the troops involved – the Russian Federation bypassed its politically-binding 
obligations as a participating state of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and was thus not obliged to internationally announce the exercise in advance or to invite 
foreign military observers. This raised some controversial debate about whether Russia’s exercise was 
a direct response to Norway’s military activities or not (Bentzrød 2015a). While such a connection is 
difficult to prove and Russia was also arguably compliant with its international obligations, its 
behaviour did not – and probably was not supposed to – send an unequivocal signal of détente. It 
rather lines up in a series of events which seem to mark a decreasing level of trust in the region. 
By the end of the Cold War the Arctic had only a limited potential for military conflict (Welch 2013: 
2 f.). In fact, for years the Arctic was characterized by researchers and diplomats alike as an 
environment in which any form of military escalation was very unlikely (Welch 2013; Lind 2014; Bergh 
2014; Wezeman 2014). One could argue that the Arctic was developing towards a convincing example 
of a ‘Security Community.’ On the other hand, unlike the theoretical concept that Emanuel Adler and 
Michael Barnett had proposed, this ‘Arctic security community’ had started to form around ‘soft’ 
security issues in the ‘economic and environmental’ as well as in the ‘human’ dimension of security 
and beyond the traditional understanding of states as the only capable security providers. At the same 
time, ‘hard’ security issues were excluded from much of the Arctic security discourse and this 
incomprehensive security approach has made the region vulnerable to spillover-effects of geo-political 
tensions emanating from the crisis around Ukraine. As these now seem to slowly threaten even the 
good track record of cooperation on ‘soft’ security issues in the Arctic, this article advocates for a 
broadening of the theoretical concept of ‘Security Communities’, to include security issues along all 
three dimensions of the OSCE’s comprehensive security approach as well as to consider additional 
actors and providers of security, other than the state. 
For this purpose, the article will first briefly outline the traditional theoretical concept of security 
communities. Afterwards, it assesses the extent to which the Arctic today can be considered a 
traditional security community, and to what degree spillover effects from the crisis in and around 
Ukraine have influenced this development, if at all. This analysis shall also highlight some of the 
shortcomings of the traditional concept of security communities in which security issues are not 
sufficiently addressed across all three security dimensions and almost exclusively dominated by states. 
The article will conclude by discussing the advantages of enhancing the traditional concept of security 
communities. It will furthermore discuss ways through which the Arctic states can facilitate the 
formation of a comprehensive Arctic security community in the future and how the region might even 
be able to transform into a proving ground for restoring trust and mutual confidence beyond its 
borders. 
Practical examples used in this article will be primarily chosen from the bilateral relations between 
Norway and Russia. As this article does not claim to deliver a full-fledged in-depth analysis, the 
presented line of argumentation should be treated as an initiatory discussion for broader ones on 
security in the High North in the future.  
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The theoretical concept of security communities and methodological 
considerations 
One of the underlying assumptions of this article is that regional security is hardly immune to 
geopolitical changes and to outside influences. Looking for example into the Arctic region, the current 
changes in the European security environment seem to also require an assessment of possible 
spillover-effects to the security agenda in the High North. In this regard, theories, such as the well-
established ‘regional security complex theory’ by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003), seem only little 
promising, as they particularly emphasize ‘proximity’, both, for security interaction, but also for 
security threats especially in the military, political, societal and environmental sector (Buzan & Wæver 
2003: 45 f.). Technological progress and global security challenges like climate change seem to ask for 
a much more general and open theoretical framework. The subsequent section will thus briefly define 
and outline the theoretical concept of ‘Security Communities,’ which will afterwards serve as the point 
of departure for identifying the key elements of an Arctic security community as well as for discussing 
spillover effects from the Ukrainian crisis.  
Definition 
The term ‘Security Community’ was first coined in 1957 by political scientist Karl Deutsch in his 
research on political communities (Deutsch 1957). He argued that security communities would 
represent a particular form of a political community, one in which the members of a certain 
geographical area hold a long-term “dependable expectation […] of ‘peaceful change’” (Deutsch 1957: 
2) as they share the common belief that group-internal disputes will solely be regulated and resolved 
through non-violent, institutionalized procedures (ibid.). While also elaborating briefly on necessary 
conditions for the establishment of such communities, for example communication (ibid.: 17 f.) and 
common, unifying core areas (e.g. size, economy, and administration) (ibid.: 18 f.), Deutsch’s concept 
failed to provide a clear analytical framework for their identification. It took another 40 years until 
Adler and Barnett enhanced and transformed the concept into a researchable theoretical framework. 
While mostly adopting Deutsch’s seminal definition, they placed special emphasis on the aspect that 
‘sovereign states’ represent the key members of a security community (Adler & Barnett 1998: 30). 
Key elements of security communities 
The concept of security communities is comprised of three key elements, according to Adler and 
Barnett. First, the members of a security community have shared identities, values, and meanings. 
Second, they have many-sided and direct relations. Third, they share a common long-term interest 
(ibid.: 31). 
This article underscores a central shortcoming of Adler and Barnett’s construction of the security 
community concept. Treating many-sided and direct relations as a separate indicator for security 
communities ignores that developing shared identities, values, meanings and long-term interests 
without having many-sided and direct relations in the first place seems rather unlikely. While these 
elements in reverse also increase the amount of direct relations, they represent, as this article argues, 
a necessary precondition rather than a simple element of security communities. Direct relations, as 
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also Adler and Barnett admit (ibid.: 54), initiate and foster the learning process which is needed for all 
sides, to learn from and about one another’s motives and behaviours. It is this knowledge about the 
other members, which creates trust and the conviction that a member of a security community can, 
regardless of the current actions of others, expect peaceful change (ibid.: 54 f.). In a most ideal case, 
this is achieved by a merger of identities, values, meanings and long-term interests, something Adler 
and Barnett would call ‘tightly coupled’ security community (ibid.: 56). 
However, it is also important to point out that direct relations are nothing to be measured in 
quantitative terms, something which Adler and Barnett’s use of the term ‘many-sided’ seems to imply. 
Purely counting the number of direct encounters appears to be simplistic and thus inaccurate, as it 
simply assumes that every interaction 
automatically leads to merging 
perceptions and expectations in security 
spheres. Much more emphasis should 
thus be put on a qualitative assessment 
of these contacts. 
Methodology 
This section shall provide some brief 
answers to the most important 
methodological considerations in this 
article. These mainly include aspects of 
operationalization, case selection and 
empirics. 
Operationalization 
The actual operationalization of indicators on highly normative theoretical concepts, such as security 
communities, is probably one of the most difficult aspects of conducting research. Measuring or even 
identifying ‘many-sided and direct relations,’ ‘shared identities, values, meanings’ as well as ‘common 
long-term interests’ is a highly delicate and normative task and will remain vulnerable to controversial 
debate and disagreement. Thus, the used operationalization in this article will also not claim to be 
inviolable to critique. Moreover, this article tries to increase the reliability and validity of its findings 
in two ways.  First, it will rely on the established operationalization of Amitav Acharya’s study on a 
possible security community in Southeast Asia (2014). Second, it will present the line of argumentation 
in the most transparent way possible. Building upon an established framework appears also most 
reasonable in light of the article’s limitations in scope. 
Since many-sided and direct relations have been identified as a necessary pre-condition for the 
formation of security communities, these will form the core point of departure for the assessment of 
security communities. Nevertheless, since states in today’s globalized world are able to meet and 
interact in numerous international venues, the analysis of this article will put special emphasis on 
official governmental forums which are Arctic-specific. 
Security 
Community
shared 
identities, 
values, and 
meanings
commonly 
shared 
long-term 
interest
many-sided 
and direct 
relations
Figure 1. Key Elements of Security Communities  
(based on Adler & Barnett 1998). 
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In order to evaluate the existence of shared identities, values, meanings and commonly long-term 
interests, Amitav Acharya divided his analytical framework into three sections: one about norms in 
dispute settlement, one about norms for collective action and one with regard to the issue of collective 
identity (ibid.: 36). The main-guiding questions he identified for each of these sections will also form 
the analytical basis of this article and are summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 2. Constructing security communities: a framework (Acharya 2014: 36). 
Questions about norms in dispute settlement 
1  In handling intra-regional disputes, has the use of force been resorted to or seriously envisaged? 
2 Has there been any indication of competitive arms acquisitions and military planning during the course of the 
dispute? 
3 Does the group provide for institutional mechanisms to settle disputes between members? 
4 How often do members resort to such mechanisms? 
Questions about norms in collective action 
1 Does the group follow its norms in devising functional cooperation, such as economic cooperation? 
2 Does the group follow its norms in dealing with outside actors? 
3 What is the level of support provided by other members of the group to a member who is involved in a dispute 
with an outside actor? 
4 How does the group handle disunity or breaking of rank by any member(s) over cooperative and collective 
action problems? 
Questions about collective identity 
1 Has there been a growing resort to multilateral approaches to problems compared with the past, including new 
issues which have been brought under the purview of multilateral cooperation? 
2 Has cooperation led to formal or informal collective defence (including policy coordination against internal 
threats), collective security and cooperative security arrangements? 
3 Has it involved and produced new ways of expressing social identity, such as redefining the region? 
4 To what extent do countries outside the group recognise its new social identity? 
 
Case selection, empirics and constraints 
This article will not be able to extensively discuss and answer each single question of Acharya’s 
framework or to cover the full spectrum of relevant dynamics within the Arctic security community. 
Most examples will therefore be derived from previous studies on the subject and in particular from 
the bilateral relations of Norway and Russia, a choice that appears particularly rewarding for a number 
of reasons: Firstly and probably most importantly, since the End of the Cold War, Norway and Russia 
share a long-lasting history of co-operation in the High North (Wezeman 2012: 6 f.; Nilsen 2015a; 
Pettersen and Nilsen 2015). Secondly, given that Norway is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
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Organization (NATO), it is also possible to cover the aggravating nexus of the currently strained 
NATO-Russia relations (Åtland & Pedersen Torbjørn 2014). This situation is fostered even more by 
the fact that thirdly, both countries are sharing a direct national border and fourthly, have for different 
reasons, a considerable share of their armed forces deployed above the Arctic Circle (Wezeman 2012). 
The Arctic region – a traditional security community under pressure of the 
Ukrainian crisis? 
Based on the theoretical framework of security communities, the aim of this section is to identify to 
which degree the Arctic today can be considered a traditional security community. Based on the 
assumption that regional security cannot be treated separately from global security developments, if 
and to what degree has the recent crisis in Ukraine influenced this development. Treating many-sided 
and direct relations as a necessary precondition, the identification of the existence of the precondition 
will be the point of departure, followed by an assessment of the Arctic’s norms in dispute settlement, 
for collective action as well as its collective identity. 
Many-sided and direct relations 
The Arctic Council (AC) is at the core of multilateral relations in the High North (Bailes & Heininen 
2012: 12). Its mandate seeks to “provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and 
other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and 
environmental protection in the Arctic” (The Ottawa Declaration 1996). The Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council (BEAC) and the Northern Dimension of the EU (ND) provide additional formats for 
discussing possible means of cooperation on non-military aspects of security in the High North (Bailes 
& Heininen 2012: 13). 
Since the AC explicitly excludes dealing with issues of military security (Ottawa Declaration 1996), 
there are no official Arctic-specific multilateral forums dealing with traditional issues of military 
security (Regehr & Buelles 2015: 72). The informal annual meeting of the Arctic’s Chiefs of Defense 
Staff (CHOD) (ibid.: 72 f.), the newly established Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF)1 (U.S. Coast 
Guard 2015), other joint military and coast guard exercises as well as minor forms of military co-
operation are thus the countries’ only forums for discussing military and traditional security 
perceptions exclusively among each other (Regehr & Buelles 2015: 69 ff.). 
Apart from solely Arctic-specific forums, all Arctic states can address a large variety of their military 
security concerns related to the region through a number of non-Arctic-specific multilateral forums. 
For this purpose most important are the OSCE’s ‘Forum for Security Co-operation (OSCE – FSC)’, 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) of NATO as well as the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) 
from which the latter is only available to NATO member states and the Russian Federation. Members 
of the Arctic states’ armed forces further officially meet during the cooperative implementation of the 
OSCE’s Vienna Document 2011 (VD’11) on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)2 
the implementation of the treaty on Open Skies (OS).3 
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After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and critical involvement in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, 
many of the above presented forums have either seen a clear cooling in the relations of most Arctic 
states to Russia and are now dominated by mutual accusations or have for the time being been 
completely suspended. The suspended forums are those which involve practical military cooperation 
with Russia, such as the NRC (NATO Foreign Ministers 2014), the CHOD and joint military exercises 
and  other forms of direct military co-operation (e.g. Pettersen 2014; Pettersen & Nilsen 2015; Johnsen 
2015). At the same time, the statement by NATO’s Foreign Ministers emphasizes that the political 
dialogue with Russia can continue on “the Ambassadorial level and above” (NATO Foreign Ministers 
2014).4 Other forums and formats, such as the AC, the BEAC, the FSC, the EAPC and the 
implementation of VD’11 and OS are challenged by different degrees of spillover effects from the 
Ukrainian crisis (e.g. United States Mission to the OSCE 2014; Nilsen 2015b; Rahbek-Clemmensen 
2015; Pettersen 2015d). These spillover effects seem so far least visible for the EU’s Northern 
Dimension, for the ACGF and joint non-military5 exercises (e.g. Pettersen 2015c; Johnsen 2015). The 
impact of the Ukrainian crisis on direct and many-sided relations in the Arctic can thus be summarized 
as: 
Table 3. Spillover effects from the Ukrainian crisis on direct relations in the Arctic (by the author). 
Direct Relations 
with Russia 
Forums 
Military Non-Military 
Suspended 
NRC, Meeting of CHOD, Joint 
Military Exercises and cooperation 
 
Stressed EAPC, OSCE – FSC, VD’11, OS AC, BEAC 
(rather) 
Unaffected 
 
ND of the EU, ACGF, Joint non-
military exercises (e.g. Coast 
Guards) 
 
Norms in dispute settlement 
Over decades, many scientists and practitioners considered the possibility of the use of military force 
or even its threat in the region as highly unlikely (Welch 2013; Lind 2014; Wezeman 2014; Bergh 
2014), an understanding which seemed to be strongly based on a set of commonly shared norms for 
dispute settlement. 
While having always been some kind of a natural habitat for strategic missiles and ballistic missile 
submarines (so-called SSBNs), with the capacity of launching nuclear missiles, the region’s harsh 
climate made conventional military operations always extremely difficult to carry out (Welch 2013: 2). 
As a result, the Arctic, in direct comparison with other regions, never was one with high levels of 
militarization (Wezeman 2012: 13 f.) and the most interesting and noteworthy activities from a military 
security perspective, seem to have and are still happening underneath or well above the Arctic ice 
sheet (Welch 2013: 2; Bamford 2015). 
Taking the delimitation of yet to be defined borders in the region – probably the most often referred 
to dispute in the area – the five Arctic littoral states committed themselves within the ‘Ilulissat 
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Declaration’ to abide by international law in order to settle their conflicting territorial claims on the 
Arctic continental shelves (Arctic Ocean Conference 2008) and also reiterated this commitment, in 
the Arctic Council’s ‘Vision for the Arctic’: 
The further development of the Arctic region as a zone of peace and stability is at 
the heart of our efforts. We are confident that there is no problem that we cannot 
solve together through our cooperative relationships on the basis of existing 
international law and good will. We remain committed to the framework of the 
Law of the Sea, and to the peaceful resolution of disputes generally (2013: 2).  
All Arctic states seem to have followed these norms and existing regulations when making territorial 
claims or settling border disputes in the region. In 2010, Russia and Norway for example signed an 
agreement on the delimitation of their borders in the Barents Sea (Centre for Borders Research 2015: 
3). Similar treaties and agreements also exist for various other border delimitations in the Arctic, even 
for the USA (ibid.) which has not yet signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). UNCLOS has not only provided a reliable framework of rules and regulations in the past, 
but also for the remaining and still to come overlapping claims in the High North (Dodds 2010: 66).  
In addition to an apparently accepted existing framework, the remaining unresolved border 
delimitations, such as Hans Island or the more or less ‘symbolic’ North Pole, are considered to carry 
little conflictual potential to provide enough ground for a risen fear of military confrontation in the 
region (Welch 2013: 2 f.; Mazo 2014).  
Both observations seem to continue to hold true. After its updated submission to UNCLOS in August, 
the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated: 
We have been well aware of the Danish plans […] and it has for a long time been 
clear that the country’s bid for extended continental shelf will include and even 
exceed the North Pole. […] Possible overlapping parts of our countries’ shelf in 
the Arctic will be delimited in a bilateral manner, in negotiations and on the basis 
of international law (Staalesen 2015b). 
Most of the recent changes in military infrastructure, deployment or arms acquisition in the Arctic 
have so far been neither very strong in their force projection nor very specifically directed towards the 
region as such. They are much more a response to a quickly melting natural environment, which for 
example requires a strengthening of the countries’ northern border security capacities for the 
prevention from potential threats through for example smuggling, human trafficking or international 
terrorism (Wezeman 2012; Padrtová 2014: 421; Lind 2014; Bergh 2014; Wezeman 2014). Also the 
actual fulfillment of this military planning can be met with a considerable amount of skepticism – 
mainly due to the high costs they pose (Wezeman 2012: 14; Padrtová 2014: 421). 
Nevertheless, Russia’s recent violations of international norms for peaceful dispute settlement in 
Georgia and in course of the crisis in and around Ukraine have also severely increased suspicion about 
the country’s military strategy in the High North, which on the one hand concentrates on the 
modernization of its armed forces and on the other hand on improvements in military infrastructure: 
Russia is modernizing the Northern Fleet’s strategic nuclear submarines, and […] 
[i]n January 2015 Russia established a new Arctic brigade in Alakkurti, located just 
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60 kilometres from the Finnish border. By 2016 another brigade will be established 
on the Yamal peninsula (Klimenko 2015). 
While Russia reiterated that it considers a strong Russian military presence and the protection of its 
interests in the Arctic by military means as an integral part of its national security (Pettersen 2015a) 
and also named the Arctic as key area in its new maritime doctrine (Pettersen 2015e), the Nordic 
ministers of defense and Iceland’s minister of foreign affairs reacted to the changed security 
environment in a joint declaration: 
The Russian aggression against Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea are 
violations of international law and other international agreements. Russia’s 
conduct represents the gravest challenge to European security. As a consequence, 
the security situation in the Nordic countries’ adjacent areas has become 
significantly worsened during the past year…. we must be prepared to face possible 
crises or incidents (Bentzrød 2015).  
This statement highlights the possibility that the Arctic states – if they ever did – seem to have lost a 
large degree of their unconditional belief in a common set of norms for peaceful dispute settlement 
in the Arctic region. 
Norms for collective action 
Within the framework of the Arctic Council, the Arctic states adopted two agreements which 
established legally binding mechanisms for acting cooperatively in the fields of Search and Rescue 
(SAR) (Arctic SAR Agreement 2011) and for reacting collectively to marine oil pollution in the Arctic 
(Agreement on Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic 2013). They furthermore 
provided joint declarations for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) (Arctic Council 2015). 
Similar cooperation on issues of traditional military security are, if at all, expressed in a number of 
joint military exercises in the region with their main tasks of practicing SAR, Anti-Terrorism and Anti-
Piracy (Regehr & Buelles 2015: 70 ff.). Other Arctic-specific forms of military cooperation do not 
exist, since the countries rather focus on other multilateral defense co-operations, most notably 
NATO, the ‘Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO)’, or bilateral co-operation, such as between 
the US and Canada or between Norway and Russia. 
In course of the Ukrainian crisis, the picture of military cooperation and collective defense in the 
Arctic became even more fragmented. While all direct military cooperation with Russia – thus also all 
joint military exercises – was suspended, military exercises on both sides seem now to follow a 
perfidious geopolitical logic of escalation in which every ‘show of force’ from one side sees a direct 
response from the other side. After Norway’s largest military exercise in proximity to the Norwegian-
Russian border since 1967, Russia carried out an even larger military exercise of its Arctic Northern 
fleet. The disproportionate nature of Russia’s exercise becomes particularly evident considering that 
the Norwegian exercise was announced far ahead in time and involved around 5,000 Norwegian 
soldiers, while Russia’s involved a total of 38,000 soldiers and was carried out without prior 
notification (Mjaaland 2015). This increasing military tit-for-tat repeated itself when Russia in May 
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once again seemed to directly respond to the long announced ‘Arctic Challenge Exercise 2015’ with 
yet another even larger exercise.6 At the same time, there is also a clear increase in military activities. 
In 2014, Russia for example increased submarine patrols in the Northern Sea by almost fifty percent 
(Nilsen 2015c). The amount of intercepted Russian spy aircrafts by NATO was three times higher 
than in 2013 (Bamford 2015). 
While it still seems unclear how they affect practical Arctic cooperation, spillover effects are also 
visible in the non-military security dimensions. For example, after being requested to register as a 
‘foreign agent,’ the Nordic countries decided to close the information offices of the Nordic Council 
of Ministers in Northwest Russia indefinitely: 
The office cannot operate in the current conditions. The purpose of the Council 
of Ministers’ presence in Northwest Russia  to create closer links and better 
networks between the Nordic countries and Northwest Russia is impossible to 
achieve as a foreign agent (The Nordic Council of Ministers 2015). 
In conclusion, if one was about to argue for the formation of norms of collective action in the High 
North, apart from those related to SAR, oil spills and the drastic consequences of climate change, 
these now see a severe setback as a consequence of Russia’s role in and around the Ukrainian crisis. 
Collective identity  
The AC is probably the most visible multilateral approach to a collective identity in the Arctic. The 
Council had a lasting effect on formulating common Arctic positions on climate change, SAR and 
environmental protection which is well illustrated by the Arctic states’ joint statement to the Warsaw 
Climate Change Conference 2013: 
Within the Arctic Council, we know that we can learn from each other, and 
cooperate to contribute to global solutions. This is why Arctic Council S tates 
remain firmly committed to work alongside other countries under the UNFCCC 
to reach – as a matter of urgency – […] the long term goal aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature 
below 2°C above pre-industrial levels (Arctic Council 2013). 
At the same time, the growing number of Observers to the Arctic Council – non-Arctic states as well 
as Intergovernmental and Inter-Parliamentary Organizations – further contributes to a recognition of 
the Arctic states’ new social identity (ibid.). 
Similar observations towards a collective Arctic identity with regards to traditional military security 
can hardly be made (Heininen 2014: 47) and have probably also not really been actively pursued. The 
annual Arctic CHOD meeting established some regional means to exchange information regarding 
the states’ regional military capacities to support SAR and other civilian missions (Department of 
National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces 2013) and a few joint military exercises established 
some means of collective action for SAR, Anti-Terrorism and Anti-Piracy (Regehr & Buelles 2015: 69 
ff.). However, a true collective identity for military security in the Arctic has never truly formed as 
national mindsets appear to be still under the influence of the Cold War (Åtland & Pedersen Torbjørn 
2014: 33). 
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While not focusing on military security seems to have actually served the Arctic well in forming a 
collective identity in the past, the disregarding of military security issues threatens to put a hold to this 
development in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. While multilateral approaches in the economic, 
environmental and human dimension seem to be able to overcome most of the negative spillover-
effects, NORDEFCO and NATO move closer together in face of a perceived threat by the Russian 
Federation:  
The Russian military is acting in a challenging way along our borders, and there 
have been several infringes on the borders of the Baltic nations. […] The Nordic 
countries meet this situation with solidarity and a deepened cooperation 
(Bentzrød 2015). 
The never fully closed gap between Russia and the other Arctic states – not only, but especially in the 
military security dimension – seems wider than ever. 
The Arctic: proving ground or sub-plot of a tensed European security 
environment? Concluding remarks 
 While this article was not able 
to carry out a fully in-depth 
analysis, it still highlighted some 
of the most visible spillover 
effects from the Ukrainian crisis 
in the Arctic. While further 
research on the formation of an 
Arctic security community is 
required, this article seems to 
indicate that the crisis did not 
put an end to an already existing 
security community in the High 
North, but rather slowed down, 
or probably even stopped, the 
long and slow process of its 
formation after the end of the 
Cold War. Many-sided and 
direct relations, norms in 
dispute settlement and for 
collective action were 
established and a collective 
Arctic identity seemed to have emerged. While the focus on non-traditional challenges to human, 
cultural, energy, economic and environmental security dominated the governmental discourse on 
Arctic security (Bailes & Heininen 2012: 99 ff.; Welch 2013: 5), the politico-military dimension has 
always been actively kept out (see Table 3). After a period of military confrontation, this approach 
seemed quite reasonable. Due to climate change, the melting of the Arctic ice sheet accelerated and 
 
Arctic 
Security Community 
 
Security Dimension 
 
Politico-Military 
Economic, 
Environmental, 
Human 
In
d
ic
a
to
r 
Many-sided and 
direct relations 
Not formalized Yes 
Norms in dispute 
settlement 
Strictly limited Yes 
Norms for 
collective action 
Strictly limited Yes 
Collective identity No Yes 
Table 4. The Arctic Security Community before the outbreak of the Ukrainian 
crisis (by the author). 
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the extraction of so far unexploited natural resources as well as the use of new shipping routes in the 
Arctic Ocean became more profitable. With it also came serious challenges to the environment, an 
increased need for solid capabilities to conduct SAR operations and to minimize threats by oil-spills, 
terrorism, trafficking, illegal migration and organized crime (Wezeman 2012: 14). At the same time 
the slow, but constant increase in the presence of military forces and capabilities continued to be 
excluded from a broader Arctic security discourse and thus fully in line with the logic of ‘Securitization’ 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 23 ff.), no extraordinary measures were taken to ‘desecuritize’ potential and 
traditional military threats to the region, simply because they were not ‘securitized’ in the first place. 
As the Ukrainian crisis seems now to indicate, cooperation solely on economic, environmental and 
human security appears vulnerable to geopolitical spillover effects. Having not tackled traditional 
security seriously enough in the past, now even seems to bring cooperation on non-traditional security 
under stress as the Arctic gets drawn deeper and deeper into a sub-plot of tensed geopolitics. 
Meanwhile, also the new US Arctic Council chairmanship’s agenda continues to stick very closely to 
the council’s original mandate and specifically disregards issues of traditional military security (Kerry 
2015). 
From sub-plot to proving ground: lessons-learned from a tensed Arctic security environment 
As the Ukrainian crisis has shown, there are four major lessons to be learned from the recently tensed 
Arctic security environment: 
1. No immunity from spillover effects: Even if conflict emerging within the Arctic is ruled 
out, the region is not (and never was) immune from spillover effects from outside the region. 
2. Preserve cooperation in the economic, environmental and human dimensions of 
security: Since military cooperation with Russia is currently suspended, even more efforts 
should be put into the conservation and strengthening of the economic, environmental and 
human security dimension. The continuation of cooperation between Norway and Russia in 
the sphere of SAR seems to be an already very positive signal in this regard (Johnsen 2015). 
3. Strengthen civil society and indigenous people: As many government-to-government and 
especially military-to-military contacts are currently completely suspended, special emphasis 
should be put on cross-border co-operation between research institutions, civil society actors 
and indigenous peoples who seem much less affected by the current crisis (e.g. Bailes & 
Heininen 2012: 108 f.; Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program 2015). Strengthening these 
contacts could contribute to negating stress in other security dimensions or between different 
security actors. 
4. Future strengthening of the military security dimension: The military security dimension 
could for example be strengthened by military cooperation such as proposed by Thorvald 
Stoltenberg7 (2009), by the implementation of CSBMs (Schaller 2014) or by establishing 
proper rules of engagement and higher levels of people-to-people contacts (Bergh 2014; 
Wezeman 2014). 
While all Arctic states should work hard to preserve what they achieved in the past, at the moment, 
the burden seems to be on Russia to send the first, genuine signals of relaxation in the relations with 
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its Northern neighbours. A full commitment by all Arctic states to their international obligations under 
the umbrella of the OSCE, such as the prior announcement of and the invitation of international 
observers to future large-scale military exercises in the region, could be considered an important first 
step. Subsequent, additional regional measures of military confidence-building – for example as 
proposed in the OSCE’s Vienna Document – could further contribute to détente in the High North. 
The strong Russian economic and energy interests in the Arctic (Sputnik News 2015) could for this 
purpose prove a distinct advantage, since the region’s harsh climate will continue to require multilateral 
efforts to live up to these interests  (Yenikeyeff & Krysiek 2007: 12 f.; Nopens 2010; Bailes an& 
Heininen 2012: 100; Baev 2015). In this regard, the Arctic might not only be able to step out of its 
role as a sub-plot of the tensed European security environment, but probably even be able to 
transform into a proving ground for restoring trust and mutual confidence also beyond its regional 
borders.  
Nevertheless, as long as the Russian government continues to draw its power from geopolitical 
rhetoric and behaviour, for example by threatening Denmark with the use of nuclear weapons 
(Isherwood 2015), no swift improvements in the Arctic as well as in the European security 
environment might be expected. 
Whatever the future might hold for the Arctic security agenda, the Arctic states remain in control of 
substantially shaping it. 
 
Notes 
1. The Forum so far only met at the experts’ level and will only be formally launched in the Fall 
of 2015. Its mandate addresses the implementation of the international search and rescue and 
oil spill response and prevention agreements in the Arctic. Issues of military security will not 
be addressed. 
2. The VD’11 is a set of CSBMs that include annual exchanges of military information and on 
defense planning, mechanisms for risk reduction, regular military contacts, the prior 
notification and observation of military activities as well as measures for verification of the 
participating states compliance with the agreement (VD’11 2011) 
3. Within the treaty on OS, all state parties have agreed to accept (passive quota) and are able to 
carry out (active quota) cooperatively aerial observation flights over the sovereign territories 
of all state parties. 
4. To what degree the suspension of direct military cooperation affects the daily informal 
communication between both sides cannot be accurately assessed in this article. It would thus 
rather be speculative. 
5. The Arctic coast guards have a mixed structure of both, more civilian (e.g. Canada and 
Sweden) as well as more military (e.g. Norway, Russia and the US). 
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6. While the ‘Arctic Challenge Exercise 2015’ involved 115 aircrafts from Norway, Finland, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, USA, Switzerland, France and Germany (Pettersen 2015b), 
Russia’s response involved 12,000 soldiers as well as 250 aircrafts and helicopters (Staalesen 
2015a). 
7. Thorvald Stoltenberg served as Norway’s Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and is also the father of NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. 
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Commentary 
 
 
 
The GLACIER Conference & President Obama’s 
Links to the Arctic 
 
 
Lawson W. Brigham 
 
 
 
 
The U.S. Department of State, led by Secretary of State John Kerry, hosted an improbable 
international Arctic conference in Anchorage, Alaska on 31 August 2015. That President Obama 
spoke at this conference, conducted a signature tour of Alaska, and became the first sitting U.S. 
President to visit above the Arctic Circle in Alaska made it an historic trip that emphasized the 
importance of the Arctic to America and the globe. It was very clear from the outset that the 
conference, together with the entire visit of the American leader to Alaska, was a political event 
organized to highlight the President’s climate change agenda in preparation for the 21st Session of the 
Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, or COP21 (to be 
held 30 November to 11 December 2015 in Paris).  
Interestingly, the U.S. is currently chair of the Arctic Council (to May 2017), the intergovernmental 
forum of the eight Arctic states chartered in 1996. However, the State Department advised that the 
Anchorage venue was explicitly not an Arctic Council meeting. Nor was the gathering an official 
preparatory meeting for COP21.  
On one hand the GLACIER (Global Leadership in the Arctic: Cooperation, Innovation, Engagement 
and Resilience) Conference was an international venue with the heads of delegation of 19 nations and 
the European Union joining Secretary Kerry in Anchorage to discuss Arctic climate change issues. 
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Seven nations sent their foreign minister (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, 
Norway and Sweden) to join Secretary Kerry and the remaining delegations were led by high-level 
representatives, many who represent non-Arctic states as Observers to the Arctic Council. In my 
judgment equally important is that this was a U.S. domestic political venue crafted to address three themes: 
remind Americans the United States is an Arctic nation; emphasize the importance of rapid Arctic 
climate change observed in Alaska; and, provide an opportunity for President Obama to speak with 
Alaskans and hold key meetings with indigenous people who live in America’s Arctic. The GLACIER 
Conference and the President’s visits to Seward, Dillingham and Kotzebue (a community located 
above the Arctic Circle on the Chukchi Sea) gained global media coverage highlighting a broad range 
of Arctic, Alaskan and global climate issues. 
The GLACIER Conference – led by Secretary Kerry – was organized into three sets of sessions for 
the more than 400 participants: one for the foreign ministers and official delegations, and two for the 
experts, actors and stakeholders who were invited by the White House and State Department.  The 
‘Foreign Minister Sessions’ focused on three themes: The Arctic’s Unique Role in Influencing the 
Global Climate; Climate Resilience and Adaptation Planning; and, Strengthening Arctic Cooperation 
and Coordination on Ocean Stewardship, Environmental Protection, and Support to Local 
Communities.  
A designated ‘Track A’ focused on an array of key Arctic community issues: Building the Resilience 
of Arctic Coastal Communities in the Face of Climate Change; Protecting Communities and the 
Environment through Climate and Air Quality Projects; and, Healthy Arctic Homes: Designing 
Structures for the 21st Century. ‘Track B’ sessions were focused on international challenges: 
Strengthening International Preparedness and Cooperation for Emergency Response; Preventing 
Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean; and, Strengthening Observation 
Networks.  
GLACIER was opened by a Denai’na leader, Lee Stephen, First Chief of the native village government 
of Eklutna, Alaska who spoke of the more than 10,000 years of indigenous life in his ancestral region. 
He was followed by: Mayor Ethan Berkowitz of the host city Anchorage; Mayor Reggie Joule (an 
Inupiaq leader) of the Northwest Arctic Borough; Alaska’s Lieutenant Governor Byron Mallot (a 
Tlingit Indian from southeast Alaska); Dr. John Holdren, the President’s Science Advisor and Director 
of the White House Office of Science and Policy; and, Admiral Robert J. Papp who is the U.S. Special 
Representative for the Arctic. Secretary Kerry completed the introductions by acknowledging Alaska 
was surely the place to be to discuss Arctic climate change issues, and noting that the GLACIER 
outcomes would help shape the COP21 discussions in Paris. Following the conference, the State 
Department issued a Joint Statement on Climate Change and the Arctic that was from the United States, the 
attending Foreign Ministers, and other representatives from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, Poland, Singapore, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. 
Together they affirmed that “climate change poses a grave challenge to the Arctic and the world.” The 
statement noted that the many observed Arctic changes are at unprecedented rates and are impacting 
Arctic communities where adaptive management strategies and new infrastructure are imperatives. 
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The group affirmed their strong determination to work together on addressing the challenges of a 
warming Arctic and planet. 
President Obama’s speech came at the end of the GLACIER Conference and after he had met early 
in the afternoon with a group of Alaska Natives. After thanking all Alaskans for hosting the 
conference, he told the assembled international delegations that America was ready to work with their 
nations on the many challenges the Arctic presents. Select key passages from his remarks taken from 
The White House Press Release on 1 September 2015 include: 
 We’re here today to discuss a challenge that will define the contours of this century more dramatically than any 
other … and that’s the urgent and growing threat of a changing climate. 
 The Arctic is the leading edge of climate change – our leading indicator of what the entire planet faces. 
 Climate Change is no longer some far-off problem. It is happening here. It is happening now … And climate 
change is a trend that affects all trends – economic trends, security trends. Everything will be impacted. 
 I’ve come here today, as the leader of the world’s largest economy and its second largest emitter, to say that the 
United States recognizes our role in creating this problem, and we embrace our responsibility to help solve it. 
 We can have a legitimate debate about how we are going to address this problem; we cannot deny the science. 
We also know the devastating consequences if the current trend lines continue. That is not deniable. 
 If we were to abandon our course of action, if we stop trying to build a clean-energy economy and reduce carbon 
pollution, if we do nothing to keep the glaciers from melting faster, and oceans from rising faster, and forests 
from burning faster, and storms from growing stronger, we will condemn our children to a planet beyond their 
capacity to repair. 
 On this issue, of all issues, there is such a thing as being too late. That moment is almost upon us. That’s why 
we’re here today. That’s what we have to convey to our people – tomorrow, and the next day, and the day after 
that. And that’s what we have to do when we meet in Paris later this year. 
All who were present would confirm that it was an eloquent speech filled with candor about a hugely 
complex Arctic and global challenge. Sprinkled with examples of profound Arctic change – sea ice 
melting, permafrost thawing, glaciers retreating, increasingly acidic oceans, changing migration 
patterns, and eroding coastal communities – the speech indicated the President is well-prepared to 
argue all of these issues and more in some detail at COP21 in Paris.  
As with most Presidential visits to a U.S. region or state, the administration in power announces a 
number of initiatives prior to and during such a visit to build political capital and create a legacy of 
action. One of the unanticipated and immediate decisions for the Alaska visit was made by Secretary 
of the Interior Sally Jewell who has authority over U.S. place names. With the President’s support, the 
name of the highest peak in North America was returned to Denali, the Athabascan name for ‘the high 
one.’ Re-establishing Denali in place of Mount McKinley has been argued for nearly four decades and 
this decision set a very positive tone for most Alaskans. It was announced that the Denali Commission 
(a federal body) would take the lead in coordinating new federal funds and competitive grants devoted 
to assisting villages that are heavily impacted by climate change. President Obama also announced 
369  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
 
Brigham 
several new federal investments to enhance safety and security in a changing Arctic: accelerating the 
acquisition of new U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers; action to be taken by NOAA and the Coast Guard 
to promote safe marine operations and transportation in the Arctic through mapping and charting of 
the Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort seas; evaluating the feasibility of deepening and extending Nome’s 
harbor by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in view of making it America’s Arctic deep water port; 
launching a five-year demonstration project for Arctic marine biodiversity observing; and, hosting an 
international workshop on community-based ecological monitoring. Each of these select federal 
initiatives is consistent with current U.S. national Arctic strategies and implementation plans published 
since 2013. 
A distinctly American event, nonetheless the GLACIER conference brought global attention to the 
Arctic.  The visit of President Obama to Alaska and the Arctic reaffirmed America’s commitment to 
the region and brought his climate change message to the very place where change is most rapid and 
is directly impacting people.  
For most Americans, as well as perhaps many around the globe, his speech and visit provided 
unprecedented attention to the Arctic by an American President. 
 
 
 
Congressman Rick Larsen represents Washington state’s Second District. He is a senior member of the House 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. 
 
 
 
 
Commentary 
 
 
The U.S. Must Live Up to Commitments as Arctic 
Nation 
 
Rep. Rick Larsen 
 
 
 
Interest in the Arctic is heating up around the world. As the region’s ice melts and it becomes more 
accessible to shipping traffic, Arctic nations like Russia and Canada are continuing to invest in 
infrastructure and research. Countries without Arctic borders, including China and Japan, also are 
expressing their interest in the region. China, for example, is currently building its second icebreaker. 
It is clear that other countries are moving forward in the High North. But the U.S. is not keeping pace. 
Even as the U.S. took over the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in April 2015, we do not have the 
infrastructure that is necessary to live up to our responsibilities as an Arctic nation. President Obama’s 
GLACIER conference in August 2015 is a sign that attention to the Arctic is growing, but that 
attention must come with investment to be effective. 
I am hopeful that during the U.S. chairmanship of the Council we will make progress on the strong 
priorities the U.S. State Department has defined. These include protecting the unique Arctic 
environment and the people and animals who live there, as well as improving our emergency response 
ability when ships get into trouble. 
But the U.S. faces a steep opportunity curve when it comes to the Arctic, and we need to do more to 
fulfill our commitments. While most of my colleagues in Congress recognize that the U.S. has 
responsibilities as an Atlantic and Pacific nation, not everyone recognizes that we are also an Arctic 
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nation. That needs to change. Before policymakers can make informed decisions about Arctic 
investments, they need to know why this area is so critical. 
That is why I worked with Congressman Young from Alaska to start the Congressional Arctic 
Working Group. The Working Group seeks to help members of Congress better understand the 
opportunities and challenges for the U.S. as an Arctic nation, and it acts as a resource for other Arctic 
countries to interact with Congress.  
Since its inception a year ago, the Working Group has raised awareness about the importance of the 
Arctic through events for Members and their staff to meet with Arctic officials from other Arctic 
nations, as well as a variety of stakeholders. 
We held a discussion with Norway’s State Secretary, heard from Canada’s Senior Arctic Official about 
the recent Canadian Arctic Council chairmanship, and held a briefing with senior State Department 
officials to discuss the agenda for the U.S. chairmanship. The Working Group also hosted 
representatives of indigenous groups from Russia. Continuing international engagement with all the 
members of the Arctic Council is critical, and the Working Group is filling that role in Congress. 
There are other steps the U.S. should take. Every Arctic nation except the U.S. has an ambassador-
level position dedicated to Arctic affairs. The U.S. should join its peers by creating such a position, 
which is why I introduced a bill with Congressman Sensenbrenner to do just that. An Ambassador to 
the Arctic would help the U.S. better manage our many interests in the region, as well as signal our 
country’s commitment to international cooperation on Arctic policy.  
The U.S. also does not have the icebreaking capability to fulfill research and commercial missions in 
the uniquely icy seas. The U.S. Coast Guard has said it needs at least three each of heavy and medium 
duty icebreakers. But currently the U.S. only has one of each, and other countries have jumped far 
ahead of us on this front. Russia is currently building its 23rd government-owned icebreaker. Without 
this capacity, the U.S. will be unable to fulfill the environmental protection, research, search and 
rescue, and interdiction operations the Coast Guard must perform in the Arctic.  
Just because the Arctic is at a high latitude does not mean the U.S. should ignore it. Other countries 
certainly are paying attention. I am hopeful the Congressional Arctic Working Group will continue to 
bring more attention to a part of the world we cannot afford to neglect. 
 
    
 
Representative Bob Herron has served in the Alaska Legislature since 2008. His current House District comprises 33 
villages in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta. He recently served as Co-Chair of the Alaska Arctic Policy Commission, which 
delivered its final report in January, 2015 (www.akarctic.com). He also chairs the House Economic Development, 
Tourism, & Arctic Policy Committee. Representative Herron has sponsored and successfully passed 9 pieces of Arctic 
legislation – most recently HB 1, Alaska’s Arctic Policy in 2015. 
 
 
 
 
Commentary 
 
 
The Alaska Arctic Policy Commission, Legislative 
Arctic Committees, and Governor Walker’s Arctic 
Policy Effort 
 
Rep. Bob Herron 
 
 
The Alaska Arctic Policy Commission (AAPC) was legislatively created in April 2012 and its first 
meeting was March 23, 2013. The AAPC was comprised of 26 Commissioners, including 10 
Legislators and 16 subject matter experts from throughout the state; and co-chaired by Senator Lesil 
McGuire and Representative Bob Herron. The AAPC was tasked with creating an actionable Arctic 
policy for Alaska – to produce a policy for Alaska’s Arctic that reflects the values of Alaskans and 
provides a suite of options to capitalize on the opportunities and safeguard against risks. 
The AAPC emphasized public engagement, convening meetings in seven locations around the state 
over the course of two years and receiving testimony from local residents in each location. Alaskans 
from all walks of life positively influenced the AAPC’s Final Report and Implementation Plan released 
January 30, 2015 (www.akarctic.com).  
The AAPC, by statute, concluded its work after the release of the Final Report and Implementation 
Plan. Per the recommendation of the AAPC, during the 2015 Legislative Session, the House and 
Senate each created their own Arctic Committee. The House Economic Development, Tourism and 
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Arctic Policy Committee is chaired by Representative Bob Herron; the Senate Arctic Committee is 
co-chaired by Senators Lesil McGuire and Cathy Giessel. These committees have and will continue to 
meet both separately and jointly to further discuss and seek ways to execute the AAPC 
Implementation Plan.  
The Implementation Plan includes 32 Strategic Recommendations organized into four Lines of Effort: 
1. Promote Economic & Resource Development 
2. Address the Response Capacity Gap 
3. Support Healthy Communities 
4. Strengthen Science & Research 
Some examples of recommendations from each of these Four Lines of Effort: 
 1A - Facilitate the development of Arctic port systems in the Bering Strait region to support 
export, response and regional development.  
 1B - Strengthen or develop a mechanism for resource production-related revenue sharing to 
impacted communities. 
 2D - Facilitate and secure public and private investment in support of critical search and 
rescue, oil spill response and broader emergency response infrastructure 
 3B - Reduce power and heating costs in rural Alaskan Arctic communities. 
 3F - Enforce measures that protect and help further understanding of food security of Arctic 
peoples and communities. 
 4F - Invest in U.S. Arctic weather, water and ice forecasting systems.  
 4G - Update hydrocarbon and mineral resource estimates and mapping in the Alaskan Arctic. 
The Implementation Plan has three target audiences and represents the playbook for Alaska Governor 
Bill Walker’s Administration and the Legislature, through the work of its Arctic Committees, and the 
federal government to implement Alaska’s Arctic Policy. In the Implementation Plan, each 
recommendation is assigned one or two departments or agencies as leads, and also includes 
suggestions for legislative actions to further the recommendation. As part of the Governor’s efforts, 
nearly every Administrative Department is involved in Arctic policy implementation – the undertaking 
is led by Craig Fleener, Governor’s Arctic Policy Adviser, and includes, among others, Commissioners 
from the Departments of Commerce, Community & Economic Development; Transportation & 
Public Facilities; and Environmental Conservation; as well as Mike Sfraga, Vice Chancellor from the 
University of Alaska, Fairbanks. 
In addition, in late 2014 a team appointed by incoming Governor Walker authored, and is still 
committed to implementing, an Arctic Policy and Climate Change Transition Report: 
http://gov.alaska.gov/Walker_media/transition_page/arctic-policy-and-climate-change_final.pdf. 
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Alaska’s Arctic Policy now in statute   
During the Fall of 2014, the AAPC collectively produced a draft Alaska Arctic Policy bill for 
consideration by the Legislature. The Legislature subsequently passed HB 1. After being heard and 
altered in several committees, the policy differs from the AAPC draft, but is substantively similar. The 
bill took effect August 9, 2015 and is codified in Alaska Statute 44.99.105. The policy consists of four 
pillars:  
 Uphold the state’s commitment to economically vibrant communities sustained by 
development activities consistent with the state's responsibility for a healthy environment; 
 Collaborate with all levels of government, tribes, industry, and nongovernmental organizations 
to achieve transparent and inclusive Arctic decision-making; 
 Enhance the security of the Arctic region of the state and, thereby, the security of the entire 
state; and 
 Value and strengthen the resilience of communities and respect and integrate the culture, 
language, and knowledge of Arctic peoples. 
This law, now officially Alaska’s Arctic Policy, is intended as an overarching guide for the AAPC’s 
Implementation Plan.   
 
 
 
Andrea Charron is Assistant Professor of Political Studies at the University of Manitoba, and Deputy-Director of the 
Centre for Defence and Security Studies. Parts of this article were originally printed WWF’s Ice Blog.  “Canada, the 
Arctic Council and Rough Seas”, (24 March 2015) http://arctic.blogs.panda.org/default/ac-rough-seas/. 
 
 
 
 
Commentary 
 
Place Holding but Noteworthy:  
Canada & the Arctic Council 
 
Andrea Charron 
 
 
 
In 1996, Canada was the first of eight Member States to chair a newly-founded Arctic Council.  From 
May 2013 to April 2015, Canada again resumed the chair (headed by the Honourable Leona Aglukkaq, 
Canada’s Minister for the Arctic Council) and set “development for the people of the North” as the 
overall theme of its two years. To achieve this goal, Canada called for responsible Arctic resource 
development, safe Arctic shipping and sustainable circumpolar communities with subthemes under 
each of these three goals.1 Unique to Canada was the call to create an Arctic Economic Council (AEC)2 
– a subgoal of responsible resource development. On the one hand, the focus Canada had directed 
on the people of the North is laudable and perfectly in keeping with the mandate of the Council. On 
the other hand, the creation of the AEC has been divisive. How should we evaluate this agenda? Did 
Canada’s Chairmanship break new ground or was it just caretaking?  
The Arctic Council cannot be expected to make grand pronouncements or oversee the creation of 
new international agreements3 every year; it is voluntarily funded and has only recently benefited from 
the creation of a permanent secretariat. Canada’s agenda promoted the continuation of many projects 
initiated under previous Chairs and oversaw the unanimous decision to not accept new Observers for 
a constellation of reasons including the ratio of Arctic states and Permanent Participants (the decision 
makers) to Observers which is 14:32 or 1 to 2. 
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From an administrative point of view, Canada’s enthusiasm for the Arctic Council was uneven. The 
final meeting of its Chairmanship held in Iqaluit April 24-25, 2015 was prepared months in advance 
although some final details were last minute. As well, Canada has been reluctant to acknowledge 
Observer states’ concerns about the diverse costs of engaging with the Arctic Council without the 
benefit of influence over decisions.  
Canada achieved its goal to create an Arctic Economic Council (which met in Ottawa for its 2nd 
meeting on 23 April 2015) despite uneven support by some members of the Council. The AEC 
comprises business representatives (to date, 42 members in total) solely from the eight Arctic states 
and six indigenous Permanent Participant organizations of the AC. The AEC selected a US chair 
(from the Inuit Circumpolar Council) and two vice chairs from Russia and Finland to guide its work.  
Big businesses, like the Baffinland Iron Mines Limited and PAO Sovcomflot (SCF Group), Russia’s 
largest shipping company, are likely to dominate the membership. The AEC’s businesses, which 
include a mix of very small and giant companies, and the lack of participation by Observer state 
companies, are glaring flaws. The “success” of the AEC will likely depend a great deal on commodity 
prices given the involvement of big resource-driven business with international focus and is unlikely 
to benefit local, traditional/subsistence businesses that are important to the economic sustainability 
and cultural well-being of Arctic hamlets.4 
Meanwhile, the Working Groups of the Arctic Council continued to do some very important work 
indeed. The SAO’s Report to Ministers (24 April 2015) outlines their progress.5 Projects over the 
course of Canada’s term included a Circumpolar Mental Wellness Symposium (thanks to Canada’s 
particular push for this event) and a review of cancer among indigenous peoples. A framework plan 
for Cooperation on the Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in the 
Marine Areas of the Arctic, a framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane 
Emissions Reductions, and an Arctic Marine Strategic Plan for 2015-2025 were all approved in April. 
The Council also established two new task forces: the Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation, and 
the Task Force on Telecommunications Infrastructure in the Arctic.6 
Volunteer funding from member and Observer states, however, makes planning of these multi-year 
projects a challenge. That the Working Groups are still functioning, especially given background 
geopolitical tensions involving Russia, Eastern Europe and five NATO Arctic Council member states, 
is probably the greatest of Canada’s achievements despite sometimes contradictory political rhetoric 
on the part of Canada. Likely a full evaluation of Canada’s Chairmanship will only be possible in 
comparison to the US term focused on “One Arctic” which, as currently outlined, tackles the very 
important but difficult issue of climate change, at least under the current US administration. That a 
four-year North American agenda was not coordinated similar to the six-year Scandinavian terms to 
benefit from longer-term planning is lamented. That the Arctic Council continues to promote 
cooperation (reaffirmed in the Iqaluit Declaration 2015)7 and has weathered recent, jarring geopolitical 
tensions means that Canada’s modest, place holding Chairmanship is noteworthy. 
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Notes 
1. See http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/425-main-
documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-meeting?download=1763:canadian-chairmanship-
program-2013-2015-english. 
2. See http://arcticeconomiccouncil.com/. 
3. See Arctic Council. ‘Agreements.’ Available at: http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/environment-and-people/agreements-statements/agreements.  
4. Arctic Human Development Report: Regional Processes and Global. (2015). Joan Nymand Larsen and 
Gail Fondahl (Eds.). Copenhagen: Nordisk Ministerråd. pp. 155 and 164. 
5. Available on the Arctic Council’s website.  See http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/604-declaration-sao-report.  
6. See “Review of Cancer among Circumpolar Indigenous Peoples” at https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/handle/11374/434; “Framework Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil 
Polluting….” at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/609; “Enhanced Black 
Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions...” at https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/handle/11374/610.  
7. See “Iqaluit Declaration 2015” at http://hdl.handle.net/11374/662.  
 
 
 
 
Currie Dixon is a Member of the Yukon Legislative Assembly, and is Minister of Community Services and Minister 
Responsible for the Public Service Commission. 
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Yukon as a Regional & Circumpolar Actor 
 
Hon. Currie Dixon 
 
 
 
As the Arctic and its variety of governance institutions and intergovernmental forums have gained 
significant international attention, sub-national governments in the circumpolar north have begun to 
play an increasingly important role on the international stage. While high level foreign policy and 
international relations continue to be in the realm of national governments, sub-nationals like 
provinces, territories, states, autonomous regions, First Nations and Aboriginal governments are 
participating and interacting in many new ways. While this involvement is a welcome step forward, 
enhanced roles for sub-national governments should come with some greater scrutiny and analysis of 
their respective positions and policies. Such a review will elucidate why and how sub-national 
governments conduct themselves outside of their own borders and may reveal observations not only 
about how these governments are viewed by others, but how they view themselves.  
As an initial contribution to this end, the Yukon provides interesting subject matter. I would argue 
that the Yukon adopts and assumes multiple identities as it conducts its business outside of its 
territorial borders. It would seem that there are four such identities, which are defined by the Yukon’s 
geography, economy, population, and political institutions.  
First and foremost, Yukon is quite clearly an Arctic territory. It participates actively in 
intergovernmental Arctic forums like the Arctic Council and the Northern Forum. During Canada’s 
chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2013-2015), Yukon led Canadian efforts on Arctic Council 
Working Groups, typically focusing on issues related to climate change research and adaptation. 
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Notably, Yukon spearheaded the development of the Arctic Adaptation Exchange information portal. 
On the international stage, Yukon has a decidedly Arctic identity.  
Secondly, regarding the structure of the economy, Yukon seems very much pacific-northwestern. Its 
economic reliance on natural resource development and tourism focuses Yukon’s interest on border 
and trade issues, labour mobility, and access to resource-hungry Asian markets. For these reasons 
Yukon is an active participant in the Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER). Like its 
PNWER colleagues Yukon tends to cast its economic gaze to the Pacific.  
Third, Yukon’s relatively small population significantly influences its role in Canadian confederation. 
On many intra-Canadian matters Yukon has much in common with other members of confederation 
with small populations. At Federal-Provincial-Territorial meetings on subjects like internal trade, 
regional economic development, or capital markets regulation, Yukon often aligns its policy positions 
with the Atlantic Provinces who share similar challenges. So in this sense, Yukon’s identity within 
Canada is defined to a degree by its small population. 
Finally, Yukon’s most obvious identity is as a northern Canadian territory. As a result of devolution 
the Yukon functions as a province in all but name, but its federal funding and unique constitutional 
status set it apart. It is a leader in Aboriginal-State relations with First Nations land claims and self-
government having altered the foundation of its political architecture. These realities influence how 
Yukon interacts with its regional neighbours, particularly on issues of trans-boundary renewable 
resource management. While it is exceedingly obvious, Yukon’s identity as a territory has an 
undeniable role in how Yukon conducts itself outside of its borders.  
Like all sub-national governments in the circumpolar north the Yukon is dynamic and multifaceted. 
Its geography, economy, population and political institutions all influence how it is perceived by 
others, and how it perceives itself. Recognizing and understanding these identities help explain its 
policies and positions, and how and why it conducts itself on the international, national, and regional 
stage. This is particularly important given the increasing role of sub-national governments in the Arctic 
and circumpolar north. As the relevance of sub-national governments like Yukon ascend, so too 
should the scrutiny, analysis and understanding of what makes them tick.  
 Page Wilson is Assistant Professor at the University of Greenland. 
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Greenland’s Election 2014: A Return to Pragmatism 
 
Page Wilson 
 
 
 
Following the resignations of Greenlandic Prime Minister Aleqa Hammond and four other ministers 
due to allegations of misuse of public funds, an extraordinary election was held on 28 November 2014.  
Under the new leadership of Kim Kielsen, Hammond’s own social-democratic party, Siumut 
(‘Forward’) won the highest proportion of votes (34.6%), narrowly beating the nationalist/left-socialist 
party Inuit Ataqatigiit (‘Community of the People’) by a 1.1% margin.  Both parties won eleven seats 
in Parliament. In order to secure the minimum of 16 seats needed to hold power in Parliament, Siumut 
has subsequently entered into coalition with two of Greenland’s smaller parties – social-liberal 
Demokraatit (‘Democrat’) and conservative Atassut (‘Solidarity’).  Both share Siumut’s stance in 
favour of economic liberalism.   
From this outcome, it is possible to draw some lessons about the Greenlandic political landscape 
which are often overlooked by international commentators and audiences alike.   
First, the Siumut party remains the long-standing, powerful, and dominant force in Greenlandic 
politics, regardless of how any individual leader, member, or group of members allegedly 
(mis)conducts themselves from time to time. While support for Siumut did suffer in the wake of the 
allegations against Hammond, in the end the party still managed to maintain its edge over its rivals, 
and, with it, the right to form government. This result is more than simply good luck on Siumut’s part; 
at every single election since 1979 bar one, it has been Siumut which has formed government. This 
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long, consistent experience of campaigning, governing and manoeuvring places Siumut in a highly 
advantageous position, within a political system where other parties split, reform, are born, or die on 
a quite frequent basis. Even in coalition, Siumut’s large size has ensured it has exercised – and 
continues to exercise – a pre-eminent influence over the direction and shape of the Greenlandic 
political scene. 
The way in which Siumut achieved its electoral victory highlights a second lesson – namely, the 
importance of matching the personality, character and background of the leader with the mood of the 
electorate. This is particularly so in countries of small population size, where the social, personal and 
family links between ruler and ruled are so entwined. It is no accident that, in the aftermath of 
Hammond’s expenses scandal, a well-regarded, former policeman with a reputation for integrity, 
honesty and down-to-earth pragmatism was appointed Siumut’s acting leader.  Kielsen’s more modest 
style stands in stark contrast to Hammond’s, with the controversial topics of Greenlandic 
independence and natural resource exploitation as the leitmotif of her premiership. While we can 
expect Kielsen’s government to remain interested in future drilling and mining opportunities, it is 
likely that this interest will be counterbalanced by a renewed emphasis on boosting profits from 
existing industries firmly grounded in Greenland’s economic present. Such emphasis is likely to 
include expanding value-added activities in Greenland’s all-important fishing industry, and improving 
the infrastructure needed to in support of the growing tourism sector. Initiatives addressing other, 
everyday social issues of concern throughout the electorate – such as housing, education and 
unemployment – are also likely.  
The final lesson to keep in mind is that, like other electorates of small population size, Greenland 
cannot afford to dispose of its political leaders too quickly, or without serious cause. Since the 
expenses scandal broke, the funds Hammond allegedly spent on personal costs have been repaid.  In 
June 2015, Hammond was elected to one of two seats in the Danish Parliament reserved for 
Greenlandic representatives; she received the most personal votes of any of the candidates. At least 
one political consultancy firm is not willing to rule out a return by Hammond to Greenlandic politics 
sometime in the future.1 It may be that if Kielsen succeeds in delivering financial gains in the short-
term from Greenland’s already-established economic sectors, there might be a real opportunity later 
on to pursue Hammond’s grand visions of the future.  For now, however, Greenland remains a 
country under construction’.2 
 
Notes 
1. See Polarisk Group, ‘Greenland:  2014 Parliamentary Election Briefing #1’ (October 20, 
2014), 
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5389998be4b047723f046137/t/544637bce4b076f260
51ce1c/1413887932673/POLARISK+Greenland+2014+Election+Brief+%231.pdf. 
2. The quote is from Kim Kielsen.  See Noah Molgaard, ‘Greenland Election:  Eyes on the 
Possibilities’ The Arctic Journal (November 25, 2014). 
http://arcticjournal.com/politics/1163/eyes-possibilities. 
 Lill Rastad Bjørst is Assistant Professor at CIRCLA, Aalborg University, Denmark. 
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Future Greenland 2015:  
Tourism as the Future of Greenland? 
 
Lill Rastad Bjørst 
 
 
Every second year the Greenlandic Business Association hosts a two-day conference entitled “Future 
Greenland” in Nuuk.1 The main theme of this year’s conference was “Growth and Welfare – Scenarios 
for the Development of Greenland.” The conference had more than 400 participants –  mostly from 
Denmark and Greenland – but the format of the conference seems to be opening up for international 
business partners. This year’s conference facilitated a dialogue in Greenlandic, Danish and English. 
Next year even more interpreters will be needed. To strengthen the outreach, the conference was 
broadcasted live via KNR (Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa – Greenlandic Broad-casting Corporation) to the 
rest of Greenland which 
made the confer-ence even 
more impor-tant as a 
platform for dialogue on 
the future of Greenland. 
One of the important 
themes of the conference 
was the severe economic 
situation of Greenland and 
an evaluation of the 
absence of the promised 
“mineral adventure.”  
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According to the Greenlandic geologist Ole Christiansen, former Managing Director of 
NunaMinerals, Greenland is still not a competitive mining country and missed its chance when the 
prices on minerals were 
good a few years ago. A 
representative from the 
Danish business community, Managing Director for PensionDanmark Torben Möger Pedersen, 
characterized the upcoming mineral sector in Greenland as a risky investment and was advocating for 
minimizing what he called “political risk.” Managing Director from the confederation of Danish 
Industry Karsten Dybvad likewise identified Greenland’s structural problems as critical and compared 
the economic situation that Greenland is faced at the moment, to the one Denmark experienced in 
the 1980’s. What the Danish keynote speakers asked for was that the Greenlandic Parliament would 
facilitate a more stable investment climate and go for the longtime planning, so investors knew what 
to expect. Dybvad said “All over the world we have to ask ourselves – what are we going to live from 
in the future?” This is now the current problem for Greenland. 
Tourism in the Arctic: a low hanging fruit? 
As a solution to the “problem”, investment in existing industries was mentioned in most of the talks 
(like fishing, tourism and entrepreneurship). Experiences from Iceland with mass tourism was 
presented and while the politicians in Greenland right now believe in development in the tourism 
sector as the “low hanging fruit” the industry identifies a lot of challenges. The director of the Icelandic 
Tourism Research Center, Edward Huijbens recommended a more conservative approach to tourism 
development. For tourism development to be to the benefit of Greenland, he said that it needs to be 
driven by the interest of the local industry. Managing Director of Visit Greenland, Anders 
Steenbakken chaired a workshop with the title “While we are waiting for the investments” centered 
on how tourism could develop in the long run. He mentioned that Greenland of course needed a 
better infrastructure and basic knowledge of “tourist reasons to go” was the key to development in 
the Greenlandic tourism sector. The workshop was aiming at encouraging the Greenlandic business 
community to think of new innovative ways to support the tourism sector and via entrepreneurship 
to develop new products and platforms for corporation.  
The minister for Industry, Labour and Trade, Vittus Qujaukitsoq (Siumut) has recently developed a 
plan to simulate the tourism sector in Greenland. The themes are: 1. Infrastructure, 2. Tax structure, 
3. Framework conditions and 4. Tourism concessions. “It has to be easy and not too expensive to 
travel around the country”, he said to the business magazine Aurora before the conference 
(Holmsgaard 2015: 18). To solely stage tourism as the savior and fixer of the economy is problematic 
because future tourism development is challenged by a number of factors in Greenland. In 2014, a 
report produced by the large Nordic consultancy firm of Rambøll identified the most important 
factors as being a short tourism season, a lack of infrastructure, the current limited capacity, the low 
standards of customer service, low growth rate, a lack of package tours, the low average of overnight 
stays (only four in average) the low spending per tourist (1.100 kroner per day), the low priority and 
lack of concrete initiatives by the Government of Greenland, the lack of online information about the 
destination and the difficulties with internal and external coordination in the Greenlandic tourism 
Photo Credit: Lill Rastad Bjørst 
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sector (Rambøll 2014: 40-52). The report was meant to inform an ongoing debate on how many mines 
and mega industrial projects Greenland should tolerate in the future. Tourism in this context was 
turned into a strategic tool to achieve a more sustainable future for Greenland with permanent local 
jobs and development (Rambøll 2014: 5-7). In other words, despite challenges in the management, 
infrastructure and legal framework in tourism (National Turismestrategi 2013), investments in the 
tourism sector was framed in this logic as opposed to investments in mining (Bjørst & Ren 2015). The 
Greenlandic politicians seem to be most keen on improving the infrastructure, and tourism is used as 
the key driver for arguments about new runways and ports but an investment in tourism is needed 
and has been needed for many years, especially in the south of Greenland.  
Following the debate at the former and this year’s Future Greenland Conference, it is a paradox, that 
arguing for a megaproject is imagined to be the only way of getting regional development. While 
planning for the big project everything else was a secondary priority. This might change now. At the 
Future Greenland 2015 Conference there was a feeling of anticlimax and disappointment after the 
prices of minerals and oil declined. Everybody is now looking for new possibilities in other sectors. A 
new Greenlandic tourism strategy is being developed at the moment and hopefully supported 
financially by all parties. Without resources, local capacity building, innovation and entrepreneurship, 
to reach out to mass tourism could be fixing one ‘problem’ with just another one. More rehearsal with 
“small scale” projects is needed.  
With the preparation for the Arctic Winter Games 2016, all the important elements for innovation, 
logistic sand capacity building for the future of Greenland can be tried out as part of a tourism related 
real life event.  
 
Notes 
1. Read more about Future Greenland: http://www.futuregreenland.gl/. 
 
 
References 
Holmsgaard, Erik (2015). ”Qujaukitsoq: Vækst, beskæftigelse og udvikling”. Aurora, Grønlands 
Erhvers medlemsblad, nr. 24. Maj 2015: 16- 18. 
National turismestrategi (2013). 2012-2015. The Government of Greenland, Nuuk 2012: 1-20 
Bjørst & Ren (2015) Steaming up or staying cool? Climate change and tourism development in the 
Arctic. Arctic Anthropology. (in press) 
Rambøll Rapport (2014): ”Hvor skal udviklingen komme fra? Potentialer og faldgrupper i den 
grønlandske erhvervssektor frem mod 2015”. Rambøll Marts 2014. 
  
 
 Jim Gamble is the Executive Director of the Aleut International Association. 
 
 
 
 
Commentary 
 
 
The Arctic Council Permanent Participants: 
Capacity & Support – Past, Present & Future 
 
Jim Gamble 
 
 
 
 
 
The six Indigenous organizations which are the Permanent Participants (PPs) of the Arctic Council 
(AC) are as varied as the people, geographic regions, and cultures they represent.  What they do have 
in common however is the challenge of representing their constituencies and contributing to the work 
of an ever expanding AC which in many cases has grown faster than the PPs have been able to adapt. 
Indigenous organizations have been involved in international work through entities like the United 
Nations since long before the AC existed, so given that this voice was present and the growing 
realization among industry, policy makers, and scientists that Indigenous knowledge could not only 
be useful, but in many cases was essential to understanding the Arctic. Not only this, but in many 
cases Indigenous peoples were actually land owners and rights holders in the Arctic, and so 
consultation, negotiation, and agreement with the people who lived on the land was often a matter of 
law. 
So, in the earliest seed of the AC, the Rovaniemi Process, the notion that the Indigenous peoples of 
the Arctic should have a seat at the table was present. When the Rovaniemi Process was formalized 
into an agreement among the eight Arctic states to form the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS) three organizations were established as observers when the following was stated:  
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In order to facilitate the participation of Arctic indigenous peoples the following organizations will be 
invited as observers: the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Nordic Saami Council and the U.S.S.R. 
Association of Small Peoples of the North.   
During this period it was recognized that the Indigenous organizations taking part in the AEPS would 
benefit from the support of a secretarial body, and so in 1994 the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat (IPS) 
was created to assist the Indigenous observer organizations in their work in the AEPS, primarily 
through communications and coordination. Two years later when the AEPS was enlarged and 
mandated with additional responsibilities it became the Arctic Council. At that time the role of 
Indigenous peoples organizations was also expanded when the category of Permanent Participant (PP) 
was created. The PPs were endowed with full consultative powers and a seat in all AC matters, only 
lacking an actual vote from putting them on exactly equal footing with the Arctic states. However, 
this notion that the PPs have a seat, but not a vote is too simplistic. In reality, in an organization like 
the AC that operates on the principle of consensus, only a no vote that breaks consensus matters. So 
that means that while the PPs can’t break consensus and keep an initiative from moving forward, in 
my experience there has never been an occasion when one or more of the PPs had serious reservations 
that weren’t addressed by an effort to reach consensus that included the PPs. The implications of this 
are plain, it’s essential that the PPs not only have the resources to be present during discussions of 
matters that affect them, but that those resources support the participation of those with the proper 
knowledge and expertise. 
With the recognition of the Arctic member states that participation of Arctic Indigenous peoples is so 
vital to the work of the AC the question of how to properly support this participation emerges, and 
clearly this has been on the mind of the AC since its very inception when it was stated in the first 
Iqaluit Declaration:  
Request Arctic States to consider the financial questions involved in securing the participation of the 
Permanent Participants in the work of the Arctic Council and in the operations of the Indigenous Peoples' 
Secretariat.  
And every declaration since has mentioned support of the PPs. So when the Kiruna Declaration which 
signaled the end of the Swedish Chairmanship stated, “…identifying approaches to support the active 
participation of Permanent Participants, and to present a report on their work at the next Ministerial 
meeting in 2015,” the ministers mandate resulted in very positive steps to seriously work on PP 
capacity and support which occurred during the Canadian Chairmanship which followed. 
It should be noted that PP capacity and support is a complicated issue for a number of reasons; the 
six PP organizations are all very different in size, structure, and how they are funded; in addition, the 
PPs have differing relationships with the Arctic states in which their memberships reside and so, for 
instance, the relationship that Aleut International Association has with the United States is different 
than what the Saami Council experiences with the Norwegian government in terms of support. This 
doesn’t change the fact that all of the PPs do have similar challenges in trying to contribute to the 
work of the AC, and to serve their constituencies in that regard and so work to address these common 
elements can be beneficial to all of the PP’s. Also, the question of PP support has received attention 
from the AC at various times including a comprehensive report undertaken during the Icelandic 
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Chairmanship that recommended, among other actions, the establishment of a PP support fund to be 
funded by the Arctic states and a recommended operating balance of $1,000,000 USD.  
Later, during the Swedish Chairmanship, another report was funded by the Walter and Duncan 
Gordon Foundation, the Oak Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation which had two main 
recommendations: to establish a task force during the Canadian Chairmanship to propose practical 
measures to address the challenges over the long term, including revisiting the idea of a PP core fund; 
and for the Arctic states to make short term commitments to support the PPs in all of the activities 
of the AC during the Canadian and U.S. chairmanships. 
The work which took place during the Canadian Chairmanship began with another study funded by 
the Government of Canada which stopped short of making firm recommendations, but again 
examined the concept of a PP core fund as well as potential support from AC observers. Following 
the release of the report a one day workshop was held in conjunction with the first SAO meeting 
October of 2014 in Yellowknife, NWT. The well attended workshop resulted in a decision to establish 
a small committee to examine and make recommendations on four areas of focus; 1) Observer funding 
of PP working group projects and an examination of potential exceptions to the “50% funding rule,” 
2) To consider PP participation at the beginning of AC projects, 3) Enhancing capacity through and 
examination of business efficiencies in the AC; and 4) Explore additional AC Secretariat resources to 
support the PPs. 
Concurrent with the efforts of the Canadian Chairmanship the idea of a PP core fund was again 
brought up by an Observer organization, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), which not only 
suggested establishing such a fund that would be administered by the six PP organizations through 
the IPS, but also committed to contributing to such a fund to improve PP capacity.  
Subsequently a three day PP support and capacity “summit” was held in March 2015, in Whitehorse, 
Yukon. The workshop, which was also funded by the Government of Canada, brought representatives 
from all six of the PP organizations together with the idea of examining how a PP core fund would 
actually work in practice. Also attending were representatives from the Government of Canada and 
the IPS (which organized the workshop). In addition, presentations from potential funders were made 
by the Gordon Foundation, Tides Canada (also representing the Arctic Funders Group), and NEFCO 
on the ACs Project Support Instrument (PSI). The meeting was very productive and resulted in the 
conclusion that two types of support funds were actually needed: 1) A core fund designed to 
contribute to PP administrative expenses, and designed to allow a contributor to generally support the 
work of all of the PPs with in a simple and transparent way, and 2) A project support fund which 
would allow contributors to donate funds to specific areas of interest (for example, Arctic marine 
issues), or to PP organizations located in certain geographic areas. The concept was that the core fund 
would be distributed to each PP organization equally, but that PPs would apply for project support 
funds and that funding decisions would be made by a governing body, potentially the IPS Board. The 
meeting also produced a PP Agreement in Principle on the founding of the funds, draft language 
regarding the meeting outcomes for the Iqaluit Declaration, and a work plan for moving forward.   
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At the 9th AC Ministerial meeting (again in Iqaluit) in April 2015 the following language was included 
in the Ministerial Declaration: 
Acknowledge that the work of the Arctic Council continues to evolve to respond to new opportunities and 
challenges in the Arctic, reaffirm existing mechanisms and commit to identifying new approaches to support 
the active participation of Permanent Participants, and welcome the work done by Permanent Participants 
to establish a funding mechanism to strengthen their capacity.  
During the Ministerial meeting the PPs also held a side event with AC observers to outline the plan 
for the two PP support funds in addition to a discussion of the role that Observers might play in the 
support of the PP organizations. Given that the criteria for Observer status in the AC calls for a 
political willingness and financial capacity to support the work of the PPs in the AC, it seems clear 
that part of the solution to PP support and capacity may fall with the Observers.  
As the AC moves on to the U.S. Chairmanship, the work on PP capacity and support continues. WWF 
has again expressed its willingness to not only contribute to a PP core fund, but also to support the 
work needed to establish such a fund legally, and so an RFP to experts in this area has been produced, 
and at the time of the writing of this article is about to be distributed. In addition, at least one other 
Observer has made a verbal commitment to contribute to the fund once established, so it seems like 
there is at least a possibility that the fund could become a reality and assist in improving PP capacity. 
It also seems clear that the Arctic member states of the AC are unlikely to support the PPs through 
such a funding mechanism, instead preferring to continue the direct relationship with their constituent 
PPs that has existed since earliest days of the AC. 
 Rebecca Pincus is Visiting Professor at the United States Coast Guard Academy. 
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The Arctic Coast Guard Forum:  
A Welcome & Important Step 
  
Rebecca Pincus 
 
 
 
In October 2015, the eight Arctic states will send their heads of coast guard or equivalent official 
delegation to the US Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut, where the Commandant 
of the Coast Guard will host a ceremonial summit and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) will 
be formally launched. A terms of reference document that outlines the basic framework of the ACGF 
will be finalized at the summit signatory meeting, and this will serve as the foundation for a 
Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC). The MOC will become the non-binding document that 
establishes the ACGF as an international body with rules and organizational responsibilities. 
This moment will mark the advancement of a commitment on the part of all Arctic states to cooperate 
at the operational level in the maritime Arctic. The operational level is where the rubber meets the 
road: where missions are executed afloat and in port, where helicopters are scrambled, inspections 
carried out, and incident response units deployed. While high-level diplomacy gets more attention, the 
kind of inter-service relationship-building at the operational level promised by the ACGF can lead to 
immediate benefits to Arctic communities and stakeholders.      
The ACGF is a welcome step. At a time when the region is facing unprecedented challenges, including 
warming that is occurring at a rapid pace, the establishment of the ACGF is a concrete sign that Arctic 
nations are committed to cooperation in the North, despite other differences. Recognizing that 
increasing access to the Arctic Ocean will increase the demands placed upon Arctic states for the 
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scarce operational resources available in this remote region to respond to missions such as search and 
rescue, as well as enforcement of regulations pertaining to environmental protection, fishing, and 
vessel safety, the ACGF will provide a forum where Arctic states can build cooperation and leverage 
available resources to maximize operational effectiveness. The ACGF will build on existing Atlantic 
and North Pacific Coast Guard Forums, and will be operationally focused and consensus based. While 
independent of the Arctic Council, the ACGF will be complimentary to AC efforts.  
Through building relationships at the operational level, as well as sharing best practices and lessons 
learned, Arctic coast guards can improve their individual mission fulfillment as well as refine 
cooperative responses to incidents that require a multi-lateral response. The ACGF offers practical 
benefits to all Arctic nations, especially those with large search and rescue territories as defined in the 
2011 Arctic Search and Rescue treaty.  
The ACGF is not only welcome, but important. The extreme conditions and distances present in the 
Arctic maritime region, particularly across North America and Russian coasts, pose significant 
challenges to efficient execution of coast guard missions. Several recent incidents of note demonstrate 
that the dangers of the Arctic region argue forcefully for coordinated international response capacities. 
For example, the extended transit of a Canadian barge, which drifted over 1,300 miles from Canadian 
waters, through US waters, before reaching Russian waters where it was finally retrieved,1 
demonstrates not only the challenges present in the region, but also the critical importance of building 
strong working relationships between all Arctic coast guard agencies at the operational level. Another 
example, the sinking of the South Korean fishing vessel, the Oryong 501, which sank in heavy seas in 
December 2014, triggered an international response including US and Russian parties along with 
South Korean vessels.2 While the Oryong 501 sank in the Russian SAR zone, the proximity and 
capability of US Coast Guard assets led to a response including USCG assets, working with Russian 
and South Korean authorities. 
The examples above should make clear that grave incidents occur in the Arctic, and as maritime traffic 
increases and weather patterns become (even) less predictable as the climate continues to destabilize, 
their frequency is likely to increase. With this in mind, the establishment of the ACGF can be 
applauded as a concrete step that will bring the Arctic states together to respond collaboratively to a 
challenge that involves them all. The establishment of the ACGF will further advance the interests of 
all Arctic states in ensuring safe and sustainable vessel traffic in the Arctic region.  
 
Notes  
1. For more information about the barge, please see a series of articles in the Alaska Daily 
News. Most recently, http://www.adn.com/article/20150316/supply-barge-adrift-arctic-
months.  
2. For more information, see for example KTUU coverage at 
http://www.ktuu.com/news/news/us-coast-guard-hands-off-massive-bering-sea-search-to-
south-korea/30242314. 
 Clive Tesar is Head of Communications and External Relations, WWF Global Arctic Programme. Rod Downie is 
Manager of Polar Programmes, WWF UK. Simon Walmsley is Marine Manager, WWF-International. 
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Getting Arctic Shipping Back on Course 
 
Clive Tesar, Rod Downie & Simon Walmsley 
 
 
 
 
In Iqaluit earlier this year, a clutch of ministers from Arctic states welcomed progress made on the 
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (the ‘Polar Code’), an International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) instrument to regulate shipping in Arctic and Antarctic waters. The ministers 
noted that the progress followed “extensive engagement by the Arctic States.” The ministers were 
right to welcome the progress made. The Polar Code, expected to be implemented in 2017, will for 
the first time introduce mandatory, polar-specific requirements for cargo vessels over 500GT and 
passenger vessels operating in polar waters. It is anticipated that it will lead to improved safety in 
Arctic shipping, with provisions on such things as training for senior officers, the requirement for a 
polar operations manual and polar operations certificate, and rules for different classes of ships 
according to their ability to operate in ice. As pointed out in a report commissioned by the Arctic 
Council’s PAME working group, improved safety measures reduce oil pollution risks. What the 
ministers did not point out that day is that the Polar Code can still do so much more to reduce the 
risks of impacts from shipping and protect the Arctic marine environment. 
A necessary next step for the Code is to extend it to smaller vessels, as so far it only applies to larger 
vessels.  So-called SOLAS (named for the international convention on Safety of Life at Sea) vessels 
are ships larger than 500 gross tonnes, commercial and passenger ships. How many of the other sorts 
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of ships currently operate in the Arctic, or their impact, is not well known. Several national delegations 
at IMO have asked for a paper giving information on the number of “non-SOLAS” ships operating 
in polar waters and reports of accidents and incidents, including those requiring search and rescue 
operations.  
  
 
WWF, as part of a coalition of NGOs, believes there is still an opportunity to strengthen the Polar 
Code by addressing significant omissions including addressing non-ice strengthened vessels, smaller 
cargo and fishing vessels, and widening the scope of the environmental provisions. There are a number 
of omissions that affect the environmental impact from shipping in the north, including better oil and 
chemical spill preparedness and response, sewage and grey water discharge, and specific vessel routing 
measures. Here, we will focus on just three: heavy fuel oils; black carbon emissions; and the 
introduction of alien species through ballast and biofouling. 
The use and carriage of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) presents one of the biggest risks to the Arctic marine 
environment. The Arctic Ocean Assessment identified the release of oil through spills or 
operational/illegal discharges as the most significant threat from ships in the Arctic. HFO is a very 
thick, viscous oil – what is left over when you’ve skimmed off the higher grade fuels. It accounts for 
three-quarters of the fuel used in Arctic shipping. The Arctic environment is particularly vulnerable 
to both operational and accidental spills of this kind of oil. It degrades slowly under Arctic conditions, 
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the evaporation and dispersion rates are low compared to lighter, refined fuels, it may emulsify once 
released into the marine environment, and it is impossible to clean up in ice covered conditions and 
with a lack of nearby response resources and infrastructure. It has a devastating effect on marine life, 
particularly as Arctic marine food webs are so simple. Due in part to lack of good quality 
hydrogeographic data, the chance of a catastrophic spill exists, and will be magnified with projected 
increased Arctic shipping. The effects of a spill of HFO in polar environments are rightly feared. The 
carriage and use (including for ballast) of this fuel has been banned in Antarctic waters south of 60 
degrees south, and around parts of the Norwegian Arctic archipelago of Svalbard. But it continues to 
be used in the Arctic as a shipping fuel, and to be transported around the Arctic for other uses. Even 
at 2012 levels of Arctic shipping, a report prepared for the PAME working group estimated, “…a 
serious accident resulting in an oil spill could on average be expected once every 1.6 years.”  
Black carbon produced by Arctic shipping is an important issue. Local sources of soot are known to 
contribute to Arctic melting, and the more local the source, the more it contributes to the problem.  
Although shipping is currently thought to contribute only 5% of the black carbon load in the Arctic, 
that could increase to 20% by 2050 according to some projections of future shipping. The eight Arctic 
Council states are committed to working together on black carbon issues, having signed a framework 
agreement in Iqaluit, Nunavut, in early 2015 that says they will, “…adopt an ambitious, aspirational 
and quantitative collective goal on black carbon, and to consider additional goals, by the next Arctic 
Council Ministerial meeting in 2017.”  
Whether that collective 
goal will include 
promoting actions on 
limiting black carbon 
from shipping is not yet 
known. There is a real 
opportunity in this 
respect for the Arctic 
states to demonstrate 
leadership on this issue, 
thereby setting an 
example for shipping in 
Antarctic waters.  
The third omission is the introduction of alien species to the Arctic, either in ballast water, or via 
biofouling, which both require fit for purpose polar operational measures to address translocations in 
such sensitive areas. As Arctic waters continue to warm, the numbers of alien species that can survive 
there will increase, including organisms such as the European green crab (nicknamed ‘cockroach of 
the sea'), and the Japanese ghost shrimp. Shipping and in particular ballast water transfer is the single 
biggest vector of marine invasive species transfer. The Arctic marine environment is already stressed 
by climate change, acidification, and increasing industrial uses of the offshore Arctic. Introducing 
“Black carbon, or soot, is a tiny, solid particle that absorbs solar radiation, 
thereby warming the atmosphere. It is co-emitted with and interacts in the 
atmosphere with various other pollutants, some of which cause cooling. Black 
carbon typically stays airborne for about a week. Because this time is so short, its 
concentrations are highest close to its sources. Nonetheless, black carbon in itself 
is a major contributor to current global warming, following carbon dioxide and 
methane. In addition to its effects on atmospheric warming, black carbon that is 
deposited on snow or ice can cause surface warming and melting by absorbing 
solar radiation to a much greater degree than pristine ice or snow. In the Arctic, 
this warming effect is particularly strong in spring when the snow is melting and 
longer days mean more sunlight.” 
 
AMAP, 2015. Summary for Policy-makers: Arctic Climate Issues 2015. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme (AMAP), Oslo, Norway. 16 pp, p. 4. 
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invasive species further complicates survival for Arctic species and the whole food web built on the 
marine environment from tiny plankton to 100 tonne bowhead whales. 
All of these omissions could still be considered in Step 2 of the Polar Code if the political will to do 
so exists. However, they will require backing by Parties to IMO. NGOs can take part in negotiations 
and make proposals, but need state support to take them further. Those Arctic Council states which 
are “port/coastal states” that is, the territories that would be most directly affected by shipping 
regulations, have an obvious interest in protecting their environments. Several other states influential 
at the IMO, such as China, Germany, India, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Singapore and the United 
Kingdom are also Arctic Council Observer states. In their applications to become members of the 
Council, and their subsequent justifications for their inclusion as Council observers, these states 
commonly stress their interests in preserving the Arctic environment. The Council itself is explicit in 
its expectations of Observers. One of the criteria for admission as an Observer is, “Have demonstrated 
a concrete interest and ability to support the work of the Arctic Council, including through 
partnerships with member states and Permanent Participants bringing Arctic concerns to global 
decision making bodies.” 
There are other options to addressing some of these issues. The first is unilateral regulation within the 
exclusive economic zones of Arctic states (out to 200 nautical miles). This is where most shipping in 
the Arctic takes place. For instance, Canada is considered to have stringent rules governing shipping 
in its Arctic waters. The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act has a zero discharge pollution policy, 
the Arctic Ice Regime Shipping System categorizes vessels according to their ability to handle different 
ice conditions, and the Zone/Date System defines opening and closing dates for entry and exit into 
the Canadian Arctic for various classes of ships.  
There are also international instruments other than the Polar Code that deal with some of the wider 
environmental issues tied to shipping. For example a ban on the use of HFO (or a phasing out) could 
be accomplished via an amendment to MARPOL Annex I, Chapter 9, Regulation 43 rather than tied 
to revision of the Polar Code.  
Another suggested alternative is to establish Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs) in the Arctic. As 
noted in a recent report, establishment of these areas can provide rules to protect the most vulnerable 
or important places in the offshore Arctic. “PSSAs can provide additional protection through 
measures that may reduce the likelihood and consequences of accidents (acute pollution), in addition 
to measures that targets operational emissions and discharges.” PSSA measures might also include 
restrictions on use/carriage of HFO. 
However the regulation of the Arctic marine sector is accomplished, it should be implemented without 
delay, and the Polar Code is one instrument to accomplish that, as it is an already established umbrella 
process to address polar shipping issues.  
We look to the Arctic states, together with the Arctic Council Observer states to plainly state their 
intention to bolster the code, and close the remaining governance gaps in Arctic shipping. We also 
recommend the regular review of the Code’s provisions, considering the rapidly changing Arctic 
marine environment.  
 Gail Fondahl is Professor of Geography at the University of Northern British Columbia and an Editorial Board member 
for the Arctic Yearbook. Joan Nymand Larsen is a Senior Scientist with the Stefansson Arctic Institute. The authors are 
co-editors of AHDR II. 
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The Arctic Human Development Report II: 
A Contribution to Arctic Policy Shaping 
 
Gail Fondahl & Joan Nymand Larsen 
 
 
 
This past year saw the publication of the second Arctic Human Development Report, a decade after 
the first report was issued. If the first AHDR (2004) provided a baseline of human development, this 
second report enabled the beginning of temporal comparisons and contrasts across a decade of 
marked social, economic, cultural and environmental change in the North. Sub-titled “Regional 
Processes and Global Linkages,” AHDR-II attends to the challenges that globalization, along with 
climate change, poses to the socio-economic stability and human security of the Arctic population.  
Synthesizing the extensive literature produced over the past decade, authors also identified key gaps 
in knowledge that still need to be tackled, as well as important success stories over the past decade. 
AHDR-II was written with certain audiences in mind. Directed at a broad audience, it nevertheless 
addresses, in particular: post-secondary students in, and interested in, the North; northern residents; 
decision- and policy-makers whose work affects the North; and the Arctic Council’s Sustainable 
Development Working Group (SWDG). Given the unanticipated interest and uptake by post-
secondary institutions of the first AHDR as a teaching resource, this audience was very much at the 
forefront in the editors’ minds during the production of AHDR-II. The report covers a wide range of 
topics, documenting their diverse manifestations across the Circumpolar North, is up-to-date, is rich 
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in graphics and illustrative material, and is free to download, providing a valuable source for teaching 
and learning about the major trends in human development over the past decade in the North. In a 
more indirect, long-term sense, AHDR-II will hopefully play a role in shaping policy, as today’s 
students become tomorrow’s decision- and policy-makers. To develop policies and practices that will 
reduce vulnerabilities of northern residents in these times of rapid change and increased uncertainly, 
an understanding of trends in Arctic human development becomes a valuable tool. 
In terms of directly addressing policy-makers, AHDR-II, like its predecessor, distills major findings 
and key policy-relevant conclusions, summarizes critical gaps in knowledge, and recommends priority 
activities that should be considered for follow-up work (AHDR-II 2014: 21-27; see also Larsen & 
Fondahl 2015). In doing so, the report provides a potential roadmap for the SDWG’s consideration 
– a function the SDWG has recognized and anticipated. More broadly, in providing an assessment of 
key challenges to human development and identifying potential opportunities, the report will hopefully 
inform Arctic governance, both formal and informal, at all scales. 
While informed decision-making and governance requires comprehensive and current information, of 
special note to the Arctic Yearbook 2015 are the conclusions related specifically to the topic of 
‘governance’ in the Arctic. ADHR-II attests that “recent institutional changes in the North have 
increased the local control and ownership of northern resources in some parts of the Arctic” and “an 
increasing trend of legitimate participation in Arctic decision-making and continued innovation in 
governance can be observed at all scales” (AHDR-II 2014: 23, 22). It notes, however, that increasing 
participation, and expanding demands for such, seriously stretch both human and fiscal resources, at 
all scales, perhaps especially among indigenous peoples.  The report identifies the need to resolve such 
challenges. AHDR-II also identifies the need for improved knowledge on what institutions and 
institutional arrangements, formal and informal, will contribute to improving the human condition in 
the Arctic (25).   
The report has been criticized for paying inadequate attention to the contested nature of governance 
processes and giving inadequate consideration of the role of non-state players such as energy 
companies in Arctic governance (Klick 2015). Certainly, such relations could be described and 
analyzed in greater detail, although the editors had to balance considerations of length against all-
inclusive discussions.  
The road to the AHDR-II’s production was not without potholes. While the project was initially 
endorsed by the SDWG, the report did not receive its endorsement. During the SDWG review 
process, SDWG member states and Permanent Participants made numerous requests for changes to 
the text of various chapters (most notably the Legal Systems and Governance chapters), most to which 
the authors agreed. However, in a few cases, the requested changes in wording would have significantly 
altered the meaning in a way to which authors did not consent. This ultimately caused the SDWG 
members to fail to reach consensus on endorsing the report. A fundamental benefit resulting from 
this tension, however, was the identification of the need, at the outset of projects, for clearer 
understandings by all players regarding the level of academic freedom versus control over texts that a 
Working Group may exercise over reports, and what constitutes an internal versus external product.   
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If not formally endorsed at the Arctic Council Ministerial, the AHDR-II received mention in both the 
Senior Arctic Officials’ Report to Ministers (AC SAO 2015: 37, 38) and in the Iqaluit Declaration itself 
(Arctic Council 2015: §19). A document offering key findings and suggestions for further research 
needs was prepared for the Ministerial and can be found on the SDWG’s website (Larsen & Fondahl 
2015). AHDR-II has been suggested as a key source for SDWG’s Social, Economic and Cultural 
Expert Group, one mandate of which is to “undertake regular gap analyses to identify research 
priorities which will assist the SDWG in framing its human development research agenda” (SECEG 
Terms of Reference §III.c). Thus, AHDR-II is poised to inform the SDWG’s priorities and workplan, 
and we anticipate that other Arctic policy-makers will find it both instructive and inspirational. 
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International Meeting of the AC Member States in 
September 2015 in Archangelsk 
 
Lassi Heininen 
 
 
The V [Fifth] International Meeting of Representatives of the States-Members of the Arctic Council, 
States-Observers and Foreign Scientific Community took place on September 15-16, 2015 in 
Archangelsk, Russia. The meeting was specially devoted to preparedness and safety in the Arctic, 
sustainable development and indigenous peoples. It consisted of two parts, the demonstration of 
rescue exercises by the EMERCOM Arctic Emergency Centre in Arkhangelsk, and the international 
conference “Ensuring Safety and Sustainable Development in the Arctic Region, Preservation the 
Ecosystems and Traditional Way of Life of the Indigenous Peoples in the North”.  
The high-level meeting was organized under the auspices of the Russian Federation Security Council 
in cooperation with the Northern (Arctic) Federal University, NArFU in Archangelsk. NArFU invited 
members of small international delegations from the Arctic states and the Arctic Council observer 
countries, as it did last year, when this annual meeting took place in Naryan-Nar, and the Varandei Oil 
Terminal in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug.  
The demonstration of rescue exercises by Arkhangelsk’s EMERCOM Arctic Emergency Centre took 
place on a sunny afternoon on the Dvina river just beside downtown Arkhangelsk. We had front row 
seats to follow the exercise, since we were on board of the 2N.V.Gogol” paddle steamship in the 
middle of the river. The situation and accident was simple but realistic: there was a fire on board of a 
tanker, and a few crew members of the tanker were dropped down to the sea, when they tried to put 
out the fire. Following from this, the mission of the exercise was two-fold: on the one hand, to put 
out the fire, which was done both by a helicopter and aircraft dropping water from the tanks on the 
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fire, and a rescue-vessel spray water on; and on the other hand, to rescue the crew members from the 
sea, which was done by surface divers who were dropped onto the water from a helicopter. The 
mission was accomplished, the fire went down and the crew members were rescued. I am not an 
expert on the field – though I followed another rescue exercise last August (2014) at the 
Priratzlomnaya Oil Rig in the Pechora Sea - but I was impressed by how efficiently all parties acted 
and fulfilled their tasks (of course so often in a real situation the sun is not shining and the conditions 
can be very harsh).  
The international conference (with a long official name) was divided into three sessions based on a 
theme, “Personal preparation and training for the Arctic development and global Arctic projects”, 
“Strengthening of the international cooperation in the preservation of the ecosystems and 
environmental protection of the Arctic” and “Conservation of the traditional life-styles and 
maintenance of sustainable development of indigenous population of the Arctic territories”. Each 
agenda item had a short film and an oral report as an introduction, and were followed by interventions 
from the participants. There were very many of these short (about 5 minutes) interventions in each 
session, and as so often, only little time for open discussion. Thus, the challenge was first, how to 
express all relevant matters within that short time frame; second, how to manage to get the audience’s 
attention, when your presentation was at the end of a list of speakers; and finally, how to keep the 
interest and intensity going at the end of a long day.  
Well, I don’t know how accurate this evaluation is, but I have a feeling that the intensity was on until 
the end. And though some presentations were neither that interesting nor new, there were many 
interesting presentations (yes, there was a simultaneous interpretation from Russian to English, and 
from English to Russian, and the interpreters were professionals). Thus, there was much to be learned 
as a foreigner, and the other way round, the Russians learned many new things from us, foreigners. In 
a time of turbulence, as it is now in international politics, it is very useful to know what the others, 
including your potential rivals, are thinking, and let the others know, what you think. And furthermore, 
demonstrate that you are ready to listen and learn new ways to do things, and maybe even apply new 
methods and new kind of thinking. 
My presentation was in the 2nd session devoted to international cooperation to preserve the Arctic 
ecosystem and strengthen cooperation. Unlike a few of my academic colleagues, I didn’t use my short 
time, although it is important and timely, to introduce any new academic and educational project, or 
to try to convince others how joint efforts in research and higher education would benefit policy-
making in the Arctic. I went straight to the point which I thought would interest most of the audience 
– policy-makers from regional and federal levels of Russia, and from many Arctic Council member 
and Observer countries: why it is so important to maintain the high stability of the Arctic region, and 
how it would be beneficial for the entire Arctic region and its peoples.  
Indeed, how come have the prognoses of emerging conflicts in, or a ‘scramble’ for, the Arctic not, 
yet, been materialized? And why is this achieved, man-made Arctic stability so resilient? An answer 
lies in the fact that the stable and cooperative Arctic is so valuable for its states and peoples in the era 
of globalization. The post-Cold War period has been successful due to the shift from military 
confrontation into political stability and growing international cooperation – there are only winners. 
  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
International Meeting of AC Member States in Arkhangelsk 
400 
This is seen for example, in how the Kingdom of Denmark and Russian Federation played, and play, 
according to the rules of UNCLOS, when they submitted their proposals on the Arctic Ocean’s 
shelves to the Commission – the proposals compete, the states cooperate. This shows the power of 
immaterial values, such as peace, human capital and that of cumulative, ‘soft’ methods in politics and 
governance (which is seen for example, by the self-governing status of Greenland, Nordic devolution, 
policy-shaping by the Arctic Council, paradiplomacy, and implementation of the interplay between 
science and politics). These are among the ways that we have managed to maintain the received state 
of political stability and willingness to cooperate, much needed preconditions for sustaining Arctic 
research. 
This goes a long way to demonstrating the social relevance of science, which is also called ‘science 
diplomacy’, i.e. that science is more than laboratories and theories, it is people, societies, the 
environment. This includes the interplay between science, politics and economics, and this has been 
implemented in the Arctic for some time now.  The International Meeting of Representatives of the 
States-Members of the Arctic Council, States-Observers and Foreign Scientific Community is a good 
example of a platform, where it is both intended to happen, and it is happening. This clearly came out 
in several presentations and comments, though there was too little time for open discussion (this 
seems to be a universal ‘bottleneck’ for the sharing of thoughts and ideas), as well as in smaller social 
contacts during the two days.   
A new Arctic security and political agenda is emerging due to the reflections of regional wars, the 
constant warfare against international terror, and flows of globalization, as well as due to ‘Grand 
challenges’ as main drivers, such as long-range pollution and climate change, and ethical questions 
concerning mass-scale utilization. Here the Arctic states and their state-owned enterprises will strongly 
influence future development by choosing either to prioritize business activities only, or adopt a more 
holistic approach by taking into consideration the commitments to environmental protection and 
wellbeing of the inhabitants, as the Arctic states promised almost 20 years ago, when the Arctic 
Council was established.  
The answer cannot, however, be simply more mass-scale utilization by extractive industries, but also 
smaller and soft ways, as many Arctic actors have shown being able to be innovative and resilient. For 
that we need on the one hand, more and deeper interdisciplinary research, and on the other hand, 
keener cooperation between policy-makers from the Arctic states and the AC Observer states under 
the auspices of the Arctic Council. Now when the post-Cold War era has come to a close in the Arctic, 
and the region has become a part of global (political, economic, technological, environmental and 
societal) changes, this is not enough, I am afraid. Hence, it has become more demanding to maintain 
this stability and strengthen cooperation. We need more meetings, such as the 2015 Archangelsk 
meeting and the annual Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik, where the interplay between science, 
politics and economics/business takes place. 
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Arctic Futures Initiative: 
A Holistic Approach to Arctic Futures 
 
Anni Reissell, Hannu Halinen, Peter Lemke & Charlie Vörösmarty 
 
 
In the age of globalization, the Arctic interacts 
with the rest of the world, and vice versa, in a 
complex manner—societally, economically, 
technologically, and environmentally. The 
complexity of the dynamic global system 
poses significant societal, research, policy and 
governance challenges for the Arctic. Then 
again, the Arctic has to be seen in a global 
context. 
The Arctic is of increasing strategic interest, 
both regionally and globally, due to the 
opportunities as well as challenges brought 
about by the pronounced physical, biological as well as social and economic changes observed across 
this critical part of the Earth system. Much of the interest is either directly or indirectly centered on 
the Arctic as a key epicenter of global climate change—both in terms of the impacts on it as well as 
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its reciprocal feedbacks on lower latitudes. Concern also arises from the huge economic potential of 
the Arctic, recoverable new energy resources across the region, and the possible opening and 
consequential expansion of important northern transportation sea routes.  
In order to better adapt and plan towards a stable and prosperous Arctic, more information is needed 
about the potential future conditions of the region. To fulfill this need, the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) is in the planning phase of a new international, collaborative, and 
integrative research project, the “Arctic Futures Initiative” (AFI), which will support decision-making in 
an effort to advance sustainable, and plausible futures for the Arctic in different environmental, social, 
economic and technological contexts. The rationale for AFI is reflected in a key conclusion from a 
seminar “Policy Support from Arctic Research” held in Helsinki, Finland in May 2013, by the Finnish Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Academy of Finland, and IIASA:  
There is a decided need for a holistic, integrative assessment of plausible futures for the Arctic, cutting 
across different disciplines and individual countries’ strategic interests.  
The AFI within IIASA aims to exploit IIASA’s key position as an international, non-governmental, 
neutral and independent research organization with a large network through its National Member 
Organizations. IIASA can also utilize its long history of developing systems analytic approaches while 
at the same time moving forward truly interdisciplinary perspectives that effectively address today’s 
multivariate and complex issues across local, regional and global scales. 
The AFI will work collaboratively with other Arctic institutions and organizations to bring together 
different scientific disciplines: natural and social sciences, economics, humanities, law, communities, 
and all affiliated stakeholders to support an integrated and “end to end” science to decision-making 
framework that builds upon IIASA’s 23 National Member Organizations, including five Arctic nations 
and six Observer nations of the Arctic Council.  
The Arctic Futures Initiative is organized to bring together the interests of the research, policy and 
business communities for an integrated and collaborative approach to a sustainable future in the 
Arctic. These communities will be involved through representative groups such as the IIASA National 
Member Organizations and partners (research), the Arctic Council (policy), and the Arctic Economic 
Council (business). AFI will also, for example, collaborate with the International Arctic Science 
Committee (IASC), the United States Arctic Research Commission (USARC), and several research 
projects, one example being the Pan-Eurasian Experiment (PEEX).  
Mission: To build a knowledge base that informs decision-making in the Arctic from a 
comprehensive, holistic perspective, covering social, economic, technological, and environmental 
issues while also taking into account the connections between the Arctic and the rest of the world. 
Objective: To initiate a research project and framework with various components that could 
contribute to a holistic integrated and sustained assessment of plausible futures of the Arctic. 
Key Roles: 1) Bringing socio-economic expertise to bear with technological and environmental 
expertise for Arctic futures assessments; and 2) Providing a framework for a sustained assessment 
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process and the ability to bridge the gap between one-time assessment efforts within the Arctic 
Council. 
The overriding objective of AFI is to initiate a research project that will contribute to a sustained 
holistic integrated assessment of plausible futures of the Arctic, while cutting across different 
disciplines and individual countries’ strategic interests. The initiative will apply advanced integrative 
and participatory methods developed by IIASA and its international collaborators for examining 
possible futures of the Arctic. This could include IIASA’s research expertise such as work related to 
socio-economic scenario development; socio-economic vulnerability assessment of sectors and 
populations (such as the indigenous one); and systems analysis to support decision making and Arctic 
adaptation efforts.  
Whether for the purposes of science, policy or business, efforts focused on the Arctic are multitude 
but currently remain fragmented. A holistic, integrated systems approach to the Arctic is missing, as 
is a consistent approach to identifying and communicating the plausible Arctic futures.  
Another key role for AFI lays in its ability, as part of IIASA as a long-standing international research 
institution, to bridge the assessments of the Arctic Council and other relevant institutions across 
various chairmanships. To fully realize an integrated and sustained assessment process of Arctic 
futures, various activities within individual chairmanship timeframes will need to fit into a broader 
sustained assessment framework that AFI will be an essential part of. This type of integrated 
methodology and sustained framework will produce more usable, timely, and relevant information, 
scenarios and models for stakeholders in the Arctic that can lead to better decisions to be made for a 
more sustainable Arctic future. 
 Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev are professors at the Department of International Relations, School of 
International Relations, St. Petersburg State University, Russia. 
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Russian Military Activities in the Arctic:  
Myths & Realities 
 
Alexander Sergunin & Valery Konyshev 
 
 
 
 
The outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis has spurred new accusations of Russia as being an aggressive and 
militarist power not only in East Europe but also in the Arctic (in addition to the charges brought 
earlier with regard to the planting of the titanium flag on the North Pole in 2007, resumption of naval 
and air patrols in the region and military modernization programs of the Russian conventional and 
nuclear forces deployed in the Far North). It was expected that in the wake of the crisis Moscow 
would dramatically increase its military activities and presence in the region as well as accelerate its 
military modernization programs. Some experts paid attention to the fact that Russia’s new maritime 
doctrine (July 2015) has identified the Arctic (along with the North Atlantic) as priority areas for the 
Russian navy. 
However, these alarmist expectations were not fulfilled. First of all, there was no any substantial 
paradigmatic shift regarding the Kremlin’s vision of the military power’s role in the Arctic. As before, 
Moscow’s military strategies aimed at three major goals: first, to demonstrate and ascertain Russia’s 
sovereignty over the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF), including the exclusive economic 
zone and continental shelf; second, to protect its economic interests in the High North; and third, to 
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demonstrate that Russia retains its great power status and has world-class military capabilities. In a 
sense, Russian military strategies are comparable with those of other coastal states (especially the U.S. 
and Canadian ones). 
Still, some impact of the Ukrainian crisis could be seen in the increasing number and scale of the 
Russian military exercises in the Arctic. For example, in March 2015 Putin ordered to inspect the 
Northern Fleet for combat readiness. Some 38,000 soldiers, 3,360 vehicles, 41 naval vessels, 15 
submarines and 110 aircrafts were involved in the inspection. In August more than 1,000 soldiers, 14 
aircraft and 34 special military units took part in drills on the Taymyr Peninsula (northern Siberia).  
However, it should be noted that the March combat readiness inspection was a response to NATO’s 
preceding drill in Norway which involved 5,000 troops, the largest military exercise on the NATO 
northern flank since 1967. As for the August exercise, according to the Northern Fleet Commander 
Admiral Vladimir Korolev, this exercise was purely defensive as it was done more than 3,000 km away 
from the Norwegian border and directed to protect economic security of the AZRF (to prevent 
poaching, smuggling, illegal migration as well as to conduct search and rescue operations) rather than 
to plan any offensive moves. 
So far, Russia has responded to NATO’s moves with more rhetoric than action in the Arctic, notes 
Andreas Østhagen, an Arctic policy expert with the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies. In 
contrast with the Baltic Sea region where the NATO-Russian tensions have obviously increased over 
the last year, “The situation in the High North is close to normal compared to the activity of the last 
years,” the head of the Norwegian Joint Command Headquarters, Lt. Gen. Morten Haga Lunde 
believes. “This is in spite of the tense situation that has evolved between Russia and NATO.”  
According to official numbers from the Norwegian Joint Command Headquarters, there had been 43 
scrambles and 69 identifications in international air space outside the coast of Norway in 2014. In 
2013 there were 41 scrambles and 58 identifications, and in 2012 there were 41 scrambles and 71 
identifications. The numbers are considerably lower than during the 1980s, when there could be as 
many as 500 to 600 identifications per year.1  
There was no dramatic increase in Russia’s naval and air patrolling of the North Atlantic and Arctic 
in 2014-2015. Moreover, after two catastrophes with the Tu-95 strategic bombers (Summer 2015) 
their flights were suspended for a while. 
Russia’s military modernization programs in the Far North were implemented according to schedule. 
However, some Western military analysts tried to represent the deployment of the Pantsir S-1 short-
range air defense system on the Kola Peninsula, plans to replace S-300 long-range air defense system 
by a more advanced S-400 ‘Growler’ system, tactical training for fighter jet pilots in Arctic conditions, 
sea trials of nuclear submarines (most of which are designed for the deployment to the Pacific Fleet), 
plans to establish 16 deep-water ports, 10 search and rescue stations, 10 air defense radar stations, and 
13 airfields along its Arctic periphery as an evidence of Russia’s growing military ambitions in the High 
North. 
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These experts tend to ignore that fact that the Soviet-time military machine has significantly 
degenerated in the 1990s and early 2000s and the Russian conventional and nuclear forces badly need 
modernization to effectively meet new challenges and threats. 
To reorganize in a more efficient way the Russian land forces in the Western part of the AZRF there 
were plans to transform the motorized infantry and marine brigades located near Pechenga 
(Murmansk region) to the Arctic special force unit, with soldiers trained in a special program and 
equipped with modern personal equipment for military operations in the Arctic. The Arctic brigade 
should be operational by 2016. There were also plans to create another Arctic brigade somewhere in 
the Arkhangelsk region. All conventional forces in the AZRF should form an Arctic Group of Forces 
(AGF) to be led by the joint Arctic command (to be established in 2017). 
However, the Ukrainian crisis has made adjustments to Russia’s military planning. While two 
Pechenga-based brigades were left in place, the Arctic brigade was surprisingly created ahead of 
schedule (in January 2015) and deployed in Alakurtti which is close to the Finnish-Russian border. 
Another surprise was that given an ‘increased NATO military threat’ in the North, President Putin 
has decided to accelerate the creation of a new strategic command ‘North’ which was established in 
December 2014 (three years ahead of the schedule). It was also announced that the second Arctic 
brigade will be formed in 2016 and will be stationed in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous district (east 
of the Ural Mountains in the Arctic Circle). 
Another interesting structural change is an ongoing reorganization of the Russian Coast Guard (part 
of the Federal Security Service (FSS), successor of the KGB). Now the Coast Guard has a wide focus 
in the Arctic: in addition to the traditional protection of biological resources in the Arctic Ocean, oil 
and gas installations and shipping along the Northern Sea Route are among the agency’s new top 
priorities. For this purpose, the FSS has established two new border guard commands: one in 
Murmansk for the western AZRF regions, and one in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky for the eastern 
Arctic regions. 
There are plans to equip the Coast Guard in the AZRF with the brand new vessels of project 22100. 
The Okean-class ice-going patrol ship, the Polyarnaya Zvezda (Polar Star), is currently undergoing sea 
trials in the Baltic Sea. Vessels of this class can break up to 31.4 inch-thick ice. They have an endurance 
of 60 days and a range of 12,000 nautical miles at 20 knots. They are equipped with a Ka27 helicopter 
and can be supplied with Gorizont UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles). 
The attention which Russia pays now to the Coast Guard is in line with what other coastal states do 
(especially Norway and Denmark). 
To conclude, serious international experts do not see any particular alarming trends in Russia’s military 
behavior in the Arctic in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis. According to the former Commander 
of the U.S. Coast Guard and current U.S. State Department Special Representative to the Arctic, 
Admiral Robert J. Papp: “Everything we have seen them doing so far [i.e. Russia], is lawful, considered 
and deliberative. So we’ll just continue monitoring it and not overreact to it.” Papp noted that all 
countries have a responsibility to be able to provide search and rescue capabilities and navigation 
assistance in the area and Russia seems to be investing in that.2 
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Notes 
1. T. Pettersen (2014, December 19). Stable Russian Air Activity in the North. Barents Observer. 
Available from http://barentsobserver.com/en/security/2014/12/stable-russian-air-
activity-north-19-12. 
2. Radio Sweden (2015, 22 May). New Security Landscape in the Arctic. Available from 
http://www.adn.com/article/20150522/new-security-landscape-arctic. 
 Maarten de Sitter is a retired NATO international civilian and an independent political adviser.    
 
 
 
 
Commentary 
 
 
NATO & the Arctic 
 
Maarten de Sitter 
 
 
    
In the light of its already full plate of responsibilities it was not surprising that the Alliance did not 
react collectively to the territorial Arctic claims Russia deposited in August 2015. Faced i.a. with Putin’s 
ongoing illegal action on the Alliance’s eastern flank, the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan 
and threats to its southern member Turkey, finding a consensus in any way vis-à-vis High North issues 
is clearly not on NATO’s forefront.  
This taciturnity however sends a bad signal, both to Vladimir Putin as well as to the Arctic nations, as 
it could be interpreted as a lack of interest. Bad PR, so to speak.    
Alliance silence on the matter unfortunately reflects a more engrained problem. Notwithstanding 
persistent efforts in the last decade, for instance by Norway, to get and keep the issue of High North 
security on the radar in Brussels, a collective decision to address the changing strategic situation 
remains elusive. Even Putin does not now trigger a NATO High North position.  Individual nations 
have taken measures – e.g. the creation of a Danish Arctic Command – but a collective response is 
absent. 
Leaving the legal merits of the ambitious Russian territorial claim to the experts, politically the 
announcement clearly fits in the aggressive expansionism that is Putin’s hallmark. A collective Allied 
reaction to Moscow’s attempted Polar territory grab requires the initiative by one or by a group of 
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nations in the North Atlantic Council to discuss the matter followed by consensus on text and possible 
measures. No move in NATO HQ in that direction can as yet be discerned. 
This lack of collective positioning on the High North, against a background of Russian sabre rattling, 
but also in the face of a growing understanding of the overall impact climate change has on the regional 
strategic situation in the High North, is not surprising. There is no NATO High North Security 
Strategy. The dearth of attention for the region was already evident at the launch of the NATO 
Strategic Concept in 2010, in which there is not a word about the Arctic. An absence of consensus 
between the editors of the Concept – i.e. member states – prevented the issue being incorporated in 
this guiding document.  
NATO can of course not be blamed that in 2015 the Strategic Concept also in general terms looks 
outdated, especially considering Putin’s continuing belligerent antics. But one expected that NATO 
declarations since Moscow’s illegitimate acts started would not only focus on beefing up Baltic and 
eastern Alliance members’ security but would also send a clear message regarding Russian polar 
posturing and preparation. Even so, an icy silence prevails.   
The timely visit of NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg to NATO Founding Member Iceland in 
April 2015 raised hopes of High North Security experts of some tough language from Brussels. 
Disappointingly, nothing of substance was announced to manifest that in the northern region too, 
NATO is strengthening its guard to defend Alliance interests. A guard that is called for also because, 
as new maritime options develop, a range of opportunities appears for Russia to spoil – if not do 
worse to – Western interests.    
Three potential measures of increased vigilance present themselves.  
ONE: the current NATO air surveillance mission should become permanent, i.e. NATO nations 
should continue to mount a taskforce of aircraft for air policing and other tasks at Keflavik on a 
rotational scheme, but henceforth without gaps of months of absence as currently is the practice.  
TWO: NATO should consider upgrading its liaison office in Iceland, maybe in an adapted variation 
on the model of the NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) recently installed in the Baltic States, 
Poland, Romania and Bulgaria as part of the Readiness Action Plan that is NATO’s military response 
to Moscow’s aggression. A small NFIU HQ with emphasis on support for NATO’s regional air and 
maritime activities.   
THREE: the budding initiative to create a regional Search and Rescue (SAR) Centre should now be 
materialised. This is not a NATO activity, but clearly one to be supported by all nations and 
organisations with Arctic activities. NATO can provide expertise.  The requirement to be able to assist 
over long distance in case of incidents in or over Arctic waters is massively evident. The beauty of this 
proposal is that it could include an invitation to Russia, as member of the Arctic Council, to join, and 
hence have SAR become an instrument of détente.   
Finally, all three measures should tbe supported by Alliance common funding as Iceland alone cannot 
be shouldered with the financial burden.  
As winter approaches, one continues to hope NATO will get its polar act together soon.        
 Fujio Ohnishi is Professor at the College of International Relations, Nihon University. 
 
 
 
 
 
Commentary 
 
Does the Sun also Rise in the Arctic? Three Pillars of 
Japan’s Arctic Policy 
 
Fujio Ohnishi 
 
 
Japan or Nihon in Japanese means a country from which the Sun rises. In general, the word Sun is 
often used as a metaphor for Japan. This commentary explains Japan’s Arctic engagement by focusing 
on its three pillars, and also considers its policy prospects.  
Japan’s Arctic engagement has centered on three pillars, namely the pillars of diplomacy, science and 
business, although these pillars are self-sustained by ministries concerned rather than coordinated 
among them. The oldest pillar is the diplomatic one, since it dates back to Japan’s signing of the 
Svalbard Treaty in 1920. However, this pillar had been dormant until recent years. In July 2009, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) officially submitted its offer to be a permanent Observer to the 
Arctic Council. In March 2013, MoFA appointed an ambassador in charge of Arctic affairs. As a result 
of various diplomatic efforts, Japan was admitted to Observer status of the Arctic Council in May 
2013.  
The most substantial engagement was conducted in the pillar of science. Both the National Institute 
of Polar Research and Marine Science and Technology Center (now called the Agency for Marine-
Earth Science and Technology) have been the main organs which conducted observational research 
in the Arctic since the beginning of the 1990s. More recently, the Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology inaugurated the five-year GRENE Arctic Climate Change Research 
Project 2011-2015, which was succeeded by the Arctic Challenge for Sustainability Project 2015-2019 
(ArCS).1  
The less emphasized but embracing huge potential is the pillar of business. The pilot case was the 
Kalaallit Nunaat Marine Seismic (KANUMAS) project 1990-1962.2 More recently, the Japanese 
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government showed interest in the utilization of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) performed feasibility research on shipping and logistics 
through the NSR for the private sector including shipping companies, trading companies, and electric 
power companies. MLIT organizes a Public-Private Partnership Council for the Northern Sea Route.  
When the government adopted the second version of the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy in April 2013, 
the Arctic-related measures among others were for the first time installed at the Cabinet level.3 
Although most such measures were not brand-new, what was unprecedented was that it instituted two 
primordial linkages among the three pillars: to utilize the pillar of science for the pillar of business, 
and to make efficient use of the pillar of diplomacy for the pillar of science.4 
In an attempt to pursue a more developed and comprehensive Arctic policy promoting full-fledged 
interests for Japanese stakeholders such as governmental agencies, academic communities and 
industries, the Japanese government is now drafting an Arctic policy document including facilitation 
of observational research, promotion of international cooperation, utilization of the NSR, and 
securing safety navigation and national interests. Japan’s new Arctic policy document is scheduled to 
be announced at some point within this year.  
To conclude, Japan will show its flag in the Arctic more clearly, and thus we watch a true sunrise at 
hand. 
 
Notes 
1. For more information on the ArCS, see the following website. 
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/research_development/ (accessed August 24, 2015). 
2. The KANUMAS project was an international seismic reconnaissance survey off the eastern 
and western coasts of northern Greenland. The Japan National Oil Corporation (now called 
Japan Oil, Gas and Metal National Corporation, or JOGMEC) joined the project as a member 
of the major oil companies (BP, ExxonMobil, Shell, Statoil and Texaco) in addition to Nunaoil, 
the Greenlandic oil company, as a key operating partner. Each of them was admitted a 
preferential exploration position in the areas covered by the seismic surveys. 
3. The 2013 Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was the second action plan for the 2007 Basic Act on 
Ocean Policy, following the 2008 Basic Plan. The Headquarters for Ocean Policy led by the 
Prime Minister functions as a composer coordinating and arranging interests related to various 
marine issues among several ministries. 
4. Ohnishi, op.cit., pp. 200-201. 
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What Role for the Arctic in the UN Paris Climate 
Conference (COP-21)? 
 
Sébastien Duyck 
 
 
 
During the two first weeks of December 2015, the UN Climate Conference in Paris will put climate 
change back at the center of the agenda of the international community. Six years after the breakdown 
of the Copenhagen climate conference, the international community is once again aiming at finalizing 
and adopting a new legally-binding instrument to address climate change.  
Just as the climate negotiations ramp up in the lead up to this event, climate change has also emerged 
as a major theme of the ongoing US chairmanship of the Arctic Council. The country has not only 
committed to work through the Council and its Working Groups towards better addressing climate 
impacts across the circumpolar world, but mindful of the upcoming Paris conference, President 
Obama also conveyed an unprecedented intergovernmental conference in the Arctic to highlight the 
regional implications of climate change and to raise awareness.  
In the context of these parallel developments, we review the role that the Arctic plays in relation to 
these international climate negotiations. How have Arctic climate change been addressed so far by 
two decades of climate negotiations? Who is “speaking for” the Arctic in this process? Will the Paris 
climate agreement have an impact on policy and economic developments in the Arctic? Before 
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addressing each of these questions, we will provide a short overview of what the Paris Climate 
Conference is expected to deliver. 
What can one expect from the Paris climate conference? 
The Paris climate conference is the final step in a four-years long negotiating process that was initiated 
to address some of the policy gaps left by the failure of the Copenhagen conference.  
 
The conference is expected to result in a package outcome building on four main elements that will 
define the response to climate change for the years to come (Boyd et al. 2015: 7). Firstly, governments 
are finalizing the drafting of a new agreement setting a new framework for climate cooperation. 
Contrary to its predecessor, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, this new agreement is expected to involve 
actively all countries and to address both the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions as well as issues 
related to climate adaptation. Secondly, all governments are requested to provide a national 
contribution highlighting the domestic policies and targets in relation to low-carbon development and 
– for most countries – to climate resilience. Thirdly, the conference will offer an opportunity for 
developed countries to confirm how they intend to support financially developing countries struggling 
with climate impacts or intending to implement drastic cuts in their carbon emissions. Fourthly, local 
governments and private entities are invited to join the momentum for climate action by offering their 
own voluntary commitments to those of national governments. 
By building on self-defined targets and voluntary commitments, this package approach constitutes a 
shift from the previous rounds of climate negotiations and from the model that underpinned the 
Kyoto Protocol. The current negotiations build from the premise that governments are not yet willing 
to take sufficient action to prevent a dangerous increase of temperatures but that a new agreement 
promoting transparency, financial and technological support and participation by all actors might help 
to increase incrementally this collective ambition. 
How has the Arctic been addressed so far by two decades of climate 
negotiations?  
The Paris conference will be another milestone in a process initiated in 1992 with the adoption of the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Since then governments have 
continuously worked under the aegis of the United Nations to foster international cooperation on the 
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issue. The Paris Conference is thus the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (“COP-21”), 
all previous conferences having resulted in their share of decisions – the most significant being the 
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 which set emissions target for a limited set of industrialized 
countries. 
 
While the Arctic has become the most prominent icon of ongoing climate impacts, the region has not 
been directly addressed during these two decades of international negotiations (Doelle 2009; Duyck 
2012). Indeed, the review of the legal instruments and political decisions adopted at each annual 
conference reveals a complete absence of reference to the region. Several elements contribute to 
explain why the UN negotiations have remained seemingly oblivious to the implications of climate 
change in the Arctic.  
Firstly, the international nature of this process limits the opportunity to address regional specificities. 
The political decisions resulting from the annual climate conference do not refer to specific geographic 
regions. References to Africa constitute the only notable exception to this principle, the continent 
being referred to as “the region suffering the most from the combined impacts of climate change and 
poverty,” a reference meant to highlight the need to channel specific resources to support the climate 
policies of African countries. 
Secondly, the strong distinction established in the Climate Convention between industrialized and 
developing countries has limited the opportunity for the climate negotiations to address climate 
impacts in the Arctic. Building on these differentiated roles, the UN addresses the vulnerabilities and 
adaptation needs of developing countries, those of industrialized nations being primarily considered 
as a matter for domestic policies. As all circumpolar states fall under the second category, issues related 
to adaptation to climate impacts in the Arctic have fallen outside of the scope of discussions taking 
place under the UNFCCC. 
Thirdly, the eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, 
Sweden and the United States) have established the Arctic Council as their own regional forum to 
address circumpolar issues. Since the adoption of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 
1991, the role of climate change as a driver of regional changes has been at the core of circumpolar 
environmental cooperation (Koivurova & Hassanat 2010).  
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In particular, the Arctic Council contributed greatly to the understanding of the implications of climate 
change through its 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) – an unprecedented regional 
assessment of ongoing climate change impacts (Nilsson 2007). Since then, the Council continued to 
foster climate related research, with recent projects focused on the impacts of climate change on the 
cryosphere and on ocean acidification. While it continues to play a critical role to foster regional 
cooperation on climate science, the Council struggled for a long time to initiate policy actions on the 
basis of these recommendations (French & Scott 2009: 654). The reduction of emissions of short-
lived climate forcers could in particular provide an avenue for the Council to promote regional action 
mitigating climate change (Rosenthal & Watson 2011). Currently, the Arctic Council’s Expert Group 
on Black Carbon and Methane is considering this issue and supports the implementation of the 
Council’s Framework for Action on Enhanced Black Carbon and Methane Emissions Reductions 
adopted during the 2015 ministerial meeting. 
Who “speaks for” the Arctic in the UN climate negotiations?  
Three main groups of actors participating to this negotiation process could possibly highlight the 
nature of Arctic climate changes: the Arctic states, Arctic indigenous peoples and the research 
community. The number of Arctic-focused side events organized during the climate conferences 
provides an indication of the role played by different actors to ensure that Arctic climate changes do 
inform the negotiations. While these events do not provide formal input to the political process, these 
events offer a significant opportunity to highlight emerging issues (Hjerpe & Linnér 2010).  
The limited role played by the Arctic states and their forum 
In state-driven processes such as the UN climate talks, national governments have an almost exclusive 
role in relation to the definition of its scope. The eight Arctic states are therefore best positioned to 
potentially promote Arctic specific issues in the climate negotiations. Up to now, their governments 
have however played a relatively limited role to bring polar issues at the UNFCCC.  
 
Table 1: Panels dedicated to the Arctic during the Annual UN climate conferences 
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In their periodic report on national circumstances and implementation, the Arctic states have 
increasingly provided information related to the vulnerability of their northernmost territories and to 
ongoing scientific research conducted in the region (Duyck 2015: 67). On the other hand, the eight 
states have seldom referred to the region in their negotiating positions and, when they did, these 
references related primarily to the need for further scientific research on regional climate processes. 
Additionally, the visibility of the Arctic Council and its climate-related projects has been very limited 
in the climate talks. Firstly, the Arctic Council lacks observer status to the UNFCCC due to its peculiar 
legal nature and consequently has much more limited options to provide contributions to the process. 
Secondly, some of its members have explicitly requested in the past the Council not to become directly 
involved in the negotiations. During its recent chairmanship of the Council, Canada also discontinued 
the practice of delivering an oral ministerial statement on behalf of the Council during the annual 
conference. Thus, while the Arctic states have repeatedly emphasized the importance of tackling Arctic 
climate change in each ministerial declaration adopted by the Arctic Council, they have done relatively 
little to promote this specific agenda under the aegis of the UNFCCC. 
Participation to the climate negotiations by Arctic indigenous peoples 
Representatives from Arctic indigenous peoples constitute a second group of actors who could raise 
Arctic specific issues in the climate process. Arctic indigenous peoples have been recognized as key 
actors in relation to regional environmental governance and have secured a unique status at the Arctic 
Council (Koivurova 2011). Building on this experience, indigenous representatives have participated 
regularly at the climate talks, either as members of the governmental delegations or with an observer 
status. Arctic indigenous peoples’ organization the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) in particular 
participated in the negotiations between 2003 and 2005 to highlight the human rights implications of 
climate change and the need for stronger climate action. The ICC had previously been successful in 
triggering an international response to the issue of chemical pollution of the Arctic, resulting in the 
adoption of the UN Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutant (Downie & Fenge 2003).  
 
However, the messages carried by the ICC message faced much stronger resistance in the climate 
negotiations (Watt-Cloutier 2015). Even under the framework of the Arctic Council, Arctic indigenous 
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peoples sometimes struggled to get their messages heard on par with those of scientists (Shadian 2014: 
187). Consequently, Arctic indigenous peoples organisations have not been able to convey effectively 
their message among the multitude of voices and communities represented at UN annual climate 
conference. During the past years, the most prominent messages voiced by indigenous peoples in the 
UN climate talks have shifted to other themes more relevant to other regions of the world, such as 
the need to respect indigenous traditional knowledge and indigenous rights, in particular in relation to 
projects related to the reduction of deforestation in rainforest countries. 
Contributions by the research community 
Over recent years, the Arctic has actually been mainly mentioned in the negotiating halls of the UN 
climate talks through the presentations delivered by scientists. In particular, research institutions have 
repeatedly highlighted the most recent findings related to Arctic changes in side events organized 
during the conferences. 
Additionally, the scientific dialogue initiated in 2013 to review the merits of long-term temperature 
goal provided the first forum to discuss more specifically Arctic climate impacts. This formal dialogue 
aims, among other objectives, at reviewing whether the target of 2ºC adopted by governments during 
the Copenhagen conference is sufficient to prevent the most dangerous impacts of climate change. 
Considering the direct human rights implications of climate change in the Arctic, information related 
to Arctic impacts is indeed particularly relevant to inform any interpretation of the objective to avoid 
dangerous interference with the climate system (Crowley 2010). 
Through this process, scientists have highlighted climate impacts observed in the region and warned 
that an increase of 2ºC of global temperatures implied a much more severe warming of the region. In 
February 2015, a representative from the Arctic Council’s Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme shared information with governmental delegates on the ongoing and projected impacts 
of climate change across the circumpolar world. This scientific dialogue offered the first concrete 
opportunity for Arctic scientific findings to inform the UN climate talks, playing the role of a 
bellwether so often described for the region. However, the impact of this process is limited by the fact 
that governments are already struggling to provide commitments that would add up to an emission 
pathway compatible with the initial 2ºC target. The outcome of the review – which will be formally 
decided in Paris – is therefore unlikely to have more than a symbolic value. 
Will the Paris climate agreement have an impact on environmental, policy and 
economic developments in the Arctic? 
References to the Arctic in the UN climate talks have thus mainly remained focused on scientific 
evidences of ongoing impacts than on specific policy proposals. Consequently, the Arctic is not 
specifically addressed in the ongoing negotiations towards the Paris climate conference, the formal 
negotiating text serving as a basis for these negotiations containing no reference to the Polar Regions.  
The Paris climate conference is also unlikely to trigger sufficient new commitments by governments 
in order to reduce emissions sufficiently to prevent irreversible climate impacts in the Arctic. Initial 
analysis of the national commitments submitted by governments ahead of the October 1st deadline 
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indicated that the current level of commitment might limit the global increase of the temperatures by 
3.5ºC by the end of the century. While such an increase of temperatures would be lower than would 
otherwise occur in a business as usual scenario, it would still be far too high to prevent irreversible 
climate impacts in the Arctic, such as on the stability of the Greenlandic icesheet or on the summer 
sea ice (Lenton 2012). 
Nevertheless, despite this absence of explicit reference and the failure to secure sufficient mitigation 
ambition, the future Paris climate agreement could possibly impact Arctic developments through two 
main channels. Firstly, the agreement could provide a new momentum for international cooperation 
on adaptation policies. Secondly it could send the strongest message adopted by the international 
community so far with regards to the commitment of countries to decarbonize the global economy. 
Adaptation has always been a core policy area addressed under the UNFCCC (for instance with the 
establishment in 2001 of an Adaptation Fund or the adoption in 2005 of the Nairobi Work 
Programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation). Cooperation under the UNFCCC on adaptation 
has however remained focused on supporting developing countries deal with the impacts of climate 
change. As far as their own adaptation policies were concerned, developed countries are so far only 
required to implement actions and to provide regular reports on these policies. 
However, the new Paris agreement could modify this approach as it is expected to build on a more 
universal approach, highlighting for instance the responsibility of all parties to implement domestic 
adaptation measures and to cooperate in the exchange of good practices. This development could 
foster cooperation and exchange of good practices between developed countries, including through 
regional forums. The Arctic Council’s project “Adaptation Actions for a Changing Arctic” (AACA), 
perceived by some as the opportunity to restructure the work of the Arctic Council (Kankaanpää 2012: 
105), could for instance benefit from this new momentum. 
 
Secondly, the adoption in Paris of a long-term mitigation goal could affect the prospects for the fossil 
fuels industry seeking to operate in the Arctic. While governments agreed in Copenhagen to a 
quantified objective (limiting warming below 2ºC), they have remained evasive as how they intend to 
meet this goal. In the lead up to the COP-21, a growing number of countries and institutional actors 
have increasingly called for the adoption in Paris of a new and more practical universal policy goal 
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that would highlight the need for the long-term decarbonisation of the global economy or the 
reduction to zero of emissions generated from the combustion of fossil fuels emissions. 
This provision would mainly have, at this stage, an aspirational nature. Even if countries in Paris were 
to endorse the need to phase-out fossil fuels emissions before the end of the century, the governments 
of the five Arctic coastal states are unlikely to shift their current position and to renounce to exploit 
the oil and gas reserves trapped under their Arctic continental shelves. But such a statement could 
further emphasize the financial risks related to stranded assets (resources which are no longer able to 
earn the economic return originally expected due to a change of the regulatory or economic landscape). 
In a region where the scale of investments required to produce fossil fuels leads to particularly slow 
return on investment, a strong commitment by all governments to phase out fossil fuels emissions 
could further undermine the economic rationale of new oil and gas extraction projects. 
Credit pictures (in order): Sébastien Duyck, UNEP/Grid-Arendal, Jay Preston, Krichevsky.  
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Briefing Note 
 
 
The New Nexus of Climate & Energy Security for the 
Sustainable Arctic Future 
 
Hyo-Sun Kim 
 
 
The Arctic is a prism to display history of the earth, interaction of global economy, and integration of 
cross-cutting issues in sustainability. In a broad context of social policy, the nexus of climate and 
energy security is critical to develop policy mix for the transition to the green economy and sustainable 
development. The social dimensions of green economy require changes in patterns of investment, 
technology, production associated with sustainable development. 
Figure 1 displays a comparison between social indices among Arctic Council member countries, when 
we set the case of US equals 1. Compared to US, Russia spends more on military expenditure and less 
on health care. Canada and Norway outperform US, in terms of mitigation policy and economic 
growth, respectively. However, an economic slowdown is remarkable, especially in Nordic countries 
and Russia due to the low price of oil and global recession. 
West Texas Intermediate (source: OPEC, IEA) fell from $73 USD per barrel in the fourth quarter of 
2014 to $49 USD per barrel in the first quarter of 2015 and accordingly, consumer energy prices fell 
early in the year. CBO (2015) expects that the global economy is still in the midst of a recovery and 
oil prices begin to rise by the end of 2015, largely in response to rising global demand for oil, which 
will lead to gradual increases in consumer energy prices. 
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The Arctic becomes global and more complicated, since dramatic changes, such as sea ice loss, are 
projected to occur in Arctic ecosystems and influence the rest of the world with extreme weather 
events and unpredictable consequences. Arctic sea ice has decreased 14% between 2010 and 2012 
since the 1970s (Tilling et al. 2015). The changes in the Arctic Ocean are so profound and climate 
change is faster and more severe in the Arctic than in most of the rest of the world. The Arctic is 
warming at a rate of almost twice the global average. That’s why sound adaptation strategy against 
climate change in the Arctic is needed for the global community as well as for the Arctic region. 
Figure 2: Sustainability Indices of Arctic Council members (US=1.00). Economy index indicates GDP per capita based 
on purchasing power parity (PPP). Energy index refers to use of primary energy (kg oil equivalent per capita) before 
transformation to other end-use. Emission indicates carbon dioxide emissions (metric tons per capita) stemming from 
burning of fossil fuels and manufacturing. Security index and life expectancy at birth explain military expenditures (% of 
GDP) and the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at time of birth were to stay 
the same throughout its life, respectively (based on World Development Indicators 2011).  
 
Climate change triggers irreversible changes. 95% of the change in the climate is caused by CO2. And 
CO2 emissions come from energy use, mostly fossil fuel. The Arctic has huge potential to supply oil 
and gas, although challenges to Arctic resource recovery comprise two sides of the same coin. 
Balancing opportunities and obstacles is key in developing Arctic oil and gas. Although the external 
cost in present value seems to be high in the case of Arctic oil drilling, the timing of Arctic oil recovery 
depends on two markets: the global oil market and the carbon market. 
Figure 3: CO2 Emissions (metric tons per capita) based on World Development Indicators. 
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Several of the Arctic Council members are exporters of oil and gas. And their CO2 emissions on a per 
capita basis are above the world average. However, most of the countries (except Russia) in the Arctic 
are experiencing a decrease in the CO2 emissions on a per capita basis, since 2005 (Figure 2). This is 
largely due to ambitious emission reduction targets1 and successful renewable policies in the Nordic 
countries. In the case of the United States, shale gas has contributed to mitigation progress in the 
industrial sector. 
The Nordic countries have pioneered energy and carbon taxes, which provide incentives for energy-
saving and fuel switching to lower carbon energy. Figure 3 illustrates renewable energy share in total 
energy supply and net removals of CO2 from LULUCF
2 in Nordic countries. Iceland has a high 
proportion of renewables in their total energy supply. And carbon sequestration such as LULUCF has 
resulted in a decrease of net carbon emissions, by 25% lower than in 1990. 
Figure 4: Renewable Energy as % of Total Energy Supply (2012) and Net Removals (MT CO2) from LULUCF, (2011). 
 
 
Climate change is not a regional issue, but rather part of a global agenda. Without support from 
developing countries, the synergy effects of national policies in leading countries will be limited. In 
this regard, carbon financing can be a catalyst to promote investments towards a low-carbon economy. 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) has served climate policy using market 
instruments, providing price signals for abatement technology since 2005. It allows firms to choose 
abatement technologies based on market price of CO2 permits, so that market price reflects 
information regarding demand and supply for the carbon permits. As such, market efficiency is a key 
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element to providing right price signals to market participants as well as to potential investors for 
technology development. 
Investors have been skeptical about market efficiency of the EU-ETS, because the carbon market is 
considered as a relatively thin market, compared to the stock market. Few transactions take place, so 
that the carbon market has often been volatile and less liquid, reflecting policy risks and uncertainty 
about allocation plans from phase I to phase III. However, regardless of the criticism, EU-ETS has 
offered opportunities for the firms under CO2 regulation to reduce abatement costs. In particular, 
EU-ETS allows market players to trade the permits within the same commitment period and this 
flexibility provides less incentive to switch between spot and futures. Kim and Lee (2015) and Lean 
et al. (2010) point out, in a short period, how there may exist arbitrage opportunities in the EU-ETS, 
but arbitrage opportunities in the EU-ETS will disappear in a long-term commitment period, as long 
as the market is efficient.  
Korea launched an emissions trading scheme in 2015, which is a significant milestone in cutting 
greenhouse gas emissions and bolstering its clean technology. California and Québec have linked their 
cap-and-trade systems. China plans to implement a national emissions trading system as early as 2016. 
As articulated by the World Bank, carbon pricing is expanding. Carbon pricing is an essential element 
of the policy mix towards sustainable development and a green economy, not only for the Arctic 
community, but also for our future of global community. 
The 21st COP of UNFCCC is expected to provide momentum to open a new paradigm for global 
commitments towards green economy. We are confronting challenges at the new nexus of energy and 
climate security. Since the Arctic is vulnerable to climate change and energy security, we should try 
our best efforts to initiate constructive dialogues, to promote public-private partnerships and to 
enhance interdisciplinary collaboration on Arctic research and policy development. 
 
Notes 
1. The national targets for emission reductions for 2020 (compared to 1990 benchmark figures) 
in Nordic countries are as follows: Denmark (40%), Iceland (15%), Norway (30%), and Swed
en (40%). Finland participates in the European Union Emissions Trading (EU-ETS). The nat
ional target outside ETS is 16% below 2015 level. 
2. LULUCF = Land use, land use change and forestry 
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The Oslo Declaration on High Seas Fishing in the 
Central Arctic Ocean 
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On 16 July 2015, in Oslo, the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean – Canada, Denmark, Norway, the 
Russian Federation and the United States (Arctic Five) – took a long-awaited further step in the 
international regulation of Arctic Ocean fisheries by signing the ‘Declaration Concerning the 
Prevention of Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean’ (Oslo Declaration). Key 
features of the Declaration are that it contains various political commitments, rather than international 
obligations; it relates exclusively to fishing in the high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean; it is 
different than a ‘moratorium’, ‘ban’ or ‘freeze of fishing effort’; and it applies only to the Arctic Five.  
The origins of the Arctic Five’s process on Arctic Ocean fisheries can be traced back to the United 
States Senate joint resolution No. 17 of 2007, directing the United States “to initiate international 
discussions and take necessary steps with other Nations to negotiate an agreement for managing 
migratory and transboundary fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean.” One of the first intergovernmental 
discussions on Arctic Ocean fisheries occurred at the November 2007 meeting of the Arctic Council’s 
Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs), which concluded that “There was strong support for building on and 
considering this issue within the context of existing mechanisms.” The search for a suitable 
mechanism – existing or new – took place largely in 2008 and 2009, during which various existing 
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regional and global bodies were proposed by interested states and entities. No consensus among the 
Arctic Five could be reached for any of these proposals.  
By the end of 2009 or at least by early 2010, the Arctic Five agreed that if a new international 
instrument on Arctic Ocean fisheries should be developed at all – which was not yet evident for all 
five by then – its development should be initiated and led by the Arctic Five outside the framework 
of (other) existing mechanisms. For this purpose, the Arctic Five have, since March 2010, convened 
a number of policy/governance meetings at senior officials level, alongside a series of science 
meetings. The former includes three meetings on which information was made publicly available, 
namely in June 2010 (Oslo), in April/May 2013 (Washington D.C.) and in February 2014 (Nuuk). 
Other meetings on which information was not made publicly available have also been held, both 
before June 2010 and after February 2014. Science meetings have been convened in June 2011 
(Anchorage), October 2013 (Tromsø) and April 2015 (Seattle), the last one also involving scientists 
from China, Iceland, Japan and South Korea.  
The Declaration signed in Oslo was already envisaged in the Chairman’s Statement of the February 
2014 Nuuk meeting and was scheduled to be signed at ministerial level in June 2014. The Russian 
Federation’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent events in Eastern Ukraine disrupted these plans 
and for a while it was uncertain if these and ‘The Way Forward’ agreed to in Nuuk would ever come 
to fruition. The Oslo Declaration – signed at ambassadorial rather than ministerial level, probably 
instigated by Canada in view of the many Canadians with Ukrainian descent – brought an end to this 
uncertainty and confirmed that the consensus that existed in Nuuk had remained largely intact. 
The most important commitment of the Oslo Declaration is that the Arctic Five will implement an 
interim measure that authorizes their vessels “to conduct commercial fishing in [the high seas portion 
of the central Arctic Ocean] only pursuant to one or more regional or subregional fisheries 
management organizations or arrangements that are or may be established to manage such fishing in 
accordance with recognized international standards.” The wording is identical to that agreed in Nuuk, 
except for the substitution of “modern” by “recognized,” which is arguably not a very significant 
change. As already said above, this commitment cannot be equated with a ‘moratorium’, ‘ban’ or 
‘freeze of fishing effort’ as it still allows fishing pursuant to existing or new regional fisheries 
management organizations or arrangements (RFMOs/As). The Oslo Declaration’s explicit reference 
to the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) – whose mandate extends to part of the 
high seas portion of the central Arctic Ocean – amounts to a recognition that NEAFC is one such 
existing RFMO/A.  
A similar explicit recognition of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission (Joint 
Commission) is not included in the Oslo Declaration, even though its geographical mandate implicitly 
includes the entire Arctic Ocean, and Norway and the Russian Federation appear to view it as an 
RFMA. However, for a number of reasons – more relating to geopolitics than international law – it 
does not seem very likely that Norway and the Russian Federation will authorize their vessels to engage 
in commercial fishing in the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean exclusively pursuant to regulation 
by the Joint Commission. First of all, their participation in the Arctic Five’s process on Arctic Ocean 
fisheries already reflects their support for a multilateral rather than a bilateral approach. Moreover, 
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while the Oslo Declaration repeats once again the Arctic Five’s position that there is “no need at 
present to establish” a new RFMO – as commercially viable fisheries are unlikely to materialize in the 
future – it also envisages a “broader process” involving other interested States (and entities) “to 
develop measures consistent with [the Oslo Declaration] that would include commitments by all 
interested States.” It is submitted that such measures would constitute an RFMA.  
The Nuuk Chairman’s Statement also envisaged this ‘broader process’ and even explicitly mentioned 
that “the final outcome could be a binding international agreement.” Its non-inclusion in the Oslo 
Declaration reflects as a minimum a lack of consensus on the need or desirability of the sentence. 
However, the root cause for this could also be a lack of support by one of more of the Arctic Five for 
a legally binding outcome. On the other hand, the significance of the non-inclusion of the sentence 
should also not be overstated, as a legally binding outcome is not ruled out.  
At the time of writing, the envisaged broader process still seemed to be in a design-phase without 
agreement on rules of procedure, date and venue of a first meeting, and who will participate besides 
the Arctic Five. Some time ago the intention seemed to be that participation in the broader process 
would be exclusively based on invitation by the Arctic Five, and that the following non-Arctic states 
and entities would be invited: China, the European Union (EU), Iceland, Japan and South Korea. 
Participation by states and entities in the broader process would thus consist of ‘Five-plus-Five.’ 
Limiting participation in this way may also serve to ensure that the Arctic Five are not outnumbered 
by non-Arctic Ocean coastal states and entities. However, the substitution of the phrase “additional 
States” by “all interested States” raises the question if the Arctic Five are perhaps considering more 
inclusive participation. 
The Oslo Declaration recognizes the interests of Arctic indigenous peoples “in the proper 
management of living marine resources in the Arctic Ocean.” However, participation of their 
representatives in their own right – rather than as part of the delegations of the Arctic Five – is 
probably not able to secure consensus among the Arctic Five, and may also be opposed by non-Arctic 
States that have concerns relating to indigenous peoples, in particular China. Participation by non-
governmental organizations – both green and industry – may be less controversial.  
So far, the only real challenge to the role claimed by the Arctic Five seems to have come from Iceland, 
which took/takes the view that it is entitled to join the Arctic Five, apparently on account of the 
possibility that the distributional range of fish stocks that occur in the Arctic Ocean also overlaps with 
Iceland’s maritime zones. It is nevertheless submitted that, in their capacity as coastal states to the 
Arctic Ocean, the Arctic Five share certain rights, interests and concerns as well as obligations, and it 
is therefore perfectly understandable – and often in fact required – that they cooperate and coordinate 
on various issues at one level or another. Iceland is simply not an Arctic Ocean coastal state on account 
of geography. If the Arctic Five were to allow Iceland to join them, they would not only have difficulty 
in finding a convincing common denominator but would also stimulate ‘applications’ by other ‘nearby’ 
states or entities, or renewed calls to convene the ‘broader process’ under the auspices of the Arctic 
Council. 
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One of the earliest instances of cooperation among the Arctic Five – although not necessarily 
conceived as belonging to the domain of the international law of the sea – is the 1973 Agreement on 
the Conservation of Polar Bears. So far, the Arctic Five’s process on Arctic Ocean fisheries is not 
inconsistent with international law. Most importantly, nothing in the Oslo Declaration suggests that 
the Arctic Five’s commitments will be imposed on non-signatories. The Declaration only observes 
that the Arctic Five “intend to continue to work together to encourage other States to take measures 
in respect of vessels entitled to fly their flags that are consistent with these interim measures.” This 
will probably above all be done by means of the envisaged broader process.  
While the Arctic Five’s process on Arctic Ocean fisheries has so far arguably been in conformity with 
international law, there are certainly concerns about the envisaged broader process. First, the Arctic 
Five have repeatedly and explicitly claimed a lead role in the development of international regulation 
of high seas fishing in the central Arctic Ocean. The Nuuk Chairman’s Statement describes their lead 
role as “appropriate.” At earlier occasions, one or more of the Arctic Five argued their lead role to be 
based on their ‘special/particular responsibility’ and ‘unique interest and role’ as Arctic Ocean coastal 
states. The Oslo Declaration is silent about the Arctic Five’s lead role, however, and contains instead 
a clarification of the Declaration’s rationale and international legal basis, with particular reference to 
the precautionary approach.  
This does not mean that the Arctic Five have renounced their lead role. Among other things, they are 
likely to maintain full control on the crucial and sensitive issue of participation in the broader process. 
If participation would indeed consist of Five-plus-Five, this would be open to challenges of 
inconsistency with the freedom of high seas fishing and the right of all states with a ‘real interest’ to 
participate in RFMOs/As that have a partial or exclusive high seas mandate. The difficulty for such 
challenges is that Five-plus-Five would be largely in line with the current overall practice on 
membership or participation within such RFMOs/As. It should also be kept in mind that there are 
currently no commercially viable fisheries in the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean and this may 
remain unchanged for a considerable number of years to come. Finally, as noted above, it may well be 
that the Arctic Five are considering more inclusive participation than Five-plus-Five. 
Another reason why the Arctic Five claimed a lead role was to significantly shape the substantive 
output of the broader process. The Oslo Declaration stipulates that the measures resulting from the 
broader process are to be “consistent with” the Oslo Declaration. This raises the question as to how 
much flexibility among the Arctic Five, and room for maneuvering and negotiation there eventually 
will be? Or, to put it differently, to what extent will the substance of the Oslo Declaration amount to 
a fait accompli and preclude the newly invited states and entities from participating in the broader 
process in a way that would be both meaningful and consistent with their rights under international 
law? Here too, however, it must be emphasized that there are currently no commercially viable high 
seas fisheries and that the Oslo Declaration does not propose a ‘moratorium’, ‘ban’ or ‘freeze of fishing 
effort’.  
A second distinct concern on the broader process is that the Arctic Five have spatially confined it to 
the high seas of the central Arctic Ocean. If this remains unchanged, it would not address the potential 
risk that coastal State maritime zones in the central Arctic Ocean will be subject to less stringent 
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regulation than the high seas portion. It can be safely assumed that fisheries will become commercially 
viable within coastal State maritime zones earlier than within the high seas area. The more urgent 
challenge, therefore, is for each of the Arctic Five to ensure that commercial fishing in their own 
maritime zones is also regulated in accordance with ‘recognized international standards’, with 
particular reference to new and exploratory fisheries. Such regulation will - for reasons of credibility 
and in light of the notion of compatibility laid down in Article 7 of the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement 
– be crucial for securing support among non-Arctic Ocean coastal states and entities to participate in 
the envisaged broader process and its eventual adoption of a regional instrument on high seas fisheries 
in the central Arctic Ocean. Non-Arctic Ocean coastal states and entities may also propose that the 
notion of compatibility be included in this instrument. For the United States this would not appear to 
be problematic, as it has already put in place a ‘freeze of fishing effort’ in its exclusive economic zone 
off Alaska in the Arctic Ocean. Hopefully, the other Arctic Ocean coastal states either already have 
regulation with a similar stringency level in place or are prepared to do so sooner or later, but at any 
rate before the conclusion of the broader process. 
Despite these points of concern, it would be inappropriate to conclude this contribution without due 
appreciation for the Arctic Five’s pro-active and precautionary efforts and commitments, and implicit 
dismissal of a laissez-faire, laissez-aller attitude. It is to be hoped that their envisaged broader process 
commences in the near future, will operate in accordance with international law and produce a 
successful outcome, in particular in light of the ecosystem approach to fisheries management. 
 Adam Stępień is a researcher at the Arctic Centre in Rovaniemi. Andreas Raspotnik is Senior Analyst at The Arctic 
Institute in Washington, D.C. 
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The European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) are, at the time of 
publishing of this year’s Arctic Yearbook, working on a new policy statement concerning the EU’s 
Arctic policy. The new communication, requested by the Council of the European Union, is likely to 
surface in the first half of 2016, slightly passing the original 2015 deadline (EU-Council 2014). In this 
Briefing Note, we focus on the formulation of the EU Arctic policy as an overarching framework, 
which so far has found its expression in declaratory statements (communications) from the 
Commission and the Union’s High Representative. Two main questions shine out: Why has it been 
so difficult to formulate a statement that meets expectations of analysts and Arctic actors and are we 
likely to see it finally occurring in 2016? 
2016 would mark eight years since the Commission’s first communication on Arctic matters. Eight 
years during which the geopolitical “hot” Arctic turned into a realistic “cold” Arctic. Eight years during 
  Arctic Yearbook 2015 
Stępień & Raspotnik 
433 
which the EU’s general approach towards the North is still a matter of debate and its policy still an 
emerging one – a policy in search for a clear goal and a purpose. This painful and discouraging process 
of elaborating a clear statement of the EU’s Arctic ambitions, contrasts with the otherwise appreciable 
progress in the EU’s Arctic-specific activities. The EU’s funding for Arctic research is still widely 
prized. The EU’s representatives in the work of Arctic Council have been able to provide visible 
inputs, in particular as regards short-lived climate forcers (Joint Research Centre), birds (European 
Environment Agency) or to the work of PAME (DG Move and the European Maritime Safety 
Agency). Although leaving much to be desired, the dialogue with Arctic indigenous peoples has 
become regular and more substantial. Recently, consultations regarding streamlining EU Arctic 
funding have been carried out. While characterized by far too many deficiencies, the very fact of 
conducting such consultations deserves acknowledgment. 
Despite this progress, during eight years, the EU’s three main institutions (the Council, Commission 
and European Parliament) have appeared to be incapable of proposing a clear-cut overarching Arctic 
policy. What are the underlying reasons for this particular European incapability? The answer may lie 
in an issue raised by the EU institutions themselves; that is the matter of (internal and external) 
“coherence” and a proposed aim of formulating an “integrated” policy. 
The European Parliament (EP), in its 2014 resolution, called for the formulation of a “united EU 
policy on the Arctic” and a “coherent strategy and concretized action plan on the EU’s engagement 
in the Arctic” (European Parliament 2014). At the same time, the Council requested the Commission 
to work towards “further development of an integrated and coherent Arctic Policy” (EU-Council 
2014). Consequently, the essential question is what coherence and integration could mean in the 
context of a crosscutting Arctic policy. Commentators – and apparently also the EP and the Council 
– would like to see the EU’s Arctic policy statement to be comprehensive, coherent, integrated, co-
ordinated, action-oriented and specific. However, could it be the case that the very nature of the EU 
Arctic policy and the character of the multifaceted EU-Arctic nexus make such expectations somewhat 
exorbitant? 
Coherence, notwithstanding multiple meanings of the term, could refer to the consistence between 
constitutive elements of a policy, so that contradictions between a variety of policy objectives and 
components are avoided or minimized. But more importantly, coherence should entail encouraging 
synergies between these various components. The policy should therefore make a positive difference 
and have added value within a policy system, and not merely minimize internal contradictions (May et 
al. 2005; Mayer 2013; Stępień, forthcoming). 
In an EU internal horizontal context, coherence may also refer to “speaking with one voice” and 
related uniformity between the relevant institutions. When applied to a geographical space, an external 
dimension to the policy coherence needs to be considered, as the policy should facilitate synergies not 
only between various EU actions, but also with the actions of other actors operating in the region 
(Gebhard 2011). 
An “integrated policy” – a concept closely associated with coherence and equally ambiguous – could 
refer to a policy that brings together under a set of common objectives and instruments a number of 
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interrelated sectors (e.g. fisheries and maritime transport) or a policy rooted in general EU policy 
frameworks (e.g. the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy or the Integrated Maritime Policy) (see e.g., 
Meijers & Stead 2004; van Hoof et al. 2012). 
In the case of a crosscutting issue like the Arctic, various components of a possible Arctic policy 
(fisheries, research, climate change, maritime transport, etc.) are bound together by a specific 
geographical label. In order to be something more than merely a label - to be more than just a sum of 
these different components and have added value – the EU’s final Arctic policy product would thus 
need to have even a minimal degree of coherence and integration. A genuine overarching “policy” 
needs to make even a modest difference: either in the region or within the general EU policy 
framework. In our understanding two issues make this quest for coherence a critical, but at the same 
time perhaps an insurmountable challenge: 
 the diversity of issues brought together under the Arctic policy umbrella; and 
 a marginal position of Arctic issues within the EU policy system as such. 
Over the years, an increasing number of issues started to fall under the umbrella of an emerging EU 
Arctic policy. While 2008 documents focused on research, fisheries, marine environment, shipping 
and hydrocarbon extraction, from 2011 and 2012 the Arctic label was stuck to regional development 
in Fennoscandia, mining, reindeer herding or the Sámi issues. Currently – based on the content of 
recent consultations on streamlining EU Arctic funding – terrestrial transport, infrastructure and 
numerous EU funding programmes are being added to the list. 
The objectives or instruments of an overarching Arctic policy would have to be fairly abstract and 
vague in order to encompass such a diversity of components (and in addition would have to 
correspond to actions and positions taken by the Arctic states themselves). And indeed, so far the 
objectives proposed in the 2008 and 2012 communications were anything but concrete and workable 
(see e.g., Keil & Raspotnik 2012). In 2012, the objectives virtually degraded to three buzzwords – 
knowledge, responsibility and engagement – which turned out to be little more than headlines for 
various disconnected, mostly already on-going, activities (Airoldi 2014). 
Would it be at all possible, instead of these general objectives, to propose a short list of concrete, new 
actions or to find a single organizing idea (May et al. 2005) for the Union’s Arctic policy? Accordingly, 
climate change could be positioned as such a top priority. However up to now, it somehow has not 
caught broader attention to really make it an Arctic policy driving force, i.e. a glue that could bind 
together diverse issues labelled as “Arctic.” Yet, would the various interest groups within the EU 
actually allow the response to climate change to be prioritized over other problems and objectives? 
And even if climate change was to become the key organizing priority, another problem remains, 
namely the peripherality of Arctic issues as a concern for the EU. The Arctic appears to be fairly 
marginal from the point of view of a policymaker regulating for a half a billion citizens. 
In that regard – as already noted by Powell (2011) – the very (analytical) starting point sounds rather 
simple but seems to be impossible to answer: What does the Arctic say about the (future) extent of 
Europe? Moreover, what does the European Arctic or the broader Northern Neighbourhood actually 
mean for the European Union in general? 
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The Eastern Neighbourhood (e.g. the Ukraine-Russia-EU triangle) and the Southern Neighbourhood 
(e.g. the Mediterranean migration crisis) undoubtedly and in fact matter, whereas the Northern 
Neighbourhood does not. Moreover, the term “Northern Neighbourhood” actually does not even 
exist in official EU vocabulary. The Arctic region may be (economically) relevant in the decades to 
come, however currently it is simply not. 
Hence, a key question occurs: how to “integrate” this “not-yet-existing-policy-region” into the EU’s 
current policy structure? 
Instead of devising an “integrated” strategy that essentially lacks a common understanding (“one 
thought/perception, one voice”) of what the region is and means, EU policymakers could initially 
focus their crosscutting Arctic activities on creating procedures, instruments and mechanisms 
enhancing and supporting the EU’s very presence in the region – presence which already has a couple 
of positive facets. Elements of such an approach could include: 
 enhanced coordination within the Commission, between EU institutions and Member States; 
 durable and meaningful consultation platforms for engaging Arctic stakeholders (including 
those from outside the EU or EEA); and 
 considering long-term mechanisms for communicating the knowledge gained through the EU’s 
Arctic engagement to the general EU decision-making processes (for instance via impact 
assessments conducted before EU regulations are proposed). 
Some steps towards that direction have already been taken, but the challenges are still plenty. The 
established inter-service group that brings together policy officers from various DGs, EEAs and EU 
agencies was a first necessary step for an envisaged coordinated approach. However, so far the 
irregular meetings have served primarily information purposes. Additionally, the channels for 
informing major EU decision-making processes on Arctic-specific problems are scarce, if any. The 
ways for better informing both EU public and Arctic stakeholders about what the EU does in the 
Arctic are also being discussed. However, numerous critical comments (Personal communications, 
Rovaniemi, Oslo, Brussels, April-July 2015) on recent consultations dedicated to streamlining EU 
Arctic funding indicate that the implementation of stakeholder engagement remains a major challenge. 
And as regards EU-indigenous Arctic Dialogue meetings, we are yet to see any concrete effects of this 
format for the EU’s activities in the Arctic. 
The upcoming policy document will show whether progress has been made in any of these procedural 
areas, whether any concrete goals could be devised, organizing ideas found and in general whether the 
“Northern Neighbourhood” has any real and defined significance for the EU as a whole, a significance 
beyond declaratory and formal statements. The new communication might show whether the 
overarching EU Arctic-policy framework can be coherent, whether it can – against the odds – manifest 
features of an integrated policy and whether it supports many, still disconnected, EU activities in the 
region. 
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(IASC) 
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The Arctic Council (AC) is generally considered the primary circumpolar forum for international 
cooperation in the region (Graczyk 2012; Koivurova 2009). This view is reflected in the increasing 
interest that the Council has attracted over the last couple of years – both from the non-Arctic states 
and actors as well as from Arctic nations, in particular the United States which holds the AC 
Chairmanship from 2015 to 2017. Yet, while the Arctic Council is coming to its 20th anniversary in 
2016, another body established by the eight Arctic states celebrates this year twenty-five years of its 
operation.  
The International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) founded in 1990 is a non-governmental 
international scientific organization, which today encompasses national science organizations from 23 
countries conducting research in and on the Arctic. Over the past 25 years IASC has evolved into the 
leading international science entity focused on the North and thus the anniversary provides an 
excellent opportunity to recall its beginnings and to reflect upon its evolution, achievements made to 
date and challenges that lay ahead of it in future. 
Foundation of IASC 
The initiative for the development of IASC drew largely on the history of polar exploration (Keskitalo 
2004) and international scientific cooperation in the Arctic that began in the late 19th century with the 
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first International Polar Year (IPY) (1882-1883) organized by the International Polar Commission.1 
The first IPY did not only collect an enormous amount of material and information, but it was also 
the first successful attempt at collaboration by different countries in the field of scientific research 
(Barr & Luedecke 2010) and a major breakthrough in the conduct of research in the Arctic, dominated 
until that time by patriotic rivalries and separate competitive national explorations (Stone 2015: 71). 
The second IPY took place fifty years later in 1932-33 and the third, under the banner of International 
Geophysical Year (IGY), in 1957-1958. The IGY had a strong focus on Antarctica and, as a form of 
its legacy, the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU, today’s International Council for 
Science) established in 1958 the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), which later came 
to serve as a model for scientific cooperation in the Arctic. It was during the SCAR meeting in San 
Diego in 1986 that the idea of creating an equivalent body for scientific collaboration in the Arctic 
was informally discussed among delegates from both Arctic and non-Arctic countries. The initiative 
came from the United States and the then President of SCAR and the Chairman of the newly 
established US Arctic Research Commission (USARC) who proposed the creation of similar 
collaboration mechanisms that existed for the Antarctica also for the North. However, the situation 
in the Arctic was much different from that around the South Pole and still strongly marked by the 
Cold War divisions.  
Apart from single occasions like the signing of the Polar Bear Treaty in 1973, the Soviet Union had a 
strict policy of bilateral contacts in the region, which during the 1980s took form of scientific 
cooperation between the USSR and Canada, and the USSR and Norway. Moreover, the long-standing 
Soviet position was that Arctic affairs should be dealt with by Arctic rim states alone (Keskitalo 2004: 
45). Hence, even though the main outcome of the San Diego meeting was a consent to continue to 
explore the possibility of creating an international Arctic science committee (Rogne, Rachold, 
Hacquebord & Corell 2015: 9), due to the USSR stance it was agreed that the next meeting would 
include representatives solely from Arctic nations. However, at that time no clear definition of the 
Arctic nation yet existed. It was only after a series of consultations, which began with the Arctic littoral 
states, that it was decided that countries with territories north of the Arctic Circle would be considered 
the Arctic ones, hence laying ground for the final identification of the eight states as “Arctic” 
(Keskitalo 2004: 45), the definition later adopted by the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS) and subsequently by the Arctic Council.  
With regard to what later became the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), the planning 
process and elaboration of the organizations founding articles continued in the cycle of meetings 
between February 1987 and May 1989. In the meantime, in October 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev 
delivered his groundbreaking speech in Murmansk, which paved the way for future collaborative 
efforts in the region. Next to proposing an integrated plan for protecting Arctic natural environment, 
Gorbachev put forward the idea of an international organization to facilitate scientific research in the 
North. While the discussions on its creation had already been well underway, the Murmansk speech 
ensured the USSR support to the initiative and provided the impetus for further work.  
However, it turned out that the main obstacle in the process was reaching an agreement among Arctic 
countries on participation and a role of non-Arctic nations in the new body. Even though delegates 
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from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, Poland and the UK took part in the 
abovementioned gathering during the SCAR meeting in San Diego, due to the USSR position and to 
the disappointment of leading scientists from those countries, further talks continued without them. 
Hence, to clarify the situation on the founding process of IASC, they asked their governments to take 
action and in March 1989 France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK formally approached the 
Arctic countries with a ‘Note Verbale’ to explain their policy on the IASC (Rogne et al. 2015: 22).  
The note drew significant attention of the Arctic eight and resulted in a temporary standstill of the 
negotiations as it occurred that there was no consensus among Arctic states on the role of non-Arctic 
countries in the new organization. Both Canada and the USSR strongly opposed participation of non-
Arctic states on an equal basis and argued that “the founding articles of IASC must reflect the broader 
range of scientific interests and responsibilities of the Arctic countries” (Note Verbale Canadian 
Foreign Office Ottawa in: Rogne et al. 2015). On the contrary, the United States was in favour of the 
exclusively scientific body without any governmental control or distinction between the scientific 
organizations from Arctic and non-Arctic states. This point illustrates well the degree of politicization 
of the whole process, where despite IASC being a non-governmental organization, “representatives 
of national governments played a central role in its creation” (Young 1992: 40-41, draft in: Keskitalo 
2004).  
 
IASC Founding Meeting in Resolute Bay, Canada, August 1990. 
To find a way out and to move forward, representatives of three states (Canada, USA and the USSR) 
met in December 1989 in Moscow and came up with a new proposal for a structure and founding 
articles of IASC. To find compromise on the interests of both sides, it was agreed that next to the 
IASC Council, i.e. the highest decision-making body of the organization, where all the member 
countries – both Arctic and non-Arctic ones – would enjoy equal rights, the Regional Board would be 
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created with inclusion of representatives of relevant national organizations solely from the Arctic eight 
(Rogne et al. 2015: 24). The Board was to consider general regional problems affecting the common 
interests of the Arctic countries and ensure that the activities of IASC would remain consistent with 
those interests (IASC Founding Articles, part D, art. 1).2 This agreement removed the last obstacle on 
the way to establishment of the International Arctic Science Committee, which was eventually 
founded in Resolute Bay, Nunavut, Canada in August 1990. Whereas representatives of France, 
Germany, Japan, Poland and the United Kingdom attended the meeting still solely as observers, during 
the first regular meeting of the IASC Council in January 1991 the science organizations of France, 
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom were admitted as the first non-
Arctic full members of IASC. 
From early days to ICARP III 
The founding of IASC marked the beginning of a new era of collaborative efforts in the region. Not 
only fruitful completion of negotiations on the Committee helped to energize the process which led 
to signing of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in Rovaniemi in June 1991 (Young 
1998: 116), but the International Arctic Science Committee played a pivotal role in overcoming 
divisions and developing cooperation between Russian and Western scientists working on the Arctic 
who previously had had very limited contact. 
Initially, even though according to its founding articles IASC was supposed to operate through the 
working groups, most of its work was done through international projects, to deliver tangible 
outcomes within a prescribed period of time. The projects revolved around the themes of impacts of 
global changes on the Arctic region and its peoples, Arctic processes of relevance to global systems, 
natural processes within the Arctic, and sustainable development in the region.  
IASC Working Group Workshop in Potsdam, Germany, January 2011. 
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In order to provide a more robust roadmap for researchers working on the region, in 1995 IASC 
convened the first International Conference on Arctic Research Planning (ICARP I), which brought 
together more than 250 scientists and defined ten large research themes, later undertaken by scientists 
and translated into concrete research projects. Moreover, as Oran Young notes, ICARP I provided 
IASC with a programmatic identity and enhanced links between Arctic and global science. It also 
brought a sense of community among scientists working on Arctic issues (Oran Young in: Rogne et 
al. 2015: 42-43).  
As the first conference proved to be a success, it was decided that it would be repeated every ten years. 
Hence, the second ICARP took place in 2005 in Copenhagen. It gathered more than 450 participants 
and produced twelve scientific plans, which helped to identify fundamental questions for Arctic 
science as well as numerous activities that later contributed to the fourth International Polar Year 
(2007-2008) and were subsequently implemented. Another form of legacy of ICARP II and the fourth 
IPY has been a very strong encouragement for inclusion of early career scientists into the work of 
IASC, which began in the preparations to both initiatives. Since its foundation in 2006 the Association 
of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS) has developed a close partnership with IASC and greatly 
profited from the Committee’s support. In addition, in 2014 IASC established a Fellowship Program 
to promote the next generation of scientists working on the Arctic and to involve them in works of 
five of the IASC working groups (WGs): Atmosphere WG; Cryosphere WG, Marine WG, Social & 
Human WG; and the Terrestrial WG.3 
However, the partnership between IASC and APECS is only one among many synergies that the 
Committee has generated over the course of time. From the perspective of bringing science closer to 
policy-making circles perhaps the most important one is the relationship with the Arctic Council with 
which IASC partnered in producing one of the most seminal works documenting the region’s change, 
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA).4 Moreover, IASC has been an observer to the AEPS, 
and consequently to the Arctic Council, from the time the Rovaniemi Process started in 1991. Since 
that time IASC has supported works of the AC by bringing the scientific expertise from all of its 
members, including non-Arctic states, to the AC assessments or by coordinating the reports’ scientific 
review processes as it did in case of the Arctic Human Development Report-II (AHDR-II) or the 
Arctic Resilience Report (ARR). A further step towards bringing the two institutions closer together 
and towards facilitating the science-policy dialogue is organizing the March 2016 meeting of the Arctic 
Council’s Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) in Fairbanks, Alaska in conjunction with the Arctic Science 
Summit Week (ASSW), which is the largest gathering of the international organizations supporting 
and facilitating Arctic research that convenes annually under the auspices of IASC since 1999.  
It was also during the ASSW, which this year took place in Toyama, Japan that the 25th anniversary 
of IASC was celebrated. The summit gathered more than seven hundred participants from twenty-
seven countries - international scientists, policy makers, research managers, indigenous peoples and 
students - and saw the culmination of the ICARP III process that began a year earlier, during the 
ASSW 2014 in Helsinki. Whereas its final report is to come out in fall 2105, the ASSW 2015 concluded 
with the Toyama Conference Statement Integrating Arctic Research: A Roadmap for the Future, which 
contains a set of overarching messages for future Arctic research planning process. The document 
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also pinpoints major challenges that lie ahead of Arctic science and our understanding of changes 
occurring in the region which transformation spurs global interest and unprecedented attention.  
Arctic Science Summit Week 2011 held in Seoul, Korea, March/April 2011.  
 
Into the Future 
Nothing better confirms the organization’ focal position in promotion and facilitation of international 
research on the Arctic than the incoming applications for IASC member status. Since the time of its 
foundation in 1990 the IASC membership has been constantly growing and today includes twenty-
three countries conducting research in the Arctic. Throughout the time IASC has become a market 
place (Rogne et al. 2015) or a “forum where an idea first germinated before being brought to fruition 
through extensive international collaboration in other organizations (particularly those controlling 
infrastructure and other resources)” (Stone 2015). The organization played also an important role in 
moving Arctic science onto the cutting edge of science at large and deepening our comprehension of 
the dynamics of the coupled socio-ecological systems (Rogne et al. 2015). Yet today, changes in the 
Arctic are still challenging our understanding of their consequences both on the regional as well as on 
global scale, and the scientific community’s ability to provide relevant and timely knowledge for 
decision-makers (Toyama Conference Statement). Addressing those challenges requires sustained 
scientific observations and combining them with insights from local and traditional ecological 
knowledge - both efforts strongly encouraged and supported by IASC. And while the Arctic moves 
from the periphery of international relations closer to the center of the world’s political and economic 
interests, science still remains the key to sustainable development and future of the region. As the long 
historical tradition of polar research shows, greatest achievements down this road come through 
international collaboration and cooperation where over the last twenty-five years the role of IASC has 
been indisputable. 
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Notes 
1. The International Polar Commission included the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Dominion 
of Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. 
2. However, with the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991 
the Regional Board soon lost its main rationale and while its meetings contributed to exchange 
of information between key Arctic science managers, eventually the Board decided to disband 
in 2008 (Rogne et al. 2015). 
3. In 2010 the IASC Council decided, in order to best harness capacities and expertise of its 
members, to come back to the originally prescribed structure, finalize the ongoing projects 
and replace them with the thematically divided working groups listed above. 
4. The idea of ACIA was brought to attention of the Arctic Council by Robert Corell, who at 
that time was the IASC representative to the Arctic Council as Chair of the IASC Regional 
Board. During the first US chairmanship of the AC (1998-2000) he presented to the Council 
a proposal of a comprehensive assessment of climate change in the Arctic. Since the idea 
corresponded closely with a task given to Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
(AMAP) and Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), two AC working groups, by 
the ministers at the 1998 AC Ministerial meeting, IASC and AMAP entered into a partnership 
to develop ACIA. 
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Political-Legal Challenges of Polar Environments 
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This briefing note reports and reflects on the ICE LAW Project (the Project on Indeterminate and 
Changing Environments: Law, the Anthropocene, and the World), a venture convened by IBRU, 
the Centre for Borders Research at Durham University with the support of the UArctic Thematic 
Network on Arctic Law. In June 2014, twenty-two scholars with expertise in cultural anthropology, 
state theory, political geography, and legal studies gathered to consider the challenges that ice – 
and particularly the sea ice of the polar regions – poses to regulatory norms and political 
institutions based on a Western legal framework that assumes a clear, permanent, and experienced 
division between solid land and liquid water. In this briefing note, we describe the process of 
constructing an interdisciplinary research project based on the geophysical complexities of ice, 
report on the results of the 2014 workshop, describe the interdisciplinary methodological approach 
constructed, and outline further research endeavours. In addition, we reflect on a number of 
research challenges posed by the project: How can one examine general characteristics of polar 
environments while acknowledging the specificity of inhabited (i.e. Arctic) regions? How can a 
research focus on one element (sea ice) be paired with acknowledgment of the complex ways in 
which livelihoods cross between polar surfaces? How can one identify regulatory gaps and inform 
practical solutions while advancing conceptual understanding? How can a focus on the Arctic be 
used to address broader global challenges amidst unprecedented anthropogenic transformation of 
the global environment?  
Introduction 
Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (United Nations 
1982) is universally recognised as providing the fundamental governing framework for the ocean 
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that lies at the centre of the Arctic region (e.g. Ilulissat Declaration 2008), only one of its 320 
articles acknowledges that parts of the ocean are, for at least part of the year, not liquid. Article 
234 gives coastal states exceptional environmental powers in portions of their exclusive economic 
zones where the persistence of “ice-cover” for “most of the year” poses a hazard to navigation. 
However, even this article contains lacunae that complicate effective implementation: what is 
meant by “ice-cover”? At what point would melting due to climate change render an area not “ice-
covered” for “most of the year”? How do these provisions relate to other provisions in UNCLOS, 
such as those governing international straits? Can Article 234 inform legal practice in other areas 
where UNCLOS implementation is complicated by the presence of ice (e.g., the role of ice edges 
in determining baselines)? How does Article 234 reflect (or fail to reflect) the concerns of users 
other than commercial shipping interests, such as indigenous inhabitants, for whom ice is not a 
hazard but an enabler of livelihoods? (Aporta 2011; Byers 2013; Kay 2004; Steinberg et al. 2015).  
For all these reasons, it is apparent that UNCLOS provides, at best, a starting point for regulating 
activities in ice-covered maritime regions. But if UNCLOS is not fully up to the task, how might 
it be supplemented, or interpreted, or replaced to better reflect the activities that transpire on a 
frozen ocean? And, equally significantly, what does the failure of UNCLOS to adequately account 
for frozen ocean tell us about the underpinning principles of state sovereignty and international 
law, in the Arctic and elsewhere? 
In 2014, these questions led researchers at IBRU, Durham University’s Centre for Borders 
Research, to form the Ice Law Project.1 The Project’s first event was the Workshop on International 
Law, State Sovereignty, and the Ice-Land-Water Interface, held in June 2014 in Durham, England, with 
support from the University of the Arctic’s Thematic Network on Arctic Law. 
The Workshop on International Law, State Sovereignty, and the Ice-Land-
Water Interface 
The workshop was designed to address sea-ice related questions at a number of overlapping levels. 
At the most practical level, the workshop sought to identify gaps resulting from UNCLOS’ failure 
to recognise sea ice and suggest ways that these gaps might be filled through new legal instruments. 
At a somewhat more conceptual level, the workshop sought to explore how the absence of a 
comprehensive regime for sea ice was reflective of a systemic disjuncture between, on the one 
hand, temperate-zone-derived legal and political principles and, on the other hand, the realities of 
the ways in which indigenous peoples, non-indigenous residents, and outside investors and states 
encounter the Arctic environment. This inquiry, although conceptual, was also of practical import 
because, as the workshop’s programme noted, “As the imprint of state institutions intensifies in 
the Arctic, these ruptures between ideals of state sovereignty and the actual territories that are 
constructed by those who would control, live in, invest in, or pass through them are likely to 
become more apparent and more problematic for all parties involved” (IBRU 2014). Finally, in 
organizing the workshop, we hoped that it and its follow-up projects would contribute to far-
reaching understanding of how “legal, political, and regulatory systems are faced with the need to 
adapt to the uncertainties and instabilities associated with dynamic notions of ‘territory’ amidst 
climate change and geophysical flux” (IBRU 2014). 
To meet its more ‘practical’ goals, the workshop sought to join anthropological expertise in the 
uses of ice in Arctic livelihoods with legal expertise in how ice was being regulated in national and 
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sub-national jurisdictions to identify how international law’s blindness to the specificities of sea ice 
might be overcome. We recognized from the start that any attempt to implement 
recommendations emerging from this exercise would face formidable political hurdles. The 
modern state system is based on a fundamental distinction between solid land (which is divided 
into state territories) and liquid ocean (which is beyond territory) (Steinberg 2001, 2009). The 
history of preliminary efforts to conceptualize an ‘Arctic Treaty’ has made it clear that any effort 
to implement a legal regime based on any other understanding of the relationship between 
geophysics and geopolitics in the Arctic would face a chilly reception in diplomatic circles (e.g. 
Bellinger 2008; Ilulissat 2008). 
Nonetheless, we felt that ‘blue sky’ thinking was needed to begin a conversation that could become 
highly relevant should the political opportunity emerge. To encourage this ‘blue sky’ thinking, we 
attempted to bracket questions of political practicability to the greatest extent possible. The 
programme sent to participants prior to the workshop made this intent clear:  
As an academic grouping without sponsorship from any policy-implementing body, the 
collection of anthropologists, legal scholars, and political theorists being brought together 
for this workshop will have the freedom to consider options that address the concerns and 
practices of peoples and institutions that encounter the specificities of Arctic and sub-Arctic 
landscapes and seascapes (IBRU 2014). 
The politics that might hinder implementation would be considered later, if at all. 
We also sought to prevent the discussion from being overly constrained by considerations of 
political practicality by pairing the ‘practical’ goal with the workshop’s more ‘conceptual’ goals: to 
use sea ice as a lens for exploring more generally the ways in which geophysical categorizations fail 
to reflect experiences of space ‘on the ground’. Such an inquiry would address a broader trend 
within political geography and international relations toward querying the material basis of political 
categories and institutions and, in particular, the relationship between geophysical and geopolitical 
binaries (e.g. Clark 2010; Coole & Frost 2010; Millennium 2013). 
To ensure that both the conceptual and practical goals were continually engaged, twelve invited 
Arctic scholars were joined by ten invited scholars without any particular Arctic expertise but with 
strong research profiles in related areas of law, political theory, anthropology, and geography. As 
might be expected, the Arctic experts, and in particular the anthropologists and lawyers among 
them, focused more on the practical goals. Conversely, the non-Arctic experts, and in particular 
the political theorists and geographers among them, focused on the more conceptual goals. 
However a surprising diversion of priorities emerged as the conversation proceeded. 
Notwithstanding the project’s origins in the identification of a specific gap in UNCLOS (and the 
need to suggest ways to fill it), ‘practical’-oriented Arctic experts consistently argued that the remit 
of the project should expand beyond sea ice. If, they asked, the goal was to investigate how actual 
encounters with the environment resist the categorizations of modern law, then should the remit 
of the project not be expanded to Arctic waters regardless of their frozen state? Should it not also 
include ice-covered land, which also confounds the idealized land-sea binary of modern law? 
Indeed, if the goal was to create legal frameworks that reflect the livelihoods of northern peoples, 
should the focus not be the entire Arctic environment? To do otherwise, the argument went, would 
be to reproduce the binaries that the project was aiming to transcend.  
Likewise, just as the practical-minded participants objected to the focus on ice (and, especially, sea 
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ice), some among them also objected to the focus on law. It was noted that law, by its very nature, 
divides space (and uses of space) into generalizable categories that deny the possibility for change 
over time, and thus some argued that the focus on law was inconsistent with the project’s 
objectives. Some workshop participants suggested that the legal focus needed to be abandoned 
entirely if we were to maintain an understanding of Arctic space and its uses as dynamic and 
unstable. Others suggested that these problems could be addressed by expanding the legal focus 
to include international soft law (e.g. regulatory mechanisms that operate by means not directly 
connected with the control of territory) or by adopting a legal pluralist perspective that recognized 
how state-based legal systems and practices are interwoven with community-based regulatory 
norms. 
In short, several of the participants who were more directly engaged in applied Arctic advocacy 
and research, questioned both the focus on ice (and particularly sea ice) and the focus on law (and 
particularly formal public international law). These were potentially damning critiques for an 
initiative called the Ice Law Project. After all, if the Ice Law Project was not to be about either ice 
or law, then what was to be its focus?  
The aftermath 
During the final day of the workshop, participants agreed that we had begun a creative and 
potentially fruitful conversation that joined scholars studying human encounters with icy 
environments, other scholars examining the adaptations and frustrations that occur when Western 
law is applied to those environments, and still others theorizing what these experiences tell us 
about the relationship between state and space. However, many in the group acknowledged that 
the initially chosen vehicle for that conversation – the development of a model law for sea ice 
(Article 234a, as it came to be called at the workshop) – might not be well suited for the task. The 
general consensus was that the goal of constructing a model public international law of sea ice was 
too constrained by the formality of law, the temporal and spatial restrictions mandated by the 
category of sea ice, and the impracticality of its realization. Nonetheless, participants retained a 
commitment toward addressing the broader question of how Western law is and is not suited to 
frigid environments. They also retained a commitment toward exploring how answers to that 
question might enhance both the development of Arctic regulatory institutions and our 
understanding of the geophysical underpinnings of modern state institutions. 
To that end, in the year since the workshop occurred, the Ice Law Project has taken on four tasks 
that have sought to pursue its research agenda through a more distributed approach. The first, and 
most simple, has been to rename the Ice Law Project as the ICE LAW Project, with the acronym 
standing for ‘Indeterminate and Changing Environments; Law, the Anthropocene, and the World’. 
This name change signifies that the project is not solely about understanding the intersection 
between ice and law (and perhaps developing a new set of legal mechanisms for regulating human 
uses of ice). It also announces our intent to use our understanding of that intersection for making 
broader insights about the relationship between a dynamic geophysical world undergoing 
unprecedented, human-generated climate change and a political-legal system that imagines static 
and absolute boundaries among land-based, territorial states and between solid land and liquid sea. 
Some of these insights will likely be of especial relevance for understanding the Arctic, but some 
may well be oriented toward increased understanding of global processes and institutions. 
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The second task has been to solicit brief ‘reflection’ pieces from workshop participants. As the 
project website notes: 
Participants were asked to submit 500-1000 word reflections on the mismatch between, on 
the one hand, the assumed division of the world into solid land and liquid water and, on the 
other hand, space as it is experienced and produced in polar regions. Participants were asked 
to reflect on the opportunities that this mismatch provides for: 
a) Understanding historic and potential relationships between the perceived physicality 
of the earth and notions/practices of territory, and/or 
b) Developing legal/regulatory mechanisms that are suited to address the challenges 
that the physicality of the region poses to actors there (Ice Law Project 2014). 
Thirteen participants have provided ‘Reflection’ pieces that continue the conversation beyond the 
confines of the meeting room.2 
Thirdly, the different foci and priorities that emerged during the project suggested that the best 
route forward was to continue a conversation among diverse individuals stimulated by overlapping 
questions and perspectives rather than by working toward a single scholarly or practical product. 
To this end, discussion during the final day of the workshop identified four coherent themes where 
more research was needed regarding the challenges and disjunctures that emerge when Western 
norms are applied in icy environments: Territory, Legal Instruments, Resources, and Mobilities.3 
These were subsequently joined by three other themes: Local and Indigenous Perspectives, 
Migrations, and Global Connections. As of this writing (June 2015), two major grant proposals are 
pending that, if successful, will facilitate sub-project workshops as well as information-sharing and 
networking among sub-project leaders. 
Fourthly, the ICE LAW project has fostered follow-up research within its individual subprojects, 
with two funding proposals presently pending. One, within the Territory subproject, proposes to 
examine sea ice relative to three other (non-Arctic) spaces where dynamic geophysical processes 
are also confounding the idealized binary between land and sea. The other, which cuts across the 
Legal Instruments, Local and Indigenous Perspectives, and Mobilities subprojects, seeks to 
investigate how local and indigenous communities are mobilizing to build hazard response 
capabilities in response to the region’s changing environment. Other projects are likely to follow. 
From Ice Law to ICE LAW, the project’s one-year journey sheds light on the pitfalls and 
possibilities that emerge when one engages the Arctic as a region that is both exemplary and 
exceptional. One the one hand, using the Arctic as a lens or, worse yet, as a laboratory for 
understanding the world is highly problematic. When one adopts this approach, the Arctic’s unique 
attributes are either elided or oversimplified, and the actual experiences and needs of Arctic 
peoples and social institutions are forgotten. On the other hand, the tendency to frame the Arctic 
as solely a place for practical problem-solving is equally problematic as it relegates the region to 
the margins of social thought and, ultimately, social power. In its effort to approach the Arctic as 
both a space of practical solving and as an exemplar for exploring processes that transcend the 
region the ICE LAW Project continues to negotiate the tensions and possibilities that emerge from 
these two conflicting objectives. 
Coda: ‘Blue Sky’ vs. ‘Blue Water’ 
As of this writing, we have before us an announcement for the Norwegian Scientific Academy for 
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Polar Research’s August 2015 summer school in Svalbard: Arctic Ocean Governance as a 
Multifunctional Challenge. At first glance, the programme announcement looks oddly familiar:  
A circumpolar system of governance is in the making for the Arctic Ocean, both when it 
comes to regime and structure. Among the eight Arctic states there is broad agreement 
(Ilullisat-declaration of 28 May 2009) that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
1982 (UNCLOS) and other global ocean conventions is to be applied as the basic regulatory 
foundation of the Arctic Ocean. At the same time, the fact is that the UNCLOS mostly was 
developed to regulate the challenges of “blue water” Oceans. Out of the 320 articles of the 
UNCLOS, only one - Article 234 - deals specifically with ice-covered waters. Issues specific 
to Arctic natural conditions, such as sea ice, environmental fragility/sensitivity, polar 
darkness etc. are not fully or sufficiently addressed in UNCLOS. (Norwegian Scientific 
Academy for Polar Research et al., 2015).  
A closer reading reveals, however, that this gathering will be very different from the Durham 
workshop. The Durham meeting sought to temporarily bracket practical political considerations 
so as to encourage ‘blue sky’ thinking regarding what the problems of regulating ice can tell us both 
about the Arctic and about the geophysical basis of the modern state. The Svalbard school, by 
contrast, is resolutely grounded in practical possibility. The focus will be on identifying and 
discussing soft law mechanisms that could fill the gaps left by UNCLOS’ ‘blue-water’ focus. These 
include mechanisms that have been already agreed to, such as the International Maritime 
Organisation’s Polar Code and the Arctic Council-negotiated Arctic Search and Rescue 
Coordination Agreement, and potential future mechanisms. The organisers of this gathering have 
identified specific problems and they are bringing together policy experts and engaged students in 
an effort to explore possible solutions. 
We find both efforts exciting. Both potentially could affect the livelihoods of Arctic residents as 
well as how the Arctic is perceived by outsiders. And yet we find the differences in the two 
meetings’ orientation intriguing as well, as they are indicative of a broader tension that has 
characterised the Ice Law / ICE LAW Project since its inception and that echo broader tensions 
within the discipline of Arctic studies: how can one merge the critical study of law and society with 
the imperative to develop workable solutions for a distinct region beset by a wide range of social, 
political, legal, and economic challenges, some of which are regionally unique? The different, but 
complementary approaches of the Durham and Svalbard groups demonstrates the exciting 
potential of the Arctic for generating new ways of thinking about global legal, political, and 
environmental challenges and the need to draw from a wide range of perspectives so as to develop 
practicable solutions for the region. We look forward to reading a report from Svalbard in next 
year’s Arctic Yearbook. 
 
Notes  
1. For more information on the project, see its website, http://www.icelawproject.org. 
2. The 13 participant reflections can be viewed at http://icelawproject.org/reflections-2/). 
3. The project’s four themes are detailed further at 
http://icelawproject.org/subprojects/research-phases/. 
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This year’s edition of the Calotte Academy, an established travelling symposium focusing on the 
social and political issues in the Arctic, took place in three Northern European countries: Finland, 
Russia and Norway. The Academy owes its name to the Northern Calotte, i.e. the northernmost 
part of both Fennoscandia and Russia, and it has a long and glorious history. Having started in the 
late 1980s when the region was still divided by many borders, both political and symbolic, the 
“nomadic” summer school has witnessed many changes since then: the empires fell, the borders 
opened, the people changed. The school itself has changed, too, but it has preserved the main idea 
of the original Academy: the person-to-person interaction between local experts and decision-
makers and established and early career researchers whose scientific interests lie in the Arctic, 
regardless of any borders. This year, given the complex political situation and tensions between 
Russia and the West, preserving this idea was crucial, even the most important since the end of 
the Cold. 
The 2015 Academy had its focus on the theme “Resources and Security in the Globalized Arctic”. 
However, this did not limit the scope of participants’ topics to political science only: the presenters 
had different academic background and areas of focus, including among others anthropology, law, 
psychology, economics and environmental sciences. Together, the group provided the nexus 
between different areas of science, the thing many Arctic research planners are seeking now; maybe 
this is the way how the new Arctic research agenda can begin to be introduced. 
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Day 1-3: from Finland to Russia 
The symposium started in Rovaniemi, the capital of Northern Finland and home to the University 
of Lapland on the 31st of May with a conference reception hosted by the city of Rovaniemi. In 
the following day, it was time for the academic sessions to begin. This year’s conference program 
consisted of research presentations by participants as well as brainstorming meetings, and already 
the first day effectively combined these two types of activity. First two sessions, both focusing on 
political sciences − “Resources, Energy and Security” and “International Cooperation, Arctic 
Strategies, Science Diplomacy and Security” − covered the trending processes in the globalized 
Arctic. The presenters discussed the role of resources for Arctic development and management, 
ways of developing and implementing Arctic strategies by different states, and new political 
challenges in the region (mostly connected to Russian international policies). As anticipated, the 
discussions were animated and even heated, however the general idea of reaching a consensus 
prevailed throughout the debates. The brainstorming meetings included discussions of major 
research projects, international scientific activities and other topics aimed at career development; 
on the first day’s session, a new research network initiative Global Arctic was presented, and the 
participants were given a chance to discuss their possible future contributions and collaboration. 
Day two was the first border-crossing day during the symposium. After a short morning session 
that included a presentation by the mayor of Salla municipality and some research insights into 
Salla’s life and development (a result of a cross-border research project itself!), the group started 
making its way towards Russia. This journey both busted some myths about Russia and supported 
others. Indeed, the border crossing was smooth and took little time (proof that the physical 
boundaries are easily permeable), which left some time to visit the borderland Russian municipality 
of Alakurtti, the base of the newly established Arctic Brigade of the Russian Army (which proves 
that the Russian military buildup in the Arctic is real). The road to Apatity, the Academy home for 
the next two nights, was much better than anticipated: the infamous gravel road from the border 
to the highway was partly freshly paved, which made the journey smooth and fast, unlike the 
general perception of the poor quality of Russian roads. However, the sad surprise was a vivid 
ethnographic insight into Russian life: the pipe maintenance in Apatity resulted in the absence of 
hot water in the whole town, confirming that Russia still has much to do in its transition from the 
Soviet period. 
Day 4-5: from Russia to Norway 
The third day, hosted by the Luzin Institute for Economic Studies of the RAS Kola Science Center, 
comprised mainly of presentations by Russian participants focusing on economics. Unfortunately, 
the dramatic changes in the Russian economy made it virtually impossible for regional Russian 
researchers to make the entire journey with the rest of the Academy, but this day managed to 
bridge this gap and secure full Russian participation in this important cross-border activity. The 
participants focused mainly on the economics of energy development of the Russian Arctic, cross-
border cooperation in the Barents Region, and issues of social and environmental sustainability in 
the circumpolar north. It is to be noted that the language of the science doesn’t recognize the 
political boundaries: all the talks − even if delivered through an interpreter − contained valuable 
insights into the global processes and provided ground for interesting discussions. One can only 
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hope that the so far successful cooperation between Western and Russian partners can be sustained 
despite the complex political and economic situation. 
The fourth day of the Academy didn’t contain any presentations; however, it featured long and in 
many ways enlightening travel across the entire Kola Peninsula, the heart of the Russian North 
and the home to many cultural, natural and man-made attractions. The first part of the day’s 
journey, the northbound route towards Murmansk, was telling the tale of conquering the North: 
the heavily polluted industrial sites of Monchegorsk and Olenegorsk, the Kola Nuclear Power 
Plant and the long-gone indigenous history of the area. The city of Murmansk, the largest human 
settlement above the Polar Circle and home to the Russian Northern Fleet, served as the midpoint 
of the journey. During the second part of the day’s ride, the Academy participants had an 
opportunity to look at the Russian war monuments, military installations from the Cold War era, 
heavy industrial pollution in Nikel and Zapolyarny (with nearly all vegetation destroyed) and 
borderland area with barbed wire and streaming rivers. Such insights into the cultural and natural 
history of the Arctic keep reminding researchers that the Arctic keeps traces of all kinds of human 
activity and there is still much to be discovered. 
Days 6-7: From Norway Back to Finland  
The last two days of the Academy, held at the maritime Norwegian town of Kirkenes and in Inari, 
the capital of Finnish Lapland, mainly focused on the issues of social sustainability, human capital 
in the North and indigenous and environmental studies. The researchers presented several cases 
from all across the Arctic, some of them discussing ways of achieving social sustainability and 
welfare in the circumpolar communities (indigenous and non-indigenous alike), some studying the 
strategies of environmental management in the Arctic Ocean and the Barents Region, some 
reflecting on the national policies of the Arctic activities and climate change mitigation. The 
continuity found in these talks provides an interesting insight into Arctic research in general: how 
the community-based approach and the studies of global processes can both serve to assess and 
address potential Arctic futures and build development strategies for global and grass-roots actors. 
The last evening of the tour brought all the participants together for an outdoor barbeque dinner 
by the campfire and the genuine Finnish sauna experience on shores of still icy-cold Lake Inari; 
indeed, not only the academic sessions, but also the endless hours spent in the bus and the well-
planned social program are crucial components for making the Calotte Academy what is – a forum 
for open and enlightening discussions with a friendly and welcoming atmosphere.  
* * * * * 
The 2015 Calotte Academy features an outstanding example of how the boundaries between 
different groups and actors can melt and disappear if cooperation and communication are the 
chosen approach. This concerns boundaries between the established and the early-career 
researchers, Western and Russian scholars, women and men, but most importantly — researchers 
from different disciplines. The nexus between social and political sciences and humanities and, 
more broadly, between “hard” and “soft” sciences, is crucial for conducting meaningful Arctic 
research. Only comparing different points of view and assessing the situation from different 
perspectives we can understand the deep roots of the global processes such as climate change and 
militarization of the Arctic or, vice versa, understand how the global issues are reflected in 
individual case studies at the local level. This is exactly what happens during the Calotte Academy: 
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exchange of ideas between people from different countries and different disciplines, evaluation of 
the research results by peers and established scholars, person-to-person contact between the 
brightest representatives of the Arctic research. Such opportunities keep bringing people together, 
and despite the fact that the Academy takes a different route every year, the ideas created during 
it persist and keep crossing the borders — physical and imagined ones alike. 
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